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I N T R O d U C T I O N
MODHUMITA ROY AND MARY THOMPSON
“WHAT SEPARATES and what connects the lives and stories of women imag-
ined within the capacious borders of the global? .  .  . How are we simulta-
neously intertwined with one another and made separate through relations 
of power, of position, of geography and history?” ask Cindi Katz and Nancy 
Miller in their “Editor’s Note” to a special double issue of Women’s Studies 
Quarterly (11). The Politics of Reproduction seeks to answer their questions 
by focusing on the entangled politics of abortion, adoption, and commercial 
surrogacy, as they play out in the “capacious borders of the global.” The essays 
in this collection are attentive particularly to the “diverse instantiations” (to 
borrow Wendy Brown’s phrase) of neoliberalism’s reshaping of economies 
and intimacies. Our aim here is to analyze and understand the dynamics of 
“simultaneously intertwined” reproductive politics as they unfold in specific 
instances of family creation, choice, and labor. Consider these three recent 
reports in the news that center on reproduction and reproductive choice:
In October 2017, a 17-year-old undocumented immigrant from Central 
America, “Jane Doe,” having received a judicial bypass of the state paren-
tal consent law in Texas, sought to have an abortion. Her action sparked a 
federal lawsuit, and a Court of Appeals’ three-judge panel (including then-
member Brett M. Kavanaugh) initially blocked her request and compelled 
her to receive antiabortion counseling from a local crisis pregnancy clinic. 
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Ultimately, the full Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit overturned the 
panel’s decision (6-to-3), and Jane Doe was able to terminate the pregnancy 
(Chappell).
In November 2017, a gestational surrogate in California, Jessica Allen, gave 
birth to twins and handed them over to the commissioning couple, the Lius, 
who had travelled from China. In a rare phenomenon known as “superfeta-
tion,” Allen had ovulated and become pregnant after being implanted with 
the Lius’ embryo, making one of the twins biologically unrelated to the Lius 
(Ridley). The Lius reportedly returned the non-biological child to the agency 
to adopt out. However, since Mrs. Liu’s name appeared on the birth certifi-
cate, making her the legal mother of the twins, in order to gain custody of 
the child to whom they were biologically but not legally related, the Allens 
were initially asked to repay part of the surrogacy fee, in addition to incurred 
legal fees and the processing charge from the agency.
In his January 2018 State of the Union address, President Trump introduced 
an adoptive couple, the Holets, as his special guests. Ryan Holet, a police offi-
cer, had apprehended a pregnant woman injecting herself with heroin and, 
in that moment he claimed, “God spoke to him,” prompting him to persuade 
the woman to let his family adopt her baby. While the intended point of this 
anecdote was the altruism of the adoptive Christian couple, Trump’s account 
neglected to report what happened to the birthmother.
These three alarming vignettes might appear, on one level, to reflect quite dif-
ferent concerns: abortion, surrogacy, and adoption. But a closer look reveals 
some deeper connections, and it is these deeper, more insidious connections 
that this collection of essays explores: the asymmetrically distributed privilege 
and precarity within which reproductive choices are made, the confluence of 
different degrees and kinds of desperation that force particular decisions, and 
the biopolitics that regulate not just biological life but the very conditions of 
the regeneration of life.
To unravel the “simultaneously intertwined” lives and concerns, we might 
begin by making deceptively simple observations about transnational move-
ments of bodies and resources. In the instances cited above, Jane Doe, for 
example, having recognized the demand for eldercare in the US, had come 
to seek a nursing degree. The wealthy and geographically mobile Lius were 
attracted by the legalized commercial surrogacy industry in California, where 
Jessica Allen was looking for opportunities to supplement her income as an 
eldercare worker. In looking deeper into their movements and what neces-
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sitates them, we probe the larger issue of neoliberalism’s global restructur-
ing of economies, which has produced extreme inequalities, authorized the 
dismantling of welfare provisions, and increased the vulnerabilities of popu-
lations already at risk. To ask why Jane Doe traveled to Texas or the Lius to 
California is to detect also the effects of economic reorganization on social 
institutions as much as in our intimate lives. This volume, in other words, is 
attentive to the effects of “macroeconomic intervention in the micropolitics 
of family relations, reshaping people’s private, everyday lives” (Davies 28). In 
a radically altered economic and social landscape, the desires of one class of 
women for reproductive labor—baby-making and eldercare—are legitimated 
and serviced by another class of women who are driven by the need to survive.
A related series of observations arise when we focus on the entanglement 
of reproduction, motherhood, and the state. We might usefully ask, when 
do regulations protect women and when do they increase their vulnerabil-
ity? The California surrogacy example lays bare the challenges that arise from 
the splitting apart of reproductive labor into discrete components—genetic, 
gestational, legal, and social—and which dispersal necessitates an attendant 
redefinition and understanding of motherhood. It is the complicated context 
of medical advances—particularly the breakthroughs in biotechnology in the 
arena of assisted reproduction—refracted as they often are through exist-
ing ideologies of race, family, and citizenship, that give rise to the problem 
faced by the Lius. These new biomedical technologies also have bolstered the 
state’s interest in regulating reproduction and necessitated legal redefinition of 
human life, of motherhood, and of kinship. Those interests are equally consti-
tuted through and shaped by social frameworks of race, class, and citizenship, 
which we can see when efforts to restrict all women’s access to abortion begin 
by impacting socially vulnerable women, as in the case of undocumented Jane 
Doe. Here we see how social policies reflect the fears of conservative groups 
(and others) about race, immigration, family values, and national belonging.
A final constellation of observations arises over the complexly sedimented 
issue of choice. The question of choice is particularly urgent in a political and 
ideological climate that encourages individual solutions to intractable social 
problems, especially in the context of unprecedented economic disparities. 
Whose choices are amplified in the use of new biomedical technologies that 
assist in human reproduction? We are discouraged from seeing the economic 
motivations behind the choices to surrender a baby for adoption or to become 
a surrogate or to seek an abortion. Most consequential for this volume are the 
political and social constructions of good and bad choices. How do we resist 
seeing Jane Doe, the Lius and Allens, and Baby Holet’s birth mother in terms 
of good and bad choice-makers?
4 • INTROdUCTION
These are urgent concerns for this collection of essays. In this introduc-
tion, we focus more fully on them and the three areas of concern they exem-
plify to set the stage for making and exploring connections not only between 
the women in the three vignettes but also between and among the essays in 
this volume. Our work, and that of the essays collected here, is profoundly 
indebted to and influenced by existing scholarship—on neoliberalism, repro-
ductive politics and justice, and the discourse of choice—which this introduc-
tion also acknowledges and explores.
Neoliberalism’s “Slow Violence”
Most commentators agree that from the 1970s on, there was a decisive his-
torical economic and ideological shift from what has been referred to as the 
postwar consensus; that is, we can trace a move from a commitment to redis-
tribution of resources and the creation of social safety nets for all to the rise of 
speculative finance, deregulation, and fetishizing of the so-called free market. 
Coined by South American theorists to describe such economic restructur-
ing and reforms, neoliberalism serves as a shorthand for free trade through 
deregulation and the exploitation of natural resources and the environment, 
austerity programs imposed by the IMF and World Bank that have dominated 
the life of so-called developing countries, and a general prioritizing of profit 
over human rights and well-being of populations. Neoliberalism, according 
to David Graeber, is the brainchild of “financiers philosophically opposed to 
the very idea of public goods” (8). This redesign of entire social systems is 
directed toward value extraction to benefit the few, what David Harvey rather 
more bluntly than most calls “accumulation by dispossession.” For Harvey, the 
phrase accurately describes the worldwide transfer of resources, raw materi-
als, and value from the poor to the rich (that is, from the 99 percent to the 
1 percent); this ruthless transfer, in his estimation, is “the new imperialism.” 
One of the striking features of this iteration of global capitalism is that it is 
more than the rearrangement of the economy. In an interview with Timothy 
Shenk for Dissent, Wendy Brown rightly insisted that we understand neolib-
eralism not just as a set of economic policies but as a “broader phenomenon 
of governing rationality” (Shenk) through which forms of human activity, 
even those once thought to be outside market logic and exchange—intimate 
bodily labor such as reproduction, for example—are brought into its orbit 
and reconstrued in market terms (Brown, Undoing the Demos). The commer-
cialization of all areas of life and the privatization of public goods—educa-
tion, healthcare, natural resources—not only generate “extreme inequalities 
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of wealth and life conditions,” they lead to “increasingly precarious and dis-
posable populations” (Shenk). Perhaps what is most dangerous and sinister 
about neoliberalism is that it “does profound damage to democratic practices, 
cultures, institutions and imaginaries” (Shenk). Across the world, despite local 
variations, neoliberalism shares the common features of intensified inequality 
and the commercialization of everything. This ferocious move toward priva-
tization and commoditization was conjoined with an older, more uncompro-
mising ideology of social conservatism. As Melinda Cooper, among others, 
has maintained, “neoliberalism and the new social conservatism . . . [are] the 
contemporary expression of capital’s double movement” (18). Their symbiosis 
has produced the ideology of “private family responsibility” and transformed 
welfare from a “redistributive program into an immense federal apparatus for 
policing the family responsibilities of the poor” (21). The common agenda 
of neoliberalism and neoconservatism has been to “arrange things so that 
[social] needs are satisfied in as small and private a unit as possible” (Davies 
28). In virtually every country in the world, now, this logic has become com-
monsense: “a simultaneous emphasis on personal self-realization for the afflu-
ent, and of ‘personal responsibility’ for the poor” (Graeber 8).
One of the most detrimental effects of this restructuring has been the col-
lapse of welfare provisions across the world. The standard prescriptions of 
the IMF and World Bank, with their insistence on austerity programs, have 
pushed large numbers of people into precarious living conditions. Precarity—
the “politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from 
failing social and economic networks of support” that render them “differen-
tially exposed to injury, violence, and death” (Butler ii)—is produced by a neo-
liberal philosophy that solely prioritizes investment and profit. In the global 
South, draconian Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed radical 
curtailment of domestic spending, including agricultural and food subsidies, 
education and health, all of which disproportionately impact the poor, and 
especially women. The economic ravages of austerity measures (as well as war 
and environmental disasters) push more and more people to seek out desper-
ate “alternative circuits of survival” (Sassen 515). The result of such immisera-
tion, to borrow an evocative phrase from Rob Nixon, is “slow violence.” It is, 
as he describes, “an attritional violence”; a violence that “occurs gradually and 
out of sight . . . dispersed across time and space” (Nixon 2).
The damage to the social fabric is disproportionately borne by women, 
especially poor women and women of color. Feminist scholars such as Briggs, 
Ghosh, Glenn, Brown, McRobbie, Kabeer, Pareñas, and Duggan (among oth-
ers) have written extensively on the effects of neoliberalism, paying particular 
attention to its globalized redesigning of socialities and intimacies. As Briggs 
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notes, the term globalization oversimplifies the effect that neoliberalism has 
had on reshaping not just markets and economies but also politics, house-
holds, and individuals. Nevertheless, the term helps in understanding how we 
relate to one another “through relations of power, of position, of geography 
and history” (Katz and Miller 11). Arjun Appadurai in his introduction to an 
anthology simply titled Globalization observed that though we appear to live 
in a “world of flow” (5), which includes “ideas and ideologies, people and 
goods, images and messages, technologies and techniques” (5), such a world is 
not “coeval, convergent, isomorphic, or spatially consistent” (5). The unequal 
relations, or “relations of disjunction” (5) within which objects—ideas, per-
sons, images, and so on—flow produce “problems of livelihood, equity, suf-
fering, justice, and governance” (6). This volume is mindful of such variable 
effects and iterations of the macroeconomic interventions in the micropolitics 
of family-making and choice.
As in the rest of the world, in the US, too, neoliberalism signals not sim-
ply an economic turn but also a reshaping of political ideologies and insti-
tutions. Beginning in the late 1970s, financial and corporate interests “reset 
government priorities to shrink spending on the well-being of actual human-
beings—from schools to housing to child welfare programs like AFDC—in 
order to keep corporate taxes low and profits high” (Briggs, How All 8–9). 
Both Democrats and Republicans oversaw the dismantling of the social safety 
net, much of which had existed since the Great Depression. After all, it was 
Bill Clinton, a new Democrat, who took credit for ending welfare as we know it 
with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act of 1996. The debate that preceded the passage of the bill reignited 
the racialized and gendered moral panic of the 1980s, which had demonized 
working-class, black, Latino, and indigenous women through discourses of 
crack babies, welfare cheats, and welfare queens (Briggs, “Foreign” 59). Some-
times aligned with conservative values and sometimes with new Democrats 
like Clinton, neoliberalism has fed and been nourished by the US culture wars 
that, as Briggs notes, were not simply about “God and gays (which is to say, 
the proper form of the family and reproductive labor),” but instead were “a 
campaign to shift the relationship of government, personal responsibility and 
economy” (Briggs, How All 14).
The fallout of these debates and policy changes hits hardest close to home 
in the institution of the family and in households—that is to say, in our rela-
tion to each other and in our practices of family-making. Economic austerity 
programs have restructured paid productive and unpaid reproductive labor. 
As wages stagnate or drop and more individuals enter the workforce, the 
socially necessary labor required for what Adrienne Rich described as “the 
activity .  .  . of world repair” has continued to be viewed as women’s work, 
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and women as the natural providers of such labor (xvi). Put less poetically, 
the quotidian reproductive labor of homemaking, eldercare and childcare, and 
child-rearing, has become double shift for a great many women. Other women, 
who have the financial ability, outsource the labor of care-giving to under-
privileged women: immigrants, with or without documents, like Jane Doe; or 
women like Jessica Allen, who, forgoing the care of their own families, have 
had to step in. Arlie Hochschild has characterized this “wrenching trend” as 
a “care drain”—that is, “the importation of care and love from poor countries 
to rich ones” (186). Indeed, Evelyn Nakano Glenn and others have alerted us 
to the “long history of extracting caring labor from women of color as part 
of a larger system of coerced labor” (49). These forms of “stratified reproduc-
tion,” a term coined by Shelle Colen, contain within them “global processes 
. . . in local, intimate, daily events in which stratification is itself reproduced” 
(178). Thus, inequality and power differentials are themselves reproduced in 
the very processes of nurturing and caretaking, and in the labor of social and 
biological reproduction. These issues are critically important to this collec-
tion of essays as we consider how some women are encouraged to view their 
labor and reproductive options as expanding and discouraged from identify-
ing with women whose decisions are constrained or compelled. Even as vari-
ous opportunities to work in the paid labor force and to make families reflect 
some women’s amplified options, they also indicate other women’s desperation, 
even coercion, which too often remains unvoiced and frequently overlooked.
It is in this context of the reorganization of productive and reproductive 
labor in the age of neoliberalism that The Politics of Reproduction considers 
how we might reassess our understanding of vulnerable women’s “alternative 
circuits of survival” (Sassen)—such as an individual’s decision to mine her 
biocapital to extract value. Jessica Allen, for example, recognized that surro-
gacy—renting her womb—would allow her access to capital ($35,000) other-
wise impossible to accumulate on a low- or minimum-wage job in eldercare, 
and further, she was right to determine that the payment would allow her to 
stay at home with her family. Under the circumstances, Allen’s calculation was 
a rational one, and we can see analogous calculations at work in the growing 
market in reproductive bio-materials such as eggs, sperm, and breast milk. In 
other words, as Donna Dickenson has persuasively argued, in this neoliberal 
era, the body itself has become a thoroughly commoditized entity. Perhaps 
of greater moment, this “multi-sited female-centered commerce .  .  . in body 
bits,” in the current conjuncture, is held out as signs of autonomy and choice 
(Chavkin and Maher). The ever-increasing, ever more normalized vicious-
ness of austerity and privatization create vulnerable subjects—“resource-less 
women” (Solinger, Beggars)—who are compelled to turn over their reproduc-
tive capacities to service those who, in comparison, are more economically 
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secure. Pat Brewer reminds us that “in the neoliberal universe, reality itself is 
simply whatever you can sell. The same sense of fragmented individuals left 
with nothing but their own capacities for self-marketing echoed on every level 
of the emerging culture of the time” (8). Commoditization and self-marketing, 
as Dickenson is quick to point out, was neither inevitable nor is it irrevers-
ible: It not only “can be resisted, it is already being resisted in many parts of 
the world” (vii). However hopeful Dickenson’s assessment of the resistance 
may be, it is certainly the case that traditional forms of political mobilization 
and resistance are being challenged, even undone or “disarticulated,” to use 
McRobbie’s term (Aftermath 24).
The Politics of Reproduction
Beyond “the simple facts of pregnancy and birth” (Briggs, How)—one aspect 
of the reproductive labor historically performed by women—The Politics of 
Reproduction is attentive to the complexly intercalated political, symbolic, 
economic, and ideological connotations of the process. The three narratives 
about Jane Doe, the Allens and Lius, and Baby Holet’s birth mother highlight 
the construction and reconstruction of pregnancy and motherhood. In each 
case, we cannot but see pregnancy as a “biosocial experience” and mother-
hood as a “historically specific set of social practices” (Hartouni 31). The essays 
in the volume, too, challenge the commonly held belief that reproduction is 
our most private and intimate activity; they examine, instead, the various ways 
in which reproduction is “in fact, deeply a matter of public concern . . . subject 
to considerable regulation” (Joffe and Reich). Reproduction is an economic, 
social, biological, and now technological phenomenon, with multifaceted per-
sonal and social implications and consequences, and the politics of reproduc-
tion have long been a volatile terrain—not just for feminist analysis. Rickie 
Solinger, in Reproductive Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know, argues that 
female fertility and its regulatory regimes—laws and policies—“have provided 
mechanisms for achieving immigration, eugenic, welfare, and adoption goals 
as well as supporting or hindering women’s aspirations for first-class citizen-
ship” (xvii). Though Solinger is describing the state of reproductive politics 
in the US, her observation is equally, though not identically, applicable to the 
rest of the world. Female fertility, its regulation, cultural constructions, and 
economic and political consequences, are all part of what is to be understood 
by reproductive politics.
Around the world, one aspect of reproductive politics in particular—abor-
tion—has remained an “indexical issue” for feminists and the opponents of 
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the right to choose (Barrett and McIntosh 14). Abortion continues to be a 
touchstone in the battle over rights, agency, bodily integrity, and control. It 
is on the issue of a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy that we see the 
state’s intervention most clearly. Whether in the global South or in the North, 
the biosocial ideology of motherhood—both that women are naturally meant 
to have children and that it is their religious, national, or familial duty to do 
so—remains strong, even if the ideal reproducing body is a racially restricted 
one. Women who try to prevent reproduction, either via birth control or abor-
tion, are deemed “unnatural, frivolous, even depraved creatures” as they are 
perceived to be denying “their destiny as mothers” (Gordon 311). They can be 
strongly stigmatized as failures (Thompson, “Misconceived” 132) and shamed 
by antiabortion rhetoric (Ludlow). Advances in technology that allow us now 
to chart the development of the fetus have exacerbated, in part, the instru-
mental view of women’s bodies. The iconography of the “free-floating fetus,” 
aggressively promoted in anti-choice propaganda, especially in the US, has 
been effective in expunging the pregnant woman and her needs “in favor of 
the perceived needs of her fetus” (Latimer 319). As such, the concern for the 
welfare of the fetus legitimizes the close scrutiny, even surveillance, of the 
pregnant woman’s behavior, and not just by medical institutions. The virtual 
“sonographic fetus” is granted an “independent and natural subjectivity” to 
the detriment of the pregnant female body, whose only value is now reduced 
to her function as a carrier (Latimer 319). It ought not to surprise us, then, that 
birthmothers in commercial surrogacy arrangements are similarly reduced, 
referred to as “hosts,” “environments,” and “interchangeable fetal carriers” 
(Roy, “Foreign” 57).
In the US, the Roe v. Wade (1973) decision, which safeguarded abortion 
access for some women, was immediately followed by lawmakers’ serious 
attempts to curtail or overturn its provisions. The Hyde Amendment (1976), 
for example, ensured that there would be no universal access to abortion. 
The enduring support for Hyde (or lack of awareness about it) points to an 
unwillingness on the part of most Americans to fight on behalf of reproduc-
tive equality for Medicaid recipients. Universal access continues to be limited 
by the subsequent backlash of decisions and policies, including Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services (1989), Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), and 
the recent Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (“TRAP”) laws. Poor, 
young, immigrant, and mostly nonwhite women’s bodies have become the bat-
tleground upon which the state’s unremitting interest in denying middle-class 
(mostly white) women access to reproductive freedom has, since Roe, been 
fought. Policies that restrict women’s access to abortion impact first and most 
powerfully the populations who are the least able to resist them. Numerous 
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challenges to abortion rights—waiting periods, parental consent or notifica-
tion laws, mandatory counseling or ultrasound policies, and proposed bans 
on selective abortions—impact women differently depending on income, age, 
geography, race/ethnicity, disability, immigration, and incarceration. If the 
long-term goal of conservative lawmakers is to curb middle-class and white 
women’s access to abortion, their policies are felt most immediately and dev-
astatingly by young women of color living in poverty in the US and, increas-
ingly, globally. Chikako Takeshita reminds us that the Global Gag Rule—that 
is, the denial of funding from the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that provide abortion 
referrals, counseling, or reproductive services—is a clear indication of how 
the US’s attempt “to restrain abortion, contraception, and women’s sexuality 
in general, has an impact on women beyond the United States” (Sreenivas, 
“Roundtable” 108). As we have already noted, though, governments around 
the world restrict access to abortion based on a hegemonic pronatalism that 
goes beyond the influence of—or pressure by—the US.
The legalization of abortion in the US sometimes has been blamed for the 
shortage of desirable (white) babies for adoption domestically. In actual fact, a 
constellation of other factors, both domestic and international, prompted mid-
dle-class interest in transnational adoption (Briggs, Somebody’s). Complicated 
adoption processes (and conversely, lax regulations elsewhere) are often cited 
as salient factors for US couples looking abroad to adopt. But transnational 
(and quite often transracial) adoption lays bare the fundamentally unequal 
positions of women and provides, as Rickie Solinger argues, a “very accurate 
index of the vulnerable status of women in the country of the birthmothers” 
(Beggars 67). Instead of viewing adoption as a choice that birth mothers make 
to give up their babies, Solinger urges a focus on the “abject choicelessness 
of some resourceless women” (67). International adoption, thus, ought to be 
seen as another instance of what Arlie Hochschild terms “care drain” or what 
Solinger explains as “the transfer of babies from women of one social classi-
fication to women in a higher social classification or group” (67). Adoption, 
too, then is no simple desire for family-making and is, instead, a marker of 
the vulnerability of some women and the extension of choice for others. The 
availability of so-called surplus babies ought also to be seen as the end result of 
state policies that accelerate the destitution and vulnerability of certain popu-
lations, which inevitably undermines the ability of poor and working-class 
women to mother their children.
In the US, this “transfer of babies” is facilitated by the unspoken belief that 
impoverished women are “too poor to parent” (Burroughs). Thus, mothers 
who live in poverty are more susceptible to having their children removed by 
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the state and placed in foster care even when there are no signs of abuse or 
intentional neglect. Here, economic class and race intersect, such that African 
American children in the US are twice as likely as white children to enter the 
foster care system, and Latino and Native American children are also dispro-
portionately overrepresented. The problem, Dorothy Roberts argues, lies in a 
system that shows greater interest in child removal over family support. In her 
analysis of safe haven laws, which encourage birth mothers to surrender new-
borns without question or penalty, Laury Oaks challenges policies that target 
young, impoverished (usually nonwhite) pregnant women with messages to 
surrender the children they are assumed to be incapable of mothering: “We 
need to place newborn surrender within the context of the unequal support 
available to women and girls in this country and how we come to think about 
good mothers versus potentially bad mothers” (3). The work of these scholars 
turns conventional thinking about adoption on its head to reveal the state-
facilitated vulnerability of some birth mothers and overprivileging of certain 
adoptive families. Trump’s State of the Union speech praising Officer Holet 
and his wife, in effect, disappeared the birth mother from his narrative and 
national consciousness. His focus instead on the Holets’ Christian altruism 
reflects the brutality of the neoliberal state, fused as it is now with neoconser-
vative ideologies, that favors specific forms of family-making (middle class, 
heteronormative, and two-parent) over protections for the human right to 
parent and public support for comprehensive addiction treatment.
The terrain of surrogacy economics and politics is just as messy. Com-
mercial surrogacy, which Anne Phillips categorizes as one form of “intimate 
bodily service” (66), is now a multi-billion-dollar industry of transnational 
scale. Globalization, new reproductive technologies, and the increasing com-
moditization of the body (identified by Kimbrell in his 1994 title, The Human 
Body Shop) have made possible types of “newly emergent and highly unequal 
reproductive exchange” (Rudrappa and Collins 939). And yet, this “ability of 
the affluent to buy eggs and sperm, to create embryos, rent poor women’s 
wombs, to make babies at a cut rate” (Roy, “Labor” 184) is often rational-
ized by commissioning parents through “moral frames of compassion and 
altruism” and characterized as a double gain, “a win-win” for all concerned 
(Rudrappa and Collins). A closer look reveals, however, that poor women, 
lacking resources to begin with and made more vulnerable by the programs of 
neoliberal states, are the providers of bio-materials and of the necessary labor 
in the reproductive process.
What undergirds this flourishing and mostly unregulated trade in baby-
making is the ideology of familialism. As Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh 
in their classic The Anti-Social Family argued, the “currently dominant model 
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of the family is not time-less and culture-free” (33). Indeed, the family is a 
historically specific social and economic institution with enduring ideologi-
cal resonance: “In many ways the institution and the ideology are reciprocally 
related, enjoying mutual reinforcement” (8). One reason why the institution 
has proved so durable, they were quick to remind us, is that “the family offers 
a range of emotional and experiential satisfactions not available elsewhere 
in the present organization of social relations” (21). Family, thus, is “at one 
and the same time .  .  . seen as naturally given and as socially and morally 
desirable. The realm of the ‘natural’ and the socio-moral are nowhere so con-
stantly merged and confused as in our feelings and thoughts about the fam-
ily” (26). This condensation of the ideological, social, normative, and natural 
accounts for baby hunger experienced by many—perhaps especially by the 
childless—and fuels the global trade in commercial surrogacy. The techno-
logical interventions in the production of the baby hold out the possibility of 
detecting in the offspring what Barrett and McIntosh call “outward tokens of 
similarity, familiarity, and belonging” (23). It is surely the strong pull of the 
biosocially produced idea of kin and family that was the central reason for the 
Lius’ rejection of the nongenetic twin carried by Jessica Allen. The market in 
bio-materials—the buying of eggs and sperm to make one’s own baby—para-
doxically both undermines and reaffirms the ideological attachment to repro-
ducing family resemblance. It may well be that the attachment to the “outward 
tokens of similarity,” now made more negotiable through technology and mar-
ket forces, encourage some to bypass the option of transnational (transracial) 
adoption, which appear to challenge the “cultural fetishes of blood and kin-
ship” (Kawash 982).
These new reproductive politics and commerce associated with artificial 
reproductive technologies (ARTs)—the buying and selling of reproductive 
materials, for example, as well as access to expensive procedures and treat-
ments—“reflect[] pronounced class- and race-based inequalities” and provide 
“a prime example of stratified reproduction” (Inhorn and Birenbaum-Carmeli 
179). In reviewing the scholarship on the effects of ARTs on social life, Inhorn 
and Birenbaum-Carmeli concluded that “technologically assisted reproduc-
tion is largely restricted to global elites, whereas the infertile poor, who are 
at the highest risk of infertility, are devalued and even despised as reproduc-
ers” (179). Equally troubling are the ethical issues surrounding the expecta-
tion of perfectibility that have arisen with the advent of prenatal and genetic 
testing, fetal screening, and buying eggs and biological materials to correct 
or eliminate the possibility of perceived imperfections (Rothschild). Concern 
over what has been called neo-eugenics has arisen in relation not only to the 
creation of so-called designer babies but also the suppression of the rights of 
MOdHUMITA ROY ANd MARY THOMPSON • 13
nonwhite and poor women to have children. In her introduction to a Frontiers 
special issue on reproductive justice, Mytheli Sreenivas reminds feminists that 
“whether ‘old’ or ‘new,’ there is no automatic trajectory—either progressive or 
regressive—between reproductive technology and struggles for reproductive 
justice” (Introduction vii).
The concept of reproductive justice informs much of the work in The Poli-
tics of Reproduction. Since the late 1980s, the reproductive justice movement 
has challenged the normalization of stratified reproduction. An activist move-
ment arising from a coalition of organizations concerned by the unavailability 
of healthcare in communities of color (African American, Latina, indigenous, 
and Asian), reproductive justice decenters middle-class and white norms 
informing traditional campaigns for birth control and abortion access. The 
movement is grounded in an awareness of historical race-based oppres-
sions—including forced childbearing, sterilization abuse, denial of parenting 
rights, eugenics, medical abuses, and environmental threats—and advocates 
for policies that both enhance access to birth control and prioritize life within 
oppressed communities. According to Ross and Solinger, the movement is 
guided by three tenets: “the human right to not have a child, the human right 
to have a child, and the human right to parent children in safe and healthy 
environments” (169). Elsewhere, Ross places the reproductive justice move-
ment squarely within the campaign for human rights by reminding feminists 
that intersectionality—the recognition of our different locations within inter-
locking oppressive systems—is not an end in itself and, instead, “is a process; 
human rights is the goal” (Ross et al. 14).
Yet another approach to redress reproductive injustice is reflected in Mar-
tha Fineman’s notion of vulnerability as an alternative to the thinking about 
“traditional equal protection analysis.” The concept of vulnerability focuses 
not only “on discrimination against defined groups, but [is] concerned with 
privilege and favor conferred on limited segments of the population by the 
state and broader society through their institutions.” This approach, she 
argues, “has the potential to move us beyond the stifling confines of current 
discrimination-based models towards a more substantive version of equality.”
No Choice Other Than to Understand Ourselves as 
Choosing
The first two decades of the twenty-first century have witnessed intensified 
interest in definitions and understandings of reproduction in the US and 
around the world. Much less discussed, however, have been those narratives 
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that problematize the normalized scripts of reproductive desire, choice-mak-
ing, and creation of families. In their useful introduction, Joffe and Reich 
reassert the core feminist belief that control of their fertility is “essential for 
women to gain full citizenship, and to be able to participate in ‘public’ as 
well as private life” (3). While they are right to cast the tension as between 
“women’s own desires regarding reproduction and the demands of the nation 
state” (3), we wish to broaden the analytical frame of reproductive politics to 
include the complex dynamics of desire and choice and to scrutinize the often 
unnamed ideology of pronatalism. Furthermore, a closer, critical look reveals 
the division of labor that separates those who desire and those who are instru-
mental in satisfying such desires.
The obvious target—and justifiably so—of feminist critiques has often 
been state regulations of reproduction; however, we might also look to how 
regulation and incitement of reproductive desire has been internalized and 
the social mechanisms that have accomplished this turn. The unquestioned 
hegemony of pronatalism, which recasts the human decision to have children 
as a biological imperative, has long stymied inquiry into this presumed natu-
ral yearning for families of genetically related children. So deep is this ideo-
logical investment that we struggle to identify who is allowed to yearn, whose 
desires are condemned, and how the absence of such desires is demonized as 
unnatural. We must investigate the social and ideological frames within which 
such aspirations are formulated. This collection of essays considers how, in the 
rush to fulfill reproductive desires, exploitation is rebranded as empowerment, 
desperation is presented as choice. We must undertake this investigation, for, 
as Solinger has argued, neoliberal representations of women as empowered 
reproductive choice-making consumers obscure the lack of protections for 
women’s reproductive health and rights as full citizens (Beggars).
Our aim in this anthology is to explore legal, ideological, social, cultural, 
and economic grounds upon which the concept of reproductive choice is con-
structed. A lot of feminist work has gone into promoting choice in terms 
of abortion, availability of birth control, family planning measures, and so 
on. Furthermore, Rayna Rapp reminds us, women must now add to this list 
unwanted choices as a result of new technologies such as genetic testing and 
fetal surgery. In The Politics of Reproduction we are interested in the less obvi-
ous, perhaps more treacherous, construction of choice into moral categories 
of good, bad, dangerous, and outside the pale. The essays that make up this 
collection all pay close attention not only to the construction of the moral 
categories within which women’s choices are evaluated but also to the very 
real consequences to (actual) women’s lives. The essays are also attentive to 
the invasion of the logic and language of the marketplace into the very idea 
of choice-making.
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“What happens,” Solinger pointedly asks, “when the special guarantee for 
all women—the promise that all women can decide for themselves whether 
and when to be mothers—is expressed by the individualistic, market-place 
term ‘choice?’” (Beggars 6). Solinger’s connection of choice to the marketplace 
leads us inevitably back to the economic and political restructuring of neo-
liberalism. As individuals are encouraged, when not forced, to self-regulate 
under neoliberal regimes, the consequences of the unavailability of social 
benefits like healthcare, housing, and childcare may appear to originate in 
individual bad decisions. Disciplined by an aversion to “mismanaged life” 
(Brown, Edgework 42), the neoliberal subject is hailed as an entrepreneurial 
actor, who reflects what Denbow calls “proper self-governance” (3). An older 
understanding of the concept of autonomy, proper self-governance, she argues, 
reflects alignment with existing social norms; failure to successfully align one-
self “demonstrates that one is not deciding rationally” (3).
Bad choice-maker is not a harmless label; in fact, it signals consequential 
social significance. On the level of social policy, it is used to explain away and 
even justify inequity. Indeed, Brewer remarks that in the current conjuncture, 
“systematic inequality and an accumulation of disadvantages are presented as 
the consequences of individual choice or lack of diligent application” (8). The 
belief that inequality is better understood as a question of moral fiber, ratio-
nality, and personal responsibility has been successfully promoted by various 
entities—media, right-wing think tanks, politicians, public intellectuals—in 
defense of “a whole raft of policies designed to improve the conduct of persons 
and supplant welfare regimes” (McRobbie, “Reflections” 63). The belief that 
every woman is an independent agent making free choices mistakes the con-
ditions for and qualities of real freedom, and “it becomes difficult to recognize 
limitations on the reproductive ‘choices’ of nonwhite and low-income/poor 
women and easier to mistake the women themselves as ‘bad choice’-makers” 
(Thompson, “Juno” 167). Trump’s State of the Union address, for example, 
made no mention of the coercive context in which the birth mother of baby 
Holet, caught with narcotics by a police officer, made her choice to surrender 
her baby. Trump’s account sought instead to present an oversimplified parable 
of a bad mother who tacitly redeemed herself by surrendering her baby to a 
good family.
As noted above, the reproductive justice movement has exposed choice as, 
at best, a flimsy concept when compared to an ethics of justice that accounts 
for women’s different sociohistorical locations. Without economic, social, and 
political restructuring, as Solinger concludes, choice is “a hollowed out prom-
ise” (Beggars 11) and “a remarkably unstable, undependable foundation for 
guaranteeing women’s control over their own bodies, their reproductive lives, 
their motherhood, and ultimately their status as full citizens” (7).
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Contrasted with bad choice-makers, those women who make good 
choices—specifically good reproductive choices—are celebrated as symbols of 
the freedom promised by neoliberal regimes. As McRobbie observes, however, 
a good choice-maker identifies as an entrepreneurial individual who, in order 
to claim the promise of freedom, must disavow feminism and collective politi-
cal organizing (Aftermath). Rather than resisting structural oppression and 
the incitement to choose, this woman must identify reproductive choices—her 
own as well as others’—as either the reflections of freedom or the “failure to 
navigate the impediments to prosperity” (Brown, Edgework). The essays in 
this volume interrogate women’s experiences of this neoliberal paradox suc-
cinctly defined by David Harvey: We have no choice but to think of ourselves 
as making choices. These nonchoices, this collection suggests, threatens to 
redefine our very understanding of freedom.
The essays in The Politics of Reproduction, therefore, renew the call for a 
feminist coalitional vision—one that recognizes our differences as well as our 
accountability to each other. They call for a more responsive and responsible 
state, one that provides regulation and the return of a social safety net. These 
essays reject the facile replacement of citizen with consumer in our public 
sphere. Finally, these essays argue for the recognition and protection of all 
women’s bodily sovereignty and humanity.
This Volume
We began this introduction with three vignettes that highlight the differential 
impact of the technologies, ideologies, policies, and practices of reproductive 
politics on women. These are the overarching concerns of this volume as a 
whole, as it also pays attention to the asymmetrical effects of neoliberalism’s 
rearticulation of both the public and the private. We trace the fallout—not just 
in the US but also in various parts of the world—to make visible neoliberal-
ism’s deployment of the discourse of choice, which, in point of fact, exploits as 
it also obscures, the vulnerability of some women and the privilege of others. 
An early (but ultimately discarded) title of our project—Mad, Bad, and Dan-
gerous—referred to this collection’s awareness of the social construction and 
reconstruction of women’s vulnerabilities as moral categories, always already 
appalling and wrong.
The Politics of Reproduction uniquely brings together abortion, surrogacy, 
and adoption as sites that need to be considered as a whole. In one sense, 
these concerns are related in very literal ways: Policies discouraging abortion 
seek to encourage adoption; the desire for genetically related children, how-
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ever, promotes surrogacy over adoption; the by-products of the surrogacy 
process often result in abortion; abortion is credited—accurately or not—
with decreasing the number of desirable white babies available for adoption, 
which drives the surrogacy market; and so on. But our interest lies in the 
connections that are less tangible. We focus on these issues because they 
reflect new ways of constructing family and changing definitions of moth-
erhood in an era of expanding reproductive freedoms and choices that are 
available, particularly to women. And yet, even as these sites reflect some 
women’s amplified options, they also indicate other women’s unvoiced des-
peration and coercion. Taken together, abortion, adoption, and surrogacy 
point to larger questions about shifts in global economies, political life, our 
gendered and raced vulnerabilities, the ways we make and understand fam-
ily, enduring feminist challenges, and our accountability to each other when 
our world invites us to reject difference and misidentifies the threats to our 
safety and existence.
The entangled politics of adoption, abortion, and surrogacy are global in 
scope. The essays in this collection reflect a particular, although not exclu-
sive, focus on the Americas, but the economies and intimacies that have been 
rescripted by neoliberalism include—perhaps even more visibly—the geopoli-
tics of African and Asian countries. In Nigeria, for example, child harvest-
ing and baby factories/farms are proliferating. These illegal institutions, where 
unmarried pregnant women—mostly young and often rape survivors—are 
promised medical care only to have their infants taken from them, supply the 
black market in adoption. Some mothers and children are trafficked, while 
babies are adopted by international families (often from the UK) who are 
attracted by lower black market prices (Makinde). Furthermore, a 2018 issue 
of The Nation reports how the US international adoption market—“one of the 
most unregulated industries in America today” (Cavell 13)—in part drives 
fraudulent international adoption agencies. Believing that they are merely 
agreeing to have their children’s educations sponsored, Ugandan mothers—
most of whom do not speak or read English—discover they have been tricked 
into signing over their parental rights to their children. Adoptive families 
in the global North adopt paper orphans (children who have biological par-
ents—usually mothers) whom they fight to retain using any first-world means 
available to them. In Asia, the problem is more visibly with commercial sur-
rogacy. Dubbed “the womb of Asia,” for example, Thailand, until 2015—when 
it banned international commercial surrogacy—was a prime market for Aus-
tralian prospective parents. The well-known incident involving Baby Gammy 
in 2014—a case in which Australian prospective parents rejected a child with 
Down syndrome who was carried by a Thai surrogate—pointed to unantici-
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pated problems with new technologies and laws that have the power to rede-
fine motherhood and parental rights.
The Politics of Reproduction reflects this pattern of privileged women and 
families (primarily from the global North) having their reproductive desires 
fulfilled by less privileged women (primarily in the global South), who make 
their reproductive decisions under harsh socioeconomic conditions. The con-
stellations of countries shift at each instantiation, but the dynamic of desperate 
choice and disavowed accountability remains constant.
The essays in this volume reflect the many academic fields where feminists 
have sought to question the hegemony of neoliberalism. They are drawn from 
a wide range of disciplinary and theoretical perspectives and are attentive to 
the historical, cultural, and ideological conjunctures of reproductive politics. 
The Politics of Reproduction reflects the work of legal scholars, medical anthro-
pologists, as well as literary and cultural critics who examine the normaliza-
tion of power via cultural forms. This blend of interdisciplinary work is called 
for, as feminist scholars seek to get their arms around the new and pervasive 
challenges that neoliberalism poses to women.
We have refrained from dividing the essays into sections or even catego-
rizing them in any way. Instead, we have loosely paired the essays based on 
their investigations of similar issues. It is our hope that, read together and 
without additional categorization, the essays will clearly, for the reader, reach 
across these assemblages to each other as we see them doing.
The Essays
The first two essays in the collection consider how the demands of neolib-
eralism, wedded with conservative values, cast nonnuclear family structures 
as illegitimate and a danger to the social order—rather than seeing them as 
endangered by the ideology of patriarchal familialism. In her close reading 
of Jesmyn Ward’s acclaimed Katrina novel, Salvage the Bones, Mary Thomp-
son analyzes Ward’s depiction of the racialized biopolitics that shape access to 
birth control and abortion. Black women, the novel reveals, are denied access 
to abortion but are condemned or penalized for having children to whom 
the state might have obligations. Thompson examines the stigmatization of 
unwed, teenage African American sexuality and reproduction to reveal the 
neoliberal state’s abdication of responsibility to its most vulnerable members: 
children of color living in poverty. These are the very children that Valerie 
Stein argues are of particular interest to evangelical religious groups. Stein 
considers how the children of single mothers, deemed fatherless, are targeted 
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by the evangelical orphan care movement in their promotion of transna-
tional adoption. The movement’s interest in the rescue of so-called fatherless 
orphans, she shows, is not only in service to the preservation of heteronor-
mative family structure; as she also argues, it privileges the needs of adop-
tive families over those of birth families. We must, as Stein maintains, ask 
ourselves the question, “Whose interests are being served and promoted by 
the claim of a biblical mandate for adoption?” And further, “What economic, 
political, and social agendas are linked with the rise of the evangelical orphan 
care movement?” One of the outcomes of following the biblical mandate is the 
transfer of children via adoption from the socially vulnerable to the economi-
cally privileged. As other essays in the volume do, Thompson and Stein illus-
trate well the rise under neoliberalism of private solutions to social problems.
A second pairing of essays reflects Appadurai’s idea of “flow,” specifically 
in the case of reproductive tourism in Mexico. In her analysis of pre-2016 
Mexican surrogacy websites advertising to a US clientele of gay prospective 
parents, Heather Mooney examines how these sites appeal to their audience 
through the rhetoric of choice, ease, and inclusivity of “all families” while ren-
dering Latina surrogates invisible: “Though camouflaged by the intersecting 
neoliberal discourses of volunteerism, choice, and commerce,” Mooney writes, 
“a clearer vision of a raced future emerges when looking across different for-
mations of racialized labor and transnational flows of bodies, body parts, and 
capital.” While Mooney’s essay considers the “flow” of desire for children from 
the US to Mexico, Rosalynn Vega weighs the unintended impact in Mexico 
of reproductive tourists’ dollars on the economy of midwifery. Drawing on 
twenty-eight months of research across thirteen Mexican states, Vega analyzes 
how “the emergence of Seguro Popular [Mexico’s universal health insurance] 
has inadvertently rendered midwifery difficult to practice and inaccessible to 
women who do not purchase medical services in the private health sector.” 
Furthermore, her analysis reveals that “midwives are forced to choose between 
economic insolvency or selling their services to affluent Mexicans and repro-
ductive travelers seeking humanized birth” in the private sphere. These essays 
ask us to recognize the deleterious if sometimes hidden consequences of 
reproductive tourism that is nonetheless marketed via the rhetoric of helping 
local economies, impoverished women, and childless couples.
Another pair of essays does important work in analyzing the role cultural 
representations play in normalizing power. In their essays, Zarena Aslami and 
Diana York Blaine analyze contemporary narratives that reflect the shift to a 
cultural regime of what Lauren Berlant called “public intimacies.” It is through 
the loss of a political public sphere that we now understand our freedom in 
terms of the once-private choices we make about sexuality, reproduction, and 
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family-making. Aslami’s essay explores the residual anxiety produced by the 
contradiction inherent in choice under neoliberalism. Returning to Lisa Bel-
kin’s inflammatory 2003 New York Times Magazine essay, “The Opt-Out Revo-
lution,” Aslami argues, “The women who quit fast-track jobs cast their decision 
to leave as choice rather than as being an overdetermined bid to save aspects of 
their lives for which they felt solely responsible.” She concludes that the women 
who opted out demonstrated that “they had no choice other than to think of 
themselves as taking an option. To admit otherwise, and maintain their sense 
of self, would be unthinkable.” Blaine’s essay expands the historical scope to 
our understanding of neoliberalism by considering the twenty-five-year span 
separating the teen-pregnancy dramas Fast Times at Ridgemont High (1982) 
and Juno (2007). Her essay reflects upon the erosion the of public sphere and 
the normalization of neoliberal values. How is it, she asks, that the tacit accep-
tance of abortion in Fast Times has been replaced by Juno’s dramatized rejec-
tion of abortion in favor of having her baby adopted by “the lovely couple”?
Many essays in this volume point to the rhetoric of choice’s role in obfus-
cating biopolitics and, specifically, the specter of eugenics. Two essays, in 
particular, highlight the conflicted and entwined technologies and politics 
of reproduction and neo-eugenics, which we understand to mean not only 
human enhancement but also regulated populations. In her essay recount-
ing the forced sterilization of thousands of indigenous and poor Peruvian 
women under the auspices of the Reproductive Health and Family Planning 
Program—an allegedly progressive social policy promoted by President Fuji-
moro as empowering women—Julieta Chaparro-Buitrago considers how even 
blatant examples of eugenics are authorized by the powerful and powerfully 
alluring discourse of choice under neoliberalism. The racial logic beneath a 
state-sponsored sterilization program, analyzed by Chaparro-Buitrago, takes 
on new significance when read alongside of Karen Weingarten’s exploration 
of the abortion debate within feminism and disabilities studies. Weingarten’s 
close reading of Emily Rapp’s 2013 memoir Still Point of the Turning World 
provides a focal point for her discussion of “how intersected women’s repro-
ductive lives are with fears about disability.” Weingarten surveys how eugen-
ics haunts the politics of abortion and disability by juxtaposing the 2016 Zika 
virus outbreak in South America with the introduction in the same year of 
legislation in Indiana “forbidding abortion in cases where a fetus was diag-
nosed with a disability.”
Two additional essays explore how social service and healthcare workers 
navigate, negotiate, and disseminate neoliberal values about family-making. 
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Melissa Hardesty’s essay examines the role of social workers in normalizing 
the economics of adoption and allaying the anxiety produced by the percep-
tions of “paying for babies.” Starting with Elisabeth Landes and Richard Pos-
ner’s polemical “Economics of the Baby Shortage” (1978) and Viviana Zelizer’s 
Pricing the Priceless Child (1985), Hardesty extends the analysis of adoption to 
its economic implications. By contrasting private and agency-based national 
and international adoptions with foster care adoption, Hardesty probes the 
anxiety produced by the obvious role wealth plays in adoption and the func-
tion of social workers in that process. Healthcare workers in Oaxaca, Mexico, 
on the other hand, must mediate between the interests of the state and the 
desires of their clients. Rebecca Howes-Mischel’s essay attends to healthcare 
workers who, under Seguro Popular, encourage rural and indigenous Oaxacan 
women to limit their childbearing. Howes-Mischel reveals, through her field-
work, how nurses and doctors are enlisted in the deployment of the concept 
of choice in service to state-sponsored family planning programs. Her analysis 
questions the “promotion of consumer choice-making as feminist aspiration” 
and concludes that “an incitement to choose does not always accompany the 
ability to choose.”
Finally, although each essay in this collection is sensitive to the precari-
ous and vulnerable positions of women under neoliberalism, the final two 
essays of this collection trace the contours of this vulnerability as depicted in 
fiction and as lived through law. Rachel Fenton provides an important appli-
cation of Martha Fineman’s theory of “vulnerability” to laws governing (or 
failing to govern) transnational surrogacy. Agreeing with Fineman that “an 
adherence to formal equality has seemingly eclipsed our moral and political 
aspirations for social justice,” Fenton explores what “aspirational social justice 
and well-being might look like in the context of ARTs.” While Fenton’s essay 
proffers the promise of remedy, Modhumita Roy’s essay exposes its dire need. 
Roy’s essay takes up the idea of precarity—a term which, as Tavia Nyong’o has 
rightly noted, has seen a “sudden acceleration” in academic writing. Keeping 
in mind, Nyong’o’s justifiable worry that the overuse of this term threatens to 
generalize precarity as ubiquitous and therefore an undifferentiated human 
condition, Roy reads Michael Robotham’s thriller The Night Ferry (2007) as a 
vivid instantiation of the production of vulnerable subjects via war (Afghani-
stan) and displacement. The novel skillfully links the precarity of abject lives to 
the exploitative violence of reproductive labor (surrogacy), which then is con-
nected to baby hunger—that is, the desire for genetically related offspring in 
the making of a normal family life.
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Precarity and Disaster in Jesmyn Ward’s 
Salvage the Bones
A Reproductive Justice Reading
MARY THOMPSON
IN 2005, the effects of Hurricane Katrina, compounded with an inadequate 
federal response, devastated African American communities along the Gulf 
Coast and specifically in New Orleans, prompting a strong outcry from black 
leaders.1 The antiabortion movement, which is dominated by white religious 
groups, has for more than a decade appropriated African American politics 
to malign abortion, but its theft of this particular tragedy was striking. In 
the weeks following August 2005, antiabortion groups alleged that satellite 
pictures of Katrina resembled ultrasound images of the fetus in utero, and, 
according to Carole Sanger, they claimed that the hurricane reflected divine 
punishment for US abortion-friendly policy. This outrageous claim can be 
seen as part of a pattern of racialized appropriations. As Laurel Raymond of 
the online news site Think Progress documents, abortion opponents have for 
many years sought to link slavery and abortion (calling it “black genocide”), 
recast Margaret Sanger as a racist,2 referred to abortions as “womb lynchings,” 
and sponsored Southern billboards that read, “The most dangerous place for 
I would like to thank my department writing group—David Babcock, Allison Fagan, Mollie 
Godfrey, Dawn Goode, Dennis Lo, and Sofia Samatar—for feedback on a version of this essay.
 1. See Sandalow.
 2. Dorothy Roberts’s Killing the Black Body provides a nuanced discussion of Sanger’s 
adherence to eugenics and the absence of racist ideologies in her writings. Loretta Ross simi-
larly defends Sanger against charges of reproductive racism (“Trust Black Women”).
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an African American is in the womb.” More recently, they have launched a 
campaign for #UnbornLivesMatter, mimicking the Black Lives Matter move-
ment and deflecting its critique of police violence. Despite professing the 
desire to “protect . . . black life,” Raymond notes, these groups remain shame-
fully mute on black women’s historical lack of reproductive control and on 
violence against black women and children. Meanwhile, these same groups 
urge policymakers to defund Planned Parenthood even as African American 
rates of unplanned pregnancy remain higher than white rates.3 Reproduc-
tive justice and human rights activist and scholar Loretta Ross contends that 
the motivation behind the stated interest in “protecting black life” by abor-
tion opponents is the goal of curbing all women’s reproductive freedom. “It 
is about re-enslaving Black women,” she remarks, “by making us breeders for 
someone else’s cause” (“Re-Enslaving”).
Salvage the Bones, Jesmyn Ward’s acclaimed 2011 Katrina novel, explores 
reproductive precarity and the threat of “re-enslavement” under a neoliberal 
state that is alternately indifferent and hostile to the lives of poor, rural Afri-
can Americans. Set on the Gulf Coast of Mississippi as Katrina approaches, 
Salvage the Bones tells the story of Esch Batiste, a fifteen-year-old African 
American girl who discovers she is pregnant. Esch, whose mother has died 
prior to the novel’s action, prepares for Katrina’s onslaught with her older 
brothers Randall and Skeetah, their younger brother Junior, and their alco-
holic father in The Pit, their maternal family’s ransacked land in the heart of 
Bois Sauvage. Salvage the Bones explores the neoliberal racialized biopolitics 
of Esch’s pregnancy through imagery of Katrina bearing down on the coast (as 
a woman might in childbirth) and the metaphors of storms, natural/national 
disasters, and Mother Nature. In place of her mother, Esch derives courage 
from the maternal figure of China, her brother’s pure white pit bull whose 
labor as both fighter and breeder helps to support the family. Through this 
affiliation, the novel rehabilitates (“salvages”) and rehumanizes the concept of 
the bitch for Esch as a badge of black maternal empowerment. What follows is 
a consideration of neoliberalism and the controlling images of black women’s 
reproductivity, leading to an analysis of the novel’s symbolic juxtaposition of 
China’s whiteness and Esch’s blackness as a comment on racially stratified 
reproduction. Within this framework, the novel’s triumph is the humanizing 
 3. Abortion rates for African American women are disproportionately higher than rates 
for white women (who nevertheless procure the greater number of abortions), and this sta-
tistic reflects higher rates of unplanned pregnancy for black women (double the rate of white 
women), which, as Susan Cohen points out, arise from poor access to birth control.
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of Esch despite a preponderance of dehumanizing stereotypes about pregnant 
black teens.4
Salvage the Bones and Biopolitics 
Biopolitics, as Foucault introduced the term, describes the infusion of social 
power into biological processes, the end result of which is the regulation of 
populations. Pregnancy and childbirth are still thought to be among the most 
natural of human actions; however, as many feminists have sought to show, it 
remains highly constructed and contested cultural terrain. Who is authorized 
to reproduce—when and with whom—and who is condemned for reproduc-
ing reflect biopolitical operations that are obscured by the language of choice. 
Neoliberalism promises the expansion of reproductive choice for women, but 
its reality reflects stratified reproduction—greater choice for already privileged 
women and desperate nonchoices for women on the social margins.
As the introduction to this collection of essays shows, neoliberalism is 
an economic and political theory that discourages reliance on the state and 
encourages individual entrepreneurial agency. It fosters stratified reproduc-
tion through what historian Rickie Solinger calls a new morality of “good 
and bad choice-makers” (7) that promotes self-sufficient motherhood and 
discourages state-dependent motherhood. These categories of good disci-
pline and of alleged bad mismanagement rely on the demonized figure of 
the pregnant black teen as a natural/national disaster. In the cultural imagi-
nary, negative representations of African American women and mothers have 
historically included the hypersexual jezebel, the lazy welfare queen, and the 
breeder—the woman who reproduces with animalistic indifference and equal 
disregard for both social mores and her resulting offspring. These pejorative 
figures—what Hill Collins refers to as “controlling images” (76)—have been 
deployed throughout policy debates and cultural representations and serve as 
cautionary, disciplinary tales to all women.5 The pregnant (black) teen breeder 
is expected to fail at parenting, to be a drain on social resources, and through 
her sexual excesses, to overrely on abortion as a form of birth control. In oppo-
sition to this image, good choice makers—the “top girls,” as McRobbie names 
 4. Glenn Jellenik has argued that the novel abstains from polemic, proffering instead a 
“universal” story and eliciting a compassionate response from its audience (221). I disagree 
and argue for a reading of the intersectional biopolitics of race, poverty, and gender. Contrary 
to Jellenik’s assertion, the novel’s “universal” appeal rests in the specificity of Esch’s racial and 
gender identity and her resistance to dehumanizing stereotypes.
 5. Dorothy Roberts’s Killing the Black Body provides a discussion of how controlling 
images of nonwhite women are deployed in the disciplining of all US women’s reproduction.
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middle-class, twenty-something, mostly white women (54)—obtain good 
abortions that are defensible because they reflect and enable a lack of reliance 
on the neoliberal state.
When asked about contemporary media such as 16 and Pregnant and the 
portrayal of teen mothers as simultaneously vilified and celebritized, Ward 
observed, “The figure of the black teen mother continues to loom large in our 
public consciousness, and we’re not willing to speak about the ethnic and class 
stereotypes associated with it because they’re still too useful to some” (265). 
“My country needs me,” Hortense Spillers ironically noted two decades ear-
lier in her groundbreaking essay on the ideological work of racist and sexist 
images of African American women, “and if I were not here, I would have to 
be invented” (65). Reflecting on the condemnation of the black matriarchal 
family by Moynihan and others, Spillers’s essay traces how slavery obscured 
the systemic violation of black women, denied the violence of white pater-
nity, and positioned black women as the symbolic fathers of their own chil-
dren. Spillers speculated that the un-gendering of both black men and women 
under slavery positions them outside patriarchal notions of gender and fam-
ily, a marker of Otherness that nevertheless holds radical potential for black 
women who claim their “monstrous” power to name (80) and for black men 
who recognize the feminine Other within themselves. Although Ward’s inter-
view does not mention Spillers’s essay, Salvage the Bones shares an interest in 
the subversion of patriarchy through its alternative kinship arrangements, as 
will be discussed later in this essay.
Storm and hurricane imagery, allusions to Mother Nature and Medea, and 
the rhetoric of natural/national disasters provide the figurative language for 
exploring and subverting the stigmatization of African American teen preg-
nancy in Salvage the Bones. Esch’s father, for example, explains the danger of 
the approaching hurricane to his family by repeating the popular myth that 
the worst US storms have all been named for women—a myth that includes 
the (incorrect) explanation that these storms are underestimated (Samenow). 
Ironically, as Esch’s father makes these proclamations, he is unaware that his 
daughter is pregnant. Katrina threatens everyone with its life-altering force, 
a power that is metaphorically granted to Esch’s youthful pregnancy. Storm 
imagery invokes simultaneously women’s power to create and to destroy. At 
one point, Esch likens her body to a “storm drain” (41), an abortive image 
that suggests her body’s inability or unwillingness to contain a pregnancy. 
In a different scene, she looks into the swirling waters of a flushed toilet and 
names it a “baby storm” (146), suggesting her lost romantic hopes and future, 
her lost mother, or a “lost baby” as in the Lucille Clifton poem of that title. 
Esch—unloved by Manny, the father of her pregnancy—also claims kinship 
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with Medea, the mother from Greek mythology who murders her children 
when she is rejected by her lover: “Here is someone that I recognize. When 
Medea falls in love with Jason, it grabs me by the throat. I can see her .  .  . 
I know her” (38). These textual moments connect the images of the hurri-
cane with pregnancy, and the awesome power of Mother Nature with moth-
ers to imply destruction and waste, the exact meaning of which is unclear: 
Will Esch claim a fearsome maternal power and abort her baby like waste? Is 
Esch’s future wasted? Or are Esch and her unborn black child seen as a waste 
of social resources? Will they be discarded as waste? Through Katrina meta-
phors, the novel explores the negative double bind faced by African Ameri-
can mothers of unplanned pregnancies: unsanctioned, unwed childbearing or 
stigmatized abortion.
The text subverts the controlling image of unwed, African American teen 
pregnancy as a national disaster by identifying real precarity, including the 
constraints on reproductive control and health that are confronting all Amer-
ican women but impacting rural and poor women of color first and most 
drastically. Precarity, according to Butler, “designates that politically induced 
condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and eco-
nomic networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury, vio-
lence, and death” (“Performativity” ii). Esch’s mother, for example, has died 
in a non-elective home birth before the story’s action. This loss is Esch’s per-
sonal tragedy but also one that points to the troubling rise in the national 
black maternal death rate, which, according to the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC), is three times the rate of maternal death for white 
women. Furthermore, the novel’s setting during the chaotic period preceding 
and following Katrina reveals the precarious position of populations already 
marginalized by the logic of neoliberalism and extends this consideration to 
include gender. In opposition to the popular refrain, “Why didn’t they just 
evacuate?” that—in neoliberal fashion—blamed victims of the storm for what 
appeared to be mismanaged lives and poor decision-making, Ward’s novel 
portrays the choices that are (un)available to impoverished populations. Read-
ers are shown how Esch and her family lack the resources to leave The Pit and 
thus fall back on perfected strategies for enduring storms. Including gender 
in its awareness of precarity, the novel also reveals—through Esch’s poignant 
isolation with her secret pregnancy—how Katrina exacerbated threats to the 
safety and reproductive health of underserved women. In her discussion of 
women’s greater vulnerability during Katrina, Ross observes that a failure to 
take into consideration gender means that “women become doubly victim-
ized—by the disaster and by the response to it” (“A Feminist Perspective” 11). 
Ross goes on to point out, “Mississippi already had only one abortion provider 
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before the storm. Women traveled from Louisiana or Alabama for services. 
What will an already under-served region do to help women receive repro-
ductive healthcare?” (12).
How is it, we might additionally ask, that women’s gender-specific needs—
for protection from gender-based violence or for reproductive healthcare, for 
example—come to be ignored or dismissed under neoliberalism? Wendy 
Brown explains that when the neoliberal state prioritizes the market, citizens 
are “interpellated as entrepreneurial actors” (42) whose agency is expressed 
and determined through self-care. Young women like Esch do not experience 
state protection of their rights (to healthcare and to reproductive control) 
as citizens; instead, they are expected to behave like consumers and neolib-
eral actors. Choice has replaced rights, leaving women who already experi-
ence race- or class-based oppression continually exposed, as Ross observes, 
to gender-specific threats and double victimization.
Looking more specifically at precarity and abortion access, we see that 
Roe v. Wade ensured that some women have access to abortion, but universal 
availability has been curtailed by the subsequent backlash of decisions and 
policies, including the 1976 Hyde Amendment, which prevents federal fund-
ing (Medicaid) from going to abortion services. As antiabortion legislation 
mushrooms, the situation for all women worsens. Across the country there are 
now contraceptive and abortion deserts that lack adequate, if any, reproduc-
tive healthcare or clinics (Power to Decide). Indeed, the Trump administra-
tion promises to tighten the noose on women’s reproductive rights by cutting 
funding to Planned Parenthood and appointing antiabortion judges to the 
Supreme Court in an effort to see Roe v. Wade overturned. In an interview 
shortly after the 2016 election, Trump articulated his desire to see abortion 
decided state by state, and when asked what women seeking abortions should 
do if they live in states prohibiting it, he dismissively suggested that “they go 
to a state where it is legal” (“President Elect Trump Speaks”). Trump’s off-
the-cuff remark reflects the brutal cynicism of neoliberalism as it applies to 
abortion politics: Women are free agents who have choices, but it is not the 
state’s role to protect reproductive rights. If you are too poor or too young to 
participate in this new regime, that is not the state’s problem; you should have 
chosen better.
Narrated through Esch’s triply marginalized perspective, Ward’s novel 
offers an aesthetically powerful text for contemplating the havoc caused by 
the hegemony of neoliberal values and the need for reproductive justice. Esch’s 
situation exemplifies the threat of “re-enslavement” described by Ross. Admit-
ting that she lacks a prescription and money for birth control pills, Esch pon-
ders her choices thusly:
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The girls say that if you’re pregnant and you take a month’s worth of pills, it 
will make your period come on. Say if you drink bleach, you get sick, and it 
will make what will become the baby come out. Say if you hit yourself really 
hard in the stomach, throw yourself on the metal edge of a car and it hits 
you low enough to call bruises, it could bring a miscarriage. Say that this is 
what you do when you can’t have an abortion, when you can’t have a baby, 
when nobody wants what is inside you. (102)
She contemplates these forms of physical harm before concluding, “These are 
my options, and they narrow to none” (102). Esch’s terrifying musings point to 
what some critics claim is becoming a frequent occurrence in the US: women 
who attempt to self-induce miscarriage (Dreweke). Confronted by her non-
choices, Esch keeps her pregnancy secret until “none of us have any choices 
about what can be seen, what can be avoided, what is blind, and what will turn 
us to stone” (88). Her ambiguous silence marks either a failure to become or a 
rejection of the neoliberal entrepreneurial actor.
Salvage the Bones’s depiction of neoliberal racialized biopolitics—includ-
ing stigmatized sexuality,6 the lack of access to birth control, unplanned teen 
pregnancy, inaccessible abortion, black maternal death in childbirth, and 
socially stigmatized unwed motherhood—lays bare the reality of reproduc-
tive precarity. In doing so, it exposes how the logic of a neoliberal entrepre-
neurial actor, who is able to choose between desirable options to maximize 
her outcomes, fails women who are young, poor, and/or black. By portraying 
a state that in no way concerns itself with Esch’s reproductive rights, health, 
or subsequent endangerment, Salvage the Bones implicitly raises awareness of 
the need for reproductive justice to remedy precarity—an ethical demand that 
encompasses prenatal care, birthing options, and the right to parent in safe 
environments in addition to birth control and abortion.7
 6. Unlike Erica Edwards’s important reading of Ward’s novel, which focuses on what 
she calls the “surplus” of Esch’s “avaricious young black female sexuality” (161) and its disrup-
tive potential, I focus on motherhood in the novel. Edwards’s reading borrows Clyde Wood’s 
concept of blues epistemology, “‘an ethic of survival, subsistence, resistance, and affirmation’ 
that sustains networks of labor and kinship throughout the Mississippi Delta region” (qtd. in 
Edwards 156). She contends that rather than resisting institutions of power, Esch and her fam-
ily exist simultaneously parallel to and in a relationship of surplus to normative structures. 
To build on Edwards’s blues epistemological reading of the novel, I consider Angela Davis’s 
observation “that blueswomen found the cult of motherhood irrelevant to their realities” (239; 
my emphasis). Davis’s comment attends to race, epistemology, and motherhood to remind us 
that reproductive subjugation constrains all women, but it affords privileges to some while 
seeking to annihilate others. Esch confronts motherhood as a blueswoman in Davis’s sense.
 7. See Ross and Solinger.
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Teen Pregnancies and Pit Bulls: Black and White Breeders
Salvage the Bones probes the urgent threats to black women and children 
posed by neoliberalism. It does this through the implicit questions that it 
asks about the relative valuing of human and nonhuman, as well as black and 
white life. The novel’s plot concerns itself with Esch’s response to the non-
choice of having a baby: Will she embrace or reject unsought motherhood in 
a world that does not value her or her child? These questions are answered 
through Esch’s identification with China, her brother’s pit bull whose fighting 
and breeding labor supports the family financially. Read literally, the figure 
of China depicts the mistreatment of dogs in illegal dogfighting and breed-
ing, but as a literary device, the meanings attached to her figure multiply and 
comment on women’s exploitation and devaluation, maternal ferocity, and—
through her whiteness—the racialized biopolitics of stratified reproduction. 
What follows here is a consideration of how Esch subverts this stratification by 
salvaging the idea of the bitch to create her own ferocious black motherhood. 
Rather than dehumanizing her, the bitch creates a subversive space of kinship 
with nonhuman China that simultaneously celebrates Esch’s maternal power 
and rejects the artificial devaluing of her black child.
The novel’s bold, disturbing linking of an animal with a black woman pur-
posefully invokes historical, dehumanizing stereotypes. The novel associates 
Esch and China as breeders—literally they are both pregnant females—and, 
because neither chose to reproduce, the text implies a gendered solidarity 
between them. However, the symbolism of China’s whiteness and the artificial 
overvaluing of her offspring compared to Esch’s unwanted black child disrupts 
this solidarity. China gives birth to a litter of puppies valued at eight hundred 
dollars, and, ironically, while no one wants to claim Esch’s pregnancy (includ-
ing Esch herself), everyone wants one of China’s puppies. This ironic juxtapo-
sition of their offspring exposes the stratification of reproduction aggravated 
by precarious conditions of displacement, racism, youth, and poverty.
Perspective on the artificial labeling and valuing of human and nonhu-
man life is offered by Patricia Williams. In her essay “On Being the Object of 
Property,” she addresses the long tradition of dehumanizing African American 
mothers and their children. Beginning with an account of the sexual exploita-
tion of her enslaved, preteen great-great-grandmother, she extends this per-
sonal history to contemporary debates over forced sterilization, surrogacy, and 
the devaluing of black children. Black mothers and their children have histori-
cally been assigned little to no social value except during the period of slavery, 
when enslaved women were compelled to produce more property for white 
slaveholders. Williams writes,
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Whether something is inside or outside the marketplace of rights has always 
been a way of valuing it. . . . Thus when black people were bought and sold 
as slaves, they were placed beyond the boundaries of humanity. And thus, 
in the twistedness of our brave new world, when blacks have been thrust out 
of the marketplace and it is white children who are bought and sold, black 
babies have become “worthless” currency to adoption agents—“surplus” in 
the salvage heaps of Harlem hospitals. (164–65)
Williams links the overvaluing of the white child sought through surrogacy to 
the devaluing of black children, who have moved from being valued nonhu-
mans to valueless humans.
In a similar fashion, Salvage the Bones provocatively connects the over-
valuing of the nonhuman puppies of a white mother to the disavowal of Esch’s 
black, human, surplus child. Certainly, in other contexts, pit bulls are surplus, 
to use Williams’s term; indeed, the American Humane Society shelters are 
filled with unwanted pit bulls. However, within the world of the novel and the 
economy of Bois Sauvage, China and her litter exist within the marketplace, 
and their artificial value is symbolized by her whiteness. China and Esch’s gen-
dered and maternal solidarity is challenged by this reminder of their racial 
difference, even as this reminder prompts consideration of why a nonhuman 
puppy is valued more than a human child whose genocide antiabortion groups 
have so earnestly sought to prevent.
Exploiting this irony, Ward’s novel masterfully plays with “controlling 
images” of both black mothers and pit bulls. As a malleable figure of alterity, 
pit bull mythology can be adopted and deployed in different contexts and with 
different meanings. Pit bull symbolism was on full display, for example, dur-
ing the 2008 presidential campaign, when Sarah Palin notoriously declared, “I 
love those hockey moms. You know, they say, the difference between a hockey 
mom and a pit bull—? Lipstick.” Palin’s reference to hockey moms coded her 
remark about laudable maternal ferocity as specific to white motherhood. 
However, in the shared cultural imaginary, pit bulls metaphorically stand in 
most often as “racialized figures of deviance” (Edwards 157)8—and specifi-
cally African American male deviance. The actor Michael B. Jordan recently 
invoked pit bull mythology to describe his portrayal of slain Oscar Grant: 
“Black males, we are America’s pit bull. We’re labeled vicious, inhumane 
and left to die on the street.  .  .  . We get branded a lot for being vicious, not 
human” (“Fruitvale Station”). For Jordan, the pit bull represents the injustice 
 8. Pit bulls also serve in the popular imaginary as metaphors of sexual deviance (see 
Weaver).
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of stereotypes and the dehumanization of African American men.9 However, 
placing Palin’s comment side by side with Jordan’s reveals how black women 
remain invisible in these popular images of superhuman white motherhood 
or dehumanized black masculinity. Esch’s identification with China, therefore, 
presents an overlap within the Venn diagram of Palin’s and Jordan’s symbolic 
invocations of pit bull mythology.
Although disquieting, the novel’s linking of its African American charac-
ters with animals purposefully destabilizes dehumanizing stereotypes by eras-
ing the distinction and hierarchy of values assigned to human and nonhuman. 
Dogs serve as the novel’s valued figurative and literal currencies: Junior hides 
under the house with stray dogs (114); the siblings fight over the bones of 
a meal (6); the boys sleep in canine-like fashion wherever fatigue overtakes 
them “in the backseats of cars, the old RV, the porch” (10); Manny dries him-
self by shaking “like a dog” (55); Esch thinks her unusual corkscrew hair is 
“like a Doberman come out white” (7); Skeetah pulls on Esch’s wrist “as if he 
can make me heel” (72); and Esch longs for Manny to touch her tenderly “as 
he would a pit puppy with pedigree papers” (9). These comparisons do not 
degrade the human characters because the novel carefully reassigns value to 
the nonhuman. Another such revaluing is the novel’s embrace of savagery. In 
the novel’s paratext, Ward notes: “The word salvage is phonetically close to 
savage. At home [Mississippi], among the young, there is honor in that term. 
It says that come hell or high water, Katrina or oil spill, hunger or heat, you 
are strong, you are fierce, and you possess hope” (264). Taking the black heart 
of Bois Sauvage (“wild woods”) and its savage and animal inhabitants as the 
normalized center of the novel, the outlying areas populated by whites become 
unfamiliar, “pale arteries” (34). This reversal of center and margin is extended 
through depictions of white people as zombie-like in appearance and behavior 
(28). White normative society is dead, nonhuman, and alien, its own “tangle 
of pathology” (Spillers 66).
The textual pairing of China and Esch, in particular, invokes gendered sol-
idarities even as it subverts non/human and racial differences. Throughout the 
novel, China is anthropomorphized as Skeetah’s adoring and adored lover, and 
his status is enhanced by this relationship: “She has eyes only for him” (2); “he 
is focused on China like a man focuses on a woman when he feels that she is 
his, which China is” (3); and she is described returning to him like “a woman 
 9. This image is further complicated by the negative association of African American 
men and dogfighting, which arose in 2007 due to football player Michael Vick’s conviction in 
a dogfighting ring. In response to the condemning media coverage of Vick, his surrendered 
dogs were quickly adopted, according to Sports Illustrated (see Gorant), even though pit bulls 
are usually “surplus” in many US animal shelters.
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approaching her partner on the dance floor” (101). Like a doting spouse, he 
constructs a home with a linoleum floor for her (28–29, 103), allows her in 
the family house (211), buys only the best pet food for her and eats it himself 
while the family lives on Ramen noodles and scavenged eggs (193), and, con-
trary to their father’s prohibition, longs to allow her on his bed (161). Skeetah 
declares, “Between man and dog is a relationship . . . [e]qual” (29). Her value 
to Skeetah is amplified through her symbolic whiteness, which is invested with 
several contradictory meanings and values: cocaine or “china” heroin (addic-
tive; reflective of wealth and excess); the family china (valued heirloom and 
household good); a china doll (porcelain, whiteness, beauty fragility); Chyna 
(the World Federation Wrestler turned porn star from 1990s); and the nation 
of China—to which Junior suggests Esch send his rejected breakfast when she 
admonishes him that people are starving in Africa (25).
China’s real value, however, is in her labor as a breeder and fighter, with-
out which she would have no place in the Batiste family. She is bred with Kilo, 
another fighting dog who is owned by Manny’s cousin, and sexually, she dom-
inates and mates with the same aggression she displays while fighting. About 
their mating, Esch observes, “There was blood on their jaws, on her coat, and 
instead of loving, it looked like they were fighting” (8); “she’d drawn blood: he 
hadn’t” (95). China proves to be a resilient breeder although she is devoid of 
mercy. As China whelps, Esch observes, “What [she] is doing is fighting, like 
she was born to do. Fight our shoes, fight other dogs, fight these puppies that 
are reaching for the outside” (2). Previously, China has cruelly killed other 
mothers—notably the family’s laying hens (210)—but Esch marvels at her abil-
ity to nurture: “I don’t know what I thought she would do once she had [her 
litter]: sit on them and smother them maybe. Bite them. Turn their skulls to 
bits of bone and blood. But she doesn’t do any of that. Instead she stands over 
them, her on one side and Skeetah on the other like a pair of proud parents, 
and she licks” (17). She is a shrewd and ruthless mother, driving off one puppy 
that becomes sick (40–41), fighting off her litter when they have nursed suf-
ficiently (109), and merciless when, unprovoked and in a Medea-like gesture, 
she kills the puppy that looks like Kilo (192).
An undefeated champion, her labor as a competitive fighting dog con-
tributes to the family’s security, wealth, and status. She and the other fighting 
dogs are sources of income through the side betting that takes place during 
the fights, but she also arbitrates, defends, and supports the siblings like a sur-
rogate mother. She intimidates treacherous Manny, who fearfully observes, 
“China don’t like me” (101), and Daddy, who drunkenly assails his children 
(105–6). After Skeetah has stolen dewormer from a local farmer, the siblings 
are pursued by his dog until China murderously intervenes (81). Additionally, 
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when Manny’s cousin (the owner of Kilo) insists on taking the pick of the lit-
ter as stud fee, Skeetah defends his claim to the puppies by fighting China in 
her postpartum, debilitated state. Over Randall’s objections at jeopardizing 
a nursing mother’s well-being, Skeetah pits China against Kilo, the father of 
her litter: “How are you going to fight her? She’s a mother!” Randall asks, to 
which Skeetah responds, “And he’s a father, and what the fuck difference does 
it make? .  .  . We all fight.  .  .  . Everybody” (169). China’s fight not only denies 
the cousin’s claim on a puppy but also defends Esch’s honor, as the conflict 
over the stud fee coincides with Manny’s realization and rejection of Esch’s 
pregnancy. In this scene, with both families present, Manny’s cousin observes 
with double meaning to Skeetah: “I heard your bitch had our puppies” (148). 
China’s victory over Kilo defends the family’s resources and honor, and later, 
Randall ends his friendship with Manny when he suspects “you dogging my 
sister” (201). As these moments suggest, China, as a lover, mother, and fighter, 
is linked with Esch—at times, as Manny attempts, to dehumanize and devalue 
her, and at other times to suggest her fierce potential.
Although Esch identifies with China, she is not like her initially. With 
Manny, Esch is a passive lover, painfully aware of his devaluation of her. As her 
family prepares for Mother Nature’s onslaught and she grapples with impend-
ing motherhood, the most threatening disaster, in her eyes, is her inability to 
win his love. Before Manny, Esch has sex with numerous boys because it was 
easier than telling them no (23). She notes her “girly heart that, before Manny, 
I’d let boys have because they wanted it, and not because I wanted to give it” 
(16). Manny also demands her passivity. She actively desires him, but sens-
ing his conditional attraction—“You know it ain’t like that” (56)—she does 
not dare to voice it. Manny has only contempt for female “weakness” (11, 96) 
although he simultaneously demands it from Esch and his normative-femi-
nine girlfriend. Manny, a neoliberal agent with entrepreneurial choices of his 
own to make—namely, whether or not to claim fatherhood—ultimately rejects 
both Esch and her pregnancy, scorning the social disadvantage of being asso-
ciated with a mother, a child, a dependent. He represents a black masculinity 
that is alienated from the “blues epistemology,” an ethic that values communal 
survival over individualism (Edwards).
Esch’s passivity extends to her approaching identity as a mother. It is 
hard to say that Esch chooses motherhood any more than China does. Birth 
control is available to Esch only in the form of condoms (30), and she is 
unable/unwilling to demand their use with Manny for reasons already noted. 
Although she wonders wistfully if ending the pregnancy would make Manny 
love her (102–03), abortion is too distant geographically and financially. As 
mentioned above, her only act of agency is not to reveal her pregnancy. Ironi-
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cally it is Skeetah, the expert dog breeder who knows the most about mothers, 
who carefully scrutinizes Esch’s body to learn her secret. Disputing Manny’s 
observation about China (made in the presence of Esch) that giving birth 
weakens females (“price of being female,” Manny declares), Skeetah objects, 
“You serious? That when they come into they strength. They got something to 
protect. . . . That’s power” (96). And it is Skeetah who, in a mothering gesture, 
assures Esch, “Everything need a chance” (214), indirectly encouraging her to 
fight for her child.
The formidable figure of China prompts Esch to confront not only her 
pregnancy but also Manny. Esch passively awaits his love until his rejection of 
her pregnant body compels her to fight. When Manny disowns the pregnancy, 
claiming it could be any boy’s, Esch attacks him with explosive violence—“I 
am on him like China” (203)—while he fights back, calling her “stupid bitch” 
(204). Recognizing the injustice of the double bind of expected and deval-
ued feminine weakness, Esch awakens to her identity as a bitch and assaults 
Manny “like China,” no longer denying her resilience and strength.
Ironically, the novel’s radical message of hope arrives in the end when 
China is lost. Esch, her brothers, and her father survive Katrina, but China 
and her litter do not. As the hurricane floods their home, the family must 
climb through their roof and attempt a desperate escape to higher ground by 
jumping through tree limbs. In the process, Esch’s pregnancy is revealed to 
their unsuspecting father, who, surprised, pushes Esch into the floodwaters. 
Although Esch’s father appears to reject her, readers recall that he taught his 
children to swim by throwing them in, suggesting that he pushes Esch toward 
survival (23). Skeetah, meanwhile, abandons his hold on China to grab Esch, 
who drops the remaining puppies. The deceptive promise of cross-species 
affinity offered by the boy-and-his-dog plot is disrupted for readers by Skee-
tah’s choice of Esch over China and her litter. The heroic pit bull is last seen 
swimming against the waters as the human family finds shelter in the sec-
ond story of their grandparents’ abandoned house. As the storm ends and 
the water recedes, the Batiste family is left to assess the damage and to await 
China’s return. Esch’s father resumes his parental role, telling her she needs 
prenatal care. Big Henry, another family friend who has steadfastly supported 
Esch without attempting to exploit her sexually, reassures her, “This baby got 
plenty daddies” (255).
The novel concludes with a displacement of the white breeder and her 
artificially overvalued offspring, in addition to a rescripting of nonnormative 
kinship roles that frame Esch’s pregnancy within a context of hope. Not only 
has Skeetah ungendered the idea of mothering by serving as a mother-guide 
to China, her puppies, and Esch, but Big Henry’s comment that Esch’s child 
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will have more than one nonbiological father suggests that fathering is not 
connected essentially to biology. The (absent) biological father is forgotten 
when Esch claims a decidedly not “monstrous” but rather Zeus-like progeni-
tor relationship to her child: “I lie awake and cannot see anything but that 
baby, the baby I have formed whole in my head, a black Athena, who reaches 
for me. Who gives me that name as if it is mine: Mama” (219). Mothering is 
similarly de-essentialized by the fact that Esch, a true blueswoman,10 expresses 
no romanticized attitudes toward motherhood and must rely on her father’s 
guidance, Randall’s protection, Skeetah’s support, and even Junior’s readiness 
“to give it a bottle” (247). Esch’s role models include the memories of her 
mother and of China, whom Esch claims as her “sister” (258) at the conclusion 
of the novel. This recasting of kinship (brothers as mothers, dogs as sisters, 
friends as fathers) changes the biopolitical field of the novel and thereby dis-
rupts the neoliberal morality of stratified reproduction. Good/bad reproduc-
tive choice-making is interrupted by reconfigured family systems. The novel 
rejects the double bind of bad choices facing young African American moth-
ers—abortion or stigmatized teen motherhood—and replaces it with a loving, 
supportive blues ethic. In place of neoliberal morality, the novel refocuses on a 
nonbiological family and community that cherishes the black child and values 
an ethic of survival. In this sense, the image of Esch as a breeder is replaced 
with a fighter and a new mythology for African American motherhood.
Conclusion
Ward’s novel challenges the dehumanizing “controlling images” of black 
women and the artificial overvaluing of white reproduction. The novel refutes 
the cultural symbolism of African American breeders by humanizing Esch and 
her family and by casting the white breeder as a nonhuman. Ultimately, her 
novel subverts reproductive stratification by privileging Esch’s black maternity 
and alternative family structure, which cherishes the black child over the mar-
ketable offspring of China. Yet this alternative family structure does not reject 
its Other; instead, its nonnormative definition of family—not based in patriar-
chal roles—privileges the relations of human and nonhuman, blood and affin-
ity, hierarchy and interdependence, survival and violence as the structure of 
kinship that endures the conditions of precarity. In so doing, the novel creates 
a new mythology of nonpatriarchal black motherhood and alternative family 
structure that expands Spillers’s vision.
 10. See Davis.
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What does Salvage the Bones tell us about reproductive politics and repro-
ductive justice? First, the narrative helps to reverse the invisibility of Afri-
can American women’s reproductive vulnerability. From the initial detail of 
Esch’s mother’s death in childbirth to Esch’s inability to obtain an abortion, 
readers are made aware of the roles that race, poverty, youth, and location 
have in determining the sorts of choices that are (un)available to poor, rural 
women under neoliberalism. This awareness undoes the neoliberal morality of 
good/bad choice-makers and the marketplace. Esch’s mother does not choose 
a home birth because of progressive values but because the cost of a hospital 
stay and the trip there are prohibitive. Her nonchoice proves fatal. Similarly, 
Esch’s nonchoice to have a child does not reflect bad values but rather soci-
ety’s abdication of its responsibility to young women. She lacks access to birth 
control, abortion, and social approbation for having a child. Second, Ward’s 
novel asserts a nonnormative understanding of reproduction, motherhood, 
and kinship that affords Esch an alternative means of self-realization and sur-
vival outside/within neoliberal hegemony. Radically, her agency is expressed 
through her choice to love her socially vulnerable child.
China’s whiteness exposes the injustice of stratified reproduction and 
what McRobbie calls the threat of “disarticulated” affinity groups—that is, the 
breaking apart of Esch’s and China’s gendered alliance. Yet the novel sustains 
hope for coalitional politics. As the source of Esch’s inspiration, China—in 
tandem with Mother Nature and Katrina—represents awe-inspiring maternal 
strength, and thus, her return is longed for at the text’s conclusion. As nonhu-
man property, China harkens to the not-too-distant past of enslaved women’s 
exploitation as breeders. The affinity Esch feels for her suggests a gendered, 
maternal solidarity that persists in opposition to oppressive systems. Esch 
claims China as her sister in a gesture of solidarity, and while China must tex-
tually recede—along with the cult of white motherhood—in order for Esch’s 
child to gain valuation, the narrative points hopefully to the possibility of a 
future that contains the children of both Esch and China. Rather than a sign 
of solidarity’s failure, the novel’s conclusion suggests the possibility of kinship 
and solidarity and their shared resistance to the logic of neoliberalism.
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C H A P T E R  2
Privileging God the Father
The Neoliberal Theology of the  
Evangelical Orphan Care Movement
VALERIE A. STEIN
OUR CULTURE often presents adoption as a feel-good story: Heroic adoptive 
parents, perhaps unable to have children of their own, battle the system and 
all of its red tape to rescue a poor, hopeless child in need of a family. In the 
end, everything works out and the child is where she was meant to be. These 
heart-warming narratives rarely show us the pain and loss experienced by the 
child and the birth mother. In fact, the birth mother plays at best a minor role 
in the story, one that highlights her supposed choices: She is given a nod for 
having made a loving choice so that her child could have the kind of life she 
could not provide, or she is disparaged as having made bad choices that make 
her unfit to parent.
Versions of this narrative flourish in evangelical Christian circles where 
adoption and foster care have become the focus of a growing movement in 
the new millennium. The evangelical orphan care movement is a theologi-
cal trend that draws on the New Testament doctrine of adoption to promote 
and encourage adoption, foster care, and orphan care. Proponents argue that 
adoption and orphan care are at the heart of the gospel message because 
the work of Christ results in the adoption of Christian believers. The move-
ment is perhaps most clearly represented by CAFO, the Christian Alliance 
for Orphans. The Alliance, officially incorporated in 2007, emerged from an 
initial gathering of thirty Christian leaders in 2004. The now annual CAFO 
Summit has since grown to include over two thousand participants, and the 
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Alliance considers itself to be the “definitive hub for the Christian orphan 
movement” (Christian Alliance for Orphans, private communication). CAFO 
seeks to coordinate the efforts of over 650 churches and almost 200 member 
organizations, including groups working in the areas of adoption, advocacy, 
foster care, global orphan care, and family preservation (CAFO, “About Us”). 
The Alliance also sponsors Orphan Sunday, a widely popular annual crusade 
held by churches across America and around the world in early November. 
The initiative seeks to motivate and coordinate responses to what evangeli-
cals see as their God’s call to care for the orphan. Leading evangelical groups 
and churches participate in Orphan Sunday, such as Focus on the Family, the 
Southern Baptist Convention, and Rick Warren’s Saddleback Church. Many 
evangelical pastors, politicians, and other prominent figures have adopted 
themselves and are strong advocates for Christian adoption and foster care.1
This call to adopt is not fundamentally about providing options for infer-
tile couples or humanitarian care for children in need. Rather, evangelical 
books, advocacy websites, sermons, blogs, and denomination resolutions 
claim a biblical and theological mandate for orphan care as a missionary 
activity: The adoption of orphaned children by Christian families mirrors the 
adoption of believers by God to be co-heirs with Christ. Adoption is the heart 
of the gospel.
This religious framing of adoption is not socially or politically neutral. 
Evangelical theology and American politics are intertwined, each continually 
reorienting itself in relation to the other.2 Just as biblical authors wrote to rein-
force or challenge prevailing ideologies or power structures, contemporary 
biblical interpretation and theological discourse are always contextual; they 
engage political, economic, and cultural matters, be they within the church or 
in society at large, privileging certain perspectives and obfuscating or dismiss-
ing others. We must ask: Whose interests are being served and promoted by 
the claim of a biblical mandate for adoption? Specifically, what is this narra-
tive’s role in a society in which privileged women adopt the children of women 
who are economically and socially vulnerable? And moreover, what economic, 
 1. Evangelical pastors and theologians Russell Moore, Dan Cruver, Tony Merida and Rick 
Morton, and John Piper have all adopted and promote Christian adoption as a theological man-
date (see their respective works in the works cited). Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin has four 
adopted children and is a vocal supporter of CAFO’s initiatives (Medefind). Christian music 
artist Stephen Curtis Chapman adopted three daughters from China and founded Show Hope, 
a nonprofit adoption advocacy organization that offers adoption grants and facilities orphan 
care centers in China (Show Hope, “Our Story”).
 2. For example, see Melinda Cooper’s Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the 
Neoliberal Era, in which she demonstrates the close relationship between evangelicalism, pro-
life politics, and neoliberal free-market philosophy.
44 • CHAPTER 2
political, and social agendas are linked with the rise of the evangelical orphan 
care movement?
Analysis of the theological framework of the evangelical orphan care 
movement reveals that “God’s heart for the orphan” ultimately leads churches 
to give preference to the needs, desires, and perspective of the adoptive par-
ents, whose role is aligned with the evangelical Christian deity’s. The birth 
mother virtually disappears in God’s plan for the fatherless child and subse-
quently from the attention of the churches. Adoption as gospel has political 
implications as well, supporting a world view consistent with neoliberal ide-
als. Preference for private solutions, minimal government intervention, and 
reduction of the state’s responsibility is buttressed by a religious narrative that 
glorifies and encourages financial support for adoption and the prospective 
adoptive parents but is silent about disadvantaged women and the web of 
social services that could support family preservation.
Rooted in the metaphor of God as father, the theology of the evangeli-
cal orphan care movement normalizes the paterfamilias, and thus it bene-
fits evangelical Christian women who are in a heteronormative, two-parent 
family. Aligning with this metaphor of God as father, evangelical adoption 
theologians have a tendency to refer to the children in need as fatherless. The 
theologically advantageous use of fatherless intersects with the American 
myth of absentee black fathers to also privilege white women at the expense of 
women of color. The theology is further racialized due to the evangelistic role 
of adoption; conspicuous transracial families serve as a visual pronouncement 
of the gospel. In the evangelical orphan care movement, theology justifies the 
systemic patriarchal, racial, and economic inequities that are imbedded in the 
adoption industry and the foster care system.3
Adoption and Orphans in the Bible
The authority of the Bible is a fundamental characteristic of evangelical Chris-
tianity, and proponents of Christian orphan care claim a scriptural founda-
tion for their view of adoption as a theological imperative. However, the Bible 
never advocates for adoption. In fact, the modern Western concept of legally 
adopting a child is virtually absent from the Bible. When the Bible speaks of 
orphans, there is no mention of adoption; in the New Testament’s proclama-
tion of the deity’s adoption of sinners, there is no command about orphan 
care. While the evangelical orphan care movement points to the Bible to glo-
 3. Laura Briggs exposes the inequities behind transracial adoption in Somebody’s Chil-
dren: The Politics of Transracial and Transnational Adoption.
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rify adoption and advance a neoliberal solution to families in crisis, a critical 
reading of the Bible actually challenges the movement at every turn and can 
help reveal the sociopolitical agenda of the interpreters.
The Hebrew Bible / Old Testament contains a vast amount of legal material 
governing ancient Israel in religious, ethical, and social matters. Though some 
form of adoption of children may have been practiced in ancient Israel, there 
are no laws in the Hebrew Bible regulating adoption and there is no Hebrew 
term reflecting the practice. There is, on the other hand, legal material per-
taining to orphans. Deuteronomy calls for what is essentially a social safety 
net for orphans—and along with them widows and immigrants. According 
to Deuteronomy 14.28–29, obligatory tithes of produce were to be directed 
to these marginalized individuals every third year. Additionally, Deuteron-
omy 24.19–21 commands Israelites not to harvest all the produce from fields, 
orchards, and vineyards, but rather to leave some behind for the orphans, 
widows, and immigrants.
There is attention to the plight of the orphans throughout the Hebrew 
Bible. The text makes it clear that the Israelite’s god, Yahweh, is concerned 
for the orphan: He is father and helper to orphans, he upholds them and 
executes justice on their behalf, and in him they find mercy (Ps. 10.14, 10.18, 
68.5, 146.9; Deut. 10.18; Hos. 14.3). Israelites are repeatedly commanded not to 
oppress orphans (Exod. 22.20–24; Deut. 24.17, 27.19; Jer. 7.6, 22.3; Zech. 7.10; 
Prov. 23.10). Each of the three major prophets indicts Israel based on unjust 
treatment of orphans (Isa. 10.1; Jer. 5.28; Ezek. 22.7).
Of the forty-two times the Hebrew word for orphan (yātom) occurs in the 
Bible, all but five occur in conjunction with the word for widow (̓almānāh). 
Yahweh is also their protector, upholds them, and executes justice on their 
behalf. Prophetic indictments against oppressive treatment usually include 
widows along with orphans. The New Testament Book of James echoes the 
Hebrew Bible’s insistence on attention to the needs of the orphans and wid-
ows: “Religion that is pure and undefiled before God the Father is this: to care 
for orphans and widows in their distress and to keep oneself unstained by the 
world” (Jas. 1.27).
The repeated pairing of orphans with widows throughout the biblical text 
suggests that the widows are the mothers of these children; what they lack is 
a father. In fact, some English translations popular among evangelicals, such 
as the King James Versions and the New International Version, read fatherless 
rather than orphan. In ancient Israel’s patriarchal society, motherless children 
could be absorbed into the father’s household, but fatherless children (and 
their mothers) were vulnerable and at risk. Rather than calling for the removal 
of these children to be placed in two-parent homes, the Bible calls for a social 
system that provides for their survival.
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In addition to what the Hebrew Bible specifically says about what to do 
for and how to treat orphans, there are two stories in the Hebrew Bible in 
which a child is taken in in a way that is similar to modern Western adoption. 
In neither case does the story lend itself to the model of adoption upheld in 
the evangelical orphan care movement. The Book of Esther recounts what 
we might consider to be a kinship adoption: Esther’s cousin raises her after 
her parents die. The more well-known story of Moses in Exodus has several 
parallels to modern Western non-relative adoption, especially international 
and domestic transracial adoptions.4 Attention to the sociopolitical roles in 
Moses’s story reveals oppression and desperation of the birth family that the 
evangelical orphan care theology ignores.
Moses was adopted by a member of the ruling class; the adoption only 
happened because the policies implemented by the ruling class left his birth 
parents unable to keep him safe. Moses was not an orphan. Given a differ-
ent sociopolitical context, Moses’s parents surely would have raised him. The 
story shares some of the complexities and ethical challenges of international 
adoption today. While some international adoptions allow an opportunity for 
truly needy orphaned or abandoned children to have a permanent family, in 
many other cases, demand for children increases supply. Several nations that 
once ranked among the top sending nations for intercountry adoption—such 
as China, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Guatemala—have closed or significantly 
scaled back their programs after reports revealed that the Western money 
flowing into the adoption industry resulted in children being bought or 
kidnapped and birth families being coerced or tricked into giving up their 
children (The Schuster Institute).5 The imbalance of power that enables the 
pharaoh’s daughter to take Moses as her son parallels the flow of adoptees to 
First World nations, whose wealth has often been at the expense of developing 
nations. There are similar issues of power imbalance driving domestic adop-
tions, especially in the case of transracial adoptions. Poor women of color are 
more vulnerable to social and economic pressures to relinquish their children, 
and they are more likely to be deemed unfit and lose custody or parental 
rights (Laura Briggs; Solinger).
 4. Moses was a Hebrew child born to parents enslaved by the Egyptians. The pharaoh had 
ordered the Hebrew midwives to kill male babies by casting them into the Nile River. Moses’s 
mother hid him and, when that was no longer possible, put him in a basket among the reeds 
in the river; his older sister watched from a distance. The daughter of the pharaoh found him, 
recognized him as a Hebrew, and took him as her own son.
 5. The US is a signatory of The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, which was 
designed to prevent child trafficking and ensure the best interests of the child (HCCH).
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Furthermore, Moses is seemingly abandoned but is meant to be found, 
with his sister standing at a distance to see what would happen to him. This 
scenario mirrors many abandonments in China, where the children—often 
second daughters or children with disabilities, both of whom may pose finan-
cial difficulties—are placed somewhere they will quickly be found and even 
watched until they are. Similarly, Moses’s account resonates with adoptions 
from Ethiopia or Haiti, where children often have a surviving but impover-
ished parent who surrenders the child to an orphanage to ensure the child 
will live. In fact, rarely are adopted children full orphans. While UNICEF has 
estimated there are 163 million orphaned children in the world, it notes that 
most of these children have one surviving parent and that of those who have 
lost both, most are able to live with extended family (UNICEF).
Moses, like many transracially adopted children, struggles with identity. 
He does not seem to fully identify with the Egyptians: “One day, after Moses 
had grown up, he went out to his people,” meaning the Hebrews (Exod. 2.11; 
my emphasis). But when he seeks some kind of camaraderie with Hebrews, he 
is rejected, and it is presumably Hebrews who report the fact that he murdered 
an Egyptian whom he witnessed beating a Hebrew man. Moses flees both 
peoples, belonging with neither, and living “somewhere between.”6
In the story of Moses, we see an adoptee who struggles with identity even 
though he was given a life of privilege. He is ultimately empowered to return 
to his birth culture and lead his people out of slavery, thus standing up against 
the oppressive political regime of his Egyptian adoptive family. The idea of 
a returning adoptee also parallels contemporary international adoption. In 
many cases, poor, illiterate birth families sign away their rights to their chil-
dren believing their children will return to support them after receiving an 
education (The Schuster Institute; Joyce).
In Moses’s story, the birth family is not only included but is, as a Hebrew 
family, the very focus of the deity’s attention. Their side is unambiguously 
God’s side. The adoptive family is problematized as members of the ruling 
class, as Egyptians responsible for oppressing the people of the Israelite God. 
Far from glorifying adoption, the story of Moses shines a light on an oppres-
sive sociopolitical situation in which a child is given up out of desperation.
Evangelical Christians could pair these two stories of Esther and Moses—
one highlighting kinship care and the other involving an adoptive parent 
essentially gaining a child because of her role in an oppressive regime—with 
the Hebrew Bible’s persistent concern for orphans and widows in order to 
 6. See the recent movie Somewhere Between (2011) about the identity struggles of four 
girls adopted from China.
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advocate for just social systems that enable family preservation. Orphan care 
theology, however, essentially ignores these two stories and instead pairs the 
Hebrew Bible’s attention to the plight of orphans and widows with the New 
Testament’s adoption metaphor. The result is, as we will see, advocacy for 
adoption rather than social services.
The adoption metaphor in the New Testament is where we find the only 
explicit use of the term adoption in the Bible. Romans 8.15, 8.23, 9.4; Galatians 
4.5; and Ephesians 1.5 use adoption as a representation for atonement, giving 
a concrete image to explain the salvific relationship between the believer and 
the deity. The believer is a sinner, unworthy, and essentially enslaved; Jesus’s 
suffering and death restore the relationship with the deity, who is his father, 
and enable Jesus’s status of sonship to be shared with the believer. The process 
changes the status of the believer to co-heir with the Christ:
But when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son, born of a woman, 
born under the law, in order to redeem those who were under the law, so 
that we might receive adoption as children. And because you are children, 
God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, “Abba! Father!” So 
you are no longer a slave but a child, and if a child then also an heir, through 
God. (Gal. 4.4–7)
The New Testament adoption metaphor stands in the Hebrew Bible tradi-
tion in which prophetic texts use metaphors to envision the character of the 
Israelite God and that God’s relationship with the Israelites. Common met-
aphors include king-vassal, husband-wife, judge-litigant, parent-child, and 
master-slave. As is generally the case with biblical metaphors that draw on 
analogies to human relationships, the purpose of the metaphor is to shed light 
on the deity by referencing a relationship that is well known or understood 
by the audience. To understand the metaphor’s purpose and impact, we need 
to understand how the relationship was understood and functioned in the 
context in which the text was written. Both the Hebrew Bible / Jewish culture 
and the Greco-Roman culture serve as contextual frameworks for New Testa-
ment writings. Both shed similar light on the metaphor’s implied relationship 
between the Christian God and believer.
In both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, the metaphor in which 
Israel becomes the deity’s son references the practice of adopting an heir for 
the parterfamilias rather than providing a home for a child who needs one. 
Read in the context of Western society, where adoption refers to the practice 
of taking the child of others to raise as one’s own, many English translations 
seem to suggest that the deity is becoming the father to children: “I thought 
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how I would set you among my children and give you a pleasant land, the 
most beautiful heritage of all the nations. And I thought you would call me, 
My Father, and would not turn from following me” (Jer. 3.19). However, the 
Hebrew word often translated as children literally means sons (bānim), and 
used in this context of being given land actually implies that Israel is gaining 
the status of son in order to inherit land.7 Similarly in the New Testament, 
the Greek Paul uses to speak of redemption points to a change of status from 
slave to heir. The word often translated in Galatians 4.5 as receive adoption as 
children (huiothesίan) literally means to place as a son.8
The Greco-Roman context offers a similar reference for the New Testa-
ment metaphor of adoption. In first-century Rome adoption was driven by 
the need for a male heir. Childless families (or families without a boy) would 
adopt a male to become heir. Adoption of females was rare. The adoptees gen-
erally were not orphans nor even children. The adoption sometimes imparted 
a change in social status if the adoptee came from a family with a different 
standing.
The New Testament doctrine of adoption is not part of a biblical mandate to 
adopt orphans; rather, it is a theological metaphor that compares redemption 
to slaves becoming heirs. The Christian God may have a heart for orphans, but 
the New Testament adoption metaphor does not reveal it.
Evangelical Adoption Theology
Evangelical Christians misappropriate this metaphor, as well as other biblical 
texts, to create a religious narrative that glorifies modern Western adoption 
and adoptive parents. This narrative ultimately reinforces the idea of the tra-
ditional two-parent, heteronormative family as well as minimal government 
intervention. Accordingly, it favors evangelical Christian women who have 
financial and familial resources to take in a child over calling on the com-
munity to provide a welfare system that could support vulnerable women in 
the care of their children. The proponents of the movement seek to create 
a culture of orphan care throughout the church. This involves developing a 
theological framework that identifies orphan care as part of the core founda-
tion of the church so that it is always a priority, but it also involves leadership, 
 7. See also, for example, Genesis 15, where the childless Abram laments that a slave will 
become his heir.
 8. Popular English translations such as the New Revised Standard Version and the New 
International Version use children when the Hebrew and Greek refer to sons in order to make 
the biblical text sound more gender-inclusive for modern audiences.
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networking, training, financial support, and structures that increase evangeli-
cal participation in and responsibility for adoption ministries, foster care, and 
orphan care on the local and global levels.
Kathryn Joyce has written on the success and extensiveness of the evan-
gelical adoption movement in The Child Catchers: Rescue, Trafficking, and the 
New Gospel of Adoption. She has shown that the adoption industry is domi-
nated by evangelical agencies and programs both in the US and in the send-
ing countries. With multiple accounts from a wide range of countries, Joyce 
reveals how the evangelical adoption agenda has impacted the supply of chil-
dren at the expense of impoverished families and stigmatized single mothers. 
In many cases, evangelical Christian organizations are even found to be acting 
unethically and illegally in order to obtain children for adoption. For example, 
Joyce recounts child trafficking in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake by a Baptist 
missionary group and accusations against Christian World Adoption of child 
harvesting in Ethiopia (1ff, 129ff).
In addition to Joyce’s revealing exposé, one can also find evidence of 
the movement’s prevalence in various online adoption communities and 
resources, such as those on Facebook, adoption discussion forums, blogs, 
and Pinterest pages, where usernames like James127 or InHisName abound. 
Evangelical Christians frequently reference a call to adopt and God’s heart for 
orphans. Christian blogger Shay Shull’s theological framing of her family’s 
decision to adopt is representative: “God is calling me to step out of my com-
fort zone and do something to further his kingdom.” She attributes the adop-
tion to God’s plan and sees it as having an evangelistic purpose. Also common 
are blogs filled with biblical quotes and religious references displaying pictures 
of large Christian adoptive families—with six, eight, and even eighteen and 
twenty-one children—that call to mind the evangelical Quiverfull movement 
where children are evidence of one’s obedience to God and also a means to 
increasing the number of Christians in the world.9 The Wright family blog 
illustrates this trend to large adoptive families as well as the role of adoption as 
a tool of evangelism: “[We] are a walking billboard for adoption—which I love 
because people it is all about God’s testimony! The famous question. .  .  .  .  .  . 
are you going to adopt more children. . . . . . . . . . . our answer—we are open to 
what God has in store” (Wright and Wright). The Wrights have eight transra-
 9. The Quiverfull movement is a conservative Christian movement in which adherents 
reject birth control in order to accept as many children as God bestows on them. The belief is 
grounded in the Genesis commandment to be fruitful and multiply (1:28) and gets its name 
from Psalm 127: “Children [Heb: sons] are a heritage from the Lord, offspring a reward from 
him. Like arrows in the hands of a warrior are children born in one’s youth. Blessed is the 
man whose quiver is full of them” (3–5a).
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cially adopted children and one child of the same race but with visible special 
needs. Transracial adoptions prove to be particularly suited to the evangelical 
agenda to spread the gospel because conspicuous families often attract atten-
tion. Thus, not only does adoption spread Christianity by acquiring a child to 
raise in the faith, it also provides opportunities to preach the gospel to curi-
ous onlookers.
The cost of adoption is even given theological frameworks. Chip-in but-
tons or links to a GoFundMe page to help pay for the adoption make rhetori-
cal appeals to God’s will and allow evangelicals to participate in spreading the 
gospel even if they are not adopting themselves. Evangelical foundations offer 
adoption grants for prospective parents who can demonstrate adherence to 
the organization’s faith statements.10
The evangelical view of adoption is grounded primarily in the New Tes-
tament, especially in the metaphor of God as an adoptive father in Romans, 
Galatians, and Ephesians. As I have mentioned, this rhetorical language seeks 
to explain salvation with an analogy to adoption. The practice of adoption 
most familiar to the original audience differs from what most modern read-
ers think about adoption. Since metaphors are connected to the social con-
text in which they originate, they can be rejected or forgotten or ignored if 
they no longer make sense in a new social context. However, metaphors can 
also be adapted to new realities if there continues to be perceived similari-
ties between the abstract and concrete references. While the biblical adop-
tion imagery relies on a cultural understanding of adoption that is no longer 
reflected in today’s context, there are enough attributes in modern Western 
adoption that allow the metaphor to be intelligible: For example, both prac-
tices include a change in legal status to include rights of inheritance and both 
often include a change in social status (in modern Western adoption, children 
generally move from a lesser-advantaged to a higher socioeconomic level). 
Evangelical leader and adoptive father John Piper cites these similarities in 
his published sermon “Adoption: The Heart of the Gospel.” He argues there 
are eight comparisons between adoption of children in contemporary society 
and the Christian God’s adoption of believers: Both are (1) costly; (2) involve 
a change in legal status, (3) inheritance rights, and (4) a familial relationship; 
(5) result in a moral transformation; (6) involve planning; (7) bring adoptees 
out of bad situations; and (8) involve suffering now for later glory. His list of 
 10. For example, search adoption on Pinterest, GoFundMe, or Facebook. Also, note the 
prominence of evangelical Christians on blogs and discussion boards found at sites such as 
Adoptive Families Circle and AdoptTogether. Organizations that offer adoption grants to 
Christians who adhere to their faith statement include ABBA Fund and the Ephesians 3:20 
Foundation.
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similarities demonstrates the theological viability of adoption as a metaphor 
for evangelicals.
Piper’s purpose in drawing these comparisons is to promote adoption by 
aligning it with the will and experience of the deity. Paired with the James 
1.27 passage, the adoption metaphor becomes an ideal to imitate and a social 
agenda to promote. The Epistle of James calls on followers to be “doers of the 
word” (1.22). The heart of the word, which is another way of referencing the 
gospel message, is salvation. As we have seen, one of the ways the New Tes-
tament presents salvation is as God’s adoption of sinners. For evangelicals, 
Christians should adopt because God has adopted them (Romans, Galatians, 
Ephesians) and because God calls on believers to care for orphans (Jas. 1.27).11 
Christians are called on to do for orphans what God has already done for 
them as believers.
Coupling the James passage with the adoption metaphor suggests a new 
meaning for both. The New Testament metaphor does not make orphans into 
sons of God; it makes slaves inheritors alongside the son. By reading this 
adoption metaphor both in a modern Western context and through the her-
meneutical lens of James 1.27, which advocates care for orphans, the meta-
phor seems to be referencing adoption as the practice of providing a father 
to the fatherless. The James passage is also given a new meaning when it is 
juxtaposed with the adoption metaphor. This passage stands in a long biblical 
tradition of public responsibility for the disadvantaged, including orphans, 
widows, and immigrants. James charges true believers to live out their religion 
with care for the orphan and widow. Read alongside the doctrine of adop-
tion, the focus of James narrows even further to focus solely on orphans and 
further still to adoption as the means to caring for them. The passage that 
drew on a fundamental societal and structural responsibility for the oppressed 
seems to advocate instead for what is essentially a private act of charity in 
which a family adopts an orphan. An example of the conflation of the adop-
tion metaphor with the James passage and the tradition in which it stands 
is clear in the advocacy materials of the Christian adoption agency America 
World Adoption: “The Bible references orphans and adoption over 50 times 
because of its importance to the Father. About half of these verses describe 
God’s heart for this specific group of children. The other half pertain to Chris-
tians’ mission to protect, give justice to and provide for ‘the least of these.’” 
The biblical texts never use orphan and adoption together, and yet evangelical 
rhetoric links them as if the Bible (God) is calling on Christian families to 
 11. This pairing and justification is common: See Moore; Merida and Morton; CAFO, 
“Core Principles”.
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adopt children rather than generally to ensure that families without an adult 
male are cared for.
Read together, James and the adoption metaphor convert the biblical com-
mitment to provide justice and material support for fatherless children and 
their mothers into the evangelical charge to provide a father to the fatherless 
at the expense of the mother. While the phrase providing a father to the father-
less suggests restorative measures, this is actually socially charged language 
that targets families of color as well as nontraditional families. The prevail-
ing myth of failing black families with unwed mothers and missing fathers 
marks the children of women of color as especially in need of rescue. Women 
who are not raising children in a traditional nuclear family structure, includ-
ing those in the LGBT+ community, are maligned by the seemingly ratio-
nal appeal to provide fathers to the fatherless. The biblical mandate to adopt 
finds expression in racially coded language that is based on heteronormative 
assumptions and institutions.
Adoption is all the more seen as God’s plan in evangelical Christianity 
because it functions as a missional activity. Linking the practice of adoption 
to the doctrine of adoption makes it an act of evangelism. The adoption move-
ment makes clear that adoption is not simply about providing homes to needy 
children, as important as it may be for children to have parents. Rather, adop-
tion is theologically foundational to the mission of the church. International 
adoption, especially, is seen as a Great Commission activity. Matthew 28.19 
calls for Jesus’s followers to spread the gospel across the Earth: “Go therefore 
and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father 
and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.” According to David Platt, evangelical 
pastor and president of the Southern Baptist Convention’s International Mis-
sion Board, adoption is necessary if one is serious about the Great Commis-
sion (Miller). Adoption as a form of evangelizing is also evident in the plea 
for donations on the BlogSpot of Orphan’s Ransom, a Christian organization 
that seeks to help prospective adoptive parents fund their adoption: “Your 
contribution will benefit children who may otherwise never receive the gift of 
a family or hear the truth of Christ’s love” (Orphan’s Ransom). Dillon Inter-
national, a leading Christian adoption agency, links adoption to evangelism in 
its statement of faith: “Dillon International was founded on the belief in the 
Great Commission of Jesus Christ.” The view is also prevalent among evangel-
ical adopters, as is shown in a comment responding to well-known Christian 
blogger and adoptive mom Jen Hatmaker and her discussion of ethical issues 
in international adoption:12
 12. An atypical evangelical adopter willing to publically criticize evangelical positions, Hat-
maker warns her readers that the Christian adoption narrative contributes to the flow of money 
from wealthy to impoverished nations in international adoption and that this money all too 
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Ben—May 14th, 2013 at 2:24 PM
But what of the Gospel? I have been separated from my family because 
I believe the Gospel . . . but I feel that I have gained everything. Is our mis-
sion to keep families together? What about in families where they’ll never 
hear the Gospel? What is of more value? Could God not be using any of 
this to His Glory? Salvation requires a cost . . . to follow Jesus means leaving 
affections for things of this earth. My adopted son will be much better off 
with me . . . but it’s not because of my wealth. it’s because in my home he’ll 
hear the Gospel where he probably wouldn’t have with his birth parents. 
(Hatmaker)
This comment by an adoptive father reveals the ethical implications of viewing 
adoption as spreading the gospel: It associates the adoptive parents with the 
will of the deity and privileges adoption even in the face of moral objections. 
While international adoption options have diminished in recent years due 
to increasing restrictions by the sending countries, evangelical groups have 
stepped up promotion of domestic adoption and foster care as a means of 
essentially fulfilling the same role: a strategy for providing access to children 
to advance a theological agenda.13
Evangelical pastor and author Dan Cruver confirms that the real goal is 
to save the souls of children, but he also explains that adoption is evangelis-
tic in another important way—it is an imitation of the gospel: “The ultimate 
purpose of human adoption by Christians . . . is to place them in a Christian 
home that they might be positioned to receive the gospel, so that within that 
family, the world might witness a representation of God taking us in and gen-
uinely loving the helpless, the hopeless, and the despised” (Cruver 15). In Cru-
ver’s comments we see that not only does adoption provide a way for children 
to hear the gospel, it also serves as a demonstration of the gospel to others by 
mirroring the metaphorical adoption of believers as co-heirs with Jesus. Thus 
adoption is a way of living out the gospel for others to see what the Christian 
God does: Saving a helpless and hopeless orphan is a reflection of that God’s 
redemption of believers through Jesus Christ. The family becomes a witness of 
the gospel, especially a conspicuous transracial family, because such a family 
inevitably seems to inspire questions about adoption.
Connecting adoption to the gospel message and evangelism means that 
adoption into an evangelical family—which is also typically a white, hetero-
often leads to corruption, such as mothers and families relinquishing their children because 
they were pressured or deceived.
 13. In 2016, CAFO promoted Stand Sunday as one way to observe Orphan Sunday. Stand 
Sunday is an initiative to promote foster care as a Christian responsibility (Weber).
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normative, two-parent family—is theologically the better choice than family 
preservation; the narrative thus supports the choices of the adoptive mother 
over the birth mother, privileging one kind of family over another. This theo-
logical foundation of adoption goes even further, though, than favoring the 
position of the adoptive parents; it implicitly maligns the birth parents, even 
while turning a blind eye to them. At first glance, the birth parents are simply 
ignored. There is no place in the metaphor for them: The only roles are God, 
who is played by the adoptive parents, and the new heir, whom the adoptee 
is cast to play. In line with the change of social status often seen in both the 
Hebrew Bible and the Roman adoption practice, the metaphor notes that the 
believer had been enslaved but is now a son. In Romans, Paul refers to human-
ity as formally enslaved to sin, and thus in the biblical context, the imag-
ery of slavery is to an abstract master (Rom. 6.6, 16–20); however, according 
to another atonement metaphor known as the ransom theory, humans are 
enslaved to devil. This atonement theory views Christ’s death as payment to 
the devil to free humanity from bondage. The ransom theory was not really 
developed until the third century in the work of Origen, and is rooted in a dif-
ferent set of biblical passages, but these atonement images and theories end up 
being conflated in evangelical Christian thinking, resulting in an amalgama-
tion of ransom and adoption imagery.14 Thus, while the impact of the adoption 
metaphor’s reference to slavery originally would have emphasized the change 
in legal status, when the metaphor is read in light of the ransom theory and 
appropriated to support adoption of children, the lens of Christian theology 
suggests the birth parents as evil. Evangelical leader and adoptive father Rus-
sell Moore insists that birth parents should not be equated with Satan, but he 
states this because he himself draws on this theological framework to explain 
that adoption in Christ means a transfer from old fatherhood to a new one: 
“We are no longer Satan’s children” (121). His very choice to use the imagery 
of being Satan’s children ties these ideas together even as he professes to deny 
their association.
Additional association between adoption and the ransom theory of atone-
ment comes from linking adoption fees with the cost of redemption. For 
example, the adoption grant organization Orphan’s Ransom compares adop-
tion fees to the price Christians were bought for and offers financial support 
to Christians who adopt (Orphan’s Ransom). While there is no reference to 
Satan, there does not need to be: The contextualization of adoption fees in the 
ransom atonement theory suggests that the child’s earlier life is one of sin and 
 14. Some find a biblical basis for the ransom atonement theory in passages such as 1 Cor-
inthians 6:20, 1 Peter 1:18, and Mark 10:45.
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darkness and the adoption is what saves the child from that darkness. Fund-
raising is common for evangelical adoptions, and the church community is 
called on to help with this ransom. Russell Moore even sees the payment as 
part of spiritual warfare (53, 177–78).
If through adoption in Christ believers have a new identity that oblit-
erates the old one, if that new identity is bought with a ransom to free the 
sinner from the devil, and if this metaphor is justification for and a call to 
the adoption of children, then the theological framework leaves its mark on 
our understanding of the practice of adoption. How can adoption not clearly 
be the better choice? Indeed, as the deity predestined believers for adoption 
(Galatians), did this same God not predestine these children for adoption? 
Adoption becomes the default choice; the association of the birth parents with 
the devil—however obliquely—helps reinforce the idea that God’s desire must 
be for child removal rather than family preservation. This vilification of the 
birth family accords with persisting prejudices about the poor and families 
of color that attribute their struggles to moral failings and bad choices. This 
belief provides a theological justification to oppose governmental social ser-
vices that might benefit such families.
While this theological framework already indirectly supports the role of 
the church and Christian families as a solution to the needs of these children 
instead of government agencies or policies, there is also unambiguous lan-
guage in the evangelical orphan care movement framing the issue of orphan 
care as one that is the responsibility of the church and not the state. For exam-
ple, in Orphanology evangelical ministers and adoptive parents Merida and 
Morton fault spiritual warfare along with “ineffectual governmental systems” 
for the number of “fatherless children” in the world and for the fact that the 
adoption process can be difficult (93). The only accepted role for the govern-
ment seems to be for it to align public policy with the orphan care movement. 
Merida and Morton encourage political engagement if it can be discerned 
that government policy or action might help the adoption of orphans. As an 
example of how the government can help, they mention how Christian lobby-
ists effected a change in US immigration policy that allowed families to adopt 
children with HIV from abroad (105). They offer no examples of government 
policies to help family preservation. Their focus is only on the orphans, and 
they argue that orphan care is the responsibility of the church; the state clearly 
needs to get out of the way.
Russell Moore argues against government involvement in Adopted for Life. 
Moore is an adoptive father as well as a leading evangelical theologian and 
president of the Southern Baptist Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission. 
He notes that Christians should both work to alleviate the poverty that some-
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times is the reason for children being relinquished and at the same time take 
care of the children who have been orphaned. However, he never advocates 
for governmental programs or policies. In fact, he insists that the care of the 
vulnerable is the job of the church and not the government. Referring to a 
popular but controversial saying in the 1990s—“it takes a village”—Moore 
comments that it does not take a village if we mean the state. He argues that 
the proverb is biblically sound only if we mean the church: “The Bible’s call 
to protect the widow and the fatherless is written to no one individual—and 
certainly not to Caesar’s government” (115, 190–91). The focus of the evan-
gelical orphan care movement is in line with this view, calling on the church 
community to care for the children and the adoptive families emotionally, 
spiritually, and financially. While there may be vague encouragement about 
working to end poverty, the clear focus is on Christian adoption rather than 
birth family preservation.
The Christian Alliance for Orphans (the advocacy group behind Orphan 
Sunday) also favors the role of churches over that of the state:
Government can play a vital role in child protection, but government can 
never provide the love, nurture and sense of belonging children need to 
thrive. That happens only one home and family at a time. Consequently, the 
Church cannot outsource James 1:27. Churches possess the unique capacity, 
community and clear command to do this in an effective, sustainable way. 
Local churches must play the central role, both in embracing children and in 
embracing the families that embrace children. (CAFO, “About Us”)
We see in this passage both the privileging of adoptive parents over birth fam-
ilies as well as the support of a neoliberal agenda. While the government is 
granted a role, the real work clearly belongs to the churches and should not 
be outsourced. James 1.27 is shorthand to identify the command of orphan 
care. While the biblical text calls on Christians to care for orphans and wid-
ows, only children are mentioned here: Government is to protect children; 
churches are to embrace children. Churches are also to embrace families that 
embrace children, but unmistakably this refers to adoptive and foster fami-
lies, not birth families. Identifying the government role as that of protecting 
children calls to mind child protective services, which often removes chil-
dren from birth families. Consider how this passage would read differently if 
instead the government was granted the vital role of supporting families.
Framing adoption as foundational to the mission of the church and, even 
more, as an imitation of the gospel glorifies adoption over any other kind of 
orphan care, prioritizes adoption into evangelical families over family pres-
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ervation, and dismisses the birth mother from consideration. Furthermore, 
adoption as an observable parallel to atonement theology promotes adoption 
of nonwhites by American white evangelicals in order to make adoption and 
the church visible to the world. In all this, adoptive parents are ultimately 
privileged in their behavior and interests because their actions parallel the 
deity’s: They are elevated as the ones who offer salvation. The result is a narra-
tive that reinforces adoption and the church as the solution to a very complex 
social situation.
The Doctrine of Adoption and the Neoliberal Agenda
There is an idealized view of adoption as a win-win situation in which couples 
who want children provide a family for children who need one. The children 
are lucky and chosen; the adoptive parents are commended for saving a child. 
The birth mothers are grudgingly commended for making a loving choice. 
The practice of adoption is more complex than the idealized narrative and 
happens for a myriad of often interconnected reasons, ranging from social to 
economic factors. Whether it is a domestic or transnational adoption, rarely 
does adoption involve a true orphan—a child with no living parents—and 
more rarely does it involve a child without any extended family (Graf; UNI-
CEF). Most often, the child moves from a marginalized or disenfranchised 
family to parents who are middle class or wealthy and white. Given the com-
plexities surrounding adoption, the ethical issues, and the psychological dif-
ficulties that sometimes affect the children and birth families, adoption is a 
debated practice.15 Clearly, given the economic factors that often lead to the 
relinquishment of a child, welfare provisions provided by the US federal or 
state government—in the form of such things as food stamps, affordable hous-
ing, childcare subsidies, or medical care—contribute to family preservation. 
Similar economic policies and state support would also increase the possibility 
of family preservation in countries that are large sending nations for interna-
tional adoption.16 One might think the family values often promoted by evan-
gelical Christians in America would be in line with such economic policy. The 
political reality is not the case. In the evangelical Christian narrative, the solu-
tion is adoption: The fatherless family needs a father. The theological narrative 
behind the evangelical orphan care movement supports the removal of the 
 15. Pound Pup Legacy is a voice within the adoption community dedicated to discussing 
problems in adoption and foster care.
 16. See Laura Briggs’s discussion of socioeconomic factors in transracial and transnational 
adoptions in Somebody’s Children.
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child from the birth family, glorifies adoption, and ultimately lends support 
to the neoliberal ideal that minimizes state support for impoverished single 
mothers while seeking private solutions for children in need.
The movement appropriates the Bible to reshape a complex problem of 
women and children into a dramatic and preordained act of salvation on the 
part of the adoptive parents. The theological context ultimately centers the 
needs, wants, and perspectives of the adoptive parents. The child is the object 
of their wants and salvific actions, and he or she is to be grateful to the adop-
tive parents as Christians are to be to their God. The birth mother is kept 
backstage, having been written out of the production.
With the adoptive parents firmly identified with God, ethical concerns 
associated with adoption and foster care are effectively dismissed. Coercion, 
deception, and a system that prioritizes adoptive or foster families over birth 
families are all acceptable risks of evangelism. In the case of international 
adoption, this Gospel-centered adoption takes advantage of Western privilege 
to victimize women in developing nations as a form of Christian neocolonial-
ism. In domestic adoption and foster care, God’s heart for adoption allows the 
desires of wealthy, privileged members of society to take precedence over the 
needs and wishes of vulnerable women and their attempts at family preserva-
tion. The Bible and culture intersect to contribute to the vulnerability of cer-
tain women while promoting the interests of others, namely white evangelical 
Christian women. While clearly benefitting these women over others, the the-
ology of the evangelical orphan care movement is a theology of patriarchy that 
fundamentally privileges God the Father.
Works Cited
ABBA Fund. www.abbafund.org. 
Adoptive Families Circle. www.adoptivefamiliescircle.com/blogs/. 
America World Adoption. “One Orphan.” www.awaa.org/one-orphan. 
The Bible. The New Oxford Annotated Version: New Revised Standard Version, 4th ed., Oxford 
University Press, 2010.
Briggs, Laura. Somebody’s Children: The Politics of Transracial and Transnational Adoption. Duke 
University Press, 2012.
Christian Alliance for Orphans. “About Us.” cafo.org/about/. 
———. “Core Principles.” cafo.org/about/core-principles/. 
Cooper, Melinda. Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era. University 
of Washington Press, 2008.
Cruver, Dan. “Adoption of the Prodigals.” Reclaiming Adoption: Missional Living through the 
Rediscovery of Abba Father, Cruciform Press, 2011, pp. 7–18.
60 • CHAPTER 2
Dillon International. “Our Mission.” www.dillonadopt.com.
Ephesians 3:20 Foundation. “Do You Qualify for a Grant?” www.eph320foundation.org/. 
Graf, E. J. “The Lie We Love.” Foreign Policy, 6 Oct 2009, foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/06/
the-lie-we-love/.
Hatmaker, Jen. “Jen Hatmaker—Examining Adoption Ethics: Part One.” 14 May 2013, jenhat-
maker.com/blog/2013/05/14/examining-adoption-ethics-part-one. 
HCCH. “Adoption Section.” www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/specialized-sections/
intercountry-adoption. Accessed 15 Dec. 2017.
Joyce, Kathryn. Child Catchers: Rescue, Trafficking, and the New Gospel of Adoption. Public 
Affairs, 2014.
Medefind, Jedd. “Orphan Sunday 2016 Blew Us Away!” Christian Alliance for Orphans, 22 Nov. 
2016, cafo.org/2016/11/21/orphan-sunday-2016-blew-us-away/. 
Merida, Tony, and Rick Morton. Orphanology: Awakening to Gospel-Centered Adoption and 
Orphan Care. New Hope Publishers, 2011.
Miller, Adam. “Panel: Adoption Part of the Great Commission.” Baptist Press, 9 July 2012, www.
bpnews.net/38228/panel-adoption-part-of-the-great-commission.
Moore, Russell. Adopted for Life: The Priority of Adoption for Christian Families and Churches. 
Crossway, 2015.
Orphan’s Ransom. “Welcome to Orphan’s Ransom.” orphansransom.blogspot.com/. 
Piper, John. “Adoption: The Heart of the Gospel.” Reclaiming Adoption: Missional Living through 
the Rediscovery of Abba Father, edited by Dan Cruver, Cruciform Press, 2011, pp. 95–107.
Pound Pup Legacy. “About Us.” poundpuplegacy.org/about. 
The Schuster Institute for Investigative Journalism. “Fraud and Corruption in International 
Adoptions,” www.brandeis.edu/investigate/adoption/index.html.
Show Hope. “Our Story.” showhope.org/about-us/our-story/. 
Shull, Shay. “Party of Five.” Mix and Match Mama, 27 June 2016, misandmatchmama.
com/2013/08/party-of-five/. 
Solinger, Rickie. Beggars and Choosers: How the Politics of Choice Shapes Adoption, Abortion, and 
Welfare in the United States. Macmillan, 2001.
UNICEF. “Orphans.” 15 June 2015, www.unicef.org/media. 
Weber, Jason. “One Question from a Pastor Changed Things for Hundreds in Foster Care.” Chris-
tian Alliance for Orphans, 11 Aug. 2017, cafo.org/2016/08/05/one-question- 
pastor-changed-things-hundreds-foster-care/. 
Wright, Dawn, and Jason Wright. “Our Family Story.” Wright Family USA—Are These Kids All 
Yours?, arethesekidsallyours.blogspot.com/p/blog-page.html.
61
C H A P T E R  3
White Futures
Reproduction and Labor in Neoliberal Times
HEATHER MOONEY
UNTIL 2016, Mexico was among the “rising stars” in destination commercial 
gestational surrogacy.1 Following the 2014 bankruptcy of Planet Hospital, a 
California-based hospital that connected domestic clients with international 
providers (Lewin), international surrogacy programs developed to capture 
the burgeoning market. Catering largely to same-sex couples, Mexico-based 
clinics deployed a niche marketing strategy around all families. Like other 
international surrogacy destinations, Mexico was appealing to intended US 
parents given the lower cost (about one-third of US costs), availability of Eng-
lish-speaking staff, broker-client relationships that mediate across industries 
and match intended parents with contracted surrogates and oocyte vendors, 
Western medical and birthing practices, and vague philanthropic gestures 
of helping women in poverty. While these themes are present in commer-
cial surrogacy discourse globally, Mexico was unique in its representations 
of and advertising to lesbian and gay parents, its close proximity to the US, 
and its connection with US partner clinics (streamlining transportation of 
sperm, zygotes, and/or surrogates across borders). As online magazine Gays 
with Kids concisely described: “Mexico is the rising star in affordable surro-
 1. Commercial gestational surrogacy describes a procedure wherein a fertilized egg is 
implanted in a contracted laborer for the gestational period. With the increasing accessibility of 
assisted reproductive technologies, commercial surrogacy has skyrocketed in popularity across 
the globe.
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gacy for gay men who are priced out of the US market. Mexico’s advantage is 
the proximity to the US, its affordable medical and legal processes, as well as 
arrangements with Californian IVF [in vitro fertilization] clinics to create and 
implant embryos.” In January 2016, however, laws in Mexico changed to pre-
vent international surrogacy, which catalyzed hybrid clinics: California- and 
Mexico-based facilities that move Mexican surrogates and embryos across the 
US border to comply with new laws (The Fertility Institutes). Currently, in 
Tabasco—the state most popular with reproductive tourists—only heterosex-
ual couples, who are Mexican citizens, are allowed to participate in surrogacy 
(Care Surrogacy Center Mexico).
Seventy-three percent of medical tourists research destinations and hos-
pitals online (Stolley and Watson 188), making clinic websites an important 
site for analysis. From November 2014 through March 2015, I monitored seven 
websites to analyze transnational commercial surrogacy markets: CARE Sur-
rogacy Mexico, Surrogacy Cancun, IVF in Mexico, Sensible Surrogacy, IP 
Conceptions, Surrogacy Beyond Borders, and New Life Mexico. These web-
sites provide information through a series of tabs running across the tops of 
their pages, mostly on clinic services, legalities regarding contracts, FAQs, 
and so on. They boast prenatal interventions, such as sperm sorting to screen 
for genetic diseases, gender selection, and sperm washing (for intended par-
ents with HIV or hepatitis). Some of the companies, such as New Life, are 
composed of global networks with “clinics and fertility centers .  .  . in vari-
ous parts of the world,” such as China, Georgia, Kenya, South Africa, India, 
Poland, Ukraine, and Mexico. Despite different clinic locales, the websites are 
strikingly uniform and showcase photos of smiling white babies and families. 
While the window into Mexico’s destination surrogacy market was brief, this 
case study explores evolving assemblages of race and reproduction at the US/
Mexico border.
To understand emerging forms of racialization, it is imperative to analyze 
the diffuse roles technology plays in producing bodies, reproduction, popu-
lations, and imagined futures. Enabled by new technologies, the outgrowth 
of international surrogacy journeys for the relatively elite is one obvious site 
through which individuals build, stylize, manage, and imagine family and the 
symbolic future. US anti-immigration discourse, often coalescing around the 
US/Mexico border, also provides a pertinent site to understand how race is 
produced through sociopolitical rhetoric, ideological anxieties about future-
potentials, policing, and surveillance technologies. While different, surrogacy 
and anti-immigration discourses share key elements—technological advance-
ments, economic relationships restructured by neoliberal policies, and the 
accompanying visualization and management of (reproductive) futures—and, 
importantly, they both symbolically and literally employ Latinx’s bodies and 
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(embodied) labor. These commonalities, explored in this chapter, undergird 
both industries and further entrench and extend patterns of racialization.
This essay begins by situating commercial surrogacy in Mexico against 
the backdrop of neoliberal policies and ideologies that impact raced and gen-
dered labor formations in the global (bio)economy. Next, I explore emerg-
ing and competing framings of Latinx fertility in the commercial surrogacy 
market and in the mainstream anti-immigration discourse that exists in the 
US. This chapter focuses exclusively on US discourse and intended parents. 
This limited focus is because the surveilled border, (gendered) anti-immigrant 
rhetoric, and America’s emphasis on anchor babies yields a unique site for 
understanding emerging forms of racialization in the contemporary US. By 
connecting these elements, specifically the construction and production of 
families and the projection of (threatening or hopeful) futures, we can explore 
how technology—as a constellation of sites, techniques, discourses, materials, 
and apparatuses—is employed and deployed in emerging forms of racializa-
tion. Following, I focus on how inclusive commercial surrogacy programs, like 
the pre-2016 clinics in Mexico that advertised explicitly beyond the hetero-
normative family structure, constructed all families through latent iterations 
of whiteness, futurity, techno-science, and consumption.
Finally, this analysis examines competing, future-oriented assemblages of 
racialization, where techno-scientific productions of hopeful or threatening 
futurity vis-à-vis family and fertility racialize bodies and populations, enabled 
and obscured by neoliberal market formations. Again, surrogacy and anti-
immigration discourses are analyzed side by side, as both are saturated with 
future-oriented projections, which racialize through emerging technologies 
and biopolitically manage, surveil, and construct reproduction. In surrogacy 
markets and anti-immigration discourse, new visions of bodies (affect, move-
ment, parts) made possible by technology (heat sensors, digital eyes, drones, 
macroscopic images of cells) extend patterns of racialization beyond mor-
phology while paradoxically signifying on the future through projections of 
(raced) reproduction as threatening or hopeful. Though camouflaged by the 
intersecting neoliberal discourses of volunteerism, choice, and commerce, a 
clearer vision of a raced future emerges when looking across different forma-
tions of racialized labor and transnational flows of bodies, body parts, and 
capital.
Neoliberalism, Race, Gender, and Labor
Contemporary commercial gestational surrogacy is undergirded by neo-
liberal economic policies encouraging privatization, retrenchment of wel-
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fare states, lowered taxation, reduced state involvement in the economy, and 
opening of international borders for unfettered movement of capital, labor, 
and goods. Neoliberal labor practices continue to crumple existing regula-
tions on employment, wages, worker rights, and labor conditions, making 
labor increasingly deleterious to employees and these effects largely invisible 
to consumers. These practices are coupled with future-facing, self-improving 
neoliberal subjectivities, anchored to the narrative of agency, free choice, indi-
vidualism, and self-sufficiency, which in turn serve to obscure the socioeco-
nomic systems that effectively constrain choice.
Commercial gestational surrogacy and other forms of embodied/affective 
labor have been identified as stratified labor—that is, as Colen describes, how 
“physical and social reproduction tasks are accomplished differentially accord-
ing to inequalities that are based on hierarchies of class, race, ethnicity, gender, 
place in a global economy” (Twine 3). Neoliberalism exacerbates preexisting 
racialized and feminized labor formations, inviting women to work in posi-
tions of precarity that are associated with stratified labor more broadly. Cur-
rently, commercial surrogacy follows an existing neoliberal road map in which 
corporations invite low-cost, subcontracted surrogates to enter the global 
(bio)economy, promising a win-win for both consumers and laborers.
Predating neoliberal policies and amplified by their implementation, 
migrant labor within and across borders is notably gendered and raced. When 
studying women’s migratory patterns, Ehrenreich and Hochschild note, “as 
women have become an ever greater proportion of migrant workers, receiving 
countries reflect a dramatic influx of foreign-born domestics. In the [US], Afri-
can-American women, who accounted for 60 percent of domestics in the 1940s, 
have been largely replaced by Latinas, many of them recent migrants from 
Mexico and Central America” (6). In addition to care work, the overrepresen-
tation of women of color in unskilled and semiskilled factory labor abroad and 
care labor in the US is well documented. In garment production—infamous for 
dangerous conditions—the workforce is also disproportionately female (about 
70 percent) and young (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and 
Organizing). According to a 2013 report by the Center for American Progress, 
wages in Mexico (one of the top five countries in garment exportation to the 
US) declined between 2001 and 2011 by an average of 14.6 percent. Regardless 
of the task, these trends in labor are marked by hallmarks of neoliberal policies: 
lower pay; the gendered divide of the service economy; and the informalization 
and flexibility of labor made possible by subcontracting, precarious job security, 
and hours dictated by the contracting company (Monnier).
The implementation of neoliberal economic policies not only structures 
labor formations but also carries raced and gendered stereotypes. “It has been 
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pointed out that the ideal global factory worker is a young woman, often a 
teenager, who is seen by the employer as having ‘nimble fingers,’ ‘good hand-
eye coordination,’ and the ‘ability to patiently accept a repetitive task.’ .  .  . In 
the view of the West, women in the Global South are also seen as depen-
dent, submissive, repressed and controllable—characteristics that make them 
particularly desirable for exploitive labor practices” (Bonacich et al. 350). 
Likewise, the assumption that women are designed for care labor—or that 
commercial gestational surrogates are inherently altruistic, fertile, and kind—
reveal how labor is constructed vis-à-vis race and gender. Straddling neolib-
eral labor formations—from factory labor to domestic work to reproductive 
labor—“the construction of the ‘Third World female worker’ in . . . the global 
division of labor is shaped by both race and gender oppression” (Bonacich et 
al. 350), which legitimizes stratification through concrete policies as well as 
supposedly natural characteristics.
Neoliberalism and Surrogacy in Mexico
Neoliberal policies have extended wage and labor stratification, signifying 
and (re)producing racialized and gendered systems in the global bioecon-
omy, which is manifest in Mexico’s commercial surrogacy market. Previously, 
altruistic surrogacy was legally allowed in Mexico. In turn, contracts varied 
greatly, from obligations-oriented to rights-oriented (including the right of 
the woman to have a say over the contracted pregnancy). Surrogate labor-
ers at times were required to stay in dormitories for the gestational period, 
though some gestated the pregnancy in their homes (Field). As clinic websites 
and existing research suggest, oocyte vendors can be sourced from anywhere 
in the world, and those vendors with white skin and features are more highly 
valued (Harrison; Schurr).
In Mexico’s pre-2016 surrogacy market, women came from a variety of 
socioeconomic and education backgrounds and reported a variety of reasons 
for participation in the industry. However, the “common denominator [was] 
that .  .  . they [were] unemployed and in a tight financial situation” (Schurr 
and Perler 3). Recruited via Facebook or other means, the payment for their 
services ($11,000 to $19,000) represented about three to four times the mini-
mum wage and the average household income in Mexico (Schurr and Perler 
3). This was especially pertinent in Tabasco, where surrogacy was legal and 
the unemployment rate is highest in Mexico (Burnett). As a Mexican woman 
interviewed in The Guardian described, the monthly payments “tripled her 
previous income from working as a maid. ‘I’m doing this for my children,’ she 
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said. ‘It’s a hard job, but it’s better than prostitution, which is the only other 
thing round here that can earn you a bit more’” (Tuckman).
Most seeking surrogacy in Mexico pre-2016 were economically elite, white 
foreign nationals from Europe and the US (güeros), with white gay-identified 
men from the US as the primary clientele (Schurr 249). In Tabasco, where sur-
rogacy briefly boomed, commercial surrogacy was made illegal due to claims 
of foreigner abuse of the system. However, others believe it is less about abuse 
of children and women and more about institutionalizing heterosexism against 
the majority same-sex couples seeking surrogacy in Mexico (Burnett).
While contested in their emergence and application, the confluence of new 
technologies and existing global neoliberal labor formations propelled com-
mercial surrogacy in places such as Mexico, where existing forms of feminized 
and racialized labor are literally embodied in reproductive markets.
Framing Fertility
Although neoliberal policies structure the sociohistorical field of reproduc-
tive markets in Mexico, this section examines paradoxical framings of Latinx 
fertility. First, I analyze the construction and erasure of Latinx fertility in 
reproductive markets from the perspective of race, futurity, neoliberal dis-
course, and techno-science. Next, I examine the stereotypes of Latinx fertility 
in mainstream anti-immigration discourse. The purpose of this section is to 
examine how disparate frames of Latinx fertility reify and extend stratified 
labor formations.
Framing Fertility: Anti-Immigration Discourse
In mainstream US discourse, Latina women’s bodies, reproduction, and fertil-
ity are often rendered through vitriolic anti-immigrant rhetoric. These anti-
immigration discourses are notably raced and gendered, as they hinge on 
the supposed excess of Latinx reproduction. This pathologization of exces-
sive Latinx bodies, families, and cultures is accompanied by a discourse of 
contagion, poisonous to the supposed American lifestyle. Latinxs are targeted 
within and across multiple social silos, including academics, popular culture, 
and politics, due to perceived threats posed by proximity and perceived other-
ness. Such vitriol is the result of racism and socioeconomic anxieties under-
girded by flows of capital, representing a supposed threat to the economic 
stability of the US from its neighbor Mexico.
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For instance, the terms anchor baby or terror baby (Cohen) linguistically 
highlight the anxieties about the reproductive capacity of noncitizens as inher-
ently threatening. These terms displace the threat onto future-potential chil-
dren as always already destructive to the hegemonic social order. The anchor 
baby is a sociopolitical symbol: It is racially coded and indicates future-
directed anxieties around citizenship, reproduction, and belonging. Further, 
the anchor baby is tied to supposed malignant forms of (raced) reproduction, 
specifically related to projections of excessive Latinx fertility.
Indeed, “fears of immigrants’ sexuality and their reproductive capacities 
are not new. Race, immigration, and fertility have formed a fearsome trinity 
for much of US history” (Chavez 71). The 1968 text Population Bomb pos-
ited that high population growth in places like Latin America would catalyze 
“environmental degradation, famines, pestilence, and wars between rich and 
poor.” Alarmist news titles such as “White Americans to Become Minority 
by 2044 Thanks to Ageing Population while Hispanics Will Make up a Quar-
ter of US Citizens” predict the exact “year when minorities will outnumber 
whites” (Pleasance). In mainstream US imaginaries, the future is constructed 
as threatening: overpopulated and outnumbered by minorities, hinging on the 
supposed excess of Latinx reproduction.
Raced and sexualized nation-space is also produced through fantasy sites, 
like the online game Border Patrol where users have “one simple objective 
[.  .  .] keep them out .  .  . at any cost!” Players are able to point and shoot at 
three stereotypical “border crossers,” including a female figure with her chil-
dren labeled “breeder” (Chavez). In 2014, the adult website PornHub launched 
an atrocious miniseries that depicted the rape of Mexican women and girls 
at the US/Mexico border by border patrol agents, before forcibly returning 
the women to Mexico (O’Neil). In these sociopolitical fantasy spaces, Latinx 
women are imagined as threats vis-à-vis reproductive excess and policed for 
their imagined or physical proximity to the US nation. They are punished for 
their perceived transgression sexually or using symbols of their reproduction; 
users are invited to affirm violent US masculinity by disciplining so-called ille-
gals along raced, gendered, and (hetero)sexualized lines. While these practices 
are not inherently tied to surrogacy and those who partake, they are part of a 
broader (neo)liberal landscape where nation, reproduction, gender, and race 
are produced through a constellation of diffuse sites and practices.
In its myriad social forms, this rhetoric has had concrete effects in the 
US, where in the 1960s through today, “concerns about overpopulation,  .  .  . 
increasing Mexican immigration, rising welfare roles [sic], and the alleged 
costs of delivering the children of undocumented immigrant women in US 
hospitals influenced the identification of Mexican-origin women, who were 
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believed to have many children, as a group needing to be sterilized in the 
Southwest” (Gutiérrez and Fuentes 90). While women in general experi-
ence gendered pressures of reproduction, women of color disproportionately 
experience the reach of reproductive racism, including symbolic/discursive 
violence of “controlling images” (Collins 69), sexual violence, forced steriliza-
tions, hysterectomies given without informed consent or under duress, aggres-
sive marketing of experimental and questionable contraceptives, and invasive 
legislation in the US and internationally. In the face of such violence, women 
of color have overwhelmingly organized against white supremacist systems, 
launching covert and overt campaigns to resist myriad forms of reproductive 
oppression (Silliman et al.). In addition, while reproductive racism continues 
in diverse forms, there are mobilizations against it, such as the recent imple-
mentation and then cessation of enforced separation of migrant children from 
their families at the US/Mexico border (Gonzalez). While this does not guar-
antee migrants and their families safe entry, it does indicate some normative 
limitations on reproductive racism that emerge in US discourse. Given this 
confluence of forces, the biopolitics of race and reproduction in the context 
of neoliberalism is at once contested and clear.
Sterilization and reproductive control haunt surrogacy landscapes in Mex-
ico. For example, in the pre-2016 Mexico-based commercial surrogacy market, 
one group of prospective parents to whom surrogacy was directly advertised 
was HIV-positive couples. While developing (bio)technologies that offer new 
and exciting options to HIV-positive individuals seeking biologically related 
children, this marketing trend ran in contrast to data on sterilization—includ-
ing of HIV-positive women—in Mexico and Latin America more broadly. Dur-
ing a four-country study in 2014 (focusing on El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, 
and Nicaragua), researchers found that one-quarter of the 285 women in the 
study living with HIV reported pressure from healthcare providers to undergo 
sterilization. While HIV diagnosis and pregnancy and children strongly pre-
dicted medical pressure to sterilize, young women and women without chil-
dren also experienced pressure to sterilize from doctors. Indeed,
women who had a pregnancy in which health care providers knew they 
were living with HIV—who were either diagnosed with HIV during pre-
natal care or had a pregnancy after the diagnosis—were almost 800% more 
likely to experience pressure to sterilize. . . . In addition, we found that only 
slightly more than half of the women who participated in the study were told 
that there exists an intervention—a regimen of AIDS-fighting antiretroviral 
drugs—that can reduce the probability of HIV mother-to-child transmission 
by 98%–99%. (Feldscher)
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Using sperm washing, economically advantaged HIV-positive parents can 
reduce the possibility of HIV transmission from parent to child. Alternatively, 
Mexican women of childbearing age continue to face a real possibility of expe-
riencing pressure to sterilize due to their HIV-positive status. The contradic-
tion is clear: US HIV-positive couples were invited to reproduce biologically 
related families through Mexico-based commercial surrogacy, whereas some 
Mexican women are excluded from accessing such techno-scientific interven-
tions or from reproducing altogether. Further, women with more children 
were more likely to experience this pressure, violently enacting the contain-
ment of excessive fertility. This form of neo-eugenics (Pande 104) reflects the 
differential policing of bodies in the global (bio)economy, which manifests 
along racially and economically stratified lines. In contrast to mainstream dis-
course, Latina women’s pivotal role in assisting (white) reproduction is val-
orized through emphasis on “shared values,” family-oriented “dreams,” and 
medical innovations on surrogacy websites.
Framing Fertility: Surrogacy Websites
As Cooper and Waldby, Pande, and Deomampo have shown, the construction 
and marketing of commercial gestational surrogates’ fertility often focuses 
on the rhetorical camouflaging of commerce using gift narratives, a common 
practice in reproductive markets. Clinics often framed surrogacy using altru-
istic motivations (especially where legal codes require it), which obscures the 
social and economic conditions that inform the decision to labor as a surro-
gate. New Life Mexico noted, “We thoroughly screen our intended parents, 
surrogates and egg donors to ensure that all parties share the same values 
and commitment” (New Life Egg Donors). Surrogacy Cancun reported, “Our 
surrogates are treated with the greatest of care and attention, in line with the 
incredibly selfless act they are performing.”
Pre-2016 Mexico-based surrogacy websites also included frequent refer-
ences to tourism, as multinational fertility corporations aligned themselves 
with Mexico’s burgeoning health tourism industry. Mexico is highly ranked in 
terms of international tourist destinations, with medical tourism a booming 
segment of the tourist industry in Mexico (Oxford Business Group). Overall, 
tourism constitutes about 9 percent of Mexico’s GDP (United States–Mexico 
Chamber of Commerce). According to the Medical Tourism Association, 
“almost 12 million international visitors arrived in Mexico in 2013, 6.5 million 
of the visitors were from the US.” Patients Beyond Borders describes, “The 
lion’s share of medical travelers to Mexico patients are regional—from Texas, 
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Nevada, Arizona and Southern California seeking easy access to affordable 
dental care and cosmetic surgery. However, patients from Canada and the UK 
are also drawn to the region due to the lack of waiting times from overbur-
dened public healthcare systems and the lure of the warm Caribbean waters.”
In Mexico, medical tourism locations were strategically located in tourist 
areas. For instance, Surrogacy Cancun states,
Cancun is extremely friendly to tourists as direct flights arrive daily from the 
US, Canada, the UK, Russia, and other countries. . . . An additional benefit 
to starting your surrogacy journey in Cancun is the sheer number of tourism 
opportunities that also exist. From the incredible beaches, to the amazing 
Mayan temples like Chitzen Itza and Tulum, to the ecotourism opportuni-
ties in places like Xel Ha, there is something for everyone. It will make your 
surrogacy journey to Cancun even more memorable.
“Surrogacy journeys” are situated within broader enterprises of experiential 
travel, replete with a “sheer number” of “opportunities” integral to the tourist/
consumer experience. Surrogacy, and the (future) consumers therein, becomes 
folded into tourism and vice versa. Pre-2016 commercial surrogacy in Mexico 
mirrored existing patterns where economically elite and, often, white bodies 
moved unperturbed across borders, following sociohistorical flows of capital, 
labor, and biopower. Commercial gestational surrogacy in Mexico capitalized 
on existing industries, including the tourism industry.
Brokering strategies—wherein intended parents are connected with sur-
rogates through a third party—were common to the industry. CARE answers 
“How Can We Build a Family?” by stating, “Gay male couples who are pursu-
ing their dreams of building a family are able to use donated eggs with the help 
of a gestational surrogate. [CARE makes] the process for gay male couples as 
straightforward as possible, helping you not only select the proper surrogate 
mother but also providing meticulous legal guidance.” This process facilitated 
client-to-clinic relations while framing and constructing the surrogate labor-
ers as requiring surveillance and social control. Surrogacy Cancun’s “Common 
Questions” page stated: “It is sometimes possible to meet the surrogate, but 
direct communication is not allowed during the process. If you wish to com-
municate with your surrogate .  .  . we can setup a video conference through 
our office.” On the FAQ page of Surrogacy Beyond Borders, the query “Can I 
meet the surrogate?” was answered thus: “Yes, we can arrange for you to meet 
or Skype with your surrogate once there is a confirmation of pregnancy. All 
of our meetings or Skype calls are chaperoned by our Mexico manager as we 
do not want our clients to be put in position where they could potentially be 
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leveraged for more money.” Brokering strategies and paternalistic language, 
while common in Mexico-based and reproductive markets more generally, 
constructed gestational surrogate mothers through rhetorics of control.
Framing Fertility: All Families?
While gift narratives, racial coding, tourism advertising, and brokering mod-
els are common on international surrogacy websites, the focus of pre-2016 
Mexico-based websites on all families—that is, LBTQ+, HIV positive, single, 
and other variations—was unique. This seemingly pluralist marketing strategy 
invites analysis of the neoliberal logics of choice that undergird assemblages of 
whiteness, futurity, and the constructions of family.
In the techno-scientific family-building market of commercial gestational 
surrogacy, the deployment of neoliberal choice-based rhetoric is clear. As 
Chen and Gill have both noted, “choice,” “agency,” and “freedom” are integral 
to neoliberal projects, signifying an agentic subject through consumption and 
individual desires. Similarly, neoliberal subjects are invited to actively invest 
in the future through techno-scientifically aided family production and con-
sumption. Their agentic choices can be described as entrepreneurial interven-
tions into the future—that is, choices made in the present in order to stylize 
the future (in terms of self, family, and community). In such interventions, 
futurity is produced and consumed in the process of family-building. Sur-
rogacy websites appeal to future-oriented neoliberal subjectivities by evoking 
hopes and dreams, which can be materially actualized through consumption. 
Not only is a literal child produced through the surrogacy process, but sub-
jects are also invited to construct symbolic futures through market participa-
tion. This serves the neoliberal function of agentic/subjectified production (of 
the child/future) and consumption (of the child/future).
Mexico-based surrogacy websites were consistent and unique in the plu-
ralist emphasis on all families, a term used to market toward lesbian and 
gay couples, as well as single and HIV-positive couples, who have typically 
been economically, legally, or socially prevented from adopting children or 
undertaking surrogacy arrangements (American Civil Liberties Union). Every 
website examined included a “Gay Surrogacy” tab on their homepage or a 
“Surrogacy”/ “Intended Parents” tab that led to a “Gay Surrogacy” or “Gay 
Intended Parents” option. As the “Welcome” page of New Life Mexico stated: 
“[We are] dedicated to help local and international, single, married, straight, 
LGBT and HIV-Positive intended parents realize their dream of having a child.” 
The home page of Surrogacy Cancun featured the image of two white men 
FIGURE 3.1. Surrogacy Cancun advertisement 
highlighting fertility tourism
FIGURE 3.2. Surrogacy Cancun advertisement 
showing symbolic elements of family and futurism
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embracing and smiling, with the caption “Global Leader in Same Sex Surro-
gacy” and “Gay Surrogacy With Savings up to 75%.” IP Conceptions featured 
an up-close shot of a white man and infant, with white-text overlay: “Mexico 
offers surrogacy to ALL intended parents.” Sensible Surrogacy opened with a 
white child swaddled in white blankets, underscored by “A complete family is 
within the reach of every loving couple.”
All families were vividly described and visualized on the web pages. Figure 
3.1 shows one advertisement for Surrogacy Cancun, which features a family 
nearly eclipsed by a looming, white, blue-eyed baby superimposed into the 
beach skyline.
Figure 3.2, also from Surrogacy Cancun, includes many symbolic elements 
of family and futurism, featuring two white men holding hands, walking on a 
sunny beach into their new lives. In this image, the lack of a transition (sun-
rise or sunset) suggests the shared and glorious infiniteness associated with 
the future.2 The inclusive, family-oriented future—much like these ocean-side 
strolls—are bright, infinite, and promising. Under “Our Commitment to Gay 
Surrogacy!” Sensible Surrogacy stated,
We believe all loving couples deserve the right to a complete family. In our 
contemporary culture, families come in all forms. . . . What defines a family 
is the bond between its members, not traditional stereotypes. We consider it 
our moral responsibility to assist all loving couples in the creation of com-
plete families, regardless of gender. We are committed to finding affordable, 
legitimate, and secure solutions for same sex & single parents looking to 
fulfill their dreams.
The pluralist construction of all families was vividly illustrated on these 
websites. Families are a life-right, determined by “bonds” forged “between 
members” and “not traditional stereotypes.” Borrowing from the logics of 
(neo)liberalism, families are an intentional choice, a “moral responsibility” 
and a “dream” to be “fulfilled.” The “bond” between its members is made by 
techno-scientific intervention beyond the body, tied to the desire for biolog-
ically related offspring. While indicative of important strides made toward 
social acceptance of lesbian- and gay-identifying parents, paradoxes emerge.
 2. The complete removal of darkness or nighttime in the frame not only hails futurity but 
also erases suggestions of (homo)sexuality. As latent and overt heterosexism and homophobia 
continue to manifest across the globe, this image desexualizes same-sex relationships by remov-
ing the suggestion of a gay couple together at night, while maintaining the positive associations 
with reproduction, family, and futurity.
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Who constitutes all families? In this market, who was invited to (re)pro-
duce, and who—through material and rhetorical effects—did it repress? In 
neoliberal times, what does the present-day racialization of labor flows and 
families reveal about the racialization of the future? When considering the 
evocation of all families, the racial coding on these websites made the limita-
tions of all families clear. In this instance, all families, while not necessarily 
heterosexual, were overwhelmingly white and relatively elite (Schurr 248). All 
families on these sites did not include the economically disadvantaged and 
those who labor to make all families a reality for consumers. When examined 
at these disparate sites, all families is a selectively used trope that represents a 
space of hope, dreams, and personal fulfillment through white family repro-
duction, amplified by neoliberal policies and the rhetoric of choice. In sharp 
contrast to the discourse of all families that threaded through Mexico-based 
commercial surrogacy markets, the social and political vitriol levied at Latina 
women shows how all families obscures how some families are denied repro-
ductive freedom, and labor in the production of all families.
White Futures
This final section aims to illustrate how neoliberalism and techno-science are 
complicit in the racialization of the future through disparate constructions of 
fertility. First, the connections between futurity and fertility must be made. 
The future, never reachable but constructed in present time, is paradoxically 
experienced as a space of both promise and threat (Gregg and Seigworth 
10). These dual possibilities demand contemporaneous action to maximize 
promise and alleviate threat. The “self-renewing menace potential” (Massumi 
53) of the future describes how threats produced in the present are always 
juxtaposed by hope of what is to come. Circularly, there is need of imme-
diate action to allay future-potential threat. This future paradox melds with 
neoliberal, capitalist logics through the constitutive discourses of choice and 
informed consumption, as perpetual investments are made into the future to 
create surplus value. Neoliberalism invites the mitigation of future anxiet-
ies through informed consumption and investments, which map onto exist-
ing patterns of stratification. Fertility, also related to future imaginaries and 
embedded in neoliberal logics, can be analyzed on individual and social levels 
as a part of the promise/threat paradox.
Second, the conflation of (racialized) fertility and offspring with certain 
visions of futurity is well documented, with the figural (white) Child a guiding 
specter of sociopolitical systems (Bliss 85; Edelman). As Edelman describes, 
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the Child “terroristically holds us all in check and determines that political 
discourse conform to the logic of a narrative wherein history unfolds as the 
future envisioned for a Child who must never grow up”  (11). Bliss and oth-
ers critique this, pointing to how marginalized populations have been denied 
and controlled by reproductive futurism in white supremacist systems (86). 
This essay has already articulated how the symbolic construction of futurity 
and (raced) reproduction manifests on Mexico-based commercial surrogacy 
websites and in anti-immigration discourse. While both discourses employ 
Latinx fertility and reproduction, the resulting assemblages are quite differ-
ent. On commercial surrogacy websites, Latinx fertility is tied with promise 
and hope in the production of white families. In anti-immigration discourse, 
Latinx fertility and reproduction imply the threat of (over)production of 
Latinx families. The promise/threat of futurity is rendered visible as a racial-
ized phenomenon.
One must, therefore, examine how racialized futurity is produced at these 
disparate sites. In commercial surrogacy and anti-immigration discourses, 
techno-scientific surveillance is—in part—complicit in producing future 
imaginaries. Surveillance technologies, medical industries, and labor are all 
enmeshed in neoliberal policies of production and exchange. Technologies are 
also fundamental to the (bio)mediated production of race and racialization. 
Put differently, constructions of race are actually beyond physicality; they are 
an insidious series of institutional and sociopolitical effects that produce the 
precarity racialized bodies experience. Part of this production includes new 
ways of coding and representing the body beyond morphology. As Clough 
states, “Although the visibility of the body-as-organism still plays a part, the 
biomediated body allows the raced body to be apprehended as information” 
(220), through which racialization and social control newly manifest.
Both surrogacy and immigration share a preoccupation with surveillance 
over bodies, bodily affect, and body parts, qualifying and quantifying data 
about body composition, surfaces, and movement through informatic bio-
mediation. Surveillance mechanisms—such as heat and motion sensors, digi-
tal eyes, drones at the border, or biomedical monitoring of a fertilized egg 
and the laborer that houses it—that “[apprehend] as information” (Clough 
220) are complicit in racialization beyond physical morphology. The surface 
and movement of the body is re-visioned through techno-scientific surveil-
lance, in turn reassembling and extending racialized productions of fertility 
and futurity along familiar lines.
Products of US border surveillance technology produce popular con-
ceptions of an overflowing Mexican citizenry, (re)producing the larger anxi-
ety of overpopulation. The US/Mexico border is monitored in border patrol 
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offi  ces and by civilian groups like Secure Border Intelligence, who provide 
interactive maps allowing users to explore grainy footage collected by night 
cameras, heat sensors, live radio streams, and mobile drones. Most of these 
videos, like the one in fi gure 3.3, show slow and seemingly endless processions 
of people walking “north,” while others depict the corralling and arrest of pre-
sumably immigrants by border patrol agents.
Th e border images produced by such surveillance invoke (future) threat 
vis-à-vis depictions of illicit movement, further circulating the aff ective logics 
of uncontrollable excess. Both explicitly and implicitly, these techno-mediated 
representations reference the supposedly excessive reproduction of Latina/xs, 
producing charged discourses around “swarms of illegal aliens crossing the 
US Border” (National News Channel), or the 2018 migrant caravan allegedly 
concealing terrorists who threaten US national security (Youseff  and Caldwell; 
Epstein and Sink).
Techno-scientifi c border surveillance footage stands in stark contrast to 
the images of reproductive surveillance on commercial surrogacy websites. 
In contrast, surrogacy websites erase surrogate laborers and employ techno-
scientifi c images to incite promise and hope. First, surrogate laborers are 
markedly absent from clinic websites. Th e “present absence” (Smith 9) of sur-
FIGURE 3.3. “Secure Border Intel”
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rogates is telling, particularly since this absence is whitened, filled with images 
of white families and babies. Whiteness, of consuming families and future 
children, is prominently featured on web pages. When visible, pregnant bel-
lies—as a stand-in for surrogate laborers—are often white or ambiguously 
raced.
Second, the surrogate’s body and labor are often replaced with images 
of the IVF process, such as a macroscopic shot of a needle piercing an egg. 
These repeated images represent the fertilization of the intended parents’ 
(commissioned) egg prior to its implantation in the surrogate mother. On 
the clinic websites, Latinx fertility is sanitized, contained, or erased, and 
the future child (signified by cells) is curated, protected, and coupled with 
rhetoric of pregnancy and labor as “selfless,” “altruistic,” and “kind.” In the 
computer-generated, microscopic images of assisted reproduction, the single 
egg mid-IVF signifies the miracle of life and the miracle of science, while also 
showcasing the sanctity of white (future) life within it. These images are part 
of the broader assemblages of racialized reproduction and racialized futures, 
with one image of Latinx reproductive capacity signifying the miracle and the 
other the contaminant.
The (bio)technical visual field that extends and produces knowledges and 
future-potentials builds on existing forms of stratification and narratives, 
ultimately reifying the sociohistorical biopolitics of (raced) reproduction. 
On pre-2016 Mexico-based commercial surrogacy websites, Latina women’s 
fertility was reconstructed through the discourse of future-promise rather 
than future-threat, a site of promise rather than a site of destruction via unre-
strained population growth or inherent illegality. Conversely, the so-called 
illegal immigrant is placed under police surveillance with state-of-the-art 
technology to protect the US border and the white citizens and space. The 
projected risk/value to racialized neoliberal futurity is monitored and con-
trolled accordingly, both with material impacts on Latina women’s bodies 
and reproduction. Both forms of techno-scientific surveillance are invested in 
present-future protection and hope—one of the US nation-space and the other 
FIGURE 3.4. Mexico Surrogacy Law
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of the commissioned fetus (further symbolic of nation itself). One hope is 
created by containing threat, the other by producing a white future child. The 
visions of overflow and malignant excess versus contained and technologized 
moderation are attached to the same body, differently deployed in construc-
tions of (white) futures.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that techno-scientific surveillance present in pre-2016 
Mexico-based commercial surrogacy websites and border monitoring serves 
to racialize the hopeful or threatening future by differently deployed visions 
of Latina/x women’s fertility. Both Mexican commercial surrogacy websites 
and anti-immigration discourse are part of competing assemblages of Latina 
women’s fertility. Looking across disparate socioeconomic formations, tech-
niques of racialization, violence, exploitation, resistance, and constructions of 
life itself become more salient. These constitutive processes apprehend bod-
ies and novel renderings thereof in neoliberal and biopolitical formations, 
racializing projections of futurity. These are intertwined with and grounded 
in existing and emerging labor structures, wherein the production and com-
modification of embodied labor is reified and reconstructed through new pro-
cesses of racialization. Importantly, this follows a road map of racist, sexist, 
and colonial histories, which are magnified and camouflaged by neoliberal 
policies and ideologies that frame stratified production and consumption of 
future life as a win-win.
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C H A P T E R  4
One Woman’s Choice Is Another 
Woman’s Disobedience
Seguro Popular and Threats to Midwifery in 
Mexico
ROSALYNN VEGA
In the Nahua region of Veracruz, Mexico, two birthing women arrive at the midwife’s 
home in the black of night. Since women are not allowed to give birth with a midwife, 
they are acting subversively. Both women are high risk: one is a young first-time mother, 
and the other has greying temples. Since local guidelines mandate that the midwife refer 
these cases to the hospital, she tacitly accepts the threat of imprisonment for defying 
government strictures.
In a wealthy neighborhood in the city of Irapuato, Yasmin sways back and forth in 
a birth pool, breathing deeply, timing her movements to the rhythm of soft music. She is 
surrounded by loved ones and the familiarity of her living room. Two young professional 
midwives reassure her. This is her third day of labor, but traumatic memories of a prior 
cesarean impel her to proceed. Finally, the baby begins crowning and moments later 
he is swimming in the water. Yasmin brings him to the surface of the water and begins 
breastfeeding him. The new family basks in their extraordinary achievement.
THIS ESSAY’S argument unfolds within the context of disparate birth expe-
riences for the indigenous recipients of Mexico’s universal health insur-
ance, on the one hand, and affluent Mexicans receiving privatized care, on 
the other. I analyze how the emergence of Seguro Popular has inadvertently 
rendered midwifery difficult to practice and inaccessible to women who do 
not purchase medical services in the private health sector. That is, by offer-
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ing medicalized birth free of charge to Seguro Popular enrollees, the modest 
out-of-pocket fees that midwives charge prove expensive in comparison. Fur-
thermore, most poor indigenous women are also recipients of Oportunidades 
conditional cash transfer stipends. The Oportunidades program provides a 
living stipend to poor mothers, conditioned on their continued obedience to 
government mandates, which include giving birth in a public hospital (where 
the likelihood of cesarean section is high). Under these circumstances, mid-
wives are forced to choose between economic insolvency or selling their ser-
vices in the private sphere to affluent Mexicans and reproductive travelers 
seeking humanized birth.
The humanized birth movement in Mexico is an outgrowth of alternative 
birth movements in Europe, Canada, and the US. Humanized birth is a broad 
term used to describe nonmedicalized birth and was used widely by my study 
subjects to encompass natural birth, water birth, home birth, and midwife-
assisted birth. In general, these births include vaginal delivery, resist the use 
of synthetic hormones and anesthesia, renounce the repetitive assessment of 
cervical dilation, and encourage a loving and pleasant environment in which 
the mother’s comfort is primary. Thus, from the perspective of humanized 
birth leaders, it is important that women eat, walk, and spend time with loved 
ones during the birthing process. A smaller subset of informants preferred the 
terms chosen birth and respected birth, thus emphasizing the importance of 
respecting women’s individual choices during the birthing process, and assert-
ing that certain medical interventions are acceptable if they were elected by 
the birthing mother.
While the humanized birth movement gained popularity in Mexico, the 
introduction of Seguro Popular discouraged midwifery practices among poor 
indigenous women. I argue that by dismantling the economic pathways by 
which most midwives earned their living, Seguro Popular, in fact, has con-
tributed to a burgeoning reproductive tourism industry, oriented around the 
humanization of birth.
Methods
This essay is based on twenty-eight months of in-depth research across thir-
teen Mexican states, from October 2010 to November 2013. Following Wilson,1 
 1. Wilson combines case studies from a variety of modern markets in order to paint a 
multifaceted portrait of the global economy. Similarly, my ethnographic work was organized 
around a variety of ethnographic sites through which I provide a detailed and complex descrip-
tion of traditional Mexican midwifery as a site of inclusion and exclusion.
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I found different vantage points through which recent shifts in birth practices 
and healthcare can be examined. This method has been used by both Ameri-
can and Mexican anthropologists and harks back to Marcus and Menéndez. 
Echoing the multi-sited work of Rayna Rapp on amniocentesis, I uncovered 
inequality by interviewing people with a broad array of positionalities vis-à-
vis midwifery and humanized birth in Mexico. In my research, I compare the 
experiences of Mexican women at both ends of the socioeconomic spectrum, 
thus revealing the powerful effects of affluent Mexicans and reproductive trav-
elers seeking demedicalized births on the practice of traditional midwifery in 
Mexico.
This type of comparative research required redefining my preconceived 
notion of an ethnographic field site. The field I identified was not a site per 
se, but rather a network of people. I began with professional midwives in San 
Miguel de Allende, Guanajuato. These midwives connected me to other pro-
fessional midwives practicing in other states,2 and as I traveled across Mexico 
for participant observation and in-depth interviews, I also gained access to 
the clientele of this extended group of professional midwives. Through my 
attendance at multiple humanized birth conferences, I recruited more couples 
and humanized birth attendants, including physicians and obstetric nurses, 
to my study. Simultaneously, I volunteered at nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), gaining access to training workshops for indigenous traditional mid-
wives. Having befriended a few indigenous midwives, and while staying as a 
guest in their homes during repeat visits to their villages, I witnessed their 
interactions with indigenous women and the traditional midwifery care they 
provide. Finally, I observed medical professionals and maternity patients in 
both private and public hospital settings and solicited interviews with physi-
cians and policy makers.
The Scripting of Seguro Popular
After intense structural readjustment between 1983 and 1995, Mexico intro-
duced neoliberal health reforms involving serious cuts in social spending, 
the privatization of public assets, and the reduction of trade barriers, which 
resulted in decreased salaries and limited employment (Laurell). The belief 
was that structured pluralism and market forces would foster competition, 
thus producing higher quality care at lower cost. This logic shaped the reform 
 2. My multi-sited research includes the states of Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, the Fed-
eral District, San Luís Potosí, Veracruz, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Michoacán, Hidalgo, 
Querétaro, and Nuevo León.
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of employment-based health insurance schemes in 1995 to 1997 and in 2007 
and was also the guiding logic during the scripting of Seguro Popular in 2004 
(113). Instead, Mexico experienced an increasing deficit in the health sector. 
Laurell explains that within this context, Seguro Popular was proposed, in 
spite of “its limited packet of services; lack of medical facilities, personnel, 
and equipment; and insufficient budget to guarantee what it promises, etc.” 
(116; my translation).
Since 2004, Seguro Popular has expanded to include 55.6 million people. 
According to the World Bank, 72.32 percent of Mexico’s poor were enrolled 
in Seguro Popular by 2012. The right to health entitles enrollees to receive all 
interventions listed in the Universal Catalogue of Health Services (CAUSES) 
free of charge. Seguro Popular offers basic medical services in the areas of 
internal medicine, general surgery, obstetrics and gynecology, and pediatrics. 
This Selective Primary Health Care (SPHC) strategy is based on the prin-
ciple of cost-effectiveness; as a result, CAUSES excludes most treatments for 
chronic illness and all expensive interventions.
It is noteworthy that CAUSES does not include services for specific ill-
nesses and diseases; rather, it is a catalogue of concrete interventions that can 
be reimbursed through Seguro Popular insurance. For example, instead of 
including cervical dysplasia, CAUSES includes pap smears for female enroll-
ees; as a result, once the patient has been diagnosed with cervical cancer, she 
is not provided with financial assistance, and treatment must be paid out of 
pocket.
The interventions covered by Seguro Popular especially target pregnancy, 
birthing, and early infancy, whilst primary causes of death in Mexico (neu-
rological and vascular diseases, cancer, heart attack, cirrhosis, nephritis, and 
severe injury) are excluded. Laurell found that Seguro Popular enrollees are 
overwhelmingly women (82.4 percent), of whom nearly all are of reproduc-
tive age (94.3 percent are between 15 and 44 years old). Given these statistics, 
it is unsurprising that 61.2 percent of hospital visits made by Seguro Popular 
insured are related to pregnancy and birth (77). Laurell notes that despite this 
emphasis on pregnancy and birth, there has not been a significant reduction 
in maternal mortality. She speculates that the uneven coverage of Seguro Pop-
ular across different states and the “diversion of funds transferred to Seguro 
Popular to different ends” are potential culprits (77).
While cost-cutting is an announced goal, ironically, costly cesarean sec-
tions are performed in public hospitals at more than three times the World 
Health Organization (WHO) recommended rate. This essay points to the con-
tradictions between global health metrics such as WHO-recommended cesar-
ean section rates and the unfolding of citizenship-based healthcare programs 
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such as Seguro Popular. I contrast global health goals with the lived realities 
of Mexican women—specifically, their inability to choose the birthing process 
within the context of an emerging universal health insurance that mandates 
medicalized birth, which often results in cesarean section. In essence, I argue 
that neoliberalism severely threatens the future viability of traditional mid-
wifery and poor and indigenous women’s access to such care.
The Effects of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and Seguro Popular on Midwifery
In 1997, the Center for the Adolescents of San Miguel de Allende (CASA) 
established a professional midwifery school and maternity clinic in Guana-
juato, the heart of Mexico, the first accredited professional midwifery school 
in Mexico. The CASA model has since been replicated in the states of Guer-
rero and Oaxaca—states with extreme poverty, large indigenous populations, 
and high maternal mortality rates. All three schools aim to recruit and train 
young women from rural and indigenous backgrounds with the hope that 
they will return to their natal villages to practice midwifery and thus reduce 
maternal mortality in places marked by the absence of medical resources and 
infrastructure.
In the state of Chiapas, however, a professional midwifery undergradu-
ate program with the same recruitment strategy has received serious accu-
sations from indigenous medicine practitioners of propelling the demise of 
traditional midwifery techniques. In a recently circulated letter, the midwives, 
indigenous doctors, and health promoters of the Organization of Indigenous 
Doctors of the State of Chiapas (OMIECH) claimed that the professional 
midwifery program was threatening traditional birth. The letter defended the 
continued need for traditional indigenous medicine in the state of Chiapas 
and denounced premeditated “ethnocide of indigenous midwifery.” OMIECH 
also challenged claims of “reducing the maternal mortality rate through the 
professionalization of midwifery” and critiqued how maternal mortality met-
rics were deployed to reinforce the hegemony of biomedical ideology and the 
undoing of traditional midwifery.3 They further pointed to how both the state 
and federal health sectors lack the financial and structural resources to employ 
professional midwifery graduates, thus contributing to the privatization of 
midwifery and the undermining of midwifery’s core values.
 3. See Adams.
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Of the CASA midwifery students I tracked over the course of nearly four 
years, very few chose to practice in high-need contexts after graduation. 
Instead, they chose to make a living selling private sector services in cities, 
and a couple of entrepreneurial-minded graduates planned to pursue lucra-
tive opportunities in the destination birth industry by opening a casa de parto 
(a natural birth center) on the beach in Baja California. In the past few years, 
more and more wealthy couples from around the world have begun traveling 
to Mexican beach destinations to have a natural birth while, in the words of 
one informant, “swimming with the dolphins.” These births are referred to as 
destination births, thus signaling their political and economic similarities with 
destination weddings. These midwives observed the financial success of Euro-
pean counterparts and obstetricians practicing humanized birth in the Tulum, 
Playa de Carmen, and Puerto Vallarta areas.
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight international develop-
ment goals established after the Millennium Summit of the United Nations 
(UN) in 2000. All 191 member states of the UN and more than twenty inter-
national organizations agreed to meet these goals by 2015. While MDGs 4 
(reduce child mortality) and 5 (improve maternal health) provide the impetus 
for philanthropic organizations and international donors to support the pro-
fessionalization of midwifery in Mexico, professional midwifery services often 
do not reach their target population (the poorest women with the least access 
to gynecological services due to insufficient infrastructure and racial discrimi-
nation). This population includes indigenous women and those living in rural 
locations, since they are more likely to experience barriers when accessing 
maternal health services and their children face a greater risk of child mortal-
ity. In practice, however, the appropriate pathways are not in place to admin-
ister midwifery services to those who need it the most. Through my capacity 
as board member or volunteer at three transnational Mexico-US NGOs, I 
experienced firsthand the pressures NGOs face when seeking funding. NGOs 
submit grant proposals to funding sources using the rhetoric of MDGs, but 
funding sources’ expectations for the implementation of MDGs can be at odds 
with the lived realities and priorities of the people for whom the intervention 
is intended. The inadvertent result is the reinscription of georacial and socio-
economic health disparities in Mexico.
I witnessed one concrete example of this conflict in an NGO proposal for 
an education-based intervention on birth spacing. This proposal appealed to 
the funding source’s interest in reducing natality with the hope that this would 
lead to achieving the MDGs of reducing child mortality and improving mater-
nal health. However, the proposal was intended for indigenous women, who, 
as a community, have been suffering from violating and traumatizing experi-
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ences of forced sterilization for decades4 and for whom reducing natality was 
not a desired goal. In this instance, the need of the NGO to stay financially 
afloat played a role in wanting to carry out a project that, if funded, would 
be in stark opposition to the priorities of many among the target population.
Over the course of my fieldwork, I observed the circumstances under 
which NGOs that trained professional midwives received funding from the 
Carlos Slim Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Kellogg’s Cor-
poration. Unfortunately, many of these efforts not only made limited inroads 
in reducing child mortality and improving maternal health; they often failed 
to meet the needs of the target population. My observations signal how MDGs 
can inadvertently reinscribe inequality when neoliberal logic is used to shift 
the emphasis from public healthcare for citizens to cost-effective interven-
tions for needy recipients5. The unintended consequences of this shift in logic 
are also evident when NGO-facilitated interventions elevate the priorities of 
funders over those of the target population.
In this already fractured milieu, the emergence of Seguro Popular played 
an important role in rendering the practice of professional midwifery in high-
need settings an unviable economic strategy for professional midwives. In 
summer 2011, CASA midwifery services were included within Seguro Popular, 
supposedly rendering them free to all insurance holders. In practice, however, 
mothers seeking services had to get a referral from their assigned govern-
ment clinic in order to transfer to CASA. These referrals were virtually unob-
tainable since in Mexico, hospital-based providers encounter the economic 
stimulus of reimbursement through Seguro Popular. In other words, the gov-
ernment clinic furnishing the referral would relinquish the reimbursement 
from Seguro Popular for services rendered to the patient. In the absence of 
referrals, midwives have become the expensive option, thus reinforcing bio-
medical hegemony and driving midwifery services further into the consumer 
market. In fact, I did not witness a single midwife-assisted birth during the 
summer of 2011. The absence of opportunity left the professional midwifery 
students frustrated and anxious about their lack of training as midwives—the 
vast majority of their experience was accrued in the general hospital, where 
they complained of serving as medical assistants in highly medicalized births.
At the time of my volunteering and direct participant observation of 
CASA, Sagrario Villareal was director. At the end of summer 2011, she 
accepted a position within the Center for Gender Equity and Reproductive 
Health in Mexico City, where she created a pilot program that used secre-
 4. See Hall; also, see Frías.
 5. See my article “Racial I(nter)Dentification.”
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tary of health funding to create salaried positions for CASA graduates within 
government clinics and hospitals in the state of Guerrero. I joined her for a 
supervisory trip of these professional midwives in summer 2013. While this 
trip gave me a more nuanced perspective on the difficulties of developing the 
midwifery model within medicalized hospital settings where cesarean proce-
dures are rampant, in the intervening time, I observed how both traditional 
and professional midwives were being undercut by Seguro Popular’s obstetric 
services.6
Las parteras se vuelven caras (Midwives Become 
Expensive)
The emergence of Seguro Popular supposedly meant free prenatal and medi-
calized birth services for all insurance holders; in actuality, however, as I 
observed during my ethnographic research, indigenous women often faced 
racial discrimination in government hospitals. Furthermore, while the devel-
opment of universal health insurance was formulated as a political strategy to 
reduce health inequality among Mexicans, it has, in fact, reentrenched health 
disparities in some settings—especially in indigenous zones where a signifi-
cant number of individuals do not possess the necessary documentation to 
enroll in Seguro Popular and continue to be uninsured.7 For many of the low-
income families eligible to enroll in Seguro Popular, the economic costs of 
giving birth are perhaps the primary consideration when choosing a provider 
or attendant. Despite complaints of racism and unnecessary medicalization of 
birth, many low-income families decide to give birth in the hospitals where 
Seguro Popular is accepted rather than pay out of pocket for a traditional or 
professional midwife. For Mexico’s underclass, the decision-making process 
is shaped by serious financial constraints, thus uncovering how the neoliberal 
notion of free choice is predicated on the assumption of economic privilege 
and individual purchasing power. That is, the contrast between the natural 
births of humanized birth participants and the (at times coercive) medicalized 
births of indigenous women in government hospitals highlights the limits of 
free choice and the conditions under which choice-making unfolds in unequal 
contexts.
The introduction of Seguro Popular has had dire consequences for the 
livelihoods of traditional and professional midwives alike. I interviewed a 
 6. Here I am not labeling different types of midwives using hierarchical terms. Rather, I 
am using the terms these midwives use for themselves.
 7. See Laurell.
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Swiss midwife, Emma, the wife of a Mayan man and mother of their Mayan-
Swiss children. Emma explained that before the implementation of Seguro 
Popular, her clientele was composed of locals, but after the initiation of Seguro 
Popular, she served a wholly foreign clientele. She opined that the decrease 
in women seeking midwifery services has led to an increase in competition 
among midwives for clients, and that as a result, “las parteras son muy envid-
iosas” (the midwives are very jealous of each other). She also commented, “I 
feel that in the future, if something doesn’t change very soon, the midwife will 
only be for rich people.”
Just a short distance away from Emma’s home, Doña Carmelita receives 
patients who are referred to her from the hospital for la sobada.8 While phy-
sicians possess limited training in repositioning fetuses and, therefore, tend 
to deliver breech-positioned babies via cesarean section instead of attempt-
ing a vaginal delivery, Doña Carmelita has had tremendous success using 
Mayan techniques for external cephalic version (controlled hand movements 
to manipulate a fetus’s position), thus preventing many cesareans. Unlike the 
doctors who refer patients to her, Doña Carmelita cannot always provide ser-
vices totally free of charge to her clients. She said, “If they want my touch, I 
receive them. If not, they go with Seguro Popular because it’s free.”
Another traditional midwife, Doña Esmeralda, complained that Seguro 
Popular has taken away all her clients. Before universal health insurance was 
implemented, she charged 600 pesos per birth (about 50 USD at the time or 
30 USD at today’s exchange rate). She would charge less and sometimes noth-
ing at all if the client were unable to pay. She told me that after the initiation 
of Seguro Popular, her fellow villagers were only willing to pay 50 pesos for a 
birth and 9 pesos for a limpia9 (about 4 USD and 75 cents at the time).
Three CASA students traveled to Aquismón in San Luís Potosí and discov-
ered that patients would only seek help from them if their services were free. 
One of them provided this exchange to me:





Only then would patients divulge their reproductive health concerns.
 8. A form of Mayan massage.
 9. An indigenous ethnomedical technique that removes illness and bad luck from the 
body.
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In Michoacán, professional midwives training at Mujeres Aliadas, a civil 
association aiming to provide reproductive services to Purepechan women, 
faced similar challenges. At the time of my fieldwork, these professional mid-
wives were charging a base price of 2,000 pesos per birth (about 160 USD). 
They applied a sliding scale based on patients’ ability to pay and instituted an 
installment payment plan. Even these adaptations were not enough to out-
weigh the allure of Seguro Popular’s free services. As a result, the users of 
Mujeres Aliadas birthing services turned out to be to middle-class mestizos, 
rather than the indigenous poor. When I interviewed Belinda, the resident 
physician at Mujeres Aliadas, she insisted that while the economic incentive 
to give birth in a hospital where Seguro Popular is accepted has been integral 
to patients’ decision to forgo midwifery services, these patients very much 
wish they had an equally affordable alternative to the overcrowding, racial 
discrimination, and ill-treatment that many experience in hospital settings.
Thus, the result of Mexico’s neoliberal healthcare system has been increased 
financial pressures for midwives, which in turn has led to the unaffordability 
of midwifery practices for the underprivileged. In fact, with the rise of repro-
ductive tourism and destination births, midwifery services are increasingly 
sold as a market-based consumer good for those with sufficient purchasing 
power.
Seguro Popular: A Neoliberal Strategy
Seguro Popular has been presented as a great healthcare success in inter-
national health forums. Many of its proponents compare it to the Univer-
sal Health System (SUS) in Brazil. Lina Berrio at the Center for Superior 
Research and Studies in Social Anthropology, however, argues that Brazil’s 
SUS is better funded than Seguro Popular, and questions the success of SUS 
given overcrowding, limited access, and long wait times.10 I would argue that 
while Seguro Popular has been labeled universal insurance, in actuality, it 
is only for those who are not enrolled in employment-based health insur-
ance. Furthermore, it is implemented distinctly in each Mexican state due to 
Mexico’s decentralized healthcare system. Although Seguro Popular is federal 
policy, health administration decisions are made at the state level, and Seguro 
Popular has not been structured to meet the particular needs of Mexicans in 
disparate contexts. Finally, while Seguro Popular is touted as a global health 
 10. Lina Berrio expressed these criticisms to me in an ethnographic interview.
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success using a rhetoric of universality, it in fact delimits and restricts public 
health services.
Also troubling is the fact that Seguro Popular has played an important role 
in furthering the privatization of the Mexican healthcare system. For example, 
when the government pharmacy lacks medication or the government hos-
pital is unable to offer a service due to a lack of equipment or personnel, 
patients are referred to private pharmacies and private hospitals. According 
to Laurell, the fact that only 6.5 percent of Seguro Popular funds nationwide 
are spent on medications suggests that the private pharmaceutical sector is 
being significantly bolstered by Seguro Popular reimbursements (99). Thus, 
the privatization of health services is not beneficial to people living in rural 
and indigenous zones. Laurell writes,
The assumption that the delivery of private services stands in for the lack of 
human and physical resources in the public sector seems to obey ideologi-
cal reasoning more than real evidence. Although there is an increase in the 
private clinics and hospitals, by definition their emergence follows profit 
interests, and it is unlikely that this expansion will occur in the poorest zones 
of the country where there is the greatest shortage. (119; my translation)
Laurell’s observations—that the institution of Seguro Popular has fueled 
privatization, which in turn follows market logics, thus authoring the aban-
donment of those living in the poorest zones of the country—were confirmed 
in my observations of Seguro Popular’s effect on midwifery. I agree with Lau-
rell’s criticism that the very conceptualization of Seguro Popular reflects neo-
liberal, US influence. Despite its veneer of responsibility for social welfare and 
services, Seguro Popular is, indeed, an extension of the neoliberal logic that 
espouses minimal government intervention, reduces the state’s responsibility 
for the welfare of its citizens, and increases privatization.
I argue that the neoliberal framing of universal health insurance as 
opposed to universal health care turns patients into consumers instead of citi-
zens.11 Essentially, Seguro Popular is a financial strategy for provisioning basic, 
cost-effective, and mostly preventative services—universal health care access 
would be needed to secure the universal right to health for all Mexicans. This 
latter framing would provide healthcare services to Mexican citizens as a citi-
zenship-based right, thus eliminating barriers to healthcare and reducing the 
degree of inequality in Mexico.
 11. See my book No Alternative.
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Intersectional Inequalities Penetrating Midwifery in 
Mexico
When analyzing the state of midwifery in Mexico, Rickie Solinger’s assertion is 
invaluable: “It is crucial to consider the degree to which one woman’s posses-
sion of reproductive choice may actually depend on or deepen another wom-
an’s reproductive vulnerability” (7). In Mexico, the humanized birth movement 
broadens the range of birth choices for women with socioeconomic and 
georacial privilege; however, this movement inadvertently usurps, fractures, 
and reinvents the traditional birthing practices of indigenous midwives while 
excluding them from profit streams.12 Here, traditional is placed within quota-
tion marks because commodified practices (such as massage techniques using 
a Mexican shawl, water birth, womb steaming, homeopathic remedies, pla-
centa art, herbal beauty balms, etc.) are marketed as indigenous, but are quite 
distinct from the birthing practices of the indigenous informants in my study. 
During ethnographic research, I observed how indigenous women defy Opor-
tunidades mandates to orchestrate covert home birth with a midwife who has 
a multigenerational inheritance of knowledge of herbal remedies, while also 
recruiting allopathic techniques in a way that is compatible with traditional 
medicine—for example, applying an IV as a postpartum blood tonic.
Couples practicing humanized birth in Mexico are often urban, middle or 
upper class, fair skinned, well traveled, and highly educated. During my inter-
views with them, many of the couples identified their nivel cultural (their cul-
tural level; that is, the degree to which they are cultured) as what distinguishes 
them from the majority of Mexicans. What their account erases, of course, are 
multiple, contingent processes of intersectional racialization.13 In this context, 
race does not strictly coincide with phenotype, but rather, refers to a social 
category resulting from a dialectic process of perception and performance of 
an individual’s positionality in society—a calculus that includes race and class, 
and ultimately maps race onto class, and vice versa.
Meanwhile, indigenous Mexican women and their traditional midwives 
are excluded almost entirely from this community. When indigeneity is 
invoked among humanized birth proponents, the object is fetishized, sepa-
rated from its cultural, socioeconomic, and geographical context, and repack-
aged for mass consumption—leading me to question if the only pathway 
to citizenship in our neoliberal age is through consumerism.14 During this 
process of commodification, the practice of indigeneity comes to represent 
 12. See my article “Commodifying Indigeneity.”
 13. See Crenshaw; also, see De Genova.
 14. See Comaroff and Comaroff; Chow; García Canclini; and Mazzarella.
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going back to nature and tradition in a way that is appealing to those seeking 
humanized birth (examples of specific indigenous practices are temascales15 
and herbal remedies). While indigenous people are often excluded from the 
consumption processes that flatten and then commodify indigenous culture, 
there are a few exceptions. During my participant observation and in-depth 
interviews, I noted that a select few indigenous midwives—only several across 
the entire country—are routinely invited to attend international new mid-
wifery conferences and forums. At these events, they perform their indige-
neity, wearing indigenous costume even if this is not their everyday attire, 
thus buttressing the uncritical claim that new midwifery is a descendent of 
traditional midwifery, and that humanized birth means going back to nature 
and recognizing our shared humanity. These few indigenous midwives have 
become representatives of traditional midwifery at transnational conferences; 
however, when I observed perhaps the most well-known of these traditional 
midwives, I noticed that her practice of more popularized techniques and 
monolingualism in Spanish may cause indigenous women to consider her to 
be on the fringes of traditional midwifery.
Indigenous birthing women also receive midwifery care, but the tradi-
tional care they receive is not celebrated—instead, it must be corrected, 
rescripted, controlled, and surveilled. The majority of women living in rural, 
indigenous villages are recipients of conditional cash transfers through pro-
grams like Oportunidades (which has since been rebranded with the name 
Prospera). While Seguro Popular and Oportunidades operated independently, 
both reflect neoliberal logic and have been lauded by the World Bank.16 Wom-
en’s stipends are conditioned on their compliance with government mandates, 
including their children’s continued attendance in school and their submission 
to vaccination programs, among other things. In the realm of reproduction, 
these women are mandated to attend five prenatal visits in the government 
clinic and give birth at the highly medicalized government hospital. Mean-
while, in many states, traditional indigenous midwives are ordered to forgo 
offering services as midwives and instead refer obstetric cases to the govern-
ment hospital. These midwives are threatened with imprisonment for homi-
cide if a woman dies in childbirth while under their care.
Professional midwives and international NGOs participate in this pro-
cess under the guise of capacitaciones (training workshops) meant to reduce 
maternal mortality. According to some of my indigenous informants, those 
running the trainings teach hygiene, nutrition, and family planning strategies 
 15. Indigenous sweat lodges.
 16. www.worldbank.org/en/results/2015/02/26/health-coverage-for-all-in-mexico and 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/19/un-modelo-de-mexico-para-el-mundo.
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that convert traditional midwives into community health workers, promoto-
ras, and hospital referralists. However, I came to realize through extensive 
interviews with those giving the trainings that the well-meaning involvement 
of professional midwives and NGO employees is bolstered by what Didier Fas-
sin describes as “humanitarian reason.” That is, those who approach encoun-
ters with needy populations from a position of privilege do so because they 
believe intervention is not only possible, but necessary. In line with Fassin I 
ask, what is lost when a rhetoric of compassion and suffering occurs in lieu of 
interests and justice, thus legitimizing actions by rendering them humanitar-
ian? Oftentimes, humanitarian encounters presuppose a relation of inequality, 
inadvertently reentrench political asymmetry, and reveal domination in the 
upsurge of compassion.
Destination Birth
Can I tell you a joke?
The good girls from the village go to have
Cesarean in the state capital,
The good girls from the state capital go to have
Cesarean in the nation’s capital,
The good girls of the country go to have
Cesarean in the United States,
And the good girls from the United States come to
Give birth in your birthing center
Here in the village.
(anonymous; my translation)
This poem, circulated by a professional midwife on social media, is written 
partially in jest, yet it provides striking insight into the traffic patterns of 
reproductive migrations in Mexico. The first part describes the experiences 
of women living in rural contexts: If they submit to bureaucratic structures, 
their pregnancies are likely to end in cesarean section in state hospitals. The 
next part of the poem refers to the “good girls from the state capital” who go 
to the nation’s capital to have a cesarean. These women are actively turning 
away from midwifery and seeking out cesareans—for them, to be treated as 
surgical subjects is to be cared for as modern beings (Roberts 77).17 The poem 
goes on to describe the “good girls of the country” going to have cesareans in 
 17. Also, see Ceclia Van Hollen’s book Birth at the Threshold: Childbirth and Modernity in 
South India.
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the United States. The last section of the poem is perhaps the most striking: 
the “good girls of the United States” come to the Mexican village to give birth 
in a birthing center.
My ethnographic research provides evidence for explaining each layer 
of this poem. During my fieldwork, I observed how supposedly hyper-fertile 
indigenous women were subject to what Morgan and Roberts describe as 
“reproductive governance” through conditional cash transfer programs man-
dating that they have medicalized births in overcrowded government hospitals 
(often in the state capital). I argue that these bad mothers are never fully able 
to achieve the status of “good girls from the village” even when they are obe-
dient to government mandates because of overlapping race- and class-based 
discrimination that, as Colloredo-Mansfeld has observed, casts them as dirty, 
ignorant, and negligent.
When these women choose or submit to the medicalization of their birth, 
they can be denied or delayed treatment with dire consequences. I interviewed 
an obstetrician in Chiapas who admitted to me that when he scans the waiting 
room, he (un)consciously makes decisions of whom to call in for treatment 
based on a hierarchy of hygiene. That is, indigenous patients often lack ready 
access to clean bathing water and may bathe every few days. Meanwhile, their 
urban, nonindigenous counterparts possess the infrastructural capacity to 
bathe daily. This physician is more likely to choose someone who has bathed 
more recently, so he tends to treat nonindigenous patients before indigenous 
patients, causing indigenous patients to wait the longest.
In Veracruz, I witnessed a fraught encounter between an indigenous mid-
wife and the director of the government hospital. The midwife had referred 
a birthing mother to the hospital, as she is instructed to do in capacitaciones 
(government-sponsored training workshops), but when her patient arrived 
at the hospital, the patient was ignored. The indigenous mother gave birth to 
a stillborn in the toilet and hemorrhaged on the floor. She was then harshly 
admonished by hospital staff for sullying the floor and was forced to clean up 
the blood.
Within the context of cash transfers, most indigenous women giving birth 
choose such hospital encounters rather than risk having their cash transfers 
reduced or halted. In conditions of extreme scarcity, they submit to a free 
medicalized birth instead of having to pay out of pocket for the midwifery 
techniques they might otherwise prefer. However, some indigenous women, 
like the birthing mother in the vignette with which I began this essay, resist 
government mandates and surreptitiously seek out local midwives. If found 
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out, their subversive actions may cause them to be labeled bad mothers, and 
their actions may be punishable.
Through ethnographic examples like the one offered in the opening 
vignette to this chapter, I consider the evaluative work on the part of indig-
enous women to achieve what they consider to be better birth outcomes. My 
work documents what the anthropologist James Scott describes as “weap-
ons of the weak”—that is, the decision-making processes of poor, rural, and 
indigenous women who either proactively seek out citizenship-based health 
services or subversively evade racial discrimination in biomedical settings by 
turning to covert midwifery services. Building upon Philippe Bourgois’s work, 
I argue that these actions, based on logical responses to an unjust reality, are 
later used by dominant sectors of society to label indigenous women as back-
ward, child-endangering, irresponsible mothers, and in dire need of humani-
tarian interventions. I suggest that while all Mexican women enjoy formal 
access to Seguro Popular health insurance, the racial discrimination experi-
enced by many of my indigenous informants in hospitals and the condition-
ality of the Oportunidades stipends they receive are indicative of substantive 
differences in access to healthcare. While indigenous mothers are racialized as 
recipients of developmental aid, the next layer of mothers position themselves 
as consumers of privatized birthing methods.
During my ethnographic fieldwork, I noted how affluent Mexicans aspired 
to inclusion in the global elite through social whitening. This desire to achieve 
elite status through consumption practices linking them to consumers in the 
developed world was paired with strategic acquisition of American birthright 
citizenship for their children. The couples I interviewed were often multina-
tionals and their logic of transnationality is in some ways similar to the “flex-
ible citizenship” Aihwa Ong describes.
The final layer of my ethnographic observations departs slightly from 
the poem since I noted that reproductive travelers seeking destination births 
in Mexico were from the global North but were not exclusively American. 
Instead, this group also included women or couples from Canada, England, 
France, Holland, Spain, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. I argue that the move-
ment at times romanticizes the birth practices of indigenous women by cast-
ing them as lingering inhabitants of a vanishing past. Furthermore, I noted 
how fervor for traditional indigenous birth practices often overlapped with 
the desire for homogenized, New Age iterations of ethnomedicine. That is, 
some reproductive tourists sample freely from ethnomedical practices (acu-
puncture, Ayurveda, Amazonian shamanism and ayahuasca, etc.) without 
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awareness of the local, political, and economic histories and current condi-
tions of the people from whom they are sampling.
Conclusion
My comparative research reveals the class-based effects of Seguro Popular on 
the birthing experiences of women. For Mexico’s underclass, Seguro Popular 
has rendered midwifery the more expensive option, and poorer families often 
turn to medicalized births solely based on cost, despite their preference for 
traditional midwifery care. On the other hand, the introduction of Seguro 
Popular impelled professional midwives to seek a living in the private sphere, 
and their services have become a source of increased status among affluent 
Mexicans.
My argument is certainly not that humanized birth practitioners are 
actively seeking to commodify indigenous birthing practices in a way that 
reentrenches social and economic inequality. Rather, I suggest that these 
mothers strive to achieve demedicalized births because they believe that this 
is what is best for their well-being and that of their child. I further suggest that 
their notion of a good birth is socially scripted and maintained. At the same 
time, however, my research signals how decision-making processes regarding 
how to achieve a good birth are structured by the socioeconomic constraints 
or freedoms that families face.
While the humanized birth movement in Mexico is motivated by well-
intentioned commitments to women’s reproductive freedom of choice, mid-
wives have no choice but to sell their services to elite women and reproductive 
tourists since Seguro Popular prohibits the use of midwifery in many indig-
enous regions. While consumers from around the world are buying romanti-
cized indigenous birth and other privatized medical services in Latin America, 
many impoverished, indigenous women are ignored and abused in hospitals. 
For these reasons, midwifery is an ideal lens for examining how neoliberalism 
is dismantling not only traditional midwifery but also poor and indigenous 
women’s access to quality care.
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C H A P T E R  5
The Work/Life Equation
Notes toward de-Privatizing the Maternal
ZARENA ASLAMI
LET ME just admit that, at the time of this writing, I have canceled class to 
be home with my sick daughter. My spouse is out of town with our son, who 
has cerebral palsy, to get a second opinion on his vision impairments. My 
daughter sleeps off a fever on the red cushy chair just a few feet from me at 
the dining room table, where I type toward a deadline. My son (I learn later) 
melts down on the floor of the examining room four states away. I will not tell 
you about all the moments that have gone into the writing of this essay, all the 
early mornings before the children wake, the writing in thirty-minute inter-
vals, the mind-fraying efforts to block out distractions, and so on. Perhaps you 
will sense those moments in the cracks of this essay. (And perhaps, you will 
sense the intimate moments, too—like watching a movie with my daughter 
when she awoke, her small body pressed into my side, or reading to and snug-
gling with my son when he returned—in the spikes of emotion in this essay.) 
But I will tell you that years before the twins were born, I read journalist Lisa 
Belkin’s much-discussed 2003 essay, “The Opt-Out Revolution,” published in 
the New York Times Magazine. At the time, it angered me. Its lack of optimism 
seemed to choke the voices of the author and the women she interviewed, 
shutting down feminist futures at what felt like every turn. So, I clipped it, 
knowing that I was not yet done with it. And, indeed, it has had a spectral 
quality, haunting the good and bad moments I have had with my children, my 
partner, and my work. It was not yet done with me either, it seems.
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You might remember it. Belkin’s article galvanized early twenty-first-cen-
tury US discourse about a powerful minority: white, educated, professional, 
heterosexual, married, working mothers. Belkin’s piece was, of course, not 
alone. It was joined later by Anne-Marie Slaughter’s 2012 “Why Women Still 
Can’t Have It All,” published in the Atlantic; Judith Warner’s 2013 follow-up 
“The Opt-Out Generation Wants Back In,” also published in the New York 
Times Magazine; and Sheryl Sandberg’s much acclaimed 2013 book Lean In: 
Women, Work, and the Will to Lead. We might also consider in this collection 
the recent media breakout figure of Ivanka Trump, who, during her father’s 
2016 presidential campaign, championed his proposed family policies and 
proclaimed herself an advocate for working mothers, eventually publishing 
her glossy Women Who Work: Rewriting the Rules for Success (2017).
These essays and books vary in tone and argument, from the celebratory if 
conflicted claim that women were making the “feminist” choice to leave work 
and become stay-at-home moms (Belkin), to the criticism that women were 
being forced out by a masculinist workplace acting against its own economic 
self-interest (Slaughter), to a confidence—buoyed by the downplayed power to 
afford domestic staff and otherwise have extraordinary abilities and resources 
at hand—that it is possible to have it all (Sandberg; Trump). Trump in par-
ticular articulates an acutely ideological blend of rhetoric around freedom and 
choice with the disavowal of the structural inequality of income and wealth 
that skews grotesquely in her favor.
But Belkin’s article, I contend, still stands out for the way it articulates 
anxiety around the problem of work/life balance. Belkin’s is not an essay about 
how hard it is to juggle everything, accompanied by stock photos of women 
in tailored business suits and high heels, briefcase in one hand, baby in the 
other. It is a thoughtful essay about high-achieving women with degrees from 
prestigious institutions who quit their professional jobs to become full-time 
mothers and who consequently experienced profound relief and anguish. 
Over the ten-plus years since it came out, Belkin’s essay has been the sub-
ject of many opinion pieces and major sociological studies, including Pamela 
Stone’s Opting Out?: Why Women Really Quit Careers and Head Home (2007) 
and Bernie D. Jones’s edited collection Women Who Opt Out: The Debate over 
Working Mothers and Work-Family Balance (2012). Data-driven, these works 
demonstrate just how much the image of high-powered mothers quitting 
their jobs to be stay-at-home moms, the drama that fuels Belkin’s article, is 
a media construction and not a sociological reality. This media construction 
performs a range of powerful ideological functions, including buttressing the 
idea that there is a rise in neotraditional values and substituting a story of 
female empowerment and choice for a critique of the structural conditions 
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that make working and raising children impossible.1 Both Stone and the schol-
ars in Jones’s edited volume concur: Given the small number of such women, 
and their status as privileged and elite, these stories of “opting out” exploit 
anxieties and also eclipse the material conditions of working parents who have 
much less in the way of support.
These sociological studies have been critical in exploding the mythifying 
power of “opting out” and drawing attention to the inequalities still inherent 
in modern heterosexual relationships and to the withdrawal of public support 
under neoliberal practices. In this essay, I do not seek to counter such cri-
tiques, but complement them by considering how Belkin’s essay sketches out 
the affective contours of a form of personhood we could call ideal neoliberal 
motherhood. By focusing on Belkin’s representation of this highly privileged 
and visible population, I hope to show, first, how recent framings of work/life 
balance operate under the sign of neoliberal rationality. As Wendy Brown has 
argued, neoliberal rationality evokes a new ideal subject, one who calculates 
according to economic advantage and for whom the moral and the politi-
cal are recalibrated as the profitable and that which accrues financial value 
to the individual. This is not classical liberalism’s ideal individual. Imagined 
by seventeenth-century English political theorists like John Locke and eigh-
teenth-century English novelists like Daniel Defoe, the ideal liberal individ-
ual is self-determining, self-regulating, self-disciplining, and presented with 
a divided social world: a public space, in which he can compete and pursue 
his economic interests, and a private space, in which he can experience feel-
ings and be guided by moral principles. Rather, this is “bare life” reworked as 
human capital: endowed with will and responsible for its fate and, at the same 
time, exposed to the vagaries of capitalism and ultimately disposable.2 As 
such, under neoliberalism, we could say that the slash between work and life 
in the worn-out phrase work/life balance does not actually suggest a seesaw-
like fulcrum between two separate domains. Instead, the slash masks an equal 
sign that signifies the full-scale economization of all aspects and faculties of 
human life. As seen by US legislation from the 1970s forward, with the econo-
mization of life comes the privatization of public services and supports not 
only for low-income mothers but also for all members of society, who are now 
seen solely as moralized economic agents.3 Citizenship is now measured by 
how little one takes from society and how much one takes on oneself, without 
consideration for the economic landscape or scope of available opportunities.
 1. See Stone and Hernandez in Jones 51–52.
 2. In Homo Sacer, Giorgio Agamben uses the term bare life to describe how present states 
and institutions conceive of human life in purely biological terms.
 3. For more on US neoliberal policy, see Brown, Undoing; Harvey; Giles.
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Among the articles that followed hers, Belkin’s is unique for its exposure 
of the affective remainder in what we can think of as the work=life equation 
for privileged subjects: angst. It is tempting to dismiss the angst of these elite 
women, but I would like to explore what happens when we reframe that angst 
as the compelling excrescence of a system that oppresses women across the 
socioeconomic spectrum. Belkin’s essay presents in raw and dramatic terms 
the stresses generated by the idea of work/life balance for a privileged class 
and struggles in spectacular ways to organize a constellation of contradic-
tory affects around ideal neoliberal motherhood and its relation to choice. 
It exposes the epic endurance of patriarchy and its capacity to sustain this 
moment of advanced capitalism. It does so by revealing how the neoliberal 
fetishization of choice works by threatening to decimate privilege: One dem-
onstrates one’s superior character by exercising choice. In effect, the pressure 
placed upon choice extorts certain women into maintaining a status quo that 
proclaims freedom for them, but actually threatens them with becoming their 
abject other: she whose bad choices have rendered her precarious and bereft 
of choices. The contradiction is pretty glaring: All humans under neoliberal-
ism are exercising choice. But for some, public options run out, whereas for 
others, resources remain. In the process, the media construction of the plight 
of the working mother reinforces the inextricability of privilege and abjection. 
Through it all, we can see how popular media’s fixation on privileged women’s 
choice to stay home, to work, or to do both presumes the fixity of an environ-
ment that was not designed for their freedom, but for someone else’s.
Ideal Neoliberal Motherhood
By neoliberalism, I refer to what theorists such as Brown, David Harvey, and 
Nikolas Rose describe as a new phase of production, governance, and politi-
cal rationality that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the US and 
Western Europe. At the level of policy in the US, neoliberalism is typically 
understood as the rejection of Keynesian welfare state economics, with its 
emphasis on the capacity of banks and governments to stabilize the economy, 
and the espousal of the Chicago School, with its emphasis on humans as ratio-
nal economic actors and the benefits of an unfettered and free market. In the 
domain of domestic economy, neoliberalism is thus associated with free trade; 
deregulation; privatization of public services, including education and child 
support; environmental resource exploitation; and the ascendance of finance 
capital. Globally, as it emanates from developed to developing nations, neo-
liberal economic policy operates as the imperial control of, as Brown puts it, 
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“every aspect of Third World existence, including political institutions and 
social formations” (Edgework 38).
However, Brown is interested not only in these manifestations but also in 
something abstract and totalizing, which, as it serves to legitimize the material 
realities of mothering in an age with decreased public support, is significant 
to our understanding of the lived experience of contemporary motherhood: 
“the political rationality that both organizes these policies and reaches beyond 
the market” (Edgework 38). For Brown, the neo- in neoliberalism refers not to 
present economic policies, which are in fact traditional (derived from classi-
cal liberalism, with its emphasis on free markets), but instead to applications 
of economic logic to all aspects of human life, including the political, the 
moral, and the spiritual, resulting in the complete gutting of liberal democ-
racy in Western nations. Thus, neoliberalism celebrates the retreat of the lib-
eral democratic state from many domains of human life, and, as Brown puts 
it, the “‘economization’ of political life and of other heretofore noneconomic 
spheres and activities” (Undoing 17). Befitting the age of finance capital, the 
economization of all aspects of life does not just entail amassing profit. Rather, 
it requires the enhancing of one’s perceived value. Brown argues that neo-
liberalism establishes a fearful symmetry among governments, corporations, 
and individuals: “Both persons and states are construed on the model of the 
contemporary firm, both persons and states are expected to comport them-
selves in ways that maximize their capital value in the present and enhance 
their future value” (Undoing 22). All three entities must behave in ways that 
increase their value or, Brown argues, they risk losing legitimacy, credibility, 
or even existence.
Neoliberalism thus remaps the everyday, obliterating distinctions among 
different domains that classical liberalism had held as distinct. Love, religion, 
education, marriage, family, labor, business, citizenship—all are reconceived 
as structured by economic rationality. A previously striated life is now homo-
geneous. If Brown sounds somewhat nostalgic for good old-fashioned liber-
alism, I think she might be. What appears to emerge in Brown’s argument is 
a wish for a division between the public and the private, precisely one that 
liberal feminists had critiqued for the ways the division was gendered, confin-
ing women to the private sphere and denying the politics of the personal. But 
the difference between their critiques of the public/private divide and Brown’s 
critique of the public/private collapse is profound: For Brown, liberalism at 
least had the capacity to contain the wild forces of capitalism in the economic 
domain. In liberal rationality, economic logic was confined to the economic 
sphere and its appearance in the private realm was cause for condemnation. 
In contrast, within neoliberal culture, as Angela McRobbie points out, women 
106 • CHAPTER 5
are coached unironically to make sound investments in their dating life. For 
example, in Lean In, Sandberg advises the reader to choose a mate according 
to who will most support and enhance their earning potential.4 In other words, 
neoliberal subjects must operate according to economic imperatives, which 
ensure their self-reliance, in order to be good at life.
Two key aspects of McRobbie’s work on postfeminism and recent media 
images of maternity are especially helpful for our understanding of the pres-
ent. First, she argues that postfeminism—the phenomenon in which the goals 
of feminism appear to be accepted, but are treated as having already been 
accomplished, rendering feminism passé and obsolete—assigns, as she puts it, 
the tropes of freedom and choice to young women. What does a woman get 
in exchange for participating in the active rejection of feminist politics? She is 
able to see herself as coherent and free of contradictions. She is also granted 
entry to the new sexual regime in which she is proclaimed to be an equal sex-
ual being and allowed to have her pleasure in a politics- and conflict-free zone 
where her choices do not implicate her in uneven power relations (“Postfemi-
nism and Popular Culture” 34). In this imagined space, to rely on government 
support is shameful. In the meantime, neoliberal feminism actively seeks to 
delegitimize the other set of demands upon which earlier feminism—particu-
larly socialist feminism—argued that freedom, choice, and equality depend, 
such as state-funded childcare. Instead, neoliberal feminism celebrates out-
sourcing domestic labor to hired help. McRobbie argues that this move is part 
of a trend of shoring up family values, even extending it to lesbian and gay 
couples, while defunding public and municipal projects. Secondly, McRobbie 
draws attention to the style of “affluent, feminine maternity,” which she refers 
to as “mediated maternity,” that circulates in partisan political discourse, con-
servative newspapers, fashion magazines, news channels, and other popular 
media in the UK. These images hail female subjects into becoming economi-
cally responsible, as well as sexually attractive, agents. This ideal of mater-
nity requires the subject to be self-reliant and uncritical of power relations 
in exchange for sexual capital. McRobbie argues that the ideal toward which 
women aspire is not political equality, but physical attractiveness: Women 
place their value in their ability to be sexier than other women. To maintain 
one’s sexual capital, one cannot complain, criticize, or demand rights. These 
civic activities are forfeited in the new game women have entered. Moreover, 
this ideal is formed over and against imagined others: “This idea of active (i.e., 
en route to the gym), sexually confident motherhood . .  . is also consistently 
 4. See McRobbie, “Feminism,” for an incisive critique of Sandberg’s Lean In, especially pp. 
133–35. 
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pitched against an image of the abject, slovenly and benefit-dependent ‘under-
class’ single mother, the UK equivalent of the US ‘welfare queen’” (“Feminism” 
120). The figure of the “middle-class, professional, wife and mother” in the 
UK, who is implicitly white, McRobbie argues, is also set against that of the 
Muslim woman, who is “assumed to be oppressed and subjected to various 
forms of domination and control” (“Feminism” 121–22). In the US context, we 
can extend McRobbie’s critique to include the ways that white motherhood is 
also opposed to black and brown motherhood.
While McRobbie’s analysis forcefully explains the new gender, class, and 
race politics in play within neoliberalism, it tends to foreclose on the ways that 
popular media might offer the raw material with which we can critique the 
emerging norms of this “maternal-feminine,” or ideal neoliberal motherhood. 
Specifically, Belkin’s interviewees do not talk about themselves as professional 
family managers. Rather, they see themselves as making a “graceful and con-
venient exit” from the exploitative demands of professional labor. Belkin tries 
hard to read their decision to be full-time mothers as a critique of the work-
place. Rather than only argue that Belkin and her interviewees have simply 
internalized neoliberal ideology, I am interested in how her essay allows us 
to see privileged women return repeatedly to their choices to make their life 
coherent to themselves and to others. The author and her interviewees are 
consumed by the nature of their choices. These women’s compulsive return to 
their choices and the angst that attends those returns points, I argue, to the 
extent to which they are not free, and exposes the contradiction in the neo-
liberal equation of choice with freedom. In other words, their anguished fixa-
tion on the process and consequences of choosing indexes precisely the way 
in which neoliberal political rationality has turned choice and its ideological 
corollary, freedom, on its head.
Belkin’s article, along with other texts in the oeuvre on work/life bal-
ance, imagines, reinforces, and struggles with ideal neoliberal motherhood. 
It reveals how compliance with this form of personhood requires that the 
subject make a choice between two modes of self-denial: full-time work or 
full-time mothering and domestic management. Examining more extreme 
situations in contemporary novels, like those involving life and death, Jane 
Elliott has called the mode of action emerging from this kind of scenario 
suffering agency: “Not only is self-preservation a foundational value for the 
forms of liberal political theory on which neoliberalism draws, but also, in 
the inexorability of what is commonly called the ‘self-preservation instinct,’ we 
glimpse something of the imprisoning nature of suffering agency, the way in 
which choices made for oneself and according to one’s own interests can still 
feel both imposed and appalling” (84). Belkin’s essay exposes the fantasy bribe 
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into which privileged female subjects enter in order to live with their deci-
sions. By revealing that fantasy, I argue, her essay also establishes the grounds 
for critique.
Maternity as Escape Hatch
“The Opt-Out Revolution” takes the temperature of the post-9/11, pre-2008 
national scene in the US. Belkin’s essay is based upon interviews with women 
who earned degrees at Ivy League schools and subsequently entered into high-
powered jobs in law, journalism, publishing, education, brand consulting, and 
advertising/marketing, only to leave them after having children. Stone refers 
to Belkin’s iconic essay as the “apotheosis” of a quasi-feminist narrative that 
began to appear in late 1990s popular media, celebrating not women’s equal-
ity, but rather their right to return to traditional roles, now coded as a sign of 
affluence: “Stay-at-home moms were suddenly fashionable, the ‘latest status 
symbol’ according to an article in the Wall Street Journal. Working mothers, 
on the other hand, were pronounced ‘passé’ by a more widely acknowledged 
arbiter of hipness, New York Magazine” (4). Belkin’s article is infused with what 
we might call a feminist gothic tone. Around the women, it sets up a mysteri-
ous and unsettling atmosphere: Why did they leave their prestigious jobs for 
traditionally female roles as mothers and home managers, and what are the 
consequences of their decisions for feminism? Belkin consults experts, such 
as social scientists, an anthropologist, and a university president, along with 
surveys, to provide data in the effort to answer this question.
The article opens with an invitation to the reader to imagine the women 
as a visual spectacle: “The scene in this cozy Atlanta living room would—at 
first glance—warm an early feminist’s heart. Gathered by the fireplace one 
evening, sipping wine and nibbling cheese, are the members of a book club, 
each of them a beneficiary of all that feminists of 30-odd years ago held dear.” 
In addition to setting the women within a detailed scenario, one with specific 
class markings (wine and cheese, fireplace, book club), this opening asks the 
reader to identify as an “early feminist” and to assume the proper interpreta-
tive framework. It also interjects a foreboding phrase, “at first glance,” letting 
us know that there is more to this scene than we might at first think and that 
it will not warm an early feminist’s heart. Finally, the historical conscious-
ness of the article announces itself, noting “early” as the 1970s and bypassing 
the first wave of feminism altogether. We are told then that the women have 
earned degrees from Princeton, Harvard, and Columbia: “They chose hus-
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bands who could keep up with them, not simply support them. They waited 
to have children because work was too exciting. They put on power suits and 
marched off to take on the world.” As readers, we now anticipate a downfall 
with trepidation.
The next paragraph reveals what will defeat any feminist triumphalism 
implied by such a description: These women quit their jobs, for which they 
worked so hard, to stay home with their young children. One woman tells 
Belkin, “I don’t want to be on the fast track leading to a partnership at a 
prestigious law firm. . . . Some people define that as success. I don’t.” Another 
woman asserts, “I don’t want to be famous; I don’t want to conquer the world; 
I don’t want that kind of life.” From there the article asserts, by way of contrast, 
a classically liberal narrative about feminism, one that measures individual 
success in terms of possession, which these women’s retreat from the work-
force betrays: “Women—specifically, educated professional women—were 
supposed to achieve like men. Once the barriers came down, once the playing 
field was leveled, they were supposed to march toward the future and take 
rightful ownership of the universe, or at the very least, ownership of their 
half.” In Belkin’s article, feminism is a meritocracy that transcends gender 
yet remains structured on traditional social hierarchies and the accumulation 
of wealth. This version of feminism does not seek to do away with a capital-
ist elite, it just seeks to open the door to allow in elite women: “The women’s 
movement was largely about grabbing a fair share of power—making equal 
money, standing at the helm in the macho realms of business and government 
and law. It was about running the world.” While this might be a fair charac-
terization of one strand of liberal feminism, it becomes clear that this elitist 
structure, at base patriarchal, only generates more problems for women when 
they are actually allowed to participate in it.
The women Belkin interviews frame their choices in stark terms: Either 
they choose to devote themselves to work and keep getting promoted or they 
choose maternity and domesticity. One of the women casts the latter as an 
“escape hatch” from the stresses of the double bind of the so-called work/life 
balance. When the choice is framed between being famous and conquering 
the world, on the one hand, and staying home with children and doing house-
work, typically cast as unappreciated and uncompensated labor, on the other, 
you bet the second choice is going to need a major PR campaign. And, indeed, 
in this language of opting out, we can see the spectral outlines of a liberal divi-
sion of the public and private: the public as the scene of stress, competition, 
and contest and the private as the scene of serenity, continuity, and concord. 
By bodily placing themselves back into the domestic sphere, the women imag-
110 • CHAPTER 5
ine themselves to be resolving the contradictions of their present: escaping a 
brutal working life and, by performing a feminist choice, maintaining a sense 
of themselves as agents.
However, this impulse to frame their decision to leave as their choice sits 
uneasily in the article. While she consults the work of social scientists, who 
argue that “the workplace has failed women,” Belkin wants to go beyond that: 
“But to talk to the women of the book club .  .  . is to sense that something 
more is happening here. It’s not just that the workplace has failed women. It is 
also that women are rejecting the workplace.” A question recurs in the essay: 
“Why don’t women run the world?” The first time it appears, the narrator 
rejoins with, “Maybe it’s because they don’t want to.” Elsewhere, Belkin asserts, 
“As these women look up at the ‘top,’ they are increasingly deciding that they 
don’t want to do what it takes to get there. Women today have the equal right 
to make the same bargain that men have made for centuries—to take time 
from their family in pursuit of success. Instead, women are redefining suc-
cess. And in doing so, they are redefining work” (my emphases). Here we have 
the language of decision-making, desire, entering into contracts, and consent, 
all terms that belong to an emancipatory liberal discourse that Brown would 
argue has been nullified by neoliberalism’s economization of all spheres of life 
and that McRobbie would argue become merely tropes that place responsibil-
ity upon citizens stripped of public supports.
But Belkin strives to see this move as a critical rejection of the values of 
the workplace: “There is nothing wrong with money or power. But they come 
at a high price. And lately when women talk about success they use words 
like satisfaction, balance and sanity.” But is rejection the same as critique? As 
Joan Scott writes, “The point of critique is not to tear down or destroy but, 
by bringing to light the limits and inconsistencies that have been studiously 
avoided, to open up new possibilities, new ways of thinking about what might 
be done to make things better” (7). Being a full-time professional or a stay-at-
home mom is not revolutionary. The choice between the two actually appears 
like a remarkably old way of thinking, one that runs in the grooves of old 
private/public distinctions that, due to the razing of boundaries wrought by 
neoliberalism, no longer accurately describe society, and one that rests upon 
economic privilege.
Belkin struggles to find something redemptive in what otherwise reads as a 
description of the ruins of these women’s ambitions. But to listen to what these 
women are saying is to notice that something structural is affecting them. They 
consistently go to the language of personal responsibility and choice, express-
ing an extreme individualism in a defensive, if self-defeating, act of survival:
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“I wish it had been possible to be the kind of parent I want to be and con-
tinue with my legal career,” [Brokaw] says, “but I wore myself out trying to 
do both jobs well.”
“It’s more accurate to say I was no longer willing to work as hard—com-
muting, navigating office politics, having my schedule be at the whim of the 
news, balancing all that with the needs of a family—for a prize I was learning 
I didn’t really want” [Belkin herself].
“As often as not . . . a woman would have loved to maintain some version 
of a career, but that job wasn’t cutting it anymore. Among women I know, 
quitting is driven as much from the job-dissatisfaction side as from the pull-
to-motherhood side” (Amsbary). (Belkin)
From a commonsense perspective, the logic here is convincing: These women 
had desirable full-time jobs and then they chose motherhood. They are, as 
Belkin wants to assert, rejecting a workplace that does not allow for flexible 
hours, telecommuting, or working from home, that fosters power struggles 
and subjects employees to top-down management. However, at no point do 
Belkin or any of her interviewees think of the state with optimism. Belkin 
does not suggest that perhaps it is a failure of the state to regulate an economy 
that produces harsh working conditions. Over these women’s lifetimes, the 
state has withdrawn public support and actively created living conditions and 
modes of suffering agency for all people, regardless of class, gender, sexual-
ity, race, ability, and parenting status. Nor, to return to McRobbie’s critique, 
does the possibility of state-provided quality childcare, which would allow 
these women to maintain their careers and their families in ways that sup-
port society, appear as an option to Belkin or her interviewees. While Belkin 
does claim that the professional workplace is “macho,” she does not use the 
term patriarchal or heteronormative to get at the way that it evolved out of 
asymmetrical gender relations, taking for granted that its employees are male, 
heterosexual, and married and have wives who stay home, manage the house-
hold, and raise children. With domestic labor taken for granted, employers’ 
expectations of what they can demand from their employees adjusts accord-
ingly. When you liberate those partners from the domestic sphere and bring 
them into the workplace without restructuring it or expectations about how 
much of one’s life will be devoted to work, it is bound to generate more prob-
lems, especially to those who have newly arrived. In other words, when you 
are late to the party, like Cinderella, you have to find someone else to do all 
those chores. In the real world, mice do not pick up the slack. Often immi-
grant working-class women of color do.
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Belkin is careful to foreground that her interviewees have ample finan-
cial support and health insurance from their husbands. However, I would 
like to suggest that the lack of state regulation of workplaces and state-
provided childcare connects this tiny if powerful demographic to working 
mothers across the socioeconomic spectrum. Seeing these connections has 
the potential, I argue, to undo a sense of self shaped by neoliberalism. In a 
quote mentioned earlier, Belkin features a woman who claims to define suc-
cess for herself, which sounds like a very hard project indeed. And another 
interviewee explains, “I’ve had people tell me that it’s women like me that 
are ruining the workplace because it makes employers suspicious. . . . I don’t 
want to take on the mantle of all womanhood and fight a fight for some sister 
who isn’t really my sister because I don’t even know her.’” This declaration of 
hyperindividualism and disavowal of feminism makes even Belkin uncom-
fortable, and she resorts again, projecting away from herself, to the conceit 
of the early feminist: “These are fighting words of a most retro sort, and, 
no doubt, a 70’s feminist peering in the window would be confused at best 
and depressed at worst.” However, Belkin persists in trying to find something 
positive and empowering in their stories: “But unmapped roads are not, de 
facto, dead ends. Is this a movement that failed, or one reborn? What does 
this evolving spectrum of demands and choices tell us about women? And 
what does it mean for the future?”
These highly educated women, Belkin writes, mostly plan to reenter the 
workforce when their children are older. They tell themselves that this is a 
temporary exit. As they explain their choices to Belkin and as she describes 
them in the essay, their anxiety about their identity is tangible, free-floating, 
and competitive: “Talk to any professional woman who made this choice, and 
this is what she will say. She is not her mother or her grandmother. She has 
made a temporary decision for just a few years, not a permanent decision 
for the rest of her life. She has not lost her skills, just put them on hold.” Bel-
kin quotes Brokaw, who entreats her, “Don’t make me look like some 1950’s 
Stepford wife.” The Stepford Wives was not published until the 1970s, but this 
conflation, along with Belkin’s skipping over first-wave feminism, speaks to 
ongoing generational anxieties. And, later, through another literary allusion, 
Belkin refers to Sylvia Plath’s semiautobiographical 1963 novel about a young, 
educated woman struggling against the lack of choices available to her in the 
1950s when she defends Brokaw to the reader: “Don’t look at her as something 
out of the ‘The Bell Jar’ either. She is not trapped. This is a choice.” The 1950s 
feminine mystique, a term famously coined by Betty Friedan to describe the 
injunction for middle-class women to be happy as mothers, firmly ensconced 
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in the domestic sphere, appears as a specter to be banished, no matter how 
accurately it might describe the present.
By the end of the article, the question “Why don’t women run the world?” 
reappears. At this point, one wonders if that question is framed in a way 
that guarantees a broken answer. It would seem that gender equity is to be 
solved by class and race inequity: Preserve the social class hierarchy, just allow 
women at the top and pay them enough to hire domestic staff to maintain 
their home and raise their children. But the answer has changed from the 
beginning of the article, when Belkin tentatively suggests, as quoted earlier, 
“Maybe it’s because they don’t want to.” By the end of the essay, she allows the 
voice of one of her interviewees to answer that question (“Why don’t women 
run the world?”) and have the last word of the essay: “‘In a way,’ Amsbary says, 
‘we really do.’”
What has happened in between the essay’s asking of this question? How 
do we get from the narrator’s initial hypothesis that women perhaps do not 
want to run the world to the assertion, in the words of one of the interviewees, 
that they in fact are already running it? Straight out of the Anglo-American 
nineteenth century, this sentiment expresses the compensatory fantasy for 
white, middle-class women who were privatized into the domestic sphere and 
granted moral and symbolic power, but denied political and economic power. 
In this context, it is dressed up in the neoliberal rhetoric of choice. However, 
the quotation falls flat at the end of an otherwise deeply concerned reflection 
upon the meaning of this historical trend. Belkin allows her voice to drop out, 
handing it over to Amsbary. This rhetorical choice suggests that Belkin herself 
registers this assertion of self-empowerment ambivalently, leaving the article 
open for readers to make their own assessments. Or, in neoliberal terms, to 
choose their own meaning.
Belkin respects her interviewees and seeks to validate their self-perception 
as making choices. But once choice and consent have been colonized by neo-
liberal political rationality, we have to consider Belkin’s and her interviewees’ 
anxious assertion of themselves as agents differently. The women Belkin inter-
views were the achievers who took advantage of the 1970s feminist movement 
and felt that they could do anything. Their sense of self rests upon feeling like 
they have agency and choice and that they can control their lives. To think 
otherwise would lead to two subject positions equally devalued within neo-
liberal discourse: victim, who is seen as robbed of agency, helpless, and weak; 
or poor person, who is cast as lazy, responsible for their own degradation, and 
ultimately disposable. No wonder the women interviewed tell the reporter and 
themselves that full-time motherhood, with all of its newly produced glam-
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our and moral validation, as well as actual satisfactions, was their choice. The 
women who quit fast-track jobs cast their decision to leave as choice rather 
than as being an overdetermined bid to save aspects of their lives for which 
they felt solely responsible. In other words, these women who “opted out” 
demonstrate that they felt like they had no choice other than to think of them-
selves as taking an option. To admit otherwise, and maintain their sense of 
self, would be unthinkable.
Others who have engaged this question do not provide ways outside of 
these problems. For example, Slaughter’s essay, which boldly argued that 
under present conditions, women cannot have it all, is bound by economic 
logic, which places it squarely within neoliberal discourse. Slaughter argues 
that workplaces should accommodate families: “Ultimately, it is society that 
must change, coming to value choices to put family ahead of work just as 
much as those to put work ahead of family.” Here, the agent of change is 
society, not the state, raising this question: In the past, what agency other 
than the state has made workplaces operate by equitable principles, such as 
eight-hour workdays, weekends, safe work environments, fair wages, and so 
on, rather than bottom-line financial ones? Moreover, and paradoxically, like 
Sandberg’s Lean In, which encouraged working women to assert themselves 
professionally and not retreat from career advancement, Slaughter’s article, 
while arguing for a workplace that is not structured solely on profits, vali-
dates capitalist structures and culture. The essay’s solutions boil down to social 
and workplace changes that accept the neoliberal idea that work is life and 
evoke an economic discourse: “flexible working hours, investment intervals, 
and family-comes-first-management.” The example Slaughter provides of her 
own “investment interval” is when she and her husband took their sabbaticals 
in Shanghai: “We thought of the move in part as ‘putting money in the fam-
ily bank,’ taking advantage of the opportunity to spend a close year together 
in a foreign culture. But we were also investing in our children’s ability to 
learn Mandarin and in our own knowledge of Asia.” The economic discourse 
of “investment” exposes how the neoliberal formula “work=life” forms the 
ground of the argument. As in Belkin’s essay, appealing to the state to estab-
lish these work policies or provide childcare is beyond the imaginable within 
neoliberal logic. What is imaginable is arguing for solutions that will increase 
the individual’s worth as human capital.
Warner’s follow-up to Belkin’s essay, “The Opt-Out Generation Wants 
Back In,” begins to shift the argument slightly. Warner emphasizes how diffi-
cult reentering the workforce is for women who “opted out.” Ultimately, War-
ner’s essay, like Slaughter’s, argues for a changed workplace. However, it goes 
a little beyond, first by highlighting the difficulties of a work=life model for 
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both fathers and mothers. A working father who expresses envy at his wife’s 
quitting her job states, “There has to be something more than going to work 
for 50 years and dying.” Warner’s only solution-like paragraph comes next, 
and it too argues for a change in workplace policies, but for men and women: 
“To find time for that ‘something more,’ husbands would need to join with 
their wives in rejecting nighttime networking sessions and 7 a.m. meetings. 
They would have to convey to employers that work-life accommodations like 
flexible hours or job sharing aren’t just for women and that part-time jobs 
need to provide proportional pay and benefits.” Second, Warner acknowledges 
the economic realities of work: “At a time when fewer families than ever can 
afford to live on less than two full-time salaries, achieving work-life balance 
may well be less a gender issue than an economic one.” Given its overall grim 
reporting and scarce solutions, Warner’s come closest to pointing to, without 
naming, that bugbear of liberal and neoliberal ideology: state-provided public 
supports.
To Mother
In Revolutionary Mothering, Alexis Pauline Gumbs asks, “What would it mean 
to take the word ‘mother’ less as a gendered identity and more as a possible 
action, a technology of transformation that those people who do the most 
mothering labor are teaching us right now?” (22–23). This 2016 volume of 
essays about mothering by women of color, edited by Gumbs, China Mar-
tens, and Mai’a Williams, like Brown’s and McRobbie’s work, offers a critique 
of neoliberal privatization, but it does so by combining theory with stories. 
Throughout this collection, mothers marginalized by race, sexuality, marital 
status, ability, and income narrate their lives and love for their children. The 
multiple introductions of the book frame these testimonials as revolutionary 
acts since they express the writers’ desire to survive and thrive in a society that 
exploits and devalues them. As Gumbs, Marten, and Williams explain in the 
beginning of this collection, “We write in solidarity with mothers who must 
send their child out into the world, knowing that the powers that be would 
prefer their child not exist anymore” (Gumbs et al. 3).
Reading stories from Revolutionary Mothering alongside those told in Bel-
kin’s article exposes the devastating distance between the marginalized and 
the elite. We can see how the angst of Belkin’s privileged interviewees is driven 
by the anxiety to hold on to that privilege and by the threat of its loss, of 
descending into social and actual death. While in no way do I want to divert 
from the brutalities of a system that marginalizes women of color, I do want 
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to make two simple points: first, that this system polices women on both ends 
of privilege, and second, that the solutions offered by Belkin, Slaughter, and 
even Warner to change the workplace only further entrench and maintain 
this system.
The work of Gumbs, Marten, and Williams and that of reproductive justice 
scholars critique what is strangling the voices in Belkin’s essay: the neoliberal 
feminist fetishism of choice. In its place, they offer collectivity. As Kimala Price 
explains, “Frustrated by the individualist approach of the pro-choice frame-
work, a growing movement created and led by women of color has emerged 
to broaden the scope of reproductive rights. Calling itself the reproductive 
justice movement, this coalition of women of color activists and their allies 
are using a human rights and social justice framework to redefine choice” 
(42). Here, we see an emphasis on public support, municipal projects, and 
the importance of the state in redistributing resources and creating a field of 
opportunity. As Jael M. Silliman, Marlene G. Fried, Loretta J. Ross, and Elena 
R. Gutiérrez explain in the second edition of their Undivided Rights: Women 
of Color Organize for Reproductive Justice, “Reproductive justice activists are 
working on initiatives to enable women to obtain the support they need to 
have and raise children. This includes campaigns to end shackling during 
prison births, to raise the minimum wage, to expand government funding for 
childcare, and other efforts to ensure the dignity and well being of women, 
children, and trans* people” (xiii). In this discourse, motherhood is intimately 
connected to all forms of social justice. These scholars’ emphasis on collabo-
ration moves beyond neoliberal individualization and toward a caring state.
These concerns expand beyond issues of gender, racial, and class inequi-
ties. For example, disability-studies scholars like Rosemarie Garland-Thomson 
remind us that disability is inherent to the human condition, marking our 
bodies’ encounters with the world. She argues that we should conserve, rather 
than eliminate, disabilities for they show our evolution as individuals and as 
species. Mothering, too, conserves and nurtures. The women in Belkin’s article 
live in a rarefied world of status and luxuries, but this world is also one where 
the practice of mothering works toward the reproduction of patriarchal and 
white supremacist institutions, rather than being unleashed toward the cre-
ative project of loving and supporting all human life. Flex time and telecom-
muting only reinforce these dehumanizing institutions. They do not do away 
with the stresses, anguish, and alienating contradictions of neoliberal mother-
hood or the brutalizing inequities of racism and capitalism. Only practicing 
motherhood as a “technology of transformation,” as Gumbs puts it, has the 
potential to do that.
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Perhaps that is what is so painful about our private experiences of moth-
ering. I started with my story of working and mothering, activities that feel 
locked together in a never-ending battle. As an academic, I have the rare privi-
lege of institutional support and work flexibility. I could cancel class to take 
care of my daughter. My spouse could take off from work to take our son to 
a specialist. These are not the experiences of most working parents by far. 
But even we did so with the terror of mounting work, missed deadlines, and 
fear of repercussions. I used that time at home to work on this chapter, while 
keeping one eye on my feverish daughter and often a hand on her forehead, 
because I felt like I had to be productive even while caring for my sick child. 
My spouse used vacation days to seek specialized medical care for our dis-
abled child and not for needed rest from a demanding work schedule. We 
struggle alone to help our offspring, in strife with ourselves and our fellow 
humans. Belkin’s essay clues us in to why this struggle will persist until all 
are free.5
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C H A P T E R  6
The Angel in the McMansion
Female Citizenship and Fetal Personhood in  
Fast Times at Ridgemont High and Juno
DIANA YORK BLAINE
WHILE ROE V. WADE (1973) granted limited but unheralded legal protections 
to women seeking abortion, the ensuing decades have brought continued ten-
sions between those who defend women’s right to bodily autonomy and the 
cultural demand that women obey the dictates of pronatalism. In light of this 
ongoing battle between pro- and antiabortion camps, two otherwise seemingly 
inconsequential films, and their disparate representations of unplanned teen 
pregnancy, take on profound significance. I will demonstrate in this essay that 
the collapse of civic discourse that occurred over the last thirty years, result-
ing in what I am calling the publicized private sphere, has directly impacted 
the concept of the female citizen, one inextricably tied to reproduction and 
the family even in nondomestic contexts. This sexual and racial marking of 
women’s public self has been produced by, and escalated, the impact of neo-
liberalism in the political, economic, and cultural spheres. As a result, in the 
contemporary political climate, the successful woman embraces maternity not 
as her inescapable destiny, but as her personal choice. Any sense that social 
imperatives lie behind the mandate to procreate are handily elided by nostal-
gia and sentiment, illustrated by the celebration of the private acquisition of a 
teenager’s baby by Vanessa Loring (Jennifer Garner), a white woman of privi-
lege, at the end of Juno (2007, directed by Jason Reitman). The film’s sacrilizing 
of Vanessa’s motherhood, and the young Juno’s (Ellen Page) refusal to termi-
nate the pregnancy, directly opposes the handling of unplanned pregnancy in 
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Ridgemont High (1982, directed by Amy Heckerling), which places Stacy Ham-
ilton (Jennifer Jason Leigh), the young pregnant woman, in a public sphere 
inhabited by all citizens regardless of race, sex, or ability—or maternal ambi-
tion. In that free space, Stacy’s abortion is logically and legally attained (com-
plicated only by the impregnating male’s failure to provide his half of the costs 
and the promised transportation to the clinic). In Juno, no such public sphere 
exists; instead, Juno’s and Vanessa’s public existence becomes conflated with 
the domestic exercise of private, affective emotions, with consumer-oriented 
mothering the only imaginable destination for middle-class modern white 
women.
The Womb as Publicized Private Sphere
Such radical shifts in the cultural imaginary from the right to choose to moth-
ering being the only right choice paralleled the rise of mediating technology 
permitting the fantasy that individuals—not developing organisms—exist in 
the womb. The more the fetus has been represented as an individual, the less 
women have agency to deny its right to exist. This emergence of the fetal self 
was made possible by ultrasound technology, an innovation that, as Rosalind 
Petchesky demonstrates, aided the invention of fetal personhood, a key factor 
in the diminution of public support for abortion. The concept of fetal person-
hood dovetails perfectly with neoliberal myths of discrete individual citizens 
capable of rational decision-making irrespective of their cultural contexts. At 
its most extreme, we now find people willing to pretend that the capacity to 
exert one’s self-will exists even before birth. For example, in April 2017, tab-
loid newspaper the Daily Mail ran a headline that read “Remarkable Moment 
an Ultrasound Shows Twin Girls Sharing a Kiss in Mom’s Womb” (Edwards). 
The accompanying image, created when the pregnant Carissa Gill and her 
boyfriend Randy visited Fetal Imaging in Pennsylvania, depicts what appears 
to be two creatures modeled out of clay, turning stubby features toward one 
another as if in anticipation of an amorous embrace. Above their heads, along-
side the identifying information about patient’s name, date, and so on, the 
facility has added “kissing twins” to the medical record. In spite of the fact 
that kissing is a learned behavior and these two not-yet-actual individuals are 
not actually giving each other a kiss, the decision to adorn this ultrasound file 
with a caption memorializing their domestic bliss conflates the public med-
icalization of pregnancy with the intimacy of the private sphere. Ms. Gill’s 
womb has become a domestic space—a home—where affective relations may, 
and will, occur. Indeed, in this sense woman’s job has become making intimate 
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relationships possible for others, not just within her house as traditionally 
mandated, but now within her very body, one that has become a publicized 
private sphere.
Perhaps this fantasy about fetuses snuggling together in utero reflects our 
urgent need for comfort in the face of the increasing neoliberal dictum that 
individuals are entirely responsible for themselves, that the only support we 
can expect will come exclusively from this private sphere. Robert Putnam has 
documented a sharp decline in the existence of civic organizations over the 
last decades of the twentieth century, resulting in an eroding sense of belong-
ing to a public sphere in which members share common goals. One of the 
factors contributing to the disappearance of these voluntary associations is 
women’s increasing participation in the workforce, as free time for volunteer-
ing has been replaced by wage work. Perhaps coincidentally, perhaps not, this 
disappearance of community (Putnam) occurs alongside an overdetermining 
of mothering that has arisen over the last three decades, because the category 
of mother symbolizes love, care, and connectedness—human needs no longer 
conceived of as flowing through civic channels. Patricia Ventura argues that 
neoliberalism’s “most significant compensation [for its deprivation is] the fam-
ily” (12). Notably this heteronormative procreative family is both created by 
and set against what Putnam identifies as a telescoping public sphere. Since 
neoliberalism’s ideology requires the existence of the symbolic nuclear family 
that can and will meet all human needs—even those previously provided by 
social organizations—women must produce babies. No babies, no families. 
But ironically, this supposed choice to mother, and the physical, financial, and 
psychological burdens it brings, also gets thrust entirely upon the female who 
reproduces. Logically, compelling women to carry fetuses to term might also 
require that we as a people are compelled to help support those offspring. But 
the dismantling of the welfare state under neoliberalism in the 1990s has in 
fact guaranteed the opposite: myriad births of children whose mothers lack 
the resources to support them and decreasing governmental resources to fill 
those needs, resulting in a rise in extreme poverty (Shaefer and Eden). One 
conservative solution to this dilemma: Discouraging reproduction unless in 
the context of financial and racial privilege by encouraging middle-class white 
maternity while continuing to make it difficult for poor women and women of 
color who seek to have and raise families (Ross).
This imperative for white reproduction includes a fetishizing of the pure 
potential signified by the privileged white pre-person. As a result, the liter-
ally ungovernable space of the womb increasingly becomes imagined as the 
domain of a rational individual. Under the neoliberal agenda, this “contempo-
rary national and mass-cultural fixation on turning women into children and 
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babies into persons through the media of photography and cinema” (Berlant 
83–84) constructs the individual as in charge of its destiny before it is even 
able to draw breath on its own. As in the case presented in the Daily Mail of 
whether to kiss or not to kiss one’s sibling, we increasingly pretend that the 
fetus makes choices before birth. Under this taxonomy, the self is defined as 
one who chooses well or poorly, and those choices account for the social and 
material conditions of the individual. This ascribing of agency to individuals, 
both pre- and postpartum, denies the reality that the social and material con-
ditions of individuals in any way constrain the choices they can make.
This word, choice, reverberates within both pro- and antiabortion rhetoric. 
Because neoliberalism as an ideology has produced the myth of the discrete 
individual, a self independent of, and not reliant upon, state services, choices 
are viewed as being made free from structural and situational constraints. 
Women choose to get pregnant, an assertion that erases the reality of the ways 
that white supremacist, capitalist patriarchy regulates our lives. From the neo-
liberal perspective, the responsibility of that choice must be borne entirely 
by the woman, an argument that perversely leads to adamantly antiabortion 
arguments: Her choice to get pregnant condemns her to carry the fetus to 
term, to produce another being in order to satisfy the demands of strangers 
who oppose females having the choice not to mother. In other words, she has 
a choice as long as the choice is to submit to the exigencies of “populist bio-
logical determinism” (Phipps 113).
Perhaps the fundamentalist Christian opposition to abortion makes a kind 
of sense from that theological perspective, but reliance on choice rhetoric also 
proscribes the proabortion movement. For example, many of my female stu-
dents assert that while they would not want to see abortion outlawed, they 
would never choose to have one themselves. Such tepid support evinced by a 
generation raised with access to safe and legal abortion fails to provide power-
ful resistance to antiabortion rhetoric and indeed parallels it in ways that have 
proved detrimental to the existence of a robust proabortion lobby. According 
to this postfeminist neoliberal logic, women should be able to choose abor-
tion, but no one should make that choice. With the rise of the publicized 
private sphere, where woman’s body becomes the recognized home of other 
citizens, abortion becomes unthinkable, even for many of those self-defined as 
pro-woman, feminist, and liberal.1 Can an unthinkable choice truly be defined 
as an option?
 1. Heather Latimer makes the related point that one can now be both pro-choice and 
embrace fetal personhood.
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Those who do choose this unthinkable option for themselves avoid the 
increasingly privatized and intensive demands of maternity. Seen from the 
vantage point of the enlightened liberal subject, it would be logical for a female 
citizen to abort a fetus rather than undergo a wholesale usurpation of one’s 
life, plans, finances, and body. Imagining such a life, one predicated on self-
determination, presupposes a space for female citizens. To be a female and be 
a citizen suggests that people’s sexual identities do not determine the exercise 
of their civil rights in the public sphere. It also means a good life without rais-
ing offspring would be attainable through meaningful work and participa-
tion in community. The movements for civil rights in the United States have 
struggled to create precisely this sort of public sphere, one habitable by all 
regardless of race, class, sex, sexual orientation, class, or ability.
Public Citizens with Private Lives in Ridgemont High
The film Fast Times at Ridgemont High depicts such a society, one in which 
everyone is ascribed the role of public citizen, regardless of his relative intel-
lectual value or her sexual identity, and regardless of their private desires. 
The main storylines feature teenaged males and females, African American, 
white, and mixed ethnicities, working and middle class, navigating academics, 
jobs, relationships, and leisure time. Lisa Dresner notes that Ridgemont High 
emerges during a period in which the advances in civil rights of the 1960s and 
1970s have yet to be stalled by the encroaching neoliberalism and neoconser-
vatism of the Reagan administration (Dresner 174). In American movies from 
this cultural moment, she observes, “girls’ sexual decision making is repre-
sented as intelligent, responsible, and important” (174). Indeed, in Ridgemont 
High, the decision by the teenaged protagonist Stacy to get an abortion reflects 
her sound thinking and capable maneuvering within limited circumstances. 
The only negative aspect of her terminating the pregnancy, according to this 
abortion-positive narrative, is the failure of the impregnating male, Mike 
Damone, to take Stacy to the clinic and provide his half of the expenses. His 
fiscal and personal irresponsibility highlights her own responsible handling of 
her situation, including not carrying a fetus to term that she cannot support 
financially and getting a last-minute ride from her brother Brad so that she 
may keep her appointment. While Stacy does not tell her brother where she is 
going, and he drops her off without asking, Brad is waiting for her upon her 
emergence from the clinic. He has figured out where she was going, and asks 
her if she is okay. She says she is, and, to her relief, he promises to keep her 
business private, then suggests they get something to eat. No negative reper-
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cussions accompany Stacy’s exercise of her right to safe and legal abortion; in 
fact, rather than focusing on her lost opportunity to mother, the scene por-
trays a growing emotional intimacy between Stacy and Brad. Dresner calls it 
“one of the most positive, moving abortion scenes portrayed in film” (187). 
The film ends with Stacy back at work at the mall, initiating coy flirtations 
with the more thoughtful and sensitive boy from her high school, whom she 
has decided to date rather than to bed.
It might seem that this ending, placing Stacy squarely in the clutches of 
compulsory monogamy, lends a reactionary note to what otherwise might 
be seen as a tale of female liberation. Without downplaying too much the 
ramifications of this romantic finale, or suggesting the film is not generically 
conservative or racially and sexually stratified, I argue that the depiction of 
her as someone who can be sexually self-determining without condemnation 
by the narrative can be understood by considering the plot involving Spicoli, 
a character easily dismissed as meaningless. Spicoli, a hapless stoner-surfer 
of marked Italian ancestry, seems to provide only comic relief as he goes 
on a series of misadventures while refusing to capitulate to the demands of 
the rigid Mr. Hand, his US history teacher. Mr. Hand, infuriated at Spico-
li’s lackadaisical attitude from day one, attempts to control Spicoli, but the 
young man seems not only incapable of being the well-regulated student 
Hand desires but also to enjoy his own unkempt, unmanageable existence. 
Given their fundamentally different approaches to life and running battle of 
the wills, this relationship seems unsalvageable, as does Spicoli’s grade in US 
history.
But in an amazing turn of events, Mr. Hand chooses to permit his young 
charge one last chance to pass by granting him a special class session. To 
do this, Hand comes unannounced to Spicoli’s bedroom, a beer- and bong-
filled den of iniquity whose walls are covered with salacious posters of white 
women in various states of undress, and while the teenager scrambles to hide 
his drug paraphernalia, the teacher declares his intention to hold Spicoli hos-
tage, in effect, while lecturing to the horrified young man about American 
history. He justifies this encroachment on Spicoli’s private time and space 
as payback for Spicoli’s semester-long encroachment on the teacher’s public 
sphere classroom. In return he generously offers Spicoli the chance to succeed 
as long as his pupil can articulate back to him the basic tenets of citizenship 
at the end of the night. They proceed to have a class session in that bong-
filled bedroom, with Spicoli ultimately articulating the foundations of our 
democracy as follows: “So what Jefferson was saying was, ‘Hey, you know, 
we left that England place because it was bogus. So if we don’t get some cool 
rules ourselves, pronto, we’ll just be bogus too. ’K?” “Very close Jeff,” replies 
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the pristine Mr. Hand, framed by naked centerfolds. He tells the young man 
he will “probably squeak by” in the course, and the grateful student reaches 
out his hand. “Aloha, Mr. Hand,” he says with great affection. “Aloha, Spicoli.” 
Following this moment of mutual recognition and respect, the adult exits the 
room, pausing to shake his head in disgust at the female nudes displayed by 
the door.
Because scholars and critics alike have tended to categorize the film as 
a “sex romp” (Johnson 62; Nowell 15 n.1), no research considers the crucial 
implications of this Hand/Spicoli relationship. I want to call attention to the 
significance of this young man’s fictional entrance into citizenship, as reflected 
by Mr. Hand’s grudging extension of, yes, his hand, which symbolizes a will-
ingness to pull this unpromising young person up and into the public sphere. 
Mr. Hand’s character produces and reproduces democracy, that modern polit-
ical system achieved through long and bloody struggle, one that extends the 
franchise to all adults, regardless of ability or resources, providing they meet 
a few minimum requirements. Hand does not withhold the right of citizen-
ship from Spicoli, nor does he demand that in return the youth renounce his 
hedonistic lifestyle, one marked by drug use, promiscuity, and lassitude.2
This idea of America as an anti-England, with its “cool rules,” exists as a 
fantasized space into which those who are allowed to enter become autono-
mous agents, unmarked and unstigmatized by their personal characteristics. 
While the promise has yet to be completely realized—after all, Jefferson for-
mulated this bracing idea of liberty while holding people in bondage him-
self—waves of activism have resulted in the enfranchising of non-Anglos, poor 
Eastern and Southern Europeans, the freed slave class, and, most recently, all 
women. When they arrived in significant numbers, Spicoli’s working-class 
immigrant Italian ancestors deeply troubled the ruling-class whites (the Mr. 
Hands) of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and laws were 
passed to try to control their lives, but by the time of this film, Spicoli’s eth-
nicity was no bar to full consideration as American citizen. And due in part 
to the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution giving women the right to 
vote, Stacy, the young white female with the unplanned pregnancy, can also be 
shown entering this autonomous public sphere as an anonymous citizen with 
the right to seek an abortion, the operation necessary for her maintenance 
of bodily integrity and legal independence. No protestors stand outside the 
clinic, no characters shame her for her actions, no stain remains when she 
goes forward with her public life, one that includes returning to work. The 
 2. When asked, “Why don’t you get a job?” by his disgusted peer, the hardworking and 
responsible older brother of Stacy, Spicoli responds in amazement, “Why?”
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fact that Spicoli and Stacy are both nonnormative, he by lacking drive and she 
by having a female body, makes more stark the film’s approbation of them as 
people, in their own right, with rights. Both are straight and white and middle 
class, which undoubtedly enables them to avoid punitive measures meted out 
to those falling outside of the mythical norm, but the progressive aspects of 
their treatment in this narrative reveal a cultural moment poised to embrace 
all unruly bodies as citizens.
However, during this very historical period in which civil rights move-
ments of the 1960s and 1970s are making true inroads into law and culture, a 
shift occurs that will result in the stalling of this progress, perhaps coming as 
a reaction to the visible changes they effected. In the 1980s, the era that saw 
the production of this film, Lauren Berlant argues a mutation occurred in the 
definition of the citizen, making private concerns public business:
Now everywhere in the United States intimate things flash in people’s faces: 
pornography, abortion, sexuality, and reproduction; marriage, personal 
morality, and family values. These issues do not arise as private concerns: 
they are key to debates about what “America” stands for, and are deemed 
vital to defining how citizens should act. In the process of collapsing the 
political and the personal into a world of public intimacy, a nation made for 
adult citizens has been replaced by one imagined for fetuses and children. (1)
Ridgemont High flashes many of those precise things in people’s faces, includ-
ing pornography, sexuality, and abortion. In the film’s imaginary world, Spic-
oli’s personal space filled with Penthouse magazine, drugs, and alcohol and 
Stacy’s private desire to seek out sexual relations with men to whom she was 
attracted did not prevent either one of them from being coded as individuals, 
emerging adults, entitled to live under those “cool rules” of the public sphere 
that Jefferson et al. devised for just such purposes. Their sexuality, while 
transgressive according to conservative Christian family values, was depicted 
as their own business in the film, and no bar to them getting accorded full 
entrance into citizenship. Spicoli’s love of centerfolds clearly transgressed the 
feminist sexual politics of the era, yet their containment in his bedroom also 
marked desire as something private. He was no more outed or excluded from 
citizenship for his embrace of pornography than Stacy was for her abortion. 
These are treated as private decisions made by private citizens. But with the 
rise of the religious right, this balance between the public and the private, in 
effect a boundary permitting the concept of adulthood at all, collapses into 
Berlant’s world of “public intimacy.” As a result, “something strange” happens 
to citizenship (Berlant 1).
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The Publicized Private Sphere in Juno
Nowhere is this “something strange” more perfectly represented than in the 
unplanned pregnancy narrative of Juno. The parallels with Ridgemont High 
are obvious: Both feature self-determining intelligent young white women 
who actively seek out sex with men; neither woman uses birth control; both 
women become pregnant. There the similarities end, reflecting drastic politi-
cal and cultural changes that have occurred in the intervening twenty-five 
years, specifically the deepening of the backlash against civil rights–era prog-
ress that began with the Reagan administration and has culminated with the 
election of Donald Trump, a businessman who made it clear from the out-
set of his candidacy that he supports only heteronormative white male social 
structures. Juno is a film beloved by young women that falls neatly in line 
with the contemporary conservative political climate. The hysteria surround-
ing abortion in the film, and the overwrought sentimentalizing of the fetus, 
set the stage for the ideal neoliberal, neoconservative happy ending: the place-
ment of a working-class woman’s white baby in a white home with a materially 
acquisitive and anxious white mother who betrays no objectionable political 
opinions and conflates caregiving with the consumption of commodities.
Like Stacy, the teen in Ridgemont High, Juno acts on her own behalf with 
a self-determination that the narrative codes as admirable. At the outset of 
the film, we are introduced to a self-possessed character, rational and cool, 
contemplating the actions that have occasioned the need for a pregnancy test, 
which she fails—or passes, depending on how you look at it. In spite of being 
young, unmarried, and pregnant, Juno almost never betrays any sense of dis-
tress. Audiences are meant to admire this flattened affect, as she wisecracks 
like the dame in a 1940s Hollywood screwball comedy, flip and hip and mod-
ern.3 That the character quickly dismisses the logical option of aborting the 
fetus has garnered attention from voices on both sides of the political spec-
trum, and much scholarship considers the ramifications of this plot point. 
Feminist academics note that Juno, like other films about unplanned preg-
nancy released in the same year, represents the potentially traumatic situa-
tion as one of light-hearted happy endings for all, thus asserting a pronatalist 
stance on maternity that reflects a “neoliberal demand for increased consump-
tion,” celebrating “young, American-born women who demonstrate their priv-
ilege as consumers and their modern female subjectivity through choosing to 
reproduce” (Thoma 412, 409).
 3. See Tarancón for coverage of the critical and cultural reception of the film.
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My contribution to this already rich conversation centers on the signif-
icance of the publicized private sphere in the narrative, that no separation 
exists, or is even imaginable, between the political citizen and personal moral 
choices.4 Because the fictive Juno acts with such seeming self-determination, 
the film naturalizes the coercive ideological constraints regulating the behav-
ior of girls and women both in the cinematic and the real world. Only those 
privileged enough to purchase products and people are validated, and yet 
audiences do not register this ideological thrust, as the sentimental mystifica-
tion of birth softens the concomitant sadistic treatment of those characters 
unable or unwilling to cosign the mandate to participate in capitalism’s new 
definition of citizenship.
At key points, the film uses this sleight of hand to mask its conserva-
tive trajectory, through maneuvers hidden in plain sight. For example, when 
the independent Juno decides not to abort the fetus, she claims not to want 
a “wholesome” adoptive couple, opting for something “edgier” instead. Yet 
upon seeing the ad featuring heteronormative Vanessa and Mark, beautiful, 
white, rich, and straight, she immediately selects them for no other reason 
than they are picture-perfect. No reflection whatever occurs about the ramifi-
cations of handing her child over to what the screenwriter herself terms “anti-
septic yuppies,” and thus the dis-ease that Juno represents as a working-class 
woman becomes healed—the pathogens get eliminated and a fantasy of life 
without contaminants in the married couples’ Glacial Valley Estates home 
reigns supreme. In the final scene Vanessa, adoptive mother par excellence, 
the perfect white woman, played by the perfectly white Jennifer Garner, poses 
in bed with perfect hair, dressed in perfect white, in a white bed, with white 
sheets, in a room with white walls, staring dreamily at her new white baby, 
swaddled, of course, in white. The audience is meant to enjoy and admire this 
scene of privileged maternal and material bliss.
That this character was an object of contempt for most of the film demands 
consideration. How—and why—does the superficial, materialistic, pathetic 
woman become this Angel in the McMansion? Tarancón notes that the “sym-
pathies of the audience are made to shift” toward this “neurotic and superfi-
cial yuppie” (461) but does not consider the ideological ramifications of the 
shift, nor the illogic of it, from either a filmic or political perspective. I argue 
two significant reasons for this shift exist: First, by shrilly insisting upon the 
Glories of Motherhood that can only be elaborated in fantasies like this film, 
Juno sanitizes messy chaotic realities like pregnancy, birth, death, the body, 
 4. For additional readings of the film besides those cited in the body of my chapter, see 
Willis; Oliver; Clarke; Troutman.
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desire, and female subjectivity. Second, while these glories reflect the Victo-
rian Cult of True Womanhood, in which a woman’s place is in the separate, 
domestic sphere, away from the realm of politics, the film must also sanitize 
the more recent neoliberal elimination of social services, requiring the pre-
tense of plenty for all, and free choice for all, regardless of race, class, sex, or 
ability. In this way, such films “combine uncertainty about options for women 
with ‘an idealized essentialized femininity that symbolically evades and tran-
scends institutional and social problem spots’” (Thoma 410). Juno allows us to 
turn away from practical concerns like access to resources, instead indulging 
in postfeminist fantasies of abundance.
Because the good life under neoliberalism must adhere to strict norms 
of consumption, the film naturalizes both the purchasing of objects and the 
spaces in which they are proffered. When Juno first meets the privileged pro-
spective parents, she is bowled over by the plenty that their picture-perfect 
home contains. Although there is no baby, Vanessa already has stockpiled 
vast stores of consumer goods generated for the billion-dollar infant market. 
Husband Mark disdainfully refers to these purchases as stemming from her 
“mall madness,” presented as gendered psychosis immanent in the female. Up 
until this point her character is clearly selfish, isolated, and materialistic—
she always gets what she wants and now she wants a baby “so bad”—but this 
negative depiction takes a sharp turn toward validation of her presumptive 
maternal instincts when Juno happens upon her at, unsurprisingly, the mall. 
This scene emphasizes that despite her sterile home environment, her literal 
sterility, her mindless privilege, and her emasculating of her partner, Van-
essa’s individual ability to “have” a child makes her a good choice of mother. 
As the scene begins, we see Juno, the pregnant teen, surreptitiously watching 
Vanessa play with children in a space designed for this activity. (We are not 
meant to consider the significance of the fact that American children play at 
the mall rather than outdoors, but given the film’s strenuous promotion of 
material privilege and consumption as the meaning of the good life, it bears 
mentioning.)
Because the adoptive father has had second thoughts, Juno was struggling 
with how to proceed until this scene at the mall when she realizes that with 
or without a husband, Vanessa is a natural mother. After watching Vanessa 
romp with a young girl, the two lead characters bump into each other on the 
elevator. Vanessa asks to touch Juno’s stomach in the hopes of feeling a kick 
from the fetus, and then dispiritedly says, “It’s not moving for me.” It seems 
this character will be doomed to a barren existence, with no one to shop for, as 
even the child is rejecting her in utero, but then Vanessa drops to a squat posi-
tion and speaks to Juno’s swollen abdomen: “Hi baby, it’s me Vanessa. I can’t 
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wait to meet you. Can you hear me baby? Sweet angel?” Upon hearing her 
voice, the baby kicks, and Vanessa beams with joy. “Magical,” she says. From 
the perspective of the conservative right, this is indeed a magical moment, for 
it validates the belief that women are magically meant to mother, and it does 
so in the marketplace, which is no longer a public space, but an extension of 
the private home, a domesticated space for women to fill with objects they buy 
and burnish. At the mall, cavorting with the children of strangers, Vanessa 
wants to own a baby of her own to shop for and to teach how to shop. She 
represents the postfeminist “neoliberal global marketplace demanding new 
forms of consumption, labor, and citizenship” (Thoma 410).
Given the film’s glorification of spending and acquiring, the narrative’s 
utter silence on Vanessa’s source of income loudly reverberates. She presum-
ably has a great professional career, but we are never told what she does. As 
a postfeminist promise to the girls in the audience that political and cultural 
constraints against their full participation in the workforce have been elimi-
nated, Juno makes concrete the fantasy that exciting, glamorous options are 
on the horizon.5 What those options are is not, and cannot, be addressed, for 
it might pollute the pretty picture. Does she work for the military-industrial 
complex? How does her income affect those of the worldwide working-class? 
And, glaringly, who will be taking care of this baby once she springs from that 
white maternal bed and bustles off to work? Impoverished women, especially 
women of color, that is who. These laborers enabling privileged white mothers 
do not themselves enjoy the protections and stability of US citizenship, nor 
are their relationships with their children encouraged, validated, or celebrated 
(Parreñas). In fact, as of this writing, migrants of all stripes find themselves 
under increasingly hostile surveillance and regulation. But because she will 
hand over her domestic work to invisible others paid from her own pocket, 
Vanessa can fulfill a neoliberal fantasy, that of the ability to raise children 
with no need, use, or desire for any social services whatever. As long as she is 
straight, white, and rich, no one need concern herself with the material reali-
ties of other women’s lives. All caring should be directed only toward one’s 
own offspring.
 5. Postfeminism is defined as the cultural movement that “works in part to incorporate, 
assume, or naturalize aspects of feminism; crucially, it also works to commodify feminism via 
the figure of woman as empowered consumer. Thus, postfeminist culture emphasizes educa-
tional and professional opportunities for women and girls; freedom of choice with respect 
to work, domesticity, and parenting; and physical and particularly sexual empowerment. 
Assuming full economic freedom for women, postfeminist culture also (even insistently) 
enacts the possibility that women might choose to retreat from the public world of work. . . . 
As this suggests, postfeminism is white and middle class by default, anchored in consumption 
as a strategy (and leisure as a site) for the production of the self ” (Tasker and Negra 2).
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The two characters who do express resistance to the otherwise unchal-
lenged mystification of childbirth in the film are soundly trashed for so 
doing: Mark Loring (Jason Bateman) and the unnamed ultrasound techni-
cian (Kaaren de Silva). Mark, Vanessa’s husband, ultimately rejects the plan 
to adopt, telling Juno that he is leaving his wife and moving to the city. While 
the film suggests his feelings for the young woman help spur this shift, his 
reversal also makes sense in the context of the story since it was Vanessa, not 
Mark, who wanted a baby from the minute they got married. He says he is not 
interested in being a parent, which seems a fine thing to know about oneself. 
His decision might even be coded as the responsible thing to do—that is, to 
come forward before the adoption occurs so that Vanessa is not left with being 
a single parent. Also, as a musician now reduced to writing advertising jingles, 
Mark’s rejection of their status-obsessed corporate life could be viewed as a 
life-affirming alternative to the capitalist mandate that all meaning derives 
from consumption of goods. He wants to drop out of this regulated, sterile, 
commercial world. “She hates it when I sit around and watch movies and don’t 
‘contribute,’” he tells Juno with a dismay Spicoli would understand, but there 
is no space in the film to consider these alternative desires as reasonable. In 
fact, it is the ostensibly bohemian Juno herself who delivers the punishing 
neoliberal judgment on Mark’s resistance to being regulated: “Your shirt is 
stupid. Grow up.”
The problem with this mandate to “grow up” stems from the decreasing 
possibility of being any kind of citizen except one devoted to conservative val-
ues. Berlant describes this type of citizenship as requiring adults to “‘forget’ or 
render as impractical, naïve, or childish their utopian political identifications 
in order to be politically happy and economically functional” (29). It is hard 
to imagine Spicoli from Ridgemont High as an adult in this highly regulated 
capitalist space welcoming only one kind of citizen, the apolitical compliant 
consumer. Mark represents precisely the dilemma of choice in such a culture, 
as his character must submit fully to the machine, churning out ads and shop-
ping with his wife and baby, or, in resisting, become stigmatized as childish 
for wanting something more pleasurable, uncertain, and less sterile. As Van-
essa’s choice to adopt obscures the realities of those who toil to service women 
with reproductive privilege while being forced to separate from their own 
offspring, Mark’s choice to move to a loft in the city obscures the situation of 
those who lack his character’s resources and race, sex, and gender privilege. 
At the same time, the film does not validate his character’s desire for some-
thing else besides the moribund sterility and sameness of suburbia, nor does 
the narrative allow space for imagining what that might be. Eliminating the 
problematic status of white masculinity by sending the husband away allows 
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the narrative to hone in directly on its end goal: illuminating the pieta of white 
womanhood and baby.
That life in Glacial Valley Estates is a form of death was made clear early 
in the film as Juno and her father drove to Mark and Vanessa’s home for the 
first time, passing one prefabricated home after another. The symbolism here 
is explicit: These funky working-class types have come to suburbia, where 
houses line up like tombstones, crypts for the wealthy, entombed by their pos-
sessions. Until this point, viewers are meant to identify with and admire Juno’s 
nonconformity. She is fresh and funny, seemingly unselfconscious and lacking 
in shame. Her judgments on others seem deserving. We admire her longing 
for individual freedom and the lengths to which she is willing to go to get it. 
Thus, the comparison between her whimsical life and this mini-mansion cum 
Stepford wife tilts audience judgment initially onto Juno’s side. First, the cam-
era cuts to Vanessa’s disembodied hand arranging everything perfectly in her 
perfect house—glass picture frames, diffuser. Magazines line up rigidly like 
in the doctor’s offices that themselves reflect publicized private spheres, fake 
living rooms offering familiar sterility. The titles suggest intimate lives medi-
ated by status: Parents, Traditional Home, Family Circle, Country Living. Mark 
tells Juno his wife “gave me my own room for all my stuff,” and Juno teases 
him about this infantilization even as she also admires his collection of rock 
and roll accoutrement, and audience sympathy aligns with the two of them in 
disliking the punishing martinet Vanessa.
And yet the seeming condemnation of her sterile home and personality 
gets quickly elided by the magic of materialistic maternity. Initially crestfallen 
to discover that Juno had found them in the Penny Saver, perhaps because the 
working-class association of this advertising circular whiffs of unseemly labor 
rather than the fancy kind she does, Vanessa begins romanticizing pregnancy 
as “beautiful,” but then, cautiously asks, “Are you looking for any other type 
of compensation?” The pregnant pause that follows reveals her concern that 
this young woman might be mercenary. Juno replies, “No, I don’t want to sell 
the thing.” Suddenly, peace descends, directing attention away from ques-
tions about how this exchange could or should fall outside of the capitalist 
economy that so clearly regulates every other aspect of the characters’ lives. 
The answer, that as compensation for neoliberal privatization and alienation 
of human life, childbearing must be deemed special, meaning it cannot be 
monetized, reveals the romantic mythology at work here. Something mystical 
involving pregnancy and motherhood transcends the otherwise impersonal 
vagaries of commerce, and women find fruition in this economy rather than 
the capitalist one. “Have you ever felt like you were just born to do some-
thing?” Vanessa asks breathlessly, clearly referring to her own maternal drive. 
dIANA YORk BLAINE • 133
“Yes,” replies Juno’s dad, “heating and air conditioning.” The humor here soft-
ens the robust conflation of masculinity with productive work and femininity 
with the work of mothering. (Upon seeing Vanessa’s Pilates machine in their 
living room, Juno’s father asks, “What do you make with it?”) But the fact that 
this natural-born-mother apparently cannot naturally birth children creates 
an opportunity for consumption, one this whole scene belies.
Also ignored are the race and class privilege that allow Vanessa, the 
wealthy white woman, to buy a baby, even after Mark, the cad, leaves her. As 
Kristen Hoerl and Casey Kelly have argued,
Vanessa’s choice to become a single mother, without becoming pregnant 
.  .  . reflects the consumer dynamic at work in the post-nuclear family. As 
a white, professional woman Vanessa exercises the range of choices at her 
disposal, to “have it all,” so to speak “autonomy, career, and a child.” (370)
Thus, Juno asks the audience to navigate two simultaneous value systems, 
one eschewing any thought of financial considerations, the other rejecting 
the idea that an impecunious life has any value. Only those females who have 
money are naturalized as mothers in the narrative, which is reflected in Juno’s 
forthright acknowledgment that she is unprepared to raise a child, and in her 
stepmother’s depiction as loving but crude. While Juno’s character is valorized 
for making the right choice, a selfless sacrifice, sending the child off to the 
suburbs, paradoxically the ultrasound technician who dares to suggest that 
raising children requires resources is soundly humiliated. This scene at the 
clinic, breathtaking in its hypocrisy, misogyny, and illogic, reflects that same 
sleight of hand performed at key moments in the plot, allowing the audience 
to side both with the unconventional Juno and her unruly family and with 
the neoconservative and neoliberal mandates that nonconforming reproduc-
tion (that is, the reproductive choices of poor women and women of color, 
among others) be discouraged. It is worth looking carefully at the scene where 
Juno, her best friend, and her stepmother have gone in for an ultrasound. 
As the girls joke around, the technician looks on disapprovingly at their cal-
low youth. When she finds out the baby will be adopted out, she murmurs, 
“Thank goodness for that.” What has been a sentimental and comical scene 
swiftly pivots in tone as a sadistic attack on the woman is unleashed by Juno’s 
insulted stepmother. The technician, pressed for an explanation, says, “I just 
see a lot of teenaged mothers come through here. It’s obviously a poisonous 
environment to raise a baby in.”
Given that the film rejects out of hand the idea that Juno herself should 
keep the baby, and that it ultimately sentimentalizes, mystifies, and celebrates 
134 • CHAPTER 6
the adoption of the baby by the privileged white consumer, this tech’s obser-
vation would seem uncontroversial. Teenaged girls without resources cannot 
raise children as well as rich grown-ups; this is the ultimate message of the 
movie. But instead of letting this comment pass, or exploring the etiology of 
the “poison” to which she refers, the narrative has the stepmother, herself a 
working-class woman, viciously attack this female worker for daring to state 
the obvious. After the group protests that the adoptive parents could be much 
worse than Juno in raising the baby—how confusing is that, given the thrust 
of this plot?—the stepmother asks condescendingly, “What is your job title 
exactly?” She makes the point that this woman has stepped out of the bounds 
of her expertise by commenting on the fitness of teenage parents, which might 
be a valid observation under different circumstances, but instead audience 
members are forced to side with her and against this woman, granting Juno 
and her stepmother ethical status for in effect asserting that the right thing to 
do is to keep one’s baby. Yet in the film the ethical thing to do is represented 
as giving it to someone in a privileged economic position.
This paradox (do not give it away / do not keep it) could be solved by 
abortion, as we have seen in Ridgemont High. McClennan and others have 
noted that instead, Juno the film and Juno the character reject the option of 
abortion with breathtaking speed and superficiality. Instead, the film scape-
goats this ultrasound technician for pointing out the obvious, while simul-
taneously naturalizing babies being raised by their birth mothers as the best 
option. In this twist, we see a celebration of women’s presumed individual 
rights, which, as Hoerl and Kelly have argued, is accomplished “without the 
corresponding structural critique of patriarchy and capitalism offered by femi-
nists of the Second Wave” (370). In other words, instead of considering the 
material conditions that affect women’s ability to choose to be mothers or 
to parent successfully, we, via the stepmother as mouthpiece for neoliberal-
ism, turn on the worker and enjoy her degradation. Although the stepmother 
described herself modestly as a “nail tech” earlier in the scene, suddenly her 
character brings the full force of masculine dismissal of female waged-labor 
to bear, while the audience and the girls cheer her on. “Bren, you’re a dick,” 
says Juno. “LOVE it!!!” No female solidarity is possible in such a narrative. 
We have only individuals vying for dominance, absent any context about what 
structural forces proscribe all of their lives. The choice to mother is reserved 
only for women with access to wealth who choose to do so, and this becomes 
an excuse to deny social services to poor women (Hoerl and Kelly 377), an 
ambiguity wholly unexplored in this scene, which instead pits working women 
against one another.
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Unlike Ridgemont High, which depicts young people getting socialized in 
school to become citizens, and operating as young adults in a public sphere 
unencumbered by their private sexual behaviors, in Juno all private activi-
ties such as pregnancy have become publicized, and no sense of a public 
sphere absent one’s private choices appears to exist. In Ridgemont High, all the 
adults are teachers. In Juno, almost all the adults are parents—the only excep-
tion being a brief glimpse of a teacher engaged in a juvenile flirtation with 
Juno’s best friend. Authority figures like Mr. Hand seem to have disappeared 
in this cultural moment, and in their place appear childish spokespeople for 
the reactionary right. “All children want to be borned,” bawls Su-Chin, Juno’s 
classmate and abortion protestor in the clinic parking lot. Unlike Stacy, Juno 
cannot make a private decision to seek an abortion, as this exercise of her civil 
rights has become public property. This publicization of the private sphere, 
reflected in the anti-choice rhetoric of the protestor, accompanies a privati-
zation of the public sphere, as the bored and untrained clinic worker reveals 
intimate personal details of her sex life to the disgusted Juno. Ultimately 
washed of any political import, Juno’s decision to reject abortion is coded in 
the film as an entirely individual decision, reflecting personality clashes with 
the worker and those other patients in the waiting room. She flees in disgust 
after their inaudible finger tapping and gum chewing become an unbearable 
cacophony. Indeed, abortion is only represented to suggest the full arsenal of 
choices supposedly available to liberated First World girls.
The silent star of this drama is of course the fetus itself, always already 
positioned as future citizen-consumer. The baby who waves to Vanessa from 
the womb has begun the inexorable command of her time and resources, rep-
resenting the unlimited potential of the autonomous male, unbound by the 
female container/crypt. In this fantasy, we need not acknowledge the inevi-
table erasure of personhood that mortality guarantees. The unaborted fetus, 
neoliberal subject extraordinaire, waves from his cockpit, ready for launch 
into—what exactly goes blissfully unexplored for the happily-ever-after end-
ing such movies generically require. Not only does the film leave us with a 
dewy white woman in bed with designer sheets and her newly acquired baby, 
but we also see Juno and her boyfriend Bleeker warbling away to each other 
as she asserts their undying future love for each other. No longer a resistant 
female, compliant Juno joins the conga line of normative ingénues. Her father 
has even promised her a return to the birthing room at the hospital someday 
“on her own terms.” In this way films can promise us what embodiment can-
not: permanence, stability, manageability. Such promises can only be made 
by ruthlessly editing out contradictory and nonnormative instances and by 
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reproducing heterosexual romance, whiteness, and material privilege. The 
power dynamics underlying such warm and fuzzy plotlines—the oppression 
and marginalization of real bodies and environments required to produce a 
nostalgic fantasy of materialistic nirvana for select groups—emerge only upon 
close considerations of the fault lines in these compensatory narratives that 
assume “universal access to citizenship and consumer culture” (Thoma 411). 
The fetal rights manifested in Juno reflect a fantasy of coherence, belied by the 
lived reality of women’s lives in a world of telescoping resources and concern 
for us as people.
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C H A P T E R  7
“Masters of Their Own Destiny”
women’s Rights and Forced Sterilizations in Peru
JULIETA CHAPARRO-BUITRAGO
ON DECEMBER 19, 1997, the Peruvian newspaper El Comercio featured the 
story of Magna Morales Canduelas, a woman from Tocache, a town in the 
Amazon region, who was sterilized and subsequently died earlier that month 
at the local hospital. Days before her passing, Rita, one of the obstetricians, 
had visited Magna in her home to convince her to get the procedure. The first 
time she visited Magna’s house, Magna’s daughter remembers, she hid away. 
Rita was persistent, however, and the next day she managed to take Magna 
to the health center. Rita had recruited another woman, Bernardina Alba, 
who recounted that Magna was not entirely convinced about the sterilization. 
Repeatedly, she told the provider that her husband didn’t agree with the pro-
cedure. “It doesn’t matter, the obstetrician said, you get it today and you will 
be back home for cooking dinner. Your husband will never find out” Alba 
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remembered. In the end, Magna accepted. After all, as Mrs. Alba commented: 
“When you have nothing and they offer you food and clothes for your chil-
dren, they manipulate you.” The women got the surgery in the afternoon, and 
next morning they were back home.
When Rita visited Magna in her house for a follow-up, Magna told the 
nurse she was not feeling well; her feet were cold, she had difficulty urinat-
ing, and had nausea and diarrhea. Rita offered some painkillers but never 
came back to check on her. Magna’s health deteriorated quickly to the point 
that she couldn’t eat or get out of bed. The next day her husband rushed her 
to the hospital because the abdominal pain and headache had worsened, and 
she was unable to walk. When they arrived, the doctor refused her entrance 
to the ER. Magna was admitted after the president and members of the local 
Mother’s Club showed up and argued with him. Magna’s husband had to pay 
out of pocket for chloromycetin (a broad-spectrum antibiotic), serum, and 
painkillers for his wife’s treatment.
Magna passed away only a few days after she was hospitalized. Accord-
ing to the doctor, she had several cardiac arrests, and they couldn’t revive 
her. The institution refused to perform an autopsy, and when her husband 
pushed for it, the hospital director replied: “Why do we need to get it done 
if we already know what caused her death?” Local authorities decided not to 
open an investigation for Mrs. Morales’s case, but one of her neighbors filed 
a complaint at the ombudsman’s office, providing documentation, including a 
tape of the testimony of the doctor in charge, who assured him Mrs. Morales 
died of meningitis.
Magna’s case is emblematic of the violations and abuses that thousands of 
Peruvian women experienced when they were sterilized under the auspices of 
the Reproductive Health and Family Planning Program 1996–2000 (RHFPP). 
These abuses took place under a program that had a progressive rhetoric of 
reproductive health and women’s empowerment. The goal of this essay is to 
understand how a presumably progressive social policy that sought to expand 
women’s reproductive health services ended up being the platform for steril-
izing thousands of women in Peru without their consent.
Some commentators have noted that this program was rooted in popula-
tion control principles and was part of a broader poverty reduction strategy 
(Ballon; Boesten, “Revisiting” and “Free Choice”; Ewig, “Hijacking”; Mooney). 
Peru was facing a dramatic economic downturn as a result of a stagnant econ-
omy, high inflation rates, and a bloody internal armed conflict. However, I find 
their analysis incomplete as they fail to explore the operation of the rhetoric 
of empowerment and autonomy for understanding the cases of forced ster-
ilization. In Governed through Choice: Autonomy, Technology, and the Politics 
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of Reproduction, political scientist Jennifer Denbow discusses the importance 
of analyzing the reproductive rights discourse for its underlying logic rather 
than assuming it has been merely manipulated for restricting women’s repro-
ductive lives. Her work leads to some provocative questions for reflecting on 
the Peruvian case: How did a program with progressive rhetoric give way to 
the large-scale sterilization of low-income, peasant, and indigenous women in 
Peru? How does the discourse of responsible parenthood and choice facilitate 
state interference in women’s lives?
When we bring an intersectional lens to examine the notions of empow-
erment and autonomy foregrounded in the program, the issue of who can be 
considered an autonomous subject becomes apparent. I argue in this essay 
that gendered racism in Peru creates the conditions for indigenous and peas-
ant women to be portrayed as irresponsible mothers unable to appropriately 
control their reproductive lives, turning them into the targets of coerced steril-
izations. Building on Loretta Ross and Rickie Solinger’s work on reproductive 
justice, I argue that the rhetoric of empowerment does not apply homoge-
neously to all women precisely because the intersections of race, class, and 
gender constitute the vulnerability of some women who are deemed as mak-
ing bad choices about their reproductive lives—in this case, having children 
while poor.
In what follows, I begin with a historical overview of the implementation 
of the Reproductive Health and Family Planning Program and the controversy 
that emerged in the media around it. Next, I explore the novelty and limits of 
this program, particularly the use of empowerment and citizenship as solu-
tions to poverty. I use Alberto Fujimori’s speech at the World Conference on 
Women in Beijing to illustrate this point. Then, I analyze the program’s rhet-
oric to underscore how two notions—responsible parenthood and choice—
were fundamental to the coercive sterilization campaign that took place under 
the program. I introduce an intersectional approach to complicate the repro-
ductive rights agenda and show how racialized gendered constructions about 
indigenous and peasant women, which depict them as unable to regulate their 
reproductive lives, turn them into the target of forced sterilizations.
A “Women Friendly” Government
In 1991, former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori declared the 1990s the 
decade of family planning, and birth control–related activities intensified dur-
ing his second presidential term (1995–2000). In his presidential address in 
1995, he announced the creation of the new Reproductive Health and Fam-
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ily Planning Program that would guarantee low-income families access to 
affordable contraceptives and women the control of their reproductive lives. 
The RHFPP was introduced as a progressive program that sought to guaran-
tee women’s reproductive health at all stages of their lives. Having a fulfilling 
reproductive life, according to the program, would improve people’s qual-
ity of life, increase equity, and contribute to a balanced relationship between 
society and the environment. The program described reproductive health as a 
fundamental human, social, and political right, which would guarantee one’s 
autonomy, self-governance, and the exercise of women’s citizenship. The lan-
guage of the policy conveyed the idea that men and women as citizens were 
the new subjects of reproductive rights—yet the program placed at the center 
the notion of responsible parenthood as the standard of proper reproductive 
behavior.
Ideas about women’s empowerment and women’s rights had a significant 
presence in Fujimori’s second presidential term. In 1997, for instance, a quota 
law was introduced to increase women’s participation in Peruvian political 
life. Feminist scholar Cecilia Blondet observes that women elected for Con-
gress went from 9 percent in 1995 to 25 percent in 2000 (Mujeres y Politica), 
eight women became heads of ministries, and women regidoras (municipal 
representatives) reached 24.8 percent in 1998 (Encanto del Dictador). Congress 
approved important legislation for preventing domestic violence and sexual 
assault. In 1996, the government also created three public offices devoted to the 
expansion of women’s rights: Promudeh (the Ministry of Women’s Develop-
ment and Human Capital); the Women’s Rights Division at the ombudsman’s 
office; and the Congress’s Commission on Women. Additionally, Fujimori par-
ticipated in the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, where 
he delivered a speech ratifying his government’s commitment to expanding 
family planning services as a platform for guaranteeing women’s control over 
their bodies. He sent a persuasive message to Peruvians and the rest of the 
world: The expansion of women’s rights stood as evidence of the democratic 
spirit of his government,1 revealing the centrality of women’s issues and libera-
tion to liberal-democratic systems (Mahmood 2005).
 1. Political scientist Christine Ewig suggests that Fujimori’s speech at the Beijing Confer-
ence helped ease criticism after the self-coup in 1992 and allowed his government to access 
financial support from international agencies, such as USAID, that had withdrawn funding 
after he dissolved Congress (“Hijacking”). In fact, gender mainstreaming policies, like the 
Reproductive Health and Family Planning Program, served to cover up what critics said was 
Fujimori’s authoritarian, violent, and corrupt regime (Boesten, “Revisiting”) by conveying the 
idea of stability, order, and good governance (Blondet, Encanto del Dictador).
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A Controversial Program
The excitement about the RHFPP was short-lived. News about coercive ster-
ilizations began to appear in newspapers as early as 1996. Members of the 
clergy, healthcare professionals, and politicians critical of Fujimori’s admin-
istration condemned the program for its potential abusive nature. Most of 
these critics considered it an attack on individual liberties and opposed to 
bioethical principles. Luis Bambaren, president of the Episcopal Conference 
of the city of Chimbote, denounced the classism of the program, arguing 
that it violated the dignity and freedom of poor people. In an interview with 
the newspaper La Republica on July 13, 1996, he criticized the use of pub-
lic resources to sterilize women, rather than investing them in the expan-
sion of social services for the poor. In another newspaper article published 
in La Republica on July 1, 1996, the president of the Medical Association of 
Peru, Franciso Sanchez Moreno, suggested that the government used incen-
tives to pressure women with less socioeconomic power to accept the ster-
ilizations. “Amidst poverty,” Sanchez Moreno argued, “it is foreseeable that 
women would choose to get the procedure in exchange for some economic 
compensation.” He condemned the use of bonuses for violating women’s right 
to make free and informed decisions about their reproductive lives. News 
articles denouncing abuses and coercive sterilizations in different parts of the 
country continued to appear in the media in 1997, attesting to the nationwide 
scope of the program. Magna’s case and other women’s testimonies of coer-
cive sterilizations across Peru were first featured in national media in Decem-
ber 1997, and they opened the door to an official investigation by the women’s 
rights division at the ombudsman’s office.
Simultaneously, the Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the 
Defense of Women’s Rights (CLADEM), a feminist umbrella organization, was 
also documenting the abuses after they heard of coercive sterilizations during 
a field visit to Huancabamba, a province in the Coastal Department of Piura. 
Feminist lawyer Giulia Tamayo, in charge of the investigation, stumbled upon 
documents at the local healthcare center containing information on tubal liga-
tion quotas for the province of Huancabamba for 1996, as well as a list of pro-
cedures done up to September that year, and dates and places for upcoming 
campañas (fairs) (CLADEM, Nada).
The ombudsman’s office and CLADEM carried out separate investigations, 
yet arrived at similar findings. They found that healthcare centers had steril-
ization quotas and that personnel captaba (caught) patients to fulfill the num-
bers. Providers used incentives, such as food, clothes, and small amounts of 
cash, in exchange for women’s compliance. The government also used stimuli 
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for providers to fulfill sterilization quotas, through sanction or promotions on 
the fulfillment of quotas, and rewards to healthcare centers with the highest 
numbers of sterilizations. Healthcare centers across the country planned and 
executed massive tubal ligation fairs where providers performed sterilizations 
and vasectomies in unsanitary conditions, and without providing information 
on other contraceptive methods.
Coerced sterilizations were concentrated in rural communities populated 
by indigenous and peasant women, as well as in low-income neighborhoods 
in cities such as Lima. Women in these areas received family planning services 
from the government, making them more vulnerable to coerced and uncon-
sented sterilizations in health centers run by the Ministry of Health. Statistical 
projections find that women who were more likely to be sterilized during the 
campaign were younger, with considerably less education, and more likely to 
live in rural areas in the Amazon or the Andean region (Byker and Gutierrez). 
Indigenous women with one or two children were more likely to be steril-
ized compared to nonindigenous women, revealing a class and ethnic bias in 
the sterilization campaign that targeted indigenous women living in poverty 
(Rendon 2017). The ombudsman office’s first report, from 1998, found eight 
cases; the second, from 2000, found 157; and the last one, from 2002, doc-
umented more than 200,000 cases of low-income, peasant, and indigenous 
women who were sterilized in the span of the four years, many of whom were 
bribed, deceived by healthcare providers, and in some cases forcibly sterilized 
in health centers.
If the main goal of the RHFPP was the expansion of women’s reproduc-
tive health, how do we account for the abuses committed under its auspices? 
Different authors have suggested that poverty reduction was one of the pri-
mary purposes behind the program (Ballon; Boesten, “Revisiting” and “Free 
Choice”; Coe; Ewig, “Hijacking”; Mooney). The government believed that 
reducing birth rates and restructuring family size would empower women and 
improve the economic conditions of their families and the country at large. 
Equating lowering birth rates with poverty reduction is an old idea, one that 
had gained popularity after World War II, when population growth—often 
associated with nonwhite and Third World populations—started to become 
a social problem that needed attention and intervention for the dangers it 
posed to the world (Connelly; Gutierrez). Demographers, historian Mat-
thew Connelly suggests, reformulated the demographic transition theory to 
make the reduction of birth rates a necessary condition for the modernization 
process and economic development. Population control policies then were 
used to solve Third World countries’ so-called development problems, such 
as recurrent famines and political and economic instability (Hartmann). Peru 
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followed this formula for alleviating the high poverty rates that plagued the 
country during the 1980s and 1990s.
Poverty reduction, however, is not the only explanation behind coerced 
sterilizations of indigenous, peasant, and low-income women in Peru. I am 
interested in how the language of women’s empowerment and autonomy could 
be used as a discourse of control, calling into question the idea that Fujimori’s 
government merely used the language of rights and feminism to cover up 
what has been described as a corrupt and abusive regime, as feminist scholar 
Jelke Boesten (“Revisiting”) and political scientist Christina Ewig (“Hijacking 
Feminism”) have suggested. We could indeed think that feminist agendas were 
manipulated to advance economic goals; however, this explanation has two 
significant shortcomings. It means not uncovering the influence of neoliberal 
principles in this program that brought together the promise of empowerment 
for women, a new modern feminist subjectivity, and the idea of citizenship as 
the solution to poverty (Grewal). Additionally, not exploring the program’s 
rhetoric leaves us oblivious to how the presumably benign language of wom-
en’s empowerment, choice, and responsible parenthood serve the purpose of 
controlling indigenous and peasant women’s lives.
Family Planning Meets Reproductive Health
The terrifying novelty of the RHFPP was its selective appropriation of the 
reproductive health concerns that emerged from the UN-sponsored Interna-
tional Conferences on Population and Development2 (ICPD) and the Fourth 
Conference of Women in Beijing, which challenged neo-Malthusian views of 
population control and economic development. These conferences offered a 
comprehensive model for reproductive rights programs, including “full ante-
natal and obstetric care, infertility treatment, breastfeeding, prevention and 
treatment of gynaecological cancers, HIV and other STDs, as well as a wide 
range of family planning methods and counseling” (Petchesky 154). Ignor-
ing the comprehensive model, however, the RHFPP focused on fertility rates, 
population growth, and economic development as pathways to women’s 
empowerment and reproductive autonomy.
 2. The conference brought together women’s health activists, both from the developed 
countries and the South, to influence the discussion about population control (Rao and Sex-
ton). Their goal was to bring together population policies and women’s reproductive rights, 
and they were backed by the population policy establishment (the World Bank, the Population 
Council, and other international NGOs) (Rao and Sexton). These groups crafted the “Cairo 
Consensus” that gave life to the ICPD’s Programme of Action,  which would regulate popula-
tion policies across the world, and which was signed by some 179 countries (Rao and Sexton).
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Even though the RHFPP included an expanded agenda of reproductive 
rights and maternal and infant health, fertility rates were still the primary 
target. The goals of the program were to expand the use of modern contracep-
tives in order to reduce overall fertility rates—from 3.2 children per woman in 
1995 to 2.5 children in 2000—and to reduce maternal mortality rates to fewer 
than 100 deaths per hundred thousand live births. The RHFPP maintained 
an approach to fertility and economic development built around the idea of 
overpopulation and the need to lower fertility rates to improve the country’s 
economic problems. This program reinforced a historical belief that the inci-
dence of poverty among rural women is explained by high fertility rates. It 
tied development goals to population dynamics while embracing the language 
of women’s rights and reproductive health.
Jelke Boesten (Prologo) and Anna-Brit Coe argue that a shift from demo-
graphic goals to a discourse of rights transforms public policies to “enhance 
women’s and men’s capacity to exercise their rights and address their repro-
ductive health concerns, including but not limited to their need for contra-
ceptives” (Coe 56). The Peruvian case, however, shows that the introduction 
of the language of reproductive rights and health did not automatically dis-
place concerns with overpopulation and poverty. This is partly inherent to 
the Programme of Action of the ICPD, which retained the same model of 
capitalist economic development as the foundation for reproductive rights 
agendas (Petchesky). Even though it “enshrine[d] an almost-feminist vision of 
reproductive rights and gender equity” (Petchesky 152), the program failed to 
address the devastating effects of privatization and structural adjustment poli-
cies in the lives of women and lacked enforcement and accountability mecha-
nisms to dismantle population control principles (Petchesky). Additionally, 
this program retained population management goals because the Peruvian 
National Population Act of 1985, which gave shape to family planning activi-
ties, had as its primary goal the regulation of population growth, and the 
RHFPP was expected to fulfill this objective.
Despite these shortcomings, the appealing innovation of the RHFPP was 
the introduction of women’s empowerment and citizenship as a new solution 
to poverty, a framework that has become mainstream in contemporary fam-
ily planning agendas. Within this new framework, women’s autonomy and 
decision-making are the solutions to high fertility rates, access to contracep-
tives, and poverty. Empowerment rhetoric has been useful for feminists and 
progressive politics, but it has also become a means of governance within 
neoliberal projects (Sharma). When empowerment rhetoric gets entangled 
with neoliberalism, it becomes a tool for governing poor people through the 
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cultivation of a sense of self-care and self-improvement (Sharma) that aids a 
neoliberal agenda.
Empowering Women, Managing Poverty
In his speech at the Fourth World Conference on Women held by the United 
Nations in 1995, Fujimori focused on women’s empowerment and their role 
in the economic and social recovery of a country that was ravaged by poverty 
and violence. He began his speech with what is still the most common figura-
tion of poverty in Peru: a woman from rural areas “carrying a baby wrapped 
in a blanket on her back, surrounded by an additional three or four more 
children. Even more unbelievably, she often carries one more human being 
in her womb. Many of these women are single mothers, estranged from their 
spouses or the sole support of their families” (Fujimori, Speech). This image 
contrasted with the description of women in grassroots organizations who, 
according to Fujimori, played a central role in fighting poverty and terror-
ism. They joined rondas campesinas (peasant patrols), community-organized 
security forces in rural areas that fought against guerrilla organizations, he 
contended. Women also had an important role in mitigating the effects of 
the economic collapse, as they courageously “created unique mechanisms to 
solve the problems of hunger and unemployment by promoting popular kitch-
ens, ‘glass of milk committees,’ Wawa Wasi [day care centers], creating close-
knitted solidarity networks which benefited entire communities” (Fujimori, 
Speech). The contrast between a poor woman, a passive recipient of society’s 
contempt, and an active and empowered one who can bring about significant 
changes to society indicated a new approach to citizenship in this program. It 
presupposed an active member of society, capable of self-improvement. Wom-
en’s empowerment, Fujimori noted, was a good reason to “invest in women as 
the most profitable way to reduce poverty and improve [Peru’s] social condi-
tions” (Speech).
Fujimori spoke in detail about the Reproductive Health and Family Plan-
ning Program as a key program in his poverty reduction scheme. It would 
provide extensive information and reproductive health services to women 
who could access—with full autonomy and freedom—the tools necessary to 
make autonomous and rational decisions about their lives. This program, Fuji-
mori suggested, reflected the desires of poor women to control their fertil-
ity and reduce the number of pregnancies, but it was received with hostility 
by the Peruvian Catholic Church, who accused his government of “trying to 
kill poor people or mutilate them” (Fujimori, Speech) after Congress legalized 
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voluntary vasectomies and tubal ligations in 1995. He described the Catholic 
Church’s position as intransigent, an ultraconservative force trying to keep 
women confined to their restrictive ideas about family planning. By contrast, 
he claimed, his government was a vanguard force willing to bring forward the 
changes needed to empower women. Modern family planning methods would 
be available to women, men, and families of all social classes. As autonomous 
and responsible parents, they would use them or opt for another solution 
according to their personal or family beliefs, he concluded.
The exaltation of women in Fujimori’s speech was a pivotal strategy to 
deal with the impacts of social adjustment (Rousseau 35). Empowerment, 
a term inherited from the repertoire of nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) as well as feminists and women’s organizations, portrayed women 
as active subjects who could acquire the necessary skills and capabilities to 
escape poverty by their individual efforts (Molyneux; Sharma). The RHFPP 
built on this principle to convey the idea that women could be educated to 
make appropriate decisions about their fertility, family structure, and par-
enting. Empowerment was not simply a palliative to poverty; it would pro-
duce long-term changes in the way women managed their fertility to become 
responsible parents. Women were not merely recipients of welfare benefits, 
but empowered citizens capable of determining their own needs and setting 
the priorities for social programs that would pave their way out of poverty 
(Molyneux).
The impulse to transform women’s behavior through empowerment fit the 
behavioralist approach that characterizes certain family programs, as Corinna 
Unger shows. Rational-choice theory as well as behavioralism, which gained 
relevance during the mid-twentieth century, were influential in family plan-
ning policies in various parts of the world, including the US, India, and 
Pakistan. In the global South, family planning involved strategies to modify 
people’s reproductive behaviors through the provision of information that 
would lead to a decrease of population growth. High fertility rates became 
a sign of backwardness, the result of traditional and old-fashioned institu-
tions that represented obstacles to individual decision-making. The assump-
tion was that women, when presented with information about contraceptives, 
birth spacing, and desired family size (nuclear), would adopt family planning 
practices and transform their reproductive behavior: “‘Fate would give way to 
control,’ this was the hope of many demographers and family planning pun-
dits who saw in dismantling traditional marriage structures, the possibility 
for individuals to make ‘rational choice-based family planning’” (Unger 71). 
People would be able to decide who and when to marry, and their fertility 
would no longer be “a rather uncontrolled, fateful concomitant of the expres-
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sion of sexual desires,” but would become “dependent on a conscious decision 
to have children” (Unger 67).
Empowerment rhetoric suited the behavioralist aspect of family plan-
ning and amplified its liberal language of responsibility and autonomy. The 
RHFPP drew on the overlap between neoliberal empowerment rhetoric and 
the liberal language from family planning programs to promise autonomy, 
free decision-making, and liberation from oppressive institutions such as the 
Catholic Church, which did not want to recognize women as “the masters 
of their own destiny”—one of Fujimori’s favorite catchphrases. If women 
changed their behavior through available information and resources, they 
would be able not only to control their reproduction but to liberate them-
selves, to become new subjects of rights, and to be recognized as citizens.
(Ir)responsible Parents
One of the central goals of Fujimori’s program was to lower the fertility rate 
from 3.5 to 2.5 by the year 2000. The program disaggregated fecundity rates 
by socioeconomic groups and showed that non-poor women had on aver-
age two children and that the average almost doubled for poor women (3.9) 
and tripled for women living under extreme poverty (6.9). Despite the wide 
variation in fecundity rates, the program suggested a clear tendency among all 
women to limit childbirth regardless of their socioeconomic status. Presum-
ably, all women aimed to have 2.4 children. Non-poor women’s reproductive 
behavior was used as the referent for desired fecundity and, most importantly, 
for setting up the program’s goals.3 This referent lies at the heart of Peru’s 
sterilization program that targeted women who deviated from this expected 
reproductive behavior.
Here is where two central notions of the program—choice and respon-
sible parenthood—need to be scrutinized to complicate the interpretation 
that legislators disingenuously used concepts like autonomy, choice, and 
 3. One could argue that the population replacement rate guided the program’s goal 
regarding fertility reduction, and was not necessarily a class-coded expectation. However, as 
Guzman argues, the urban and highly educated sectors of the population exhibited lower fer-
tility rates compared to the rest of the population, particularly the peasantry and low-income 
families. The “diversity in reproductive behavior may be found in the markedly elitist character 
of Latin American societies and the social, economic, and cultural marginalization of the great 
mass of the population, especially the peasantry” (Guzman xxvi). In the 1960s, the idea of a 
smaller family, characterized by the nuclear, bourgeois family, “took a root among an increas-
ing portion of the population, leading to the desire and later the practice of birth control” 
(xxvii).
JULIETA CHAPARRO-BUITRAgO • 149
rights in their efforts to control women’s lives (Denbow). Jennifer Denbow 
calls into question this premise and examines how the notion of autonomy as 
self-governance can be used to restrict women’s reproductive decisions. An 
autonomous individual is self-reflective and capable of making decisions that 
comply with existing social norms and power relations. According to Denbow, 
the notion of autonomy as proper self-management “allows for the appear-
ance of respect for women’s rights and self-determination, while justifying 
increased surveillance and management of women’s bodies and reproductive 
decisions” (3). Women get the possibility to choose and make decisions about 
their reproductive lives; however, it is ultimately the state—in the form of 
experts—that decides if they are making the right choices and whether or not 
to intervene to steer their behavior toward expected goals (Denbow).
In the Peruvian case, the concepts of responsible parenthood and choice 
presupposed the notion of autonomy as described by Denbow. The notion of 
responsible parenthood,4 according to Raul Necochea López, has its roots in 
a Catholic-inspired family planning program from the mid-1960s to the mid-
1970s that responded to the rapid demographic growth that Peru experienced 
during the second half of the twentieth century. This family planning program 
combined the provision of contraceptive pills and sex education to train work-
ing class and poor families to become responsible parents (Necochea López). 
The program was not a platform for women’s empowerment, the author notes, 
because fertility control was not understood as a woman’s right. The program 
was instead a way to promote Catholic values among future parents in charge 
of providing children with spiritual formation, material support, and edu-
cation. The National Population Act of 1985 officially included a notion of 
responsible parenthood that transformed it from a Catholic value into a fun-
damental right of every couple to freely and responsibly decide the number 
and spacing of their children, along with the obligation to educate them and 
to adequately meet their basic needs (MIMDES 11).
Being a responsible parent meant making the appropriate decisions about 
one’s reproductive life, such as having a certain number of children and using 
modern contraceptive methods to align one’s behavior with normative ideas 
about family structure and sexual behavior. As explained above, women were 
expected to limit their fertility and comply with the program’s goals of achiev-
 4. The notion of responsible parenthood figured in other Latin American family plan-
ning programs, such as Mexico. As Elyse Singer notes, the idea of responsibility first appeared 
in the 1970s, when fears about population explosion were the engine of family planning cam-
paigns that the Mexican government designed to curb population growth. Responsibility was 
understood as the adoption of modern contraceptives to reduce family size and control the 
spacing of births. This same language appeared in the abortion bill that legalized this practice 
in Mexico City in 2007.
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ing a heterosexual, nuclear family of two children per household as an expres-
sion of their reproductive autonomy. At the interface between state authority 
and individual self-governance, the concept of autonomy gains relevance as 
autonomous subjects are those who are deemed capable of governing them-
selves (Denbow).
As feminist scholars have noted, the expansion of the idea of choice can 
result in increased regulation of bodies and sexualities (Brown and Halley; 
Denbow; Menon; Ross and Solinger). Such was the case in Peru, where the 
RHFPP increased the regulation of women’s reproduction by taking a coercive 
turn. What happens when certain groups of women, like indigenous and peas-
ant women, are perceived as being unable to self-govern? What do race and 
gender have to do with ideas about self-governing?
Nikolas Rose describes governance as the “conduct of conduct,” includ-
ing “all endeavors to shape, guide, direct the conduct of others” (3). Through 
governance, individuals are educated to tame their passions and keep their 
instincts under control—in sum, to govern themselves (Rose). Contemporary 
practices of governance presuppose the freedom of individuals to act and to 
adjust themselves to norms of socially accepted behavior. Governance, then, 
is an intervention in one’s behavior and actions; nonetheless, coercive forms 
of governance have not been abandoned, nor have they disappeared. As Rose 
notes, groups such as ethnic minorities, inhabitants of inner cities, and moth-
ers on welfare “are defined, demarcated and delineated such that they can be 
the legitimate targets of such negative [coercive] practices of control” (10). 
Even in these instances, the use of coercion is configured through the gram-
mar of freedom as its justification. We see this logic operating in the program 
that used the language of women’s empowerment and responsible parenthood 
to forcibly control peasant and indigenous Peruvian women’s reproduction.
The fact that peasant and indigenous women were disproportionately tar-
geted by this program calls for a scrutiny of the notion of autonomy fore-
grounded in the RHFPP. Who are the women that can make good use of the 
information given to them to make decisions about their reproductive lives and 
futures? Who can make these decisions “with full autonomy and freedom,” as 
Fujimori claimed (Mensaje)? As described in the previous pages, the program 
suggested that all women could use the contraceptive method of their choice 
to control their fertility and to make decisions about family size. However, 
the implementation of the program took a more coercive expression targeting 
mainly peasant, indigenous, and low-income women for non-consented ster-
ilizations. Building on reproductive justice scholarship (Ross and Solinger), 
it is possible to understand the coercive expression of the RHFPP once we 
analyze the operation of a rights discourse along class categories that racialize 
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gender identities. A reproductive rights agenda builds on the premise of guar-
anteeing women’s autonomy over their bodies, but racialized gendered images 
that depict indigenous and peasant women as excessive breeders and negligent 
mothers turn them into the targets of coerced sterilizations.
The issue of coercion illustrates how the rights discourse can certainly 
empower women who conform to expected reproductive behavior, but this 
discourse is neither gender nor racially neutral. The intersections of class, 
race, and gender delineate the contours of the sterilization program in Peru. 
As Jennifer Denbow notes, societies often see marginalized social groups as 
incapable of governing themselves, and bestowing autonomy on women and 
other—often racialized—minority groups is conditional on their adherence 
to dominant social norms. The violation of these norms often results in forms 
of exclusion, marginalization, or even violence. The behavioralist impulse of 
the RHFPP program expected women to curb their reproductive behavior, 
and that meant limiting the number of births by using contraceptive meth-
ods. However, indigenous and peasant women were perceived as incapable 
of appropriately doing so. Their alleged ignorance about birth control meth-
ods and inability to properly use them legitimized coercive measures to force 
women to comply with the expected reproductive behavior.
Although one could argue that the program never used racial categories to 
describe its target population or the goals to be achieved, one of its important 
effects was the racialization of gender differences. Earlier, I described the most 
prevalent figuration of poverty in Peru: an indigenous woman surrounded 
by children. In Peru, race, gender, and class overlap as poor sectors of the 
population tend to be mainly composed of racialized groups, and indigenous 
women in particular. “Women are more Indian,” Marisol de la Cadena writes, 
to describe how within a peasant community in Cusco women’s subordination 
is constructed in ethnic terms. I extrapolate this argument to Peruvian soci-
ety at large to show how racialized gender constructions present indigenous 
women as bad and irresponsible mothers. It explains why women were dispro-
portionately affected by the sterilization program as this racialized and class 
configuration had a gendering effect, placing women as its primary target. 
The assumption was that peasant and indigenous women would not conform 
to the expected models of responsible parenthood, and therefore, the govern-
ment must intervene in their reproductive lives. The cure for poverty, then, 
was made to hinge on women’s choice to limit their fertility. If women, out of 
ignorance, from irrationality, or against their best interests, were understood 
to be refusing that choice, coercion and violence in the name of women’s free-
dom seemed rational, almost imperative. The non-self-reliant, non-self-regu-
latory subject is the one that was forcibly controlled.
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Final Thoughts
In this chapter, I have provided a different interpretation of the role of the 
RHFPP in the sterilization of women in Peru. It is part of a broader landscape 
of gendered racism that has subjected peasant and indigenous women in Peru 
to various forms of violence, including sexual violence in the context of the 
armed conflict and later, the sterilization program. They have been the targets 
of these different forms of violence because of their racialized class position 
within Peruvian society. A careful reading of the program reveals that the 
seemingly neutral terminology of choice and responsible parenthood—within 
a context of racialized and gendered inequalities—created the conditions for 
the outrageous mass sterilization of women. The RHFPP exposes the con-
trol of poor women’s reproduction as part of a broader project of realigning 
the democratic system and bringing into line women’s reproductive capacities 
with an envisioned economic future, a neoliberal horizon of self-management, 
rational reproduction, and proper parenthood.
I do not argue that all family planning programs that use this rhetoric 
lead to sterilization practices; instead, I show how the sociopolitical context 
in which this program was implemented created the conditions for this abuse 
to take place in the name of economic development, poverty reduction, and 
democratization. It is also important to note that abusive practices in repro-
ductive healthcare provision in Peru had already been documented in the 
report Silencio y Complicidad: Violencia Contra las Mujeres en los Servicios de 
Salud Publicos en el Peru. Giulia Tamayo, a feminist lawyer in charge of the 
investigation, identified the Peruvian government as responsible for violence 
and other types of abuses committed against poor, indigenous, and peasant 
women who sought reproductive care. The intensification of reproductive care 
activities in Peru after the second half of the 1990s gave way to new modali-
ties of coercion and discrimination. The government implemented the RHFPP 
without modifying healthcare providers’ often negative perceptions of women 
and their subordinated status within their healthcare system (CLADEM and 
CRLP). The RHFPP exacerbated these conditions and placed women as the 
targets of coercive sterilizations.
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C H A P T E R  8
It’s All Biopolitics
A Feminist Response to the disability Rights 
Critique of Prenatal Testing
KAREN WEINGARTEN
OCCASIONALLY A VIRUS dominates a season, and in the summer of 2016, 
as news reports documented the rise of infected babies born with micro-
cephaly, Zika, a virus previously unknown outside the world of epidemiology, 
played that role. Zika, which is primarily transmitted through mosquitos, cap-
tured the media’s attention, and soon the South American governments most 
impacted by the virus were making impossible recommendations: Remain 
celibate until the virus has passed! Avoid pregnancy! Postpone marriage! Stay 
indoors for six months! Anxiety about the Zika virus drew attention to how 
we talk about pregnancy, and particularly how women’s reproductive lives are 
so deeply entwined with fears about disability.
In Florida, where mosquitos with the virus were discovered fairly late in 
summer, news reports documented women who stayed indoors or covered 
themselves head-to-toe with mosquito repellent on the rare occasion they 
ventured outside (Rabin). The World Health Organization issued a recom-
mendation in June 2016 telling people to delay pregnancy if they lived in or 
had traveled to a country affected by the Zika epidemic (Sun). There was talk 
that Brazil might liberalize its strict antiabortion laws (Romero), and the pope 
even suggested that women infected with Zika could use contraceptives to 
I’d like to thank my writing group, Sarah Blackwood, Lauren Klein, and Kyla Schuller, for their 
comments on earlier versions of this essay. The editors of this collection, Modhumita Roy and 
Mary Thompson, also provided invaluable insight.
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avoid pregnancy (Bailey). This wasn’t the first time a virus had such a poten-
tially important role in shaping social policy. In the 1960s, the measles epi-
demic in the US played a similar role in changing abortion law (Garsd). The 
measles virus, like Zika, usually causes only minor illnesses in most adults and 
even children; however, fetuses infected with the measles are often born blind, 
deaf, and developmentally disabled. Leslie Reagan documents how this dis-
covery contributed to the movement that would legalize abortion in the US, 
first on a state-by-state basis and ultimately nationally in Roe v. Wade. Reagan 
argues that it was in part this fear of disability that led Americans to accept 
abortion as a viable option that should be legal (2–4). Now almost seventy 
years later, Zika is similarly drawing attention to how intersected women’s 
reproductive lives are with fears about disability.
In the months before Zika made news, abortion and disability were 
entwined through an entirely different discourse. In March of 2016, then Indi-
ana governor Mike Pence signed a law forbidding abortion in cases where 
a fetus was diagnosed with a disability (Cox). A federal judge subsequently 
overturned the law two months later (Kelly). However, as of the writing of 
this essay, North Dakota still has a similar law in effect, and other states have 
tried—but so far failed—to follow suit (Balmert). In these cases, antiabor-
tion activists and lobbyists are borrowing from the language of disability 
rights, and even claiming—in some cases—that their goal is not antiabortion 
but pro-disability and pro-child.1 To support their position, they cite stud-
ies showing that in the majority of cases, women choose to have an abortion 
when their fetuses test positive for Down syndrome. These laws, we’re told, 
are meant both to protect those with Down syndrome today and to prevent 
future discrimination against people with disabilities.2 It is an argument that 
has circulated among disability studies scholars and disability rights activists 
for at least four decades (Fine and Asch 19–20).
The anxiety about Zika’s effects on fetuses and the antiabortion laws that 
attempt to curtail access to abortion in cases when a fetus has been diag-
nosed with a potential disability are rooted in the ways in which disability 
is marginalized, ostracized, and even feared in American society. What kind 
 1. See, for example, the statement made by Mike Fichter, president and CEO of Indiana 
Right to Life. In applauding then Indiana governor Mike Pence for signing a law that bans abor-
tions on the basis of gender, race, or disability, he stated, “By signing the dignity for the unborn 
bill, Gov. Pence has again signified his commitment to protecting life. We are pleased that our 
state values life no matter an individual’s potential disability, gender or race” (Indiana Right to 
Life).
 2. A study published in 2012 suggested that between 50 percent and 85 percent of women 
aborted fetuses with a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome. The authors also suggest that this 
rate seems to be decreasing. See Natoli et al.
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of life will my child with microcephaly live? a woman pregnant with a fetus 
diagnosed with the condition might wonder. Will my child be able to live 
independently? Will she have a full life? A happy life? In a country that has 
increasingly moved away from the welfare state toward a neoliberal state that 
privileges self-reliance, autonomy, and financial independence, it is no wonder 
that any condition that limits the ability to achieve these fantastical states of 
being creates alarm.
Yet the critique of that fear is so clear and so necessary: As disability activ-
ists and scholars have argued since before the passage of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act in 1990, disability is as much a constructed category as race, 
gender, and sexuality, and that construction is tied to normalizing discourses 
and built environments that attempt to hierarchize, ostracize, and circum-
scribe our bodies. As awareness about disability has entered the public sphere, 
it has joined race and gender, sexual identity and sexuality as an identity 
marker. This recognition and protection is inarguably a positive step. How-
ever, problematically, it’s also precisely this logic that antiabortionists have 
latched onto in their arguments that abortion should not be allowed when a 
fetus has been diagnosed with a possible disability. The antiabortion argument 
claims that if disability is a protected category, then aborting a fetus because it 
has been diagnosed with a genetic mutation or potential impairment is both 
eugenic and discriminatory against the child to come and all those currently 
living with that disability. It is this line of thinking, one that is shared by both 
antiabortion activists looking to overturn abortion laws and some disability 
scholars and activists, that this essay will question. I want to carefully exam-
ine the underlying argument that calls the abortion of a fetus with a poten-
tial disability eugenic or morally wrong for the ways in which it places the 
responsibility of population building on women’s shoulders and for the ways 
in which it intentionally—or unintentionally, in many cases—constructs the 
fetus as already a child. Finally, I also want to take up Alison Piepmeier’s chal-
lenge that feminists invested in reproductive justice, or the understanding that 
access to abortion and contraception is always entwined with other social and 
political issues, also need to address its intersection with disability rights and 
recognition (“Inadequacy” 161). This essay is a feminist response to that call.
Is Prenatal Testing Eugenic?
I’m particularly interested in how—and whether—the belief in reproductive 
justice can coexist with the critique that women’s choice to abort fetuses with 
potential disabilities is a new form of eugenics. This argument has recently 
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become especially relevant as new forms of prenatal testing have emerged that 
allow women to know earlier than ever whether their fetus has a genetic muta-
tion; perhaps even more significantly, these tests are much less invasive than 
earlier forms of prenatal testing that carried the risk of miscarriage.3 I borrow 
my definition of eugenics from Wendy Kline’s historical tracing of the word. 
While Kline overlooks how fears about disability shaped eugenic policy, she 
does trace the development of eugenics to the drive to control women’s repro-
ductive lives. As she explains, “Reproductive decisions would then be based 
not on individual desire but on racial duty” (2). In other words, eugenicists 
believed that reproduction should be managed on the level of the population 
primarily through legally enforced sterilizations and educational programs 
encouraging fit women to reproduce. Through both these means, women 
were portrayed as “responsible not only for racial progress but also for racial 
destruction” (3). The future of humanity was placed on their shoulders.
After Hitler’s horrific experiments in Europe’s concentration camps, the 
word eugenics would perhaps have been archived as a relic of this history, 
a description of practices that no longer have traction in contemporary sci-
entific circles. However, more recently, eugenics—sometimes termed neo-
eugenics—has become a key word for disability studies scholars and activists 
disturbed particularly by advances in prenatal genetic testing.4 In Extraordi-
nary Bodies, Garland-Thomson’s 1997 groundbreaking book about physical 
disability in American culture and literature, she briefly notes in her opening 
chapter that prenatal testing might create a future that attempts to eliminate 
disability. More recently, in 2012, she expanded this idea in the Journal of Bio-
ethical Inquiry to argue for conserving disability as an enriching and essential 
component of human culture, and to state that any attempt to eliminate it 
not only engages in new forms of eugenics but also impoverishes the human 
experience. Garland-Thomson isn’t the first or only disability studies scholar 
to make this claim.5 Ruth Hubbard and Elijah Wald connect the long his-
tory of eugenics in Europe and the US to current forms of genetic testing, 
and particularly prenatal testing that results in abortions, calling these pro-
cedures “the new eugenics” (22–38). In a talk at Columbia University, Alison 
 3. I’m referring to free cell DNA testing, which can locate fetal cells in the mother’s blood 
and test for mutations that cause Down syndrome and other trisomies, as well as some chro-
mosomal duplications and deletions.
 4. It is, in fact, a key word in the recently published Keywords in Disability Studies (Adams 
et al.).
 5. Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell also argue for understanding current discrimination 
against people with disabilities as a new (or continuing) form of eugenics in Cultural Locations 
of Disability. However, their work doesn’t address the case of prenatal testing and selective abor-
tion. Whether they make a convincing case for using the concept of eugenics to describe the 
pathologizing of people living with disabilities is a topic for another time.
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Piepmeier argued that choosing to abort a fetus with a potential disability 
discovered through prenatal testing not only limits human diversity but is a 
form of eugenics.6 All four critics share the same underlying suspicion of pre-
natal testing, but they also make explicit their commitment to reproductive 
justice and access to abortion (sometimes this is framed as a pro-choice argu-
ment and sometimes it is more explicitly critical of the admittedly problematic 
framework of choice).
However, there are arguments against viewing prenatal testing as eugenic, 
and my argument here builds on those. Nikolas Rose, known for his analyses 
of contemporary scientific technologies and biopower, argues that describ-
ing prenatal genetic testing as eugenics is a misnomer. According to Rose, 
prenatal testing—and other forms of genetic testing labeled as preventative 
medicine—is “individualized, voluntary, informed, ethical, and preventative” 
and organized around the “pursuit of health” (55). Even as Rose is aware that 
these tests work to “eliminate differences coded as defects” (55), he insists that 
they cannot be called eugenic because, as he explains, eugenics is concerned 
foremost with state action—that is, with persuading the state to set laws and 
policies that shape the population in order to form a nation-state with an 
identity determined by the governing body. Furthermore, he points out that 
genetic testing (and, it follows, abortion of a fetus with potential disabilities) 
is never compulsory but voluntary: “Seldom, if ever, are the actions or judg-
ments of any of the actors in these practices shaped by the arguments that the 
nation is somehow weakened geopolitically by the presence of ‘diseased stock’ 
within the population” (69). In other words, prenatal testing for him can’t be 
a form of eugenics because its justifying rhetoric and any abortions that might 
follow are personal, are individualized, and don’t echo early-twentieth-century 
claims about national consequences of reproducing badly.
I’m going to turn now to examining one of these personal accounts that 
evokes the tensions between what it means to value disability and to still 
choose to abort a fetus diagnosed with a genetic mutation in order to show 
how limiting it is to simply label such a decision eugenic. Emily Rapp’s 2013 
memoir Still Point of the Turning World, about her son, his disability, and hers, 
eloquently explores the pain of receiving a fatal diagnosis for her child that 
could have been discovered prenatally. Rapp’s son Ronan was diagnosed with 
Tay-Sachs at nine months old after Rapp and her husband had some concern 
about missed milestones, which they thought might be due to his eyesight. 
Therefore, it was an ophthalmologist who gave them the heartbreaking news 
 6. This talk was filmed as part of a series, “Evaluation, Value, and Evidence: Parenting, 
Narrative, and Our Genetic Future,” organized by Rachel Adams and presented at Columbia 
University’s Heyman Center for the Humanities. 
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that Ronan had a genetic mutation that has no treatment and no cure. Rapp 
had been tested for the Tay-Sachs gene, even though she was of neither Ashke-
nazi nor French Canadian descent, but because she carried a rare form of the 
mutation, the screenings didn’t flag her as a carrier. And because her husband, 
who was Jewish, did carry the more common Tay-Sachs mutation, their child 
had a 25 percent chance of inheriting both copies of his parents’ Tay-Sachs 
mutations and dying in early childhood, which is what happened.7
Rapp recognizes the unusual conditions that led her son to die prematurely, 
but her memoir is in part a narrative that wants to undo the distorted logic of 
luck—that it was unlucky that she had an unusual and undetectable Tay-Sachs 
mutation, that it was unlucky she had a child with another Tay-Sachs carrier, 
and that it was unlucky that their first child fell into the 25 percent category of 
inheriting both his parents’ mutations. Narratives of luck, the memoir so beau-
tifully explains, are about illusions of control and learning about how little con-
trol we ultimately have over the bodies into which we’re born. This is one of the 
subjects she explores in prose that is as poignant as it is philosophic and intel-
lectual. As Rapp describes in her memoir, Tay-Sachs was not her first encoun-
ter with disability; Rapp was also born with a physical disability that shaped 
much of her childhood and adult life, and she readily admits her own desires 
to try to control the narrative around her own body so that her identity was 
not defined through her disability. Much of her writing engages with disability 
discourses through a feminist understanding of how bodies are constructed, 
controlled, and represented. Rapp’s astute understanding of disability, and her 
ability to write about it so movingly, is in fact one of the reasons disability 
studies scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson draws on her memoir to argue 
that all forms of disability, even Tay-Sachs, are worth conserving. Even more 
significantly, Garland-Thomson argues that the prenatal genetic testing used to 
eliminate conditions like Tay-Sachs are a form of eugenics in part because they 
work to eliminate a core experience that makes us human: suffering. Garland-
Thomson explains that “suffering expands our imagination about what we can 
endure,” and she cites Rapp’s memoir because “her careful balancing of suffer-
ing’s costs with the benefits of the ‘blissful’ love Ronan begets” is an example of 
what she terms a counter-eugenic logic. Garland-Thomson argues that prenatal 
 7. Disability scholar Marsha Saxton, quoting the epidemiologist Abby Lippman, notes 
that Tay-Sachs serves as a problematic model for rationalizing prenatal testing because it’s both 
rare and extreme in its effects. Saxton and Lippman are right that Tay-Sachs is an example 
on the margins, especially in comparison to more common and less disabling conditions like 
Down Syndrome. However, extreme examples have the ability to expose the limits of arguments 
and their full repercussions, especially in this case for women’s reproductive bodies. Which 
disabilities, for example, should be deemed acceptable for prenatal testing and who should be 
demarcating these lines of acceptability?
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genetic testing—and presumably the selective abortions that follow—would 
strip us of complex emotions, however painful, and thus make the world a 
less diverse, more eugenic place. While Garland-Thomson acknowledges that 
the term eugenics is a “controversial and complicated” word to use, she none-
theless evokes it to refer to the practice of eliminating “the human traits and 
ways of being in the world that we probably understand as disability” (340 
n.1). Her definition elides the historical underpinning of eugenics as an explicit 
nation-building project in both the US, where thousands of women of color 
and women deemed imbecilic were forcefully sterilized in the name of national 
good, and in the brutal history of Nazi Germany.
While Rapp’s memoir doesn’t address abortion, she did write on the topic 
a year before Ronan’s death in the online journal Slate. There she argued, in 
response to conservative politician Rick Santorum’s antiabortion critiques of 
prenatal testing, that if she had known Ronan had Tay-Sachs when she was 
still pregnant, she would have had an abortion. As she explains, “I love Ronan, 
and I believe it would have been an act of love to abort him, knowing that 
his life would be primarily one of intense suffering, knowing that his neuro-
logically devastated brain made true quality of life—relationships, thoughts, 
pleasant physical experiences—impossible” (“I Would Have”). Rapp, in this 
argument, is balancing her deep love of Ronan with the suffering he endured, 
but unlike Garland-Thomson, she decides that some forms of suffering can-
not be justified by the love or experience gained. Yet Garland-Thomson, 
while acknowledging in the same essay that she knows Rapp would have had 
an abortion had she received Ronan’s diagnosis prenatally, dismisses Rapp’s 
understanding of her own experience to present it as an example of “counter-
eugenics.” While critics regularly undermine writers’ assessments of their own 
work, what’s significant about Garland-Thomson’s argument is that by dis-
counting Rapp’s belief that aborting a fetus with a potentially significant dis-
ability would have been a compassionate decision, she implies that had Rapp 
made that decision, she would have been engaging in eugenics.
What are the implications of calling the abortion of a fetus with Tay-Sachs 
eugenic? For that matter, what are the implications of accusing any woman 
who chooses to have an abortion because of the results of her prenatal genetic 
tests of engaging in eugenic practices? Rapp states in unequivocal terms that 
in an ideal world, her son would never have been born. Yet nowhere does 
Rapp argue that all fetuses with Tay-Sachs should be aborted or that her son 
challenges the reproductive decrees of the state. On the other hand, Garland-
Thomson’s argument about Rapp’s experience attempts to situate disability as a 
form of biodiversity and make larger claims about population building. Rapp’s 
writing about her son, however, never tries to find any good in his suffer-
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ing. His suffering, she lets us know explicitly, is bad: heartbreaking, painful, 
unbearable. Rapp is not looking to optimize her experience or her under-
standing of her son’s illness; rather, as she tells us, her memoir is about writing 
as a means of survival, and it is about learning to let go of illusions of control.
Because the word eugenics is strongly associated with the elimination 
of certain bodies, it has the means to powerfully convey the ways in which 
people with disabilities have been ostracized, disenfranchised, and physically 
harmed. At the same time, calling prenatal testing eugenic has the poten-
tial to shame women who have turned to these tests for whatever reason. It 
builds on the shame that already surrounds abortion in the US. It doesn’t 
fully take into account the lived pain of Rapp’s son Ronan or the emotional 
suffering of his parents, and it doesn’t acknowledge the economic repercus-
sions of having a severely disabled child with a limited life-span. Yet I would 
be remiss if I did not acknowledge that disability—in all its myriad forms—is 
also stigmatized in the US. Ultimately, it is this stigma, the valorization of the 
so-called normal, healthy body, that Garland-Thomson and others working in 
disability studies are hoping to address. Bodies in the twenty-first century are 
constantly managed, and that management often works on a molecular level 
that is obsessed with how our bodies function physiologically, and how they 
could be improved for economic and political ends. We are told how much we 
should weigh, what we should eat, how we should sleep, whether our genes 
predict a propensity for any life-altering diseases; these are among just some 
of the ways we’re managed on an individual level in order to generate popula-
tion-level statistics—and profit. This management is how I’m defining biopoli-
tics for the purpose of this essay. Increasingly, the state is also outsourcing the 
gathering of this information to private corporations and turning the man-
agement of our bodies—and diseases—into profit-propelled industries that 
provide different levels of information and help depending on ability to pay. 
The withdrawal of the state and the privatization of healthcare is one of the 
hallmarks of neoliberalism. And when this management of women’s repro-
ductive lives and the lives of people with disabilities enters the political sphere 
is when we see how neoliberalism works hand-in-hand with biopolitics to 
deem which lives are worth living given their economic and political values.
The Biopolitics of Reproduction and Disability
The key point for me is that a shared biopolitical logic governs both the mar-
ginalization of bodies with disabilities and reproductive bodies. Just as the 
healthy body—the idealized body free of any inhibiting disability—is held up 
as the norm, the reproductive body that can produce children without eco-
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nomic, social, physical, and emotional constraints is similarly prized. When 
the disability studies scholars I’ve been citing critique prenatal testing and the 
selective abortions that might follow because they deprive us of diversity or 
harm humanity, they end up replicating the underlying logic that made eugen-
ics such a popular ideology once upon a time: Women need to reproduce for 
the benefit of the nation-state and the population at large. In other words, 
our reproductive choices have repercussions that exceed us. In an argument 
that seems to have endless variations, women’s reproductive lives, we are told, 
hold a greater responsibility because it is through their bodies and reproduc-
tive choices that the future of a more utopic (diverse) population rests, just as 
eugenic scientists and politicians argued at one time when justifying racial 
hierarchies and passing laws for forced sterilization. Even though almost all 
the critics I cite resist subscribing to the biopolitical norms that shape how 
disabled bodies are valued, they ultimately reenforce the norms that dictate 
how women should behave reproductively when they call selective abortions 
eugenic, morally wrong, or irresponsible.
Such logic is evident, for example, in Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch’s 
Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights, which explores the ethics and morality 
of prenatal testing and the abortion of fetuses considered to have abnormal 
genetic makeup. An underlying question in all the essays in their anthology is 
whether abortion is a form of discrimination against people with disabilities. 
While they included a handful of essays by critics arguing against the posi-
tion that such selective abortion discriminates against people living with dis-
abilities, Parens and Asch take the position, asserted not only in their opening 
chapter and but also in a later chapter by Asch, that “prenatal genetic testing 
followed by selective abortion is morally problematic, and that it is driven by 
misinformation” (5). Parens and Asch explain in three points why prenatal 
testing that leads to abortion devalues disability. As they see it, for one, it pres-
ents disability as the problem that needs to be solved rather than the social 
discrimination against people with disabilities. Two, it views disabled children 
as a disappointment or a departure from the normative parental experience. 
And three, aborting a fetus with a disability is often a misinformed choice 
based on the thinking that a child with disabilities won’t contribute to the 
world and familial experience (13). Important to their argument, and to the 
many critical arguments that follow in the collection, is the point that selec-
tive abortion “signals an intolerance of diversity not merely in the society but 
in the family” (13).
While Asch, Parens, and many of the writers published in their collec-
tion make a compelling case for why selective abortion is a discriminatory 
practice, they do not address whether the elimination of such practices will 
actually change societal attitudes toward disability. They do not consider how 
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labeling selective abortion after prenatal testing immoral or discriminatory 
might have the effect of shaming women who will, despite these arguments 
and for a myriad of reasons, still choose to have selective abortions. And per-
haps most important, they do not address how their arguments hold women’s 
reproductive bodies responsible for improving the future population and end-
ing discriminatory attitudes. It is an enormous burden to bear.
Marsha Saxton similarly critiques the position held by some reproductive 
justice feminists, who in constructing arguments for why abortion should be 
legal present disability as a justification that can convince even those people 
who might be skeptical of legal and accessible abortion. Saxton’s critique of 
this argument is fair; using disability to argue for the legalization of abortion 
does make assumptions about which lives we value, what kinds of parents 
we’ll be, and what it means to live with disability. However, once we start 
listing the qualifications explaining why abortion should be legal (in cases 
of rape, in cases of incest, in cases of disability, etc.), we have already been 
swayed by antiabortion rhetoric that asks us to justify the necessity of acces-
sible and safe abortion as a basic human right. Saxton’s response to that cri-
tique similarly adopts this rhetoric when she argues, “A woman’s individual 
decision, when resulting from social pressure, or colluding with a ‘trend,’ has 
repercussions for others in the society” (157). In most cases it is impossible to 
know whether a woman’s decision to abort is a result of social pressure, and in 
fact it may be—but how many of the decisions we make, big and small, aren’t? 
It’s precisely these arguments that rely on the pronatalist, neoliberal rhetoric 
that holds women responsible for the future of the population, the nation, 
humanity as a whole. Neoliberalism as an ideology excels at placing blame on 
the individual while obscuring the social conditions that shape us.
In their 1999 book, Exploding the Gene Myth, biologist Ruth Hubbard and 
Elijah Wald present a feminist critique of prenatal testing when they argue 
against the position that prospective parents are responsible for bearing chil-
dren who are “physically and mentally sound,” and they rightly point out that 
this rhetoric “places the burden of implementing these so-called rights of 
fetuses squarely on the shoulders of individual women” (26). For them, pre-
natal testing unfairly holds women accountable for ensuring that the future 
nation, population, society (you name it) will not encompass disability because 
disability is often framed as a burden on the state and a blemish in the fam-
ily. Their argument is an important one, and it is one that has historical and 
contemporary significance, for women’s reproductive bodies have historically 
been asked to reproduce for the future of the nation or the people or however 
the population views itself collectively. Yet this argument also holds when the 
situation is flipped, when women are held accountable for deciding to abort 
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fetuses after prenatal test results. Eva Feder Kittay believes that “the morality 
of that choice must be weighed in the conscience of the woman who makes 
that choice. She alone can know just what her act meant and if it was carried 
out as a consequence of moral sloth and uncaring, or through a responsible 
choice” (190). While the rhetoric of choice that Kittay relies on has been cri-
tiqued by many working in reproductive justice,8 in essence, Kittay’s argument 
asks for caution when it comes to assessing why women might choose to abort 
a fetus diagnosed with a disability or disease. While Kittay suggests that only 
the woman can judge herself, I am arguing that that judgment is misplaced, 
especially in these neoliberal conditions of austerity where healthcare is rarely 
guaranteed, economic security is an unreachable goal, and access to education 
is increasingly at risk. In an ideal world not governed by these conditions of 
austerity, having a disabled child would not mean expensive healthcare bills 
that might not be covered, it wouldn’t mean that one parent couldn’t work so 
that medical appointments could be kept, it wouldn’t mean that childcare or 
respite care was impossible to find or unaffordable. Until we live in that world, 
abortion might be the only pragmatic choice available for many women.
The Biopolitical Child
The National Tay-Sachs and Allied Diseases (NTSAD) website, which is pri-
marily designed to help parents with a child recently diagnosed with one of 
these conditions, has a page called “Prevent.” The word, in the context of this 
site, however, is somewhat misleading because there is no cure or even treat-
ment for the inevitable effects Tay-Sachs and similar disorders will cause. In 
the case of infants diagnosed with Tay-Sachs, death in early childhood is the 
sure conclusion. Prevention, then, according to the website, is genetic screen-
ing, ideally before pregnancy, but more realistically for most women, during. 
In the US, routine prenatal screening generally includes a blood test that first 
looks to see whether the pregnant woman is a carrier for a number of com-
mon recessively linked disorders such as a Tay-Sachs. If she is, the next step 
is to determine whether the fetus would have received another recessive copy 
linked to the disorder from the gametes contributed by the sperm. While the 
NTSAD website doesn’t say it explicitly, prevention is abortion in the case of a 
 8. For some of the critiques of “choice,” the rhetoric that Kittay draws on, see Rickie 
Solinger’s Beggars and Choosers: How the Politics of Choice Shapes Adoption, Abortion, and 
Welfare in the United States; Rosalind Petchesky’s Abortion and Woman’s Choice: The State, 
Sexuality, and Reproductive Freedom; and Dorothy Roberts’s Killing the Black Body: Race, Repro-
duction, and the Meaning of Liberty.
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fetus found to have two recessive copies of genes linked to a disorder described 
on its site. The NTSAD seems to be acknowledging what in our current politi-
cal moment is often viewed as a radical claim—the fetus is not a child.
In not conflating the fetus with the child, the NTSAD site aligns with an 
earlier understanding of gestation and birth, one that has not been widely 
used since the advent of reproductive technologies that allow for the view-
ing and hearing of the fetus during pregnancy. Lorna Weir describes the shift 
as follows: “Where previously the birth threshold only definitively concluded 
at the end of the birth process with the separation of mother and child, the 
perinatal threshold distinguished mother from the unborn during pregnancy 
and birth” (3). In other words, even as the fetus is physically dependent on 
the pregnant woman for its life support, a fact that at one point created the 
widely believed assumption that a fetus could therefore not be viewed as an 
independent being, the more dominant belief today among those advocat-
ing against the legalization of abortion is that the fetus deserves personhood. 
Even among supporters of abortion, as Weir points out, the question is often 
not whether a fetus is ever a person but at what point in pregnancy the fetus 
passes the threshold of personhood. However, as Lauren Berlant reminds us, 
“It was not always the case that everyone knew what a fetus looked like” (86). 
Berlant argues that the pro-life movement has successfully turned the fetus 
into a person by borrowing from the language of minority rights to present 
the fetus as “the unprotected person, the citizen without a country or a future, 
the fetus unjustly imprisoned in its mother’s hostile gulag” (97).9 Implicit in 
this logic is the belief that if we can save the fetus, then we can save ourselves.
Rebekah Sheldon, continuing this line of thought, argues that the child, 
and the fetus that often stands in for the child, figures doubly in our biopoliti-
cal moment. First, as a figure of our continuity-without-change, it works as a 
call for protection and safety from future harm. In other words, the figure of 
the child should remind us to keep what we now have safe, to conserve our 
resources, our planet, our humanity, and our selves. But Sheldon also argues 
that in the fetus/child’s connection to reproduction, as a product of reproduc-
tion, the fetus/child is a reminder of how new forms of biotechnology are 
refiguring our lives—as we refigure the lives of these technologies. Pregnancy 
in the twenty-first century is saturated in technological innovation, even in its 
uncomplicated manifestation, from the pregnancy test to early DNA screening 
to the sonogram viewing. To be pregnant in the twenty-first-century US is an 
 9. Berlant traces the development of the victimized fetus to the Reagan years, but in fact 
the fetus was personified and framed as embattled citizen almost as soon as the antiabortion 
movement began in the US. See also my argument in Abortion in the American Imagination: 
Before Life and Choice, 1880–1940.
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experience in technological change. Sheldon thinks that amidst this change, 
the fetus/child stands in as our response to the biotechnologies that turn us 
into the genes that supposedly map our destinies, the mutations that turn us 
into freaks, the numbers and percentages that categorize risks in our imagined 
futures. The figure of the fetus/child is safe and comforting.
Sheldon’s argument provides another framework for understanding why, 
for example, in the now widely chronicled—and critiqued—story of Ashley X, 
Ashley’s parents desired to turn her into a child forever. Because Ashley was 
born severely disabled, her parents decided to give her hormones in order 
to stunt her growth so that she would never look older than a prepubescent 
child, and her breast buds and ovaries were surgically removed to prevent the 
onset of bodily changes that come with puberty. Her parents argued that her 
smaller size would make it easier to care for her in their home, and the halt 
of puberty would, according to them, reduce the likelihood of her experienc-
ing sexual abuse by future caretakers. You can hear in this story the narratives 
that Sheldon describes in her work: the desire to prevent future harm, the 
imagining of the child’s body as whole, the child as response to a body that is 
increasingly medicalized and technologized. In this narrative, however, dis-
ability activists have critiqued the turn to infantilizing the disabled body.
Yet there is also another side to this narrative. Alison Kafer calls prenatal 
testing, which she rightly notes often ends with the abortion of fetuses diag-
nosed with potential disabilities, “a clear manifestation of compulsory able-
bodiedness and able-mindedness” (29) because bodies—both the bodies of the 
future children and the bodies of the pregnant women—are seen as a threat to 
the future. Building on Lee Edelman’s critique of the Child, she notes, “These 
sites of reproductive futurity demand a Child that both resembles the parents 
and exceeds them” (29). She also incisively critiques how the focus on dis-
ability in our society is a focus on cure, which is always a politics of deferral; 
implicit in its logic is that the goal is to have a future with no disability, and 
this politics, she notes, equates disability with failure. Extending this argu-
ment, she posits, “Disabled children are not part of this privileged imaginary 
except as the abject other” (33). However, there is a slipperiness to this argu-
ment: In serving as a critique of the selective abortions that follow prenatal 
testing, it conflates the Child, and the very real children that Kafer imagines, 
with fetuses. While there is unquestionable truth in Kafer’s construction—the 
Child is often burdened with all parental aspirations—the Child is ultimately 
not the fetus, and to conflate the two is to implicitly accept the encroachment 
of rhetoric developed by antiabortion ideologies.
Or consider the quotation that Parens and Asch include from an earlier 
essay authored by Asch, in which she asserts, “Do not disparage the lives of 
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existing and future disabled people by trying to screen for and prevent the 
birth of babies with their characteristics” (13). In Asch’s construction, the 
fetus immediately becomes the already born baby, and the pregnant woman’s 
body—her life—doesn’t enter the equation in her formulation. There is a dan-
ger for women’s reproductive lives when fetuses are equated so quickly with 
babies, even in the name of justice, precisely because, as in this example, Asch 
erases the woman’s lived experiences, her reasons for seeking an abortion, and 
the material conditions that shape her life.
Mary Ann Baily, who attended the conversations about prenatal test-
ing and disability documented in Parens and Asch’s anthology, describes the 
dichotomy as follows: “Their [disability studies critics in the seminar] picture 
is of a line of babies waiting to be born, and a quality control officer com-
ing along and throwing ‘people like them’ out of line so they never make it 
to earth” (66), whereas her view is of a “disembodied soul” waiting to take 
the form of a baby. Baily identifies as a pro-choice Catholic, and she readily 
admits that this view of a disembodied soul stems from her religious ideol-
ogy. Yet even as a religious woman, she distinguishes between a fetus that is 
not yet fully human and the status of full personhood assigned to fetuses by 
the disability rights critics in the Hastings seminar. In other words, implicit 
in the disability rights critique of abortion in response to prenatal testing is a 
depiction of the fetus as already child, already embodied human.
Michael Bérubé notes the hypocrisy in antiabortion discourse promoted 
by many right-wing politicians who are invested in protecting the rights of 
fetuses, all fetuses, until they are actually born. Those same politicians then 
actively try to destroy or defund early intervention programs, parental leave, 
and respite programs, not to mention other social welfare laws meant to ease 
economic constraints. Referring to his son with Down syndrome, he explains, 
“The danger for children like Jamie does not lie in women’s freedom to choose 
abortion; nor does it lie in prenatal testing. The danger lies in the creation of a 
society that combines eugenics with enforced fiscal austerity. In such a society, 
it is quite conceivable that parents who ‘choose’ to bear disabled children will 
be seen as selfish and deluded” (52). Yet, on the other hand, will those women 
who choose not to bear disabled children because neoliberalism has disman-
tled the social safety net by defunding Medicaid, limiting respite services, and 
cutting social services in schools also be seen as selfish? Bérubé continues to 
point out how this logic relies on free-market, neoliberal beliefs that distin-
guish between productive and non-productive citizens, and that the danger is 
that the value we place on human life will come to be based on its economic 
potential. This line of thinking is chilling indeed, and frighteningly, not far 
from our current reality. However, what is also emerging in our new reality 
is a system where individuals are seen as responsible for their own healthcare 
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and their own social services, often through private fundraisers or individual 
wealth. And those who don’t have access to such resources? Neoliberal ideol-
ogy is by design tight-lipped when it comes to answering that question.
There is an important economic critique here based on how the devel-
opment of capitalism in the West has shifted the role of the child from one 
worker or contributor in the family to a reflection of a family’s wealth, intel-
ligence, and status. But once again, as worrisome as that trend is in the kinds 
of pressures it imposes on our children, a rejection of prenatal testing is not 
likely to undo or undermine this shift. It is rooted in an economic and political 
philosophy with deep stakes in our current culture; it is rooted in the increas-
ing biopoliticization of human life that shapes how we value both disability 
and women’s reproductive bodies. As Sheldon tells her readers in a different 
context: “Causality is richer and stranger than rescue narratives imagine” (83). 
In other words, conserving deafness or Down syndrome or spina bifida is not 
going to necessarily happen through the elimination of prenatal testing for 
the presence of genes that cause these conditions. It is not, to use Sheldon’s 
language, the child to come who will save us from this future harm. The truth 
is, as Kafer recognizes, children’s bodies are messy and imperfect too. In many 
ways, they are even messier and more imperfect in their potentialities than the 
adult bodies we inhabit. And children are not necessarily our future, as any 
parent with a seriously ill child could tell you. Parenting is usually at its most 
disastrous when we project our desires for the future onto our children, even 
if the imagined future hopes for a world where our disabilities do not impact 
how we are viewed or what access we have.
My arguments here intend to demonstrate how even the disability stud-
ies critique of prenatal testing, one that often positions itself as attuned to the 
importance of legal and accessible abortion, reinscribes the same reproductive 
norms for women and assumes personhood for the fetus in much the same 
way that pronatalists and antiabortionists have over the past century. And 
while I agree with Rayna Rapp, Alison Piepmeier, and others who argue for 
the necessity of genetic counseling that is more nuanced, politically attuned, 
and context-dependent, I also unequivocally believe in access to selective 
abortion for whatever reason.10 A world that limits or eliminates prenatal test-
ing or selective abortion in order to protect disability is a world that has sur-
rendered to the biopolitical management of bodies for yet another series of 
norms, standards, and hierarchies.
 10. See Rayna Rapp’s study on the uses of amniocentesis and the counseling received after-
ward, where she argues for the importance of genetic counseling that understands the context 
in which “risk” is communicated. Rapp stresses how important it is for counselors to be able to 
make room both for cultural variation and for providing a context for any particular diagnosis.
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C H A P T E R  9
Commodification Anxiety and the 
Making of American Families in a  
State-Contracted Adoption and  
Foster Care Program
MELISSA HARDESTY
CLAUDIA’S CUBICLE was the first in the adoption team aisle at Kids First, 
a state-contracted child welfare agency in a Midwestern city in the United 
States. Most agency staff worked in a large room punctuated by a maze of 
desks and partitions. The aesthetic screamed call center rather than social ser-
vice agency, but as I learned over fifteen months of ethnographic observations 
aimed at understanding how caseworkers assess prospective adoptive parents 
applying for domestic infant or foster care adoption, the setup was good for 
building community among workers. Claudia kept a Froot Loops–themed 
bowl at her desk. During hectic periods, like this cloudy February afternoon 
in 2012, when work prevented her from walking across the street to Pop-
eye’s or McDonald’s, she used the bowl to cook ramen noodles. After holding 
countless batches of soup, the white plastic background behind Toucan Sam 
had taken on the color and sheen of a chicken bouillon cube. As Claudia 
trudged through paperwork, her managers, Ivy and Val, dropped a new case 
file on her desk. Meanwhile, Beth, an intern, was enlisted to transport the 
child in question, an infant, to an emergency foster care placement. Soon, 
the entire adoption aisle was abuzz with baby excitement. Infants were not 
unheard of in foster care adoption, a state-mediated form of family-making 
where abused or neglected children whose rights have been terminated are 
placed in permanent homes, but this was a healthy infant—a rare, sought-
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after demographic for would-be adoptive parents. “The birth mom was selling 
the baby outside a liquor store,” Claudia told her lingering coworkers.
Child welfare workers were rarely shocked by the circumstances that 
prompted entanglements between parents and the child welfare system, but 
this case was unusual. The addicted parent can be sent to drug or alcohol 
rehab, the abusive or neglectful parent to parent training classes. The baby-
selling parent was an altogether different character. Workers were speculating 
about her motivations when Val walked through the aisle with a grocery bag 
full of onesies. “Is it true she was trying to sell her?” Beth asked. “Yep,” Val 
quipped, “outside a liquor store to the highest bidder. She’s in jail now.”
Workers’ emotions ranged from befuddlement to anger. There were no 
bidders, or the police arrived before a baby sale could take place. The details 
of the liquor store incident remained murky because the usual confounders of 
child abuse and neglect cases—parent mental illness and missing or unreliable 
witnesses—made it difficult to pin down what actually happened. Neverthe-
less, in the context of child adoption, where tens of thousands of dollars may 
be exchanged in the process of transferring parental rights from one person 
to another, this incident raises the question of how the act of offering a child 
for sale can lead a birth mother to be criminalized, while exchanges of money 
in adoption and foster care are regular operating procedure.
In the US and abroad, the flow of children into and out of adoption and 
foster care is undergirded by socioeconomic inequality. Economic hardship is 
among the most common reasons women place children for adoption in the 
US (Oaks ch. 3), and poverty is entwined with the forms of child abuse and 
neglect that prompt the state to take custody of children and sometimes ter-
minate parental rights, making them available for foster care adoption (Rob-
erts). At the same time, private and agency-based domestic infant adoption 
and international adoption are costly, and therefore off limits, to poor appli-
cants. Foster care adoption is frequently subsidized (sometimes entirely) by 
the state as a means to incentivize adoption of children whose histories of 
trauma and older age render them less desirable to would-be adoptive parents. 
Subsidies, in turn, attenuate economic barriers for potential adoptive parents. 
In a Western culture that, according to Igor Kopytoff, likes to maintain a “cat-
egorical and moral distinction between people and things,” market valuations 
of family relationships create commodification anxiety—the fear that intimate 
and sentimental relationships will be tainted or corrupted by the presence of 
money (271).
The moral valence of money in regulating social relationships has been 
the subject of sociological inquiry for the past few decades. In Pricing the 
174 • CHAPTER 9
Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children, Viviana Zelizer detailed 
the historical process at the turn of the twentieth century whereby American 
children transitioned from laborers who were expected to contribute wages 
to their families to “economically useless but emotionally priceless” members 
of the family (57). Paradoxically, the economically useless child came with 
a much higher price tag than her wage-earning counterpart (201). Whereas 
parents had to pay others to take custody of unwanted infants and toddlers 
in the mid- to late 1800s (195), adoptive parents hoping to gain custody of an 
infant today can expect to pay tens of thousands of dollars to an attorney or 
adoption agency. Commercial attributes of adoption violate the moral dis-
tinction between people and things identified by Kopytoff, and what Zelizer 
refers to in “The Purchase of Intimacy” as a Hostile Worlds perspective on the 
intersection of money and intimate ties (818). The Hostile Worlds perspec-
tive contends that social relationships and economic exchange are so different 
that any intersection of the two can only lead to “moral contamination and 
degradation” (818).
Despite overwhelming evidence demonstrating links between sentiment 
and money in all families, the cultural fiction that these two moral registers 
can and should be separate persists. At the same time, the monetary exchanges 
that regularly occur in biological, nuclear families, in addition to indirect gov-
ernment-family transfers written into the tax code and private health insur-
ance subsidies in America, are far less obvious than the financial exchanges 
that transpire when families are created and regulated through public and 
government-contracted social service agencies. Monetary exchanges in adop-
tion and foster care are far more visible and appear as a breach of deep-seated 
cultural values. I argue that child welfare workers manage the dicey intersec-
tion between money and families by performing ethical labor—that is, they 
carefully manage the way they talk about and define money and teach would-
be adoptive parents to think about money in similar ways. These linguistic 
management strategies normalize adoptive families by downplaying the mar-
ket and making recourse to an understanding of healthy families as private, 
self-sufficient, biological, and child-centered. Within normal families, money 
supposedly has nothing to do with whether or not people become parents and 
how they parent. In reality, the availability of children in domestic infant and 
foster care adoption is linked to birth parents’ inabilities to be self-sufficient. 
Child welfare workers’ attempts to normalize families by downplaying market 
forces in adoption inevitably lead them to patch over forms of social inequal-
ity already entrenched in the adoption market.
The concept of an adoption market found its way into academic literature 
in 1978 when Elisabeth Landes and Richard Posner published “The Econom-
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ics of the Baby Shortage.” The article was a response to the shortage of adopt-
able (white, healthy) infants, a problem the authors attributed to decreased 
stigma around unwed childbearing and increased availability of birth control 
and abortion. They proposed giving pregnant women financial incentives to 
forgo abortion in cases of unwanted pregnancy and instead carry fetuses to 
term so that they could be adopted by waiting families. Academic and popu-
lar audiences, who tended to view market logics as incompatible with family-
making, were offended by what they dubbed “the baby-selling article.” The 
controversy was so heated and long-standing that Posner was still responding 
to the baby-selling accusation nine years after the article’s publication (59). In 
the decades since, increased demands for any healthy infant—not just white 
infants—has racialized the anxiety around commodifying children. Michele 
Bratcher Goodwin noted that market comparisons in adoption are offensive, 
in part, because of their alleged similarity to the auction block of slavery (2). 
Similarly, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) and the Multi-
Ethnic Placement Act of 1994 (MEPA)—pieces of federal legislation aimed 
at regulating adoption and foster care—and the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, or welfare reform), 
which limited federal economic support for poor families, have been criti-
cized for hastening the removal of poor, disproportionately African American 
children from the custody of their mothers and making it easier for white 
and middle-class families to attain custody (Briggs ch. 3). Poverty and child 
welfare involvement disproportionately affect African American families, and 
support for welfare reform was garnered, in part, by appealing to the ste-
reotype of the welfare queen, commonly portrayed as an African American 
woman who gives birth to multiple children so that she can live on welfare 
checks. ASFA asks states to terminate parental rights on children who have 
been in state foster care for fifteen out of the last twenty-two months (if par-
ents have not made reasonable progress toward achieving treatment goals) 
and incentivizes adoption. MEPA prohibits agencies from making decisions 
about foster care and adoptive placements on the basis of race, thus making it 
easier for white families to adopt children of color. ASFA was passed just one 
year after PRWORA and three years after MEPA, leading opponents of welfare 
and adoption reform to conclude that these policies were motivated by racism, 
or that they would have racist effects.
PRWORA defined parental poverty as an individual problem of depen-
dency that could be solved through procuring waged work in the market 
economy. Widely considered a punitive, neoliberal reform because it offered 
free market solutions to social problems, PRWORA made the economics 
of parenting more precarious, while ASFA expedited adoption of children 
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already in state care. In sum, legislative reforms of the mid-1990s simultane-
ously decreased state financial support for poor families—a move that was 
likely to increase the number of children placed in foster care due to neglect—
while pushing the state to terminate parental rights on foster children more 
quickly, and to place these legally free children in adoptive homes. Such poli-
cies hasten the flow of children from poor to relatively wealthier families. 
Scholars have also linked international adoption to neoliberal reforms, 
particularly cuts to state welfare spending. Wealth inequality in the former 
USSR led some parents to relinquish custody of their children, while the avail-
ability of such children, according to Sadowski-Smith, spawned an uptick in 
predatory and unethical adoption practices (3–5). According to Laura Briggs, 
the neoliberal structural adjustments demanded by the International Mon-
etary Fund and World Bank in exchange for loan money to bail out fledgling 
national economies in Latin America had a similarly pernicious impact on 
adoption practices. Structural adjustments—a catchall term describing poli-
cies such as privatization of state services, cuts to welfare subsidy spending, 
and liberalization of trade—created political and economic conditions rife for 
adoption profiteering, and allegedly, child stealing (chs. 4–6). The neoliberal 
policy context makes it increasingly difficult for poor and working-class par-
ents to manage the demands of child-rearing and work, all the while neo-
liberal understandings of family foreground freedom and choice, as if one’s 
choices about when and whether to parent can be divested from a global econ-
omy that has hastened economic inequality.
Public and Private Adoption at Kids First
My interest in learning about adoption sensitized me to some of the every-
day sights that often seemed unremarkable in the city where this study was 
conducted—bulletins for Family Tree, a local adoption agency, posted in the 
window of a Planned Parenthood Clinic, and subway ads and billboards invit-
ing women to contact various adoption agencies. “Pregnant? Scared? We can 
help,” an ad proclaimed in bold script written across the bulbous abdomen 
of a despondent-looking woman. In contrast, the city adoption team at Kids 
First did little to recruit birth mothers interested in making an adoption plan. 
Adoption team manager Val told me that it was rare for pregnant women to 
approach the city program for adoption services. “I’m not sure why that is,” 
she said, though I had already begun to suspect that it was because the pro-
gram did not market itself to them. Given a large supply of foster care children 
whose rights were likely to be terminated, they did not need to. Kids First was 
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situated in a blighted community, in a city punctuated by pockets of concen-
trated poverty and its attendant social problems, so they focused on provid-
ing social services through the public child welfare system. In the post-ASFA 
environment, foster care adoption services fulfilled the federal government’s 
demand to shorten the time children spent in foster care and to increase adop-
tion. While Kids First had been doing domestic infant adoptions for over a 
century, the city’s foster care–centered adoption program was started as a 
direct response to ASFA’s demands.
Questions of social inequality are foregrounded in foster care adoption 
work, in part because child welfare workers’ recommendations about who 
ought to have custody of children—birth parents or foster parents—are inex-
tricably tied to the social problems that accompany concentrated poverty. At 
the same time, the co-occurrence of domestic and international fee-for-service 
adoption and state-subsidized foster care adoption in Kids First’s adoption 
program, an unusual programmatic arrangement, made this a fruitful site for 
understanding how adoption markets affect family-making in a neoliberal era.
Doing the Math: Adoption and Foster Care in the US
According to Adoptive Families magazine, the average cost of adopting a child 
in 2015–2016 was more than $35,000, or nearly 60 percent of the median fam-
ily income in US dollars, making adoption a substantial financial burden on 
many prospective parents and completely inaccessible to others (“Adoption 
Cost”). The Adoption Tax Credit substantially reduces the burden of adoption 
expenses, as adoptive parents can claim up to $13,810 (in 2018) in allowable 
expenses for the year in which an adoption was completed (IRS). However, 
the credit does not diminish the up-front costs of pursuing adoption. Con-
sider the creative strategies used by some middle- and working-class people to 
cobble together the tens of thousands of dollars often required to adopt. Read-
ers of Adoptive Families reportedly pulled from their 401(k) accounts, took 
advances on anticipated inheritances, and threw adoption carnivals through 
their churches. One woman charged adoption expenses on a no-interest credit 
card and later referred to her child as “my Visa baby.” Many use the fund-
raising platform GoFundMe to crowdsource adoption expenses (“Affording 
Adoption”).
Notably, workers at Kids First did not consciously consider domestic 
adoption fees or foster care adoption subsidies an important part of the every-
day work of assessing prospective parents and managing foster care and pre-
adoptive relationships; yet I observed numerous exchanges in which workers 
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spoke bluntly and incisively about how money impacts applicants’ access to 
different modes of adoptive family-making.
On an unseasonably hot day in March, the adoption team was suffering in 
cramped cubicles without air conditioning when Janet called across the aisle 
to ask Elise how her initial paperwork meeting with a new client went. “She 
was a mess,” Elise responded, with the tender, empathic tone of voice usually 
reserved for babies and pets. “She was so emotional. She brought her mom 
with her, and they held hands the entire time. That’s how nervous she was. 
She makes thirty thousand dollars a year, and she wants to adopt an infant 
with no legal risk.” The term legal risk was commonly used by Kids First’s 
adoption workers to characterize concurrent planning foster care adoption, 
which places a foster child with pre-adoptive parents before the rights of the 
birth parent(s) are terminated, but this termination is not a given. The process 
of actually adopting a child through this system is lengthy, emotional, and 
uncertain. Elise did not think her new client could handle it. Domestic infant 
adoption was the best option for her, but she couldn’t afford it.
Lizzy, who had recently left her job at a traditional adoption agency, inter-
jected, “I always hated it when single moms would call [her prior agency], 
even those that had incomes of a hundred and fifty thousand dollars a year.” 
Other workers rolled their desk chairs toward the center aisle to listen. “Most 
international countries won’t let single [US] women adopt, and it’s difficult 
with domestic infant[s], too,” she explained. “A lot of single women don’t get 
picked out of the album by birth moms. They’re more likely to pick a tradi-
tional family.” “It’s very difficult for single women,” Elise nodded in agree-
ment, but quickly changed the focus back to money, “especially if they have 
low income. There aren’t really any options out there. You’re buying a baby. 
That’s just how it is.” Murmurs of agreement trickled through the aisle before 
chairs were slowly wheeled back in front of computer screens and piles of 
paperwork. While workers ordinarily tried to downplay the money required 
to access domestic infant and international adoption, this example highlights 
the stark reality that applicants have to buy the opportunity to adopt a baby, 
if not the baby itself.
Adoptions from foster care are fully subsidized by the government, and 
prospective parents do not incur the enormous fees common to domestic 
and international infant adoption. Theoretically, this means that the pool of 
suitable adoptive parents is more socioeconomically diverse. Given the links 
between race and income, this also meant that Kids First’s applicants for foster 
care adoption were also more racially and ethnically diverse than the typical 
adoptive parent. “Some of our parents are a little rough around the edges,” 
Sue once told me. “I have gone into some areas. I mean, remember when we 
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went to the one home study, I think it was in—I don’t know if it was in [a 
lower-income, predominantly African American neighborhood] or—.” “Was it 
Violet?” I asked, referring to a middle-aged, working-class African American 
woman. “Yeah, yeah,” she continued. “The area was not that great. It’s not the 
white picket fence you picture an adoptive parent having. So, some of the—
but I don’t think that means they wouldn’t be good parents, and I don’t think 
it means the child would be unsafe.”
Several months later, when Sue was about to leave Kids First for a job 
in domestic infant adoption, she prepared to contend with a different kind 
of parent. “Even at my interview, she [the new manager] made it sound like 
there’s some pretty entitled people, and I’m picturing, you know, white, middle 
class, we want our baby now—I don’t feel like that’s what our clientele here is 
completely.”
Implicit in Sue’s description of the clientele at Kids First versus “regular” 
adoption agencies is a dynamic where wealthy, white parents demand imme-
diate access to available babies, as working-class prospective adoptive parents 
bump up against Norman Rockwell images of the ideal American family, as 
they try to prove that they can be good parents and keep children safe in 
dangerous neighborhoods. Workers at Kids First, hoping to temper the anxi-
ety that low-income applicants experienced when submitting their financial 
information, often assured clients, “We’re not looking for the richest parents. 
We just want to make sure that taking in another child is not going to make 
you or break you.” Yet the make-or-break metric suggests that workers are 
also on the lookout for applicants who want to improve their financial lot by 
taking in a child who comes with a subsidy from the state. Taken together, 
these examples show how evaluations of parents cohere around two opposite 
but equally pernicious stereotypes—the purchasing parent who thinks that 
money entitles them to a child and the profiteering parent1 who could be made 
or financially benefit from a child placement. These composite bad parents 
delimit the boundaries of normal parenting and show how the moral calculus 
of the kinship/cash nexus determines who gets access to children and who 
does not.
Elise’s case of the well-meaning but under-resourced single woman stood 
out as a rare instance at Kids First in which the inability of an applicant to 
pay for domestic adoption services, and her presumed inability to withstand 
emotionally the legal risk of foster care adoption, limited her access to a child. 
Her case casts light on the market dynamics lurking beneath the surface of 
 1. I discuss the implications of the profiteering foster parent in a recently published arti-
cle, “It’s Not a Job! Foster Care Board Payments and the Logic of the Profiteering Parent.”
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a social service system intent on minimizing their impact. State-subsidized 
adoption lessens economic discrimination against prospective parents, but 
this leveling effect is incidental to the actual purpose of foster care subsidies; 
they exist because foster kids are considered riskier sentimental investments 
(i.e., less valuable).
The woman described by Elise and the workers’ discussion of her under-
score the ambivalence with which many adoption workers fulfill their role as 
agents of surveillance. Declining a prospective parent based upon factors such 
as a failed background check, “unrealistic expectations” of the adoption pro-
cess, or even “getting a bad feeling” about somebody seemed to be less ethi-
cally troublesome to workers at Kids First than having to turn somebody away 
because of money. Elise had the power to refuse her client for government-
funded foster care adoption, but she was powerless to overlook that client’s 
inability to pay the service fees for domestic adoption. “You’re buying a baby” 
in this context bluntly marks economic discrimination as something endemic 
to the adoption system.
Creating and Disciplining the Purchasing Parent
The payment required from prospective parents in domestic or international 
adoption elicits commodification anxiety—fear of baby selling—at the cul-
tural level, and according to workers, can elicit feelings of entitlement at the 
individual level. Under market logic, payments and fees demand a product 
or service in return. At first glance, regular adoption looks a lot like a simple 
purchase; a sum of money is paid to the agency in exchange for an adoptive 
child. However, agencies, workers, and birth parents have discretion when 
it comes to determining who is and is not a suitable parent, and this means 
that a client could spend a lot of money and still not get a placement. Agen-
cies need people who are willing and able to pay money to adopt a child, but 
they also face a cultural imperative to downplay market forces and a prac-
tical impetus to regulate the expectations of clients. Thus, workers employ 
strategies to discipline the purchasing parents the adoption market has itself 
created.
Regular adoption fee schedules are an important tool in the disciplinary 
apparatus. They are the most obvious indicators of market dynamics in adop-
tion, and they help educate the public and potential clients about the distinc-
tions between ethical child adoption and baby markets. A typical adoption 
fee schedule has separate fees for application, home study, programming and 
training, and child placement. The itemization of fees serves the practical pur-
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pose of anticipating and making payments over time, which allows the agency 
or the client to opt out of the process midway. Categories also accomplish the 
moral work of separating money from babies.
In particular, attaching fees to services and expenses is a common strategy 
employed by workers to discursively situate agencies outside baby markets 
and to constitute clients as consumers of services for the child who have no 
entitlement to an actual child placement. Yet most of the services provided 
by adoption agencies—helping pregnant women manage their healthcare and 
choose adoptive parents, assessing prospective adoptive parents and helping 
them create family profiles—are geared toward birth parents and adoptive 
parents, respectively. At information and orientation sessions held for pro-
spective parents, Kids First’s workers cautioned attendees, “Our job is not to 
find the perfect child for you. We’re trying to find the best home for the child.”
The administrator at another local agency, Family Tree, espoused a similar 
warning: “Children are not an entitlement. Our job is to safeguard children 
against harm, not to find you children or please birth parents.” The implicit 
argument that unmediated transfers of parental rights are a danger to children 
was not questioned by participants in this session or addressed by the admin-
istrator. It is remarkable that birth parents are automatically assumed to be fit 
and that a birth parent could forgo agency-mediated adoption altogether and 
transfer parental rights via an attorney. Indeed, these dynamics suggest that 
adoption agencies, particularly those that specialize in domestic infant and 
international adoption, act more like a professional matchmaking service for 
families than as a child welfare service.
The idea that an agency can collect adoption fees from an applicant, then 
use their discretion to deny adoption based upon loosely regulated criteria, 
is rendered more rhetorically sound when it is done under the auspices of 
promoting a child’s best interests. Agencies have other compelling reasons for 
setting boundaries on the expectations of purchasing parents and highlight-
ing the cost of the vetting process. Adoption staff know all too well that birth 
mothers and fathers can decide against surrendering a child, thus disrupting 
the exchange and causing prospective adoptive parents to incur costs without 
receiving a child in return. In fact, the money and labor required to transfer 
parental rights from biological parents to adoptive parents reveal the hege-
mony of biological parenthood, which is figured as a legal and natural right. In 
contrast to the Family Tree administrator’s assertion, children are an entitle-
ment—for biological parents. This has both positive and negative implications 
for birth and adoptive parents.
As Barbara Katz Rothman pointed out, property ownership models have 
been useful for securing reproductive freedom for women in liberal society 
182 • CHAPTER 9
and for protecting against state intrusion in the family, but they do not render 
the female body or maternal labors valuable under capitalism and patriar-
chy; hence the high cost of adoptable children and low income-generating 
potential of surrogacy for birth mothers (21–25). Additionally, one can have 
legal rights over one’s body and children but lack the economic and cultural 
resources to fully exercise these rights. The limitations of the property rights 
model can be seen in UNICEF’s attempt to decrease or limit international 
adoption by arguing that children have a right to grow up with their birth 
parents. This so-called right is unenforceable because some birth parents are 
unwilling or unable to parent. UNICEF’s argument may be an attempt to pro-
tect poor parents suffering in the wake of neoliberal structural adjustments 
and/or wars from having their children rescued by people from more eco-
nomically and politically powerful countries, but it does not name or address 
the neoliberal policies driving the phenomenon.
Neoliberal child welfare policies in the US have similarly undercut the 
effectiveness of property ownership models in protecting some families, par-
ticularly African American families, from state intrusion. Dorothy Roberts 
takes issue with the package of child welfare laws passed under the Clinton 
administration—ASFA, MEPA, and PRWORA—for precisely this reason. 
PRWORA values labor force participation over parental labor and makes it 
more difficult for poor women to successfully parent their children. When 
women cannot parent adequately, the state may step in to remove their chil-
dren. ASFA makes it more difficult for poor parents to regain custody of chil-
dren who have been removed from the home by speeding up child welfare 
timelines. MEPA, in turn, ignores the racial disproportionality of the child 
welfare system and makes it easier for white families to adopt black children. 
Hence Roberts argues that these policies represent a pernicious mix of free 
market ideology and de facto racism rooted in the devaluation of black chil-
dren and their parents (76). Ownership rights to one’s children have no teeth 
when structural inequality and countervailing policies enable government 
intrusion in the family under the banner of child protection.
While attending prospective adoptive parent information sessions, I found 
that many of the educational documents that agencies used to introduce appli-
cants to the adoption world tacitly defined the criteria for assessing parents. 
These criteria strongly implied that parenting is separable from economics. 
One notable example included a self-assessment checklist from an adoption 
magazine, according to which a charitable impulse—wanting to adopt because 
adoptive children are often disadvantaged—was specifically flagged as an 
inappropriate motivation for family-making through adoption; only a deeply 
felt desire to parent was considered appropriate. This intrinsically motivated 
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parental impulse closely aligns with the neoliberal ethic of self-actualization 
through carefully weighed individual choices. It also sidesteps any consider-
ation of the market dynamics that delimit choices—especially in the wake of 
global capitalism—about who gets to parent and how. Through written and 
verbal discourse, adoption agencies thus instill in prospective parents a nar-
rowly defined orientation to the adoption transaction and frame as a matter 
of fact and objectivity a morally loaded process.
Self-Sufficient, Private, and Normal Families
If prospective adoptive parents are subject to surveillance and discipline 
though adoption’s discourse about money, this very language is also used to 
defend adoption as a normal means of family-making. Oftentimes, in order 
to normalize adoptive parents and distance them from the image of making a 
purchase, agencies rhetorically draw analogies between payments made in the 
adoption process and medical fees incurred by biological parents. For exam-
ple, in an article from Adoptive Families magazine, Carney asserts, “I’m often 
struck that the same folks who inquire how much our adoption cost would 
never dream of asking proud parents who’ve just given birth in a hospital how 
much they (or their insurance) paid in medical bills” (“The Truth”). The per-
son who asks the price of an adoptive child commits a social/moral error, the 
article implies, because she associates payment with a child. Like the adoption 
workers I observed, Carney links payment to services and further normal-
izes the market and adoptive parents by drawing an analogy between adop-
tion expenses and the fees paid for medical services by biological families. 
The implicit message is that adoptive families are normal, just like biological 
families.
Again, these normalizing moves are not recognized as such. Instead, Car-
ney makes reference to “adoption myths,” which can be countered by facts. 
“To a degree, such blundering remarks reflect a simple lack of information,” 
she writes. “For those with no direct adoption experience, a little education 
can go a long way. But just beneath the surface of these myths lurk some 
unpleasant value judgments.” The person who asks the price of a child makes 
“unpleasant value judgments,” while those who (re)educate them are simply 
shoring up the facts. Better exposure to adoption, she implies, allows one to 
properly categorize the money being exchanged. For her, the right category 
is a matter of accuracy, but Carney’s mission to disseminate adoption facts is 
punctuated by language that reveals the moral underpinnings of this task. The 
stakes of correcting misconceptions, she asserts, lie in protecting the adopted 
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child from harmful remarks, showing her (the child) that “adoption is a nor-
mal way to build a family.”
In contrast to Carney’s assertion, the answer to the question of whether 
adoption entails buying a child is a matter of interpretation. There is little 
doubt that market dynamics infuse adoption practices, that a sizeable pro-
portion of adoptions involve the transfer of children from poor women to 
wealthier people, and that one must pay large sums of money to access domes-
tic infant adoption. At the same time, adoption offers transformative possi-
bilities for family because it disrupts the naturalization of parental labor and 
the economic devaluation that often accompanies denaturalization. When it 
comes to expensive and labor-intensive acts such as pregnancy and parent-
ing, naturalization discourses have been mobilized to defend America’s stingy 
social safety net via PRWORA and other pieces of national and state-level leg-
islation that restrict access to affordable birth control and abortion. As these 
policies show, access to normal, private family life comes with a very real and 
often unaffordable price tag.
Advocates like Carney wash over the fact that normal families are differ-
ently subsidized by the government, employee health insurance plans, and 
hospitals. Carney contends that after the Adoption Tax Credit, the cost of 
adopting a child is comparable to giving birth in a hospital. However, her 
analysis fails to account for the fact that the majority of prenatal clinic and 
delivery charges are covered by insurance and the fact that the Adoption Tax 
Credit is a reimbursement. Birth parents may incur medical bills, but this is 
not going to stop them from receiving hospital services or gaining immediate 
custody of a child.
The point here is not that biological parents should face the same eco-
nomic barriers as adoptive parents. Rather, it is to demonstrate that normalcy 
excludes even while it legitimates. Normalizing strategies may be increasingly 
successful for incorporating some adoptive parents into the fold of Ameri-
can family, but they also wash over the structural economic conditions that 
lead many birth mothers to make adoption plans (or have parental rights 
involuntarily revoked) and the financial barriers faced by working-class and 
poor would-be adoptive parents. Indeed, attempts to enclave children from 
the commodity sphere do not rid the adoption world of market dynamics, 
they merely leave unmarked the normal ways markets privilege those with 
the most resources.
Moreover, even when the adoption world and its participants acknowl-
edge the socioeconomic and racial inequalities in their wake, they advocate 
for adoption by relying upon less explicitly economic norms that neverthe-
less perpetuate inequality. For example, adoption workers commonly stress 
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that their services are primarily focused on the child, not would-be adoptive 
parents or birth parents. And children, we’re told, “are not an entitlement.” 
All of these assertions are consistent with a child-centric American culture 
that excludes children from the labor market and constructs them as costly 
financial liabilities. Responsibility for this burden is placed on private, self-
sufficient parents. Children may deserve grants and entitlements, but adults 
do not. In the midst of the self-sufficient family’s failure, children are shunted 
from one parent to another, thousands of dollars are exchanged, and eco-
nomic responsibilities and failures remain the private property of adults.
Adoptive Families: Radical and Regressive
This analysis shows that inequality is perpetuated not just through policies 
that are beyond the purview of child welfare workers, but also through the 
complicated intersection of cultural norms about money and family that get 
rehashed in their day-to-day language. By shoring up the market and down-
playing its significance, adoption workers leave uninterrogated the social 
inequality that undergirds adoption, which in turn allows the market to fur-
ther propagate inequality. As Kopytoff observed, the very idea that the family 
could be a sphere of pure sentiment, relatively free from economic constraints, 
is a luxury afforded to relatively wealthy people (273).
Nivedita Menon argued that adoption can be a radical endeavor because 
it denaturalizes family-making by showing that the biological nuclear family 
is not inevitable. In adoption, the link between genetic transmission, gesta-
tion, and parenting is disrupted. A woman can give birth without becoming 
a mother and vice versa. A man can mother and/or father. Absent social and 
economic barriers, adoption could lead to more inclusive, alternative fam-
ily structures—those not explicitly structured around the gender binary and 
heterosexuality. Yet few of the workers in this study viewed adoption as radi-
cal because its radical possibilities are bound to a decidedly regressive eco-
nomic reality; a sizeable proportion of birth parents in domestic infant and 
foster care adoption are poor women with few social and economic resources. 
Yet, adoption workers and parents are embedded in a cultural and normative 
professional context that renders these realities unspeakable. To protect the 
sanctity of parenthood and children, and the cultural fiction that money and 
family belong to separate realms, workers engage in a laborious exercise of 
properly categorizing payment and containing the market.
Despite their best efforts, the practice of containing the market without 
explicitly confronting its propensity to exacerbate inequality leads child wel-
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fare workers to become unwitting participants in the cycle of marginaliza-
tion. Undervalued children remain underpriced, as we see in the example of 
foster care adoption, and prospective parents who must pay to gain access 
to children are stigmatized if they expect anything in return for their costly 
investment in adoption. Yet workers are committed to normalizing adoptive 
families and removing the social stigma to which they are sometimes subject. 
Unfortunately, their moves to legitimize adoption hinge on normalizing pri-
vate, self-sufficient biological families without contesting the social and eco-
nomic exclusions the hegemony of this family form entails. This unintended 
outcome stems in part from adoption workers and participants’ perceptions 
that they are simply engaged in the work of educating an ignorant public—
they are not engaged in moral or normative work at all.
Discrimination against impoverished birth parents is also indirectly 
enacted by adoption agencies working to promote the best interests of the child. 
Family Tree’s administrator told prospective parents that adoption is exciting 
but also very sad. Most birth mothers, he informed them, are adult women 
who already have children but cannot afford the expenses associated with an 
additional child. Adoptive parents should be prepared for the tough questions, 
he said, recalling the story of a child who learned that his birth mother was 
living in poverty and asked his adoptive parents why they couldn’t give her 
money.
There is no satisfying answer to the child’s question because it underscores 
the fact that in adoption and in society at large, social inequality is treated 
as a given, sometimes rationalized as just desserts for poor choices or one’s 
inability to compete in the job market. Adults may have a vested interest in 
caring for a child, both emotionally and financially, and many will pay enor-
mous sums of money for access to the most coveted available children. How-
ever, prior to adoption, these prospective parents will never be entitled to 
children to whom they are not biological parents, and women who make an 
adoption plan will never be entitled to the money others have paid for the 
chance to parent their children. Welfare spending cuts and welfare-to-work 
programs push parents into the labor force without giving them access to 
adequate childcare, thus increasing the risk that poor parents will lose their 
children due to allegations of neglect. When poor parents lose custody of 
children, removal is commonly chalked up to individual failure rather than 
systematic injustice. In fact, baby markets should not be interrogated only or 
primarily because they entail the commodification of children. Also important 
is the way adoption markets perpetuate and ignore the suffering and margin-
alization of birth parents. Within a legal and cultural system that prohibits 
baby sales under the auspices of protecting women from sexual and reproduc-
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tive exploitation all the while operating a stingy and inadequate welfare state, 
adoption workers can inadvertently become handmaidens of the status quo.
While commodification anxiety has a long history in the US, the Hos-
tile Worlds perspective (Zelizer, “Purchase” 818) that asks us to bracket preg-
nancy, adoption, and child-rearing from the market can perpetuate inequality 
in a neoliberal social and economic system in which freedom itself is cast in 
market terms. As Nancy Fraser observed, exploitation in the Marxist sense 
can be appealing to those who have been prevented from selling their labor 
in the capitalist marketplace due to racist or sexist domination (9). Fraser’s 
point about commodification and my arguments in this essay are not meant 
to minimize the dangers of that commodification; rather, they imply that in a 
capitalist system, we have to attend to rather than downplay market forces if 
we want to redress inequality.
To be fair, the social policies that hasten socioeconomic inequality can feel 
far removed from day-to-day adoption work, such that the links between neo-
liberal social and economic reforms and the availability of adoptive children 
remain tacit and under-conceptualized by child welfare workers. As an ideol-
ogy, neoliberalism attains its success by lodging itself into our cultural lenses, 
concealing the contingency of its logics by appearing to be inevitable. How-
ever, neoliberalism, much like the families that adoption workers reconstruct 
through their day-to-day work, is not natural or inevitable. Policy makers and 
advocates can do something to attenuate its impact on parents and children. 
The process of parsing through commodification anxiety may be uncomfort-
able for workers and adoption advocates, but it allows us to better understand 
how families are regulated in the wake of global capitalism, and how we might 
intervene in the service of social and reproductive justice.
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“It’s Your Choice, But . . .”
Paradoxes of Neoliberal Reproduction for 
Indigenous women in Oaxaca, Mexico
REBECCA HOWES-MISCHEL
“One of the problems we face here is that women are too passive in 
the face of doctors, they need to understand themselves as consum-
ers. Something this group [Parto Libre] can do is work to improve 
women’s capacity to demand choices.”
—Sonia,1 nurse-midwife
MIDWAY THROUGH a year of anthropological fieldwork focused on the poli-
tics of reproduction in Oaxaca, Mexico, in 2008, I found myself sitting on the 
floor with a group of midwifery activists, doulas, and feminist doctors. By this 
point in the circle, personal introductions had shifted into a discussion about 
how each participant identified the cultural and institutional obstacles Oaxa-
can women—particularly rural and indigenous ones—face in their ability to 
plan and birth children in safe and culturally competent settings. The group’s 
main critique focused on the normative birth model’s emphasis on medical 
authority and technological intervention rather than on pregnant women’s 
bodily experiences, cultural traditions, and personal preferences. Their chal-
lenge to this institutional birth paradigm reflects Mexican feminists’ embrace 
of an increasingly global movement for parto humano (humanized birth), 
which is sometimes translated as “respectful care.” Activists using the frame-
work of parto humano emphasize that birth is a normal and embodied process 
that the laboring person should direct, and they stress that such women (and 
family)-centered approaches are in line with evidence-based medical guide-
 1. All direct quotations were either audio recorded and later transcribed or noted verba-
tim in field notes and then translated into English by me. Field note excerpts are elaborated 
versions of real time jottings I made. All communities and individuals have been given pseud-
onyms, per the ethics review conducted by New York University’s Institutional Review Board.
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lines to improve obstetrical outcomes. Articulated alongside movements to 
resurrect indigenous midwifery traditions, parto humano is a campaign that 
often centers challenges to medical institutional authority as both feminist 
health practice and collective cultural heritage preservation.
For Sonia, empowering rural women to make choices as medical con-
sumers instead of as patients was key to improving their birth experiences. 
Her argument was framed around the differential rate of caesarean sections 
between local private and public hospitals (according to her presentation, 80 
to 90 percent and 40 to 45 percent, respectively), which she argued partially 
reflects women not claiming the right to make choices. As she concluded: “It’s 
an issue of fear and misinformation for women about their biological capacity 
to give birth, so we should work to empower them through this capacity.” At 
the time I understood this narrative as a call toward encouraging indigenous 
women to embody the possessive individualism of neoliberal subjectivity. It 
also seemed to reflect a trend in discourses about modern human rights and 
reproduction that address people as individuals and that stress the value of 
traditional practices as reflections of consumer choice (Craven; Rothman).
But a month later, in June, I began to rethink how Sonia’s promotion of 
consumer choice-making as feminist aspiration expressed a particular under-
standing of the aftereffects of neoliberalism in southern Mexico and about 
contexts in which an incitement to choose does not always accompany the 
ability to choose.
On a hot afternoon in a small rural community further south in the cen-
tral valley, Lucia, a nurse, ushered a mother clutching her young son’s hand 
to where Erica, the social worker, was standing on the edge of a crowd on 
a cement patio in front of the temporary health clinic. Addressing Erica, 
Lucia explained that “she [the mother, Rosa] has doubts about the campaign. 
Explain to her why he needs the shot [the measles, mumps, and rubella vac-
cine].” Without waiting to hear Rosa’s doubts, Erica replied matter-of-factly: 
“Ultimately it’s your choice, but you are his mother and you are responsible for 
his health, so you should be educated and make the right choice.” Here Erica 
positioned Rosa as both someone whose choices mattered (i.e., as an autono-
mous choice-maker) and as someone who needed moral and scientific suasion 
to make the right choice (i.e., as an unreliable choice-maker). Contextualizing 
these two interactions within broader shifts in Mexican public health institu-
tions, I suggest that we can understand the invocation of choice alongside 
disciplining discourses of risk, responsibility, and (implicitly) maternal love 
in negotiations over reproductive and mothering practices as an illustration 
of the contradictory ways Oaxacan indigenous women experience a kind of 
state-driven cultural neoliberalism.
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Contexts of Neoliberalism and Reproduction
The southern state of Oaxaca is rural, with a large indigenous population rep-
resenting sixteen different ethnolinguistic groups. In the national imaginary, 
these communities are typified simultaneously as central to Mexico’s national-
ist cultural heritage and as lagging in modern development. It is the source of 
large-scale migration to the north (both to northern Mexico and to the US) in 
the aftermath of NAFTA-imposed neoliberal market reforms.2 The women at 
the center of this analysis experience neoliberalism as they build transnational 
families and as their reproductive choices are symbolically overdetermined in 
public health institutions. Their experiences support Solinger’s argument that 
the sociopolitical designation of “good” and “bad” choice-makers (7) is a key 
to the way neoliberal discursive and governing regimes target reproductive 
practices (i.e., to fail to make the right choice is to reveal oneself an “inad-
equate mother”; 191). Yet, contrary to analyses of neoliberalism that attend to 
privatization and the evacuation of a public sphere, it is within public institu-
tions (and the expansion of social welfare) that these women are asked to be 
good choice-makers.
This essay attends to contexts in which women are encouraged to make 
good choices, are shamed for not making good choices, and perhaps, refuse 
to choose at all.3 I conclude by asking questions about how to understand the 
gap between institutional pressure to make choices and women’s responses 
deferring them. This analysis of the specific contours through which neo-
liberalism takes shape in Oaxacan public health practices relies on thirteen 
months of ethnographic fieldwork I conducted between 2006 and 2013 that 
was focused on the routine politics of reproduction in rural Oaxaca. The data 
gathered over the course of this research include long stretches of participant 
observation in and around public health spaces—specifically a regional hospi-
tal (Hospital Rural) and two community clinics—as well as extended partici-
pant observation in a surrounding indigenous community; semi-structured 
interviews with medical professionals, policy makers, feminist activists, and 
community members; and content analysis of public media about pregnancy 
 2. Economic reforms in Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in 1994’s North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), challenged the sustainability of Oaxacan agricul-
ture by placing small-scale farmers in direct competition with multinational corporations. With 
American food (particularly corn) cheaper than local produce, Oaxacans from agriculturally 
focused regions increasingly migrated north for economic opportunity.
 3. Good choices or the right choice are contingent and precarious categories that shift to 
reflect normative expectations expressed in institutional socialization. Throughout this chapter, 
I place them in quotes only when repeating direct speech. However, this is not to suggest static, 
settled, or self-evident constructs.
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and reproduction. Employing a perspective that acknowledges interview con-
tent as a discursive production of self-in-context, I analyzed these narrative 
interactions as collaborative and co-constructed encounters.4 I draw on this 
archive to consider how narratives about making responsible choices reveal 
the uneven ways that forms of neoliberalism take shape in Oaxacan women’s 
reproductive experiences.
Good choice-making is a central link between neoliberalism as a form 
of economic privatization and neoliberalism as a form of gendered sub-
jectivity. Neoliberal models of health encourage individuals to internalize 
sets of norms in the name of responsible citizenship. They learn to calcu-
late risk (as prescribed by institutional experts), to take responsibility for 
self-optimization projects, and to become subjects who can appropriately 
make use of state resources in the service of a larger body politic (Rose). This 
neoliberal subjectivity is gendered, as mothers are tasked with acting as con-
sumers (Craven), who make responsible and future-oriented decisions to opti-
mize both their own and their children’s outcomes (Reich)—particularly while 
pregnant (Lupton). Women are tasked with reliably consuming information 
(even when unavailable or inaccessible) and making “‘free choice[s]’ in terms 
of safe/unsafe, order/disorder, life/death . . . [that frame] women’s mothering 
identities as good/bad” (Bryant et al. 1199). In this schema, the self-maximiz-
ing individual experiences agency through personal empowerment rather than 
as part of public collectives. Thus, as Cruikshank argues, one of the key modes 
through which neoliberalism works is by hailing individual subjects into the 
subject position of rational consumers who may be more and less empowered 
to act on this array of choices. Accordingly, feminist analyses of reproduc-
tive politics in an age of neoliberalism(s) stress the stratifying effects of the 
presentation of a purported world of innumerable—yet constrained and con-
straining—choices to women who are encouraged to act as self-actualizing, 
self-sacrificing, and self-caring individuals (Lowe).
As such, Sonia’s narrative appears to very much illustrate a particular kind 
of activism that positions consumer relationship to a market of choices as a 
central way to shift the classically hierarchical relationship between doctor 
and patient (Rothman). It is also part of a long tradition in Mexico in which 
indigenous women are encouraged to adopt modern or mestiza5 maternal 
sensibilities to demonstrate their civic and moral fitness in their health, chil-
 4. See Charmaz for extended discussion of the relationship between narrative construc-
tion and grounded theory interviews.
 5. The alignment between ideas about modernity and mestizaje (a national ideology of 
racial mixing) is a post-Revolution argument valorizing the national body as given form in the 
figure of the mestizo—ethnically mixing indigenous and Spanish “blood” (Stern).
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drearing, and nutritional choices (Stern; Smith-Oka). Yet, in the encounter 
recounted above, Rosa was neither the empowered choice-making figure of 
Sonia’s remedy nor a docile subject to Erica’s dictates. Instead, I suggest that 
analyses of reproduction amidst the aftereffects of neoliberalism benefit from 
greater attention to the contradictory ways that Mexican indigenous women 
are invited to choose in public health settings though practitioners’ repeti-
tions of “it’s your choice, but . . .” Attending to the gap between the incitement 
to choose and women’s active choice-making—or their deferral of choice—
illustrates the contradictory logics of neoliberalism in Mexican public health 
settings.
Oaxacan Public Health in a Time of Neoliberalism
Public health institutions and mothering practices have been key elements 
of state-building throughout rural communities since the Mexican Revolu-
tion—exemplified by the inclusion of a national right to health in the 1917 
constitution. As Birn argues, “Public health offered a concrete, feasible area 
through which the state could enlarge its authority by meeting revolutionary 
expectations for improved social conditions, build a sense of citizenship—
particularly among rural populations—and tether science and scientific pro-
fessionals to renewed national goals” (Marriage of Convenience 15). Between 
the 1930s and 1980s, the Federal Health Ministry slowly extended its reach 
through the newly built clinics and hospitals that brought services to rural 
areas and brought rural areas into federally centralized health campaigns. In 
the mid-twentieth century, Mexico turned its policy attention to questions 
of (over)population and child health concerns and stressed the importance 
of integrating rural indigenous communities into the national body politic 
through an expanded public health services infrastructure that supported 
community education programs (Birn, Marriage of Convenience). In 1983, fac-
ing a debt crisis and under pressure from international politics and economic 
forces, the Mexican government initiated neoliberal restructuring of the pub-
lic healthcare system. Despite maintaining public commitment to quality 
universal coverage, these reforms exacerbated discrepancies in human devel-
opment indices (health, poverty, literacy) between the wealthier (and whiter) 
North and impoverished (and indigenous) South (Laurell).
Constructed in 1980, Hospital Rural’s outpatient wing, which served as my 
primary research site, embodied the ambivalent intersection between Mexico’s 
national commitment to health (and reliance on population health as a key 
marker of modernity) and its neoliberal dismantling of the publicly financed 
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social services infrastructure. Ironically, for rural Oaxacan women the period 
inaugurating large-scale and national privatization of public services is the 
same period in which they finally gained access to them. Illustrating what 
Schwegler describes as Mexico’s negotiated and “hybrid forms of neolib-
eral governmentality” (684), medical personnel simultaneously emphasized 
the importance of their community service to underserved populations and 
stressed the importance of such communities learning to embody a neolib-
eral ethos of autocuidado (self-care). This dual-pronged emphasis reflected 
changes in the funding and organization of health provision that encouraged 
the development of newly accountable subjects in the name of moral citizen-
ship (Birn, “Federalist Flirtations”). Thus, the rippling effects of neoliberalism 
within public health institutions most acutely manifest in ideological rather 
than political and economic forms. Maintaining the federal health system’s 
centralizing force and framing good health as a collective project, rural public 
health institutions through national health campaigns integrate indigenous 
women into a modern body politic as responsible choice-makers who need 
to develop an ethos in alignment with public standards. Even as the rural 
communities surrounding Hospital Rural have experienced greater inclusion 
into the formalized public health system, full enfranchisement is discursively 
hedged as invocations of risk, and choices that move the locus of accountabil-
ity from the public sector to embodied and individual actions.
While risk discourse animates a general neoliberal ethos of health, in 
southern Mexico it intersects with long-standing Mexican public health and 
policy concerns about rural women’s reproductive health. The alignment 
between the bodily health of gendered bodies, their cultural practices, and 
the symbolic health of the nation continues to reverberate through the impor-
tance health institutions place on the risk indices that serve as contemporary 
instruments of modernity claims—notably, the vital statistics of population 
and maternal and infant mortality (Andaya; Howes-Mischel). Thus, while 
indigenous women’s reproductive practices have long been the terrain in 
which Mexican state claims to modernness are rendered uneven and unset-
tled, in the aftereffects of neoliberalism the close alignment of private deci-
sions and collective morality is ever tightened.
“The Ones Who Come All Eventually Make the Right 
Choice . . .”
The confrontation between Rosa and Erica came at the end of a long, hot 
day. Early that June morning, the equipo de salud (the mobile clinical team 
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of a medical resident, several nurses, a nutritionist, and a social worker) set 
out from the public hospital for their biweekly visits to the small community 
less than twenty kilometers away. The equipo operates as an auxiliary force in 
Mexico’s centralized public health system to offer communities regular access 
to basic healthcare targeted at mothers, children, and the elderly and to coor-
dinate nationally directed community health initiatives. Upon our arrival, 
Erica had stressed to the group of promotoras (middle-aged women tasked 
with implementing health campaigns) the importance of the entire communi-
ty’s participation in that week’s national vaccine drive. Midday, Erica called the 
promotoras together and gave them community census lists with the names of 
the women whose children were not yet vaccinated highlighted, sending them 
off to retrieve them. She told them, “It is important to do this with enthusiasm 
because you are my people here. Your participation is for your community 
and the project of health is bigger than individuals because it is for all of us. 
So, it’s important that you communicate these things [compliance with vac-
cines] as science, not as beliefs.” Speaking in the voice of national interests, 
Erica aligned good health choices with advancing the national body politic. 
This is ideological, but also institutional, reflecting the way public welfare pro-
grams align individuals’ clinical compliance to social benefits.
Progresa (Progress), the contemporary social welfare system launched 
in 1997, from the first directly linked public services to neoliberal models of 
health and personal responsibility to state expectations of, and on, its popula-
tion. In 2002 it was renamed Oportunidades (Opportunities) and shifted to 
a conditional cash transfer program that made direct payments to mothers 
as “responsible caregivers” as long as they satisfied program requirements, 
including children’s regular school attendance and medical visits for both 
children and pregnant women.6 Considered the region’s most successfully 
restructured social welfare program, it relies on aligning deeply maternalist 
expectations with neoliberal frames: “basing its programme on normatively 
ascribed maternal responsibilities, in effect making transfers conditional on 
‘good motherhood’” (Molyneux 438). It is now rebranded Prospera (Prosper-
ity). As a form of governance, it encourages women to learn and internalize 
these expectations as a civic duty that is consistent with long-standing nar-
ratives of maternal caregiving that are foundational to gendered citizenship 
claims (Molyneux).
Thus, all day a steady stream of women and children passed through the 
central plaza to receive the shot or to present proof of their prior compli-
 6. Frenk et al. offer a comprehensive history of the policy developments that led to these 
policy reforms, while Molyneux’s and Smith-Oka’s analyses highlight the way motherhood in 
particular is mobilized within them.
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ance—rendering their evidence of good choices forms of public civic virtue. 
Rosa instead arrived with questions raised by a neighbor about the vaccine’s 
risk and thus wasn’t sure that she wanted to participate in this campaign at this 
moment—although she did leave open the possibility for future participation 
once she had thought more about it. Erica’s response was swift and emphatic:
Who told you that? Really you should do it. It’s a national campaign, and if 
you don’t, there’s a risk he will get sick. But, ultimately, it’s your choice. You 
are his mother, and you are responsible for his health. Of course, it’s your 
choice, but if you do not, he could get very sick, and it would be because he 
wasn’t vaccinated.
Without attempting to explain herself further, Rosa walked away for a short 
while. Finally, nodding at Erica, she and her son joined the line in front of 
the vaccinating nurse. As we piled into the back of the hospital’s truck at the 
day’s end, I asked Erica whether any woman had refused to participate in 
the campaign, and she replied: “No, the ones who come all eventually make 
the right choice. It’s only the ones we can’t find, the ones who don’t come, 
those we don’t know about.” Linking individual choices to national health, 
Erica positions the women in the community as subjects capable of making 
rational choices, but unreliably so. Further, she suggests that making good 
choices is simultaneously a demonstration of individual desire to participate 
in the modern body politic and not actually a choice. Rather than a scenario 
with good or bad choices, the only way to not make a good choice was to 
refuse to make a choice.
“It’s Important to Make Good Choices”
Small color-coded cartillas (booklets) titled “Your passport to health” were 
a ubiquitous presence in the clinical and para-clinical spaces in and around 
Hospital Rural, where I observed the quotidian politics of prenatal care. As 
do national passports, these cartillas classified individuals by age and gender 
and facilitated their access to the public facilities. The cartillas not only served 
as a personal record of health and an access point, they operated as a kind of 
surveillance device that enabled hospital personnel to review at a glance wom-
en’s compliance with Oportunidades requirements. While as rural citizens, all 
pregnant women were eligible for free basic prenatal care, low-income house-
holds also received conditional cash transfers through the program. About 
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half of the people served by the outpatient wing of Hospital Rural received 
these benefits, and all were treated as if they did.
Oportunidades perhaps best illustrates rural indigenous women’s experi-
ences of the contradictory aftereffects of neoliberalism in Oaxaca: On the one 
hand, it radically expanded the material reach of the public welfare state; on 
the other hand, its benefits required individuals’ acquiescence with institu-
tionally mandated practices. Oportunidades’ gendered focus offers indigenous 
women a clear carrot (cash benefits) and stick (the removal of such benefits), 
yet Smith-Oka’s analysis of how “the underlying structure of Oportunidades 
is aimed at rationalizing poor people’s behavior and self-care” (48) points to 
a subtle second carrot. In addition to its conditional cash benefits, the public 
welfare system encourages women to find empowerment in their increased 
capacity for responsible mothering that results from their participation 
in its programs. This reliance on the buzzwords of neoliberal development 
exposes the gendered and illusionary nature of agency as promoted within 
the program. Further, the evolution of the initiative’s name from progress to 
opportunity and now to prosperity reflects a proposition that ties individual 
and national long-term economic welfare to both material and ideological 
advancements in their caregiving.
Margarita, a nutritionist, began one mandated community workshop in 
the outpatient wing’s multipurpose room by reminding the assembled women 
that “it’s important to make good choices.” The group of eight women included 
a first-time participant barely showing at nine weeks’ gestation, two first-time 
teenage mothers, and a thirty-two-year-old mother of three, who drew on 
her experience to counsel another participant, whose thirty-five-week preg-
nant belly inspired a long side conversation about natural remedies to allevi-
ate the physical discomfort of the final stretch. For Margarita, the importance 
of making good choices was reflected in small daily decisions about what to 
eat, and she encouraged women to choose nutrient-dense unprocessed food 
from local markets rather than commercial food. But more importantly, they 
were reflected in what she termed “a broad sensibility.” More significant than 
what kind of food they purchased was understanding their daily choices as 
demonstrations of maternal love, starting with breastfeeding: “We’re going to 
talk about many details you can choose, but first the most important thing is 
to offer your breast. Like this, you hold it like a ‘C’ [she demonstrates cupping 
her own breast] and offer it with love. That’s the most important choice you 
can make.” Throughout her presentation, Margarita returned to the theme 
of classifying the kinds of choices women would be asked to make as new 
parents, teaching them in each case which choice was the caring one. Good 
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choices like breastfeeding or local vegetables thus enroll the domestic spaces 
of family nutrition into clinical discourses of responsible care, rendering the 
former newly modern and scientifically informed (Yates-Doerr).
In another workshop held in a neighboring small town, the clinic’s direc-
tor even more explicitly reminded women that the nutritional choices they 
make are direct manifestations of their maternal responsibility. At the end of 
a presentation about the cultural importance of reincorporating amaranth (a 
cheap and nutrient-dense heritage grain that a local NGO promotes to address 
child malnutrition) into the community’s diet, she switched from explaining 
its benefits over processed food to castigating women for making irresponsible 
choices:
The reason there are so many problems in this community is that people are 
lazy and forgot how to make the right choices. They lost that sensibility. It’s 
important to pay attention at these workshops because, if not, it’s too easy 
not to make the right choices, and we already see the problems with that.
She went on to tie unspecified “bad choices” to the rise of childhood illness 
and cancer, suggesting that these things (and not the town’s location next to 
the municipal dump) were causal agents of an ill community.
Again and again, in the didactic spaces of Oportunidades medical pro-
fessionals held out the carrot of good choices to reshape what Smith-Oka 
refers to as indigenous women’s “reproductive habitus” (16). With this term, 
she highlights the ways social, political, economic, and medical institutions 
socialize women’s preconscious dispositions toward “reproductive and sexual 
practices, contraceptive choices, childcare practices, and mothering practices” 
(79). Addressing predominantly indigenous communities, instructors encour-
age women to embody a broad sensibility of good mothering that is defined 
by compliance with institutional practices. To receive public benefits is to be 
encouraged to develop a new sensibility—one whose good choices demon-
strate responsible maternal love. Selectively invoking lost cultural heritage, 
they suggest that modernization has both introduced new bad choices and 
offers a means of making good ones.
As Oportunidades expanded rural women’s inclusion into the public wel-
fare system, it expanded the degree to which their private practices could 
be framed as matters of national and moral concern. This broad sensibility 
is classically neoliberal as women’s private choices—rather than public and 
structuring contexts of food-insecure poverty, ethnic marginalization, and 
transnational displacement—are rendered the salient domain of child out-
comes. Yet, I think it is crucial to note that in each of these instances, women 
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only learned about good choices,7 and that in the face of an incitement to pub-
licly choose, most often women participants were silent. Thus, understanding 
how neoliberalism works in rural Oaxacan prenatal health is to attend to what 
Rapp terms the “existential gaps” (693) between institutional narratives about 
the need to make good choices and the embodied contexts of deferring (or 
refusing) choice.
“What Kind of Birth Control Will You Choose?”
In 1977, three years after family planning was made the constitutional right 
of all couples, Mexico established a National Family Planning Program that 
was integrated into existing maternal and child health services (Rodriguez-
Barocio et al.). Since then, Mexican health policy has heavily promoted birth 
control—particularly long-acting forms—as a means of modernizing the 
nation and the family (Laveaga). This is illustrated by colorful murals pro-
moting birth control that are now a ubiquitous part of villages’ public spaces, 
sponsored by the national education institution and created by local health 
committees. One common mural directly links the nuclear family to emo-
tional well-being with the slogan “A small family is a happy family” above two 
cartoon figures embracing with a small child encircled between them. And, 
posters with similar language linking familial care to family planning have 
proliferated throughout clinical spaces. Discursively highlighting the indi-
vidual practice of planning as a demonstration of maternal worth and love, 
public health media encourage women to internalize a sensibility of respon-
sible motherhood in the service of a modern body politic. This was reinforced 
in medical encounters as doctors used health information tools to socialize 
patients’ reproductive sensibility.
During the nine months I spent at Hospital Rural, I observed and recorded 
almost fifty women’s prenatal exams with two cohorts8 of the four family med-
 7. It is worth noting that although in my Oaxacan fieldwork clinical dictates were framed 
in discourses of responsible and loving motherhood, Smith-Oka observed a dominant narrative 
of “bad mothers” in her fieldwork in the neighboring state of Veracruz. One explanation for 
this variance is the influence of locally specific cultural histories and politics of indigeneity in 
southern Mexico on interactions between clinics and communities (personal communication).
 8. All of the residents who staffed the outpatient wing were completing their mandatory 
national service period. This requirement ensured that Mexico made good on its national com-
mitment to public health. Doctors are assigned their locale, which meant that their duration in 
the community was limited. This program also meant that the cultural gap between the clini-
cal institution and their patients was exacerbated as only two of the residents I shadowed were 
Oaxacan, and none of them were indigenous.
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icine residents and obstetrical specialists who staffed the outpatient wing. The 
exams involved periods of highly standardized interactions while doctors 
completed an individualized risk profile and periods of idiosyncratic ques-
tions and observations during the physical exam. In the former, doctors asked 
women for information about their age, marital status, number of pregnan-
cies, and number of children. At the end, the doctor used this to calculate a 
risk score, which structured the woman’s prenatal care. While assigning a risk 
score to each pregnancy is a purportedly neutral assessment to guide women’s 
clinical care, it ultimately gave doctors a language to contextualize possible 
future harm in women’s daily practices rather than in the forms of social and 
economic marginalization that make Oaxacan reproduction risky (Howes-
Mischel). Thus, the standardizing instruments of the national public health 
system encourage a maternal neoliberal subjectivity that centers the individual 
as the prime locus of positive and negative outcomes.
The risk form also served as a launch point for further, seemingly infor-
mal, conversations between doctors and patients as they shifted from the 
interview toward the physical exam. Questions about this pregnancy easily 
became questions about the next (potential) one, as Dr. Augustin explained 
to me after an exam:
It’s important that they think about their choices now for two reasons. The 
first is when else will we see them so often, will they need to listen to this 
way of thinking. The second is that sometimes people have romantic ideas, 
but this is a time when it is very practical and very physical. So, for both 
reasons, it’s an opportunity to think about the future and encourage good 
choices.
He couched these questions in terms of offering information and encourage-
ment—of empowering women to act on their own futures. Yet, in practice and 
in interactions in which women’s rhetorical affect was primarily one of passive 
reception, questions about using birth control were more often commands to 
use birth control. In its most neutral form, this routine exchange looked like 
this one between Dr. Pamela and a woman named Edeline:
DR. P: “And what method of planning will you use after this one?”
E: “An IUD?”
DR. P: “Correct.”
This exchange of “What kind of method will you choose .  .  . Correct” was 
echoed in twenty-four of the forty-seven cases I recorded. Sometimes doctors 
REBECCA HOwES-MISCHEL • 201
incorporated additional narratives that connected proper family planning to 
a vision of a good life, as reflected in the following utterance by Dr. Augustin:
OK, so this is your second baby? So, two is good, right? Good for everyone. 
What kind of birth control do you and your husband choose for afterwards? 
[He pauses for response; she is silent.] Talk about it with him. It’s good to do.
Repeating the optimal nature of only two children “for everyone,” he enrolls 
Felicia and her absent husband in the process of making good choices on 
behalf of the future of their family. Yet, given the way family planning cam-
paigns evoked responsibility to a larger collective, his invocation of “everyone” 
suggests that this choice also is one to benefit the national body politic.
Rarely did women directly oppose doctors’ imperatives to make the good 
choice. Instead, they deferred or displaced it to an unspecified future. Such a 
strategy of postponement is evident in the patient Juana’s statement, “My hus-
band and I, we’ve talked, but we haven’t decided [here she trailed off].” Nota-
bly, Juana leaves open the possibility of resolving these discussions in favor of 
the right choice, but she reclassifies it as a marital—not a medical—concern. 
Only in one instance did a man—a rare presence at these exams—participate 
in the exchange at the end of the exam. As Estela (the man’s pregnant teenage 
daughter) began to gather her belongings, the doctor engaged him as follows:
DR. PAMELA: “And after the baby? Tell [Estela’s partner] that it is a simple 
thing.”
ESTELA’S FATHER: “We want another baby.”
DR. PAMELA [TURNING BACK TO ESTELA]: “You may want more, but talk 
to him about how to make good choices that serve your future.”
[Estela nods, and she and her father leave.]
Often invoking absent partners’ implicitly uncertain participation in the 
making of “good choices that serve your future,” doctors enrolled women as 
subjects who had the capacity—if not yet the determination—to act as choice-
making consumers. That is, while doctors’ narratives about the importance of 
choice were largely performative in practice, they seemed genuinely invested 
in women’s ultimate capacity to make choices, as long as they made good ones.
Doctors in prenatal spaces rarely followed up on this issue of post-birth 
contraceptive plans.9 Instead, they emphasized the importance of a future-
 9. This is partially a limitation of the data as I did not follow women into the maternity 
ward on the other side of the hospital; however, Castro’s research suggests that patients in public 
hospitals are most likely to receive long-acting contraceptive methods at birth.
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oriented planning sensibility that encompassed both women’s dietary and 
contraceptive choices. Dr. Delfina’s speech to nineteen-year-old Paola reflects 
doctors’ rhetorical framing of the importance of choosing as part of women’s 
responsibility to craft an empowered future:
Now, what kind of birth control do you and your boyfriend use? None?! And 
this is your first pregnancy? Well, you’ve had a lot of luck, that’s good. It’s 
good when women have babies because they want to be pregnant, because 
they want to be a mother. But the desire is good for when you’re ready; it’s 
good to use birth control and then we can plan and it’s not something that 
just happens. And if you plan, we can make sure that everything’s OK.
Illustrated by her repeated insistence on the goodness of planning, Dr. Delfina 
encourages Paola to internalize a future-oriented sensibility in which choice-
making is a key indicator of success. Notably, even when partners were occa-
sionally invoked or involved, the responsibility to make contraceptive choices 
was firmly attached to women’s lives, reinforcing Gutmann’s argument that 
Mexican family planning plans men out of the center of domestic choices. In 
part, this echoes the gendered dynamics of Oportunidades’ cash benefit flows 
that designate women as empowered beneficiaries and as potentially “back-
wards” individuals who require institutional socialization through expecta-
tions of “good motherhood” (Smith-Oka). Thus, it is important to consider 
not only the constraining circumstances in which women were encouraged to 
make good choices but also the stakes of choosing not to make choices at all.
“The Doctor Hasn’t Told Me Yet”
Throughout my research in Hospital Rural, I attempted to conduct interviews 
with the women whose exams I had just observed, listening for the ways they 
internalized, contested, or elaborated on the forms of embodied socializa-
tion encouraged by medical professionals. Women were generally minimally 
responsive, offering only short affirmations of an institutional narrative that 
could be summed up as: “The doctors are good, the treatment is good, there’s 
nothing I would change.” Conscious of the contested status of the high rates of 
caesarian sections in public hospitals, I added a query about the form of birth 
they desired, receiving a uniform answer that “the doctor hasn’t told me yet.” 
Originally I dismissed these interviews as bad data and decided that within 
the hospital, I was too closely positioned as an institutional figure to receive 
answers that sounded like (my idea of) authentic reflection.
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However, I continued to hear this demurral of choice in my more extended 
conversations with community members with whom I developed relation-
ships, causing me to return to the implications of “my doctor hasn’t told me 
yet.” Rather than a statement of docile passivity, I ultimately conclude that 
it lays bare the fictitiousness of incitements to choose within public health 
spaces—the illusionary nature of choice that Solinger shows haunts stratifying 
discourses within neoliberalism generally.
As medical professionals presented women with decisions about fertility 
control or children’s vaccines, they simultaneously positioned them as autono-
mous choice-makers and as potentially unruly and unmodern ones who might 
make nonscientific and therefore bad choices. As medical professionals drew 
on expectations about proper maternal affect by stressing the importance of 
making good, loving, and responsible choices in their disciplining invocations 
of risk, the social worker Erica was proven right. The only women who did not 
make “good” choices were ones who refused to choose. Thus, while neoliberal 
expectations introduced the discursive possibility of an array of choices in 
the course of their medical encounters, seldom could these women not make 
good choices.
Much of the scholarship on reproduction in the aftereffects of neoliberal-
ism emphasizes the relationship between conditions of economic austerity and 
the push to privatize risk and responsibility in the individual actor. To con-
sider the forms of neoliberalism at work in Oaxacan public health spaces is to 
consider how these same privatizing logics are deployed in the provision (and 
expansion) of public services. For a population whose reproductive practices 
and outcomes have long garnered suspicion within Mexican health policy, it 
is striking how well current concerns about making good choices about vac-
cines, prenatal diet, and birth control extend long-standing ones rather than 
constitute novel phenomena. As Oaxaca has experienced a hybrid form of 
neoliberalism in the expansion of public welfare services alongside economic 
privatization, indigenous women are simultaneously positioned as (poten-
tially) autonomous modern subjects and as unreliable ones. This hybridity 
points to the unevenness through which neoliberalism takes shape, as well as 
to the continuing salience of looking at reproduction and intimate decisions as 
a central domain in which multiple forms of power operate. Thus, the incite-
ment to choose contains both a kind of aspiration (i.e., “Be the kind of person 
who can make good choices”) and caution (i.e., “If you don’t, bad things can 
happen”). Not making a good choice is to risk censure, whereas not making 
a choice defers it. Indigenous women’s statement that “my doctor hasn’t told 
me yet” thus constitutes recognition of the dynamics of this form of neoliberal 
governance.
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Amidst this cacophony of narratives about choosing well, a final return 
to where this essay began in the circle of Mexican feminists: What, then, of 
Sonia’s original proposition that Oaxacan women are not yet, but need to be, 
empowered to demand choices as consumers? Perhaps she points to a para-
doxical strategy for shifting the politics of reproduction in an arena already 
structured by an ethos of neoliberal consumerism. As Sharma’s research in 
India shows, dissonant fissures created by paradoxical forms of neoliberalism 
in practice may at times create spaces for women to resignify empowerment 
discourses as a form of “moral citizenship talk” (xxxv). Alongside their birth 
activism that is couched not in direct opposition to public facilities but in 
restoring cultural heritage practices to communities, perhaps these Oaxacan 
feminists are crafting new frameworks for reproductive agency in which the 
right to demand choices may look like the right to make not good choices.
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WE LIVE in an age where dreams of reproduction can be bought and sold. 
Human gametes, fertility treatments of every type, and surrogates are available 
in the billion-dollar, unregulated global marketplace. For reproductive con-
sumers, the global marketplace becomes an attractive option when restrictive 
regulation and policies prohibit the fulfillment of their reproductive dreams 
at home. For those involved in supplying the global market with eggs, sperm, 
and wombs to rent, ethical issues about commodification and exploitation 
arise, particularly when that supply originates in developing countries in the 
global South—increasingly the destination of choice for fertility travelers from 
the global North. The realities, good-news stories, and particularly the trag-
edies that globalized reproduction potentially entails are never far from media 
consumption. The stories of baby Manji, born in India and whose gestational 
and commissioning mothers relinquished any claim to her (Roy 54), and baby 
Gammy, who was allegedly left behind in Thailand according to newspaper 
reports (an account later rejected by an Australian court) when the Australian 
commissioning couple collected only his twin sister, are only two recent tales 
of surrogacy gone wrong (Callaghan and Newson; Photopoulos). Likewise, 
international media interest was sparked by the Italian case of elderly parents 
The author is indebted to Martha Albertson Fineman.
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achieving a postmenopausal pregnancy abroad with consequent removal of 
the child by the Italian authorities (Margaria and Sheldon). These news sto-
ries are a preview of the vulnerabilities that can ensue, for all parties involved, 
from the transnational reproduction trade.
Reproduction is an area characterized by the increasing medicalization 
of women’s bodies and state control over their decision-making. In seeking 
to establish control over reproductive choices, it is unsurprising that schol-
ars and activists focused on the acquisition of bodily autonomy and formal 
equality. In positioning women as fully functioning liberal subjects for whom 
reproductive liberty has become synonymous with autonomous choice-mak-
ing and freedom to contract (Fineman, “Vulnerability” 17), law has led to 
some valuable gains in terms of formal equality in the way in which assisted 
reproductive technologies (ARTs) have been regulated by the state in many 
developed countries. However, what this chapter is concerned with is the 
extent to which “an adherence to formal equality has seemingly eclipsed our 
moral and political aspirations for social justice” (Fineman, “Equality”; my 
emphasis), and what aspirational social justice and well-being might look 
like in the context of ARTs. Fineman’s concept of vulnerability is an “alter-
native vision for justice” based on the understanding that vulnerability is a 
constant, shared, and “universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human 
condition,” arising from our embodiment (“Vulnerability” 20) and our differ-
ential embeddedness “in social relationships and within societal institutions” 
(“Equality” 613). Fineman suggests that replacing the mythical, autonomous, 
fully functioning liberal subject with the vulnerable subject in politico-legal 
discourse necessitates a mandate for a responsive state, “one with a clear duty 
to effectively ensure realistic equality of access and opportunity to society’s 
resource-generating institutions for everyone” (“Equality” 613). In this essay, I 
position ART provision, including surrogacy, firmly within the context of vul-
nerability, inequality, globalization, and the discourse of social injustice and 
exploitation. From the stance of Fineman’s vulnerability thesis, I will explore 
how the gains made by the liberal order’s focus on formal equality and auton-
omy in reproductive decision-making regulation may be set against the state’s 
unresponsiveness to the embodied vulnerability of ART users, exposing actual 
inequalities and limitations on opportunity. I explore how law and policy per-
petuate and facilitate globalization and continue to other some types of moth-
ering. I use Fineman’s vulnerability analysis to question states’ accountability 
for their unethical domestic regulation and the consequent vulnerabilities—
predominantly of women—that this facilitates and perpetuates along global 
geographic trajectories as a result.
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The Vulnerability Thesis and Assisted Reproduction
Our need for connection and care is part of our humanity, which will include 
for some, but not all, a desire to reproduce, situated within particular social, 
cultural, and religious contexts. Such contexts may affect women more than 
men. It is precisely within these contexts that an inability to reproduce with-
out assistance, whether for clinical or social reasons,1 will be lived. It is crucial 
to understand that Fineman detaches vulnerability from its association with 
“victimhood, deprivation, dependency or pathology” (“Vulnerable Subject” 
266), and therefore to be vulnerable is not to be stigmatized. Rather, all of us 
are universally vulnerable simply because we are human, simply because we 
are embodied. Infertility arises from our embodiment and is characterized by 
its very universality and ubiquity: It may genuinely affect anyone regardless of 
gender, sexuality, race, religion, disability, or able-bodiedness, wherever they 
are globally situated. While infertility is universal, it, like vulnerability itself, 
is “experienced uniquely” (Fineman, “Vulnerable Subject” 269) because we 
are differentially and uniquely embodied, and differently situated. Our vul-
nerability can be mitigated by our access to assets that provide us with resil-
ience or resources to respond to vulnerability, including the state and societal 
institutions. For some, the lure of ARTs, including surrogacy, may represent a 
solution to infertility, but in turn may both exacerbate their own vulnerability 
and create vulnerabilities in others: ART and surrogacy users become subject 
to constraints imposed by law and institutions such as healthcare providers—
which gain legitimacy and authority through the state and law—and through 
the medicalization of infertility, which may contribute to inequalities and dis-
parities in treatment through social exclusion (Bell). The role of the state from 
a vulnerability stance must be to increase our resilience, be responsive to ART 
and surrogacy users’ vulnerability in order not to unduly privilege some and 
disadvantage others, and ensure genuine equality of opportunity is realized 
by all.
Infertility and the (Un)responsive UK State
The Legal Regulation of ARTs
The state defines and regulates the constitution of the family. Access to ARTs is 
often constrained by regulation in conformity with the privileged normatively 
preferred family ideal, most often the sexually affiliated two-parent hetero-
 1. Note that this is my meaning when I use the word infertility in the context of this 
chapter.
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sexual patriarchal model, to the exclusion of others. The Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act of 1990, as updated in 2008, regulates assisted reproduc-
tion in the UK. The UK has made significant progress in the inclusivity of 
diverse family forms since its initial regulation in 1990. The privileging of the 
heterosexual family was clear under s.13(5) HFE Act of 1990, which required 
clinics to consider “the need of that child for a father” (my emphasis), and pro-
vided justification for the exclusion of single and lesbian women from infer-
tility treatment in line with the general concern of the liberal order with the 
dangerousness of manless mothers apparent within much of family law (see 
Fineman, Autonomy chs. 4 and 5). This criterion was jettisoned in 2008, in 
recognition of both the positive findings of the literature on lesbian and solo 
parenting and of the unacceptable discrimination on grounds of sexual ori-
entation (Fenton et al. 249). There has been a significant increase in the num-
ber of same-sex female couples receiving treatment in the UK in recent times 
(Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority).
In addition to newfound inclusivity in terms of access, the new 2008 par-
entage regime brings the legal position of lesbian couples into line with that 
of heterosexual married and unmarried couples, although, as it is set out as a 
mirror image of the sexually affiliated heterosexual model, it might be thought 
symbolically suggestive of the notion that the alternative model is secondary 
or even other (Fenton et al. 249). More radically, however, the reform also 
permits a nonsexual partner to be named as the father or as the second legal 
parent of a child. Sexual affiliation is thus not the only determinant of family, 
something Fineman has argued for at least two decades (Fineman, Neutered 
and Autonomy). Although the new regime still maintains the normative pri-
macy of the biogenetic two-parent model so fundamental to the liberal order, 
the UK approach is to be applauded for its significant and positive recogni-
tion of alternative family forms. By contrast, in the US, fertility clinics are free 
to refuse to treat single and lesbian women, and “studies indicate that many 
infertility clinics will deny access to single men, gay couples and poor cou-
ples” (Storrow, “Medical” 376–77), thus reifying heteronormative bias (Stor-
row, “Marital” 100).
The 2008 reform has enacted valuable and responsive gains in reproduc-
tive choice by granting access to previously excluded groups, which to a cer-
tain extent mitigates vulnerability by transitioning previously conceptualized 
subversive or dangerous mothering into the mainstream. However, a vulner-
ability perspective reveals that what the law actually does is permit those 
previously excluded to be reclassified as the liberal autonomous subject, and 
inclusion therefore looks like formal equality. Such single, male-partner-less 
women begin to look like the liberal subjects and the lesbian family begins 
to look like its heterosexual equivalent. The alternative nonsexual two-parent 
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family takes on the appearance of an accepted family form (Fenton 134). But, 
as Fineman states, “we have merely expanded the group to whom this ver-
sion of equality is to be applied” (Autonomy 24). The symbolic recognition of 
formerly excluded groups is important but may be deceptive: Law does not 
operate in a vacuum, and a vulnerability analysis, in its pursuit of social jus-
tice, requires us to explore the wider healthcare context and barriers to access 
of ARTs as a social good.
Resource Availability and Equality of Access:  
State Responsiveness
Law legitimates those societal institutions that distribute significant social 
goods and that, says Fineman, provide us with “assets” that give us “resil-
ience” when faced with vulnerability (Fineman Vulnerability 22–23). In the 
realm of ART provision, the most important societal institutions are health-
care providers. The vulnerability thesis therefore suggests that the state and 
healthcare providers—as societal institutions—have a duty to be responsive 
and “a responsibility to structure conditions in which individuals can aspire to 
meaningfully realize their individual capabilities as fully as possible” (“Vulner-
able Subject” 274)—in this case, parenthood.
Health inequalities exist across different socioeconomic groups, genders, 
and ethnicities in the UK (House of Commons Health Committee 5). Poverty 
and social exclusion—which may be related to sociocultural or racial groups 
and access to basic medical care—are determinants of women’s reproductive 
health (Earle and Letherby 234; Cahn 35), and similar patterns of inequal-
ity are evident globally. Further, Bell argues that one of the consequences of 
the medicalization of infertility is the focus on the treatment of infertility as 
opposed to its preventable causes, which are more common among women 
of low socioeconomic status (635). This correlation between general health-
care access and fertility substantiates the argument that infertility patterns 
are of appropriate concern to a responsive state and indicates that reproduc-
tive health can be protected through equal healthcare provision provided by 
systems such as the National Health Service (NHS), which provides health-
care free of charge to all in the UK.2 The NHS is a social asset, important 
 2. The NHS provides healthcare free of charge in the UK based on clinical need and not 
ability to pay. This includes primary and secondary care, including emergency treatment. Some 
means-tested contributions are required, such as a small standardized prescription charge for 
medication irrespective of the actual cost of the medication. It is possible to purchase private 
healthcare and insurance to cover private healthcare.
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in its provision of shelter and resilience against citizens’ vulnerabilities, but 
equal availability of healthcare is not sufficient under a vulnerability analysis: 
It must take into account the ability of differently situated groups in society to 
access and utilize such healthcare. Genuine equality of opportunity and access, 
then, obviates the privilege of the least vulnerable in society. Such concerns 
and patterns are distinctively structural, and not merely individual—and the 
state is connected as the moderator of social resources in the production of 
the general health-provision conditions under which fertility, or infertility, is 
facilitated (Fenton 132).
While law may now formally include in its gaze those previously excluded 
on the grounds of identity, genuine equality is unlikely to result from forced 
conformity to the autonomous liberal subject model. Unless resources are 
actually available, and utilization possible, access to ARTs is merely symbolic: 
The questions, then, become, what does genuine equality in ART provision 
look like in a post-identity and post-autonomy context, and how do “asset-
conferring” (Fineman, “Vulnerability” 23) societal institutions—namely, the 
NHS—distribute ARTs as a social good?
In the UK, some ART treatment should be theoretically available under 
the NHS. The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) determines 
the effectiveness and appropriateness of treatments for use by the NHS using 
best clinical and economic evidence, and the constitution of the NHS sets out 
the use of NICE-recommended treatment where clinically indicated as a right 
for patients (UK Department of Health and Social Care). NICE recommends 
that public healthcare should provide three full cycles of in vitro fertilization 
(IVF) for women under forty years and one full cycle for women aged forty 
to forty-two (NICE, “Fertility Problems”). Treatment for same-sex couples is 
included. However, research has consistently indicated that regional commis-
sioning bodies do not provide the recommended cycles of IVF, and the trend 
is in a continuing decline in healthcare provision. By 2016, the Fertility Fair-
ness audit had found that of the Clinical Commissioning Groups (regional 
commissioning bodies—CCGs), just 16 percent offered three cycles and 22 
percent offered two cycles, with a majority of 60 percent offering only one 
cycle (Fertility Fairness). Five CCGs have now cut NHS IVF completely (2.4 
percent) (Fertility Fairness), and 13 areas have cut or are consulting on reduc-
ing IVF provision since the start of 2017 (Marsh). This essentially means that 
access to ARTs is governed by one’s geographic location—a postcode lottery. 
Access is thus fundamentally unequal and is further exacerbated by a range 
of arbitrary and unsubstantiated nonclinical and non-evidence-based social 
deservingness criteria by CCGs (such as excluding cases where one partner 
already had a child) and the imposition of age limits, many as low as thirty-
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five years. The postcode lottery is being worsened by the CCGs. In response 
to these cuts, NICE has issued a new quality standard calling for the end 
to the postcode lottery and emphasizing the importance of treating infertility 
(NICE, “NICE Calls”). Pressure has also been put on CCGs by a successful 
legal challenge against a CCG’s refusal to fund oocyte cryopreservation as rec-
ommended by NICE for a woman undergoing chemotherapy: Here the CCG’s 
policy was found to be unlawful, and it is possible that this decision will spark 
further legal challenges where the NICE guidance is not followed (R [on the 
application of Elizabeth Rose] v. Thanet Clinical Commissioning Group). While 
the effect of these current developments remains to be seen, in the meantime 
fertility treatment remains an ever-decreasing priority for commissioners, 
resulting in significant inequality of access to public resources distributed by 
a societal institution, which unjustifiably exacerbates vulnerability.
Although the regeneration of society is valuable and productive in itself, 
the discourses surrounding healthcare provision are of cost and effectiveness. 
Thus, this reduction in public funding of IVF by CCGs is always justified 
under the guise of reducing public spending. Ideologically we might ques-
tion whether economic productivity arguments have any place in a vulner-
ability analysis, but nonetheless, pragmatically, we might contest them and 
reveal them to be illusory. Indeed, research into the fiscal implications relat-
ing to achieving ART-conceived children demonstrates an eightfold return on 
investment for government, and thus “appropriate funding of ART services 
appears to represent sound fiscal policy” (Connolly et al. 603). It is suggested 
that the call for a more responsive state should also involve a requirement 
to recognize the long-term economic advantages—particularly in the era of 
the increasing trend in below-replacement fertility experienced across the 
world—rather than entrusting the distribution of significant social goods 
to regional microeconomic, short-term budgeting by CCGs. Even more 
important should be the focus on the babies inevitably not born as a result 
of cuts and thus on the people who are precluded from becoming parents, 
and the economic context in which cuts are made. As Connolly et al. point 
out, “‘financial access’ plays a critical role in overall access to fertility treat-
ment” (607)—not just in terms of actual cost but in affordability. In times of 
austerity, affordability and thus utilization declines, and of course, austerity 
affects different socioeconomic and cultural groups differently, with women 
being particularly disadvantaged (Karamessini and Rubery). The correlation 
between affordability and utilization is well illustrated by the US, which has 
one of the lowest utilization rates of developed countries and also the high-
est direct cost of ART treatment (by a large margin) but almost no public 
financing (Connolly et al. 604, 607). The lack of public funding thus creates 
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inequality based on ability to pay, which affects different socioeconomic and 
cultural groups unequally. It is no surprise that financial access is used to 
police the norms of motherhood. Indeed, there are other structural inequali-
ties that operate social exclusion from infertility treatment. US research 
demonstrates that ART treatment is utilized more by educated, white, older 
women and that “racial, ethnic and educational disparities in access to fer-
tility care are not generally reduced by state insurance mandates to cover 
fertility treatment” (Connolly et al. 607). Bell argues that medicine not only 
reinforces norms of family but also controls the application of those norms. 
She suggests that “not only does it do so explicitly through the private medi-
calized market in which only a few individuals can afford treatment, medical-
ization also implicitly reinforces stratified reproduction through its inherent 
characteristics” (634).
In addition to its nonimplementation, the NICE guideline itself raises an 
issue about the age limit restrictions. Although this has now been extended 
from thirty-nine years to forty-two years, it nonetheless limits treatment for 
forty to forty-two years. The law imposes no age limit, while CCGs impose 
their own arbitrary, often lower, age limits. The rationality of NICE’s imposi-
tion of age limits has been discussed elsewhere (Fenton 136–37), but it can still 
be questioned whether they are at odds with social reality: There has been a 
consistent increase in women giving birth over the age of forty years (Office 
for National Statistics). The recognition of the vulnerable subject at the fore-
front of decision-making about the allocation of scarce resources (rationing) 
might suggest that older women should be prioritized, as they need treatment 
more than younger women. The recourse to exclusion of older mothering as 
a money-saving exercise, in the guise of rationing, is strongly reminiscent of 
the discourses that portray older mothers as subversive and morally unsuit-
able (Fenton et al. 246)—and perhaps bad, and even dangerous. Furthermore, 
early motherhood is restrained by socioeconomic actualities—exacerbated in 
the era of austerity—that lead women to the impasse of early pregnancy and 
lost career positioning or potential infertility. Through this lens, the promise 
of ARTs in the eventuality of infertility, coupled with the subsequent exclu-
sion from NHS treatment, simply exacerbates vulnerability. Such vulnerabil-
ity is perpetuated by large businesses such as Apple and Facebook, who now 
offer egg freezing to female employees for retention purposes (Tran). Such 
practices simply increase the normalization of late childbearing, lure career 
women into infertility with the promise of (successful) ARTs, and simultane-
ously entrench patriarchal norms regarding caregiving and family. NHS rules 
create an excluded yet privileged class of infertile women—those with the 
economic resilience to afford private treatment (in the UK, private clinics will 
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treat women up until the age of around fifty years, for example). The infertile 
woman who is not economically self-sufficient is effectively punished for her 
inability to buy herself out of the state’s control.
Despite the gains made by law in terms of reproductive freedom and 
autonomy, the centering of the vulnerable subject reveals reproductive choice 
to be, in substantive terms, illusory. The vulnerable subject is certainly not 
the liberal actor that the traditional identity-based formal equality analy-
sis portrays her to be. The operation of NHS rationing reflects underlying 
inequality, unevenness, and discrimination in the distribution of resources 
that deny actual autonomy and equality. Thus, while law has certainly less-
ened the barriers to access to ARTs, we remain bound by the familiar liberal 
scenario as described by Fineman: “We gain the right to be treated the same 
as the historic figure of our foundational myths—the white, free, propertied, 
educated, heterosexual (at least married), and autonomous male. We do not 
gain, however, the right to have some of his property and privilege redistrib-
uted so as to achieve more material and economic parity” (Autonomy 23). 
Formal autonomy, after all, is merely symbolic without actual access to treat-
ment. Discrimination on formal identity grounds may now be unlawful, but 
discrimination due to geographic location is not, and thus what is missing is 
the recognition of our sameness, our humanness. Although currently a poor 
representation of social responsibility, the NHS as an institution could provide 
assets and resilience against vulnerability in this arena. However, as Fineman 
suggests, institutions themselves are vulnerable; they are not “foolproof shel-
ters,” but are “potentially unstable and susceptible to challenges from both 
internal and external forces” (“Vulnerable Subject” 273). The NHS is vulner-
able to the privilege and disadvantage created by the state and exacerbated 
by political choices around austerity. The responsibility of the state therefore 
needs to be reconceptualized to establish a more equal access to resourcing 
and utilization, unpolluted by privilege and inequality. We need to create a 
paradigm in which “the state is not a default (therefore stigmatized) port of 
last resort, but an active partner with the individual in realizing her or his 
capabilities and capacities to the fullest extent” (Fineman, Autonomy 271). In 
this context, that includes becoming a parent.
Surrogacy and the Abdication of State Responsibility
Whilst the law on ARTs may now be relevant to the twenty-first century, 
the same cannot be said of the law relating to surrogacy in the UK. The UK 
reveals itself unresponsive to surrogacy both domestically and transnationally. 
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The UK prohibits commercial surrogacy (as do many European countries) 
and allows altruistic surrogacy but fails to provide a statutory regime for its 
regulation and for the legal enforceability of surrogacy agreements (Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985). The law has been unable—or unwilling—to grapple 
with the ethics of surrogacy and therefore has chosen to simply ignore it, cre-
ating and exacerbating vulnerability in its wake and leaving the courts, who 
are consequently themselves rendered vulnerable, to attend to the aftermath 
once the child is born. The ban has meant that surrogacy arrangements not 
only are unenforceable but cannot be arranged professionally on a commer-
cial basis, leaving commissioning parents without proper legal guidance and 
unaware of the legal complexities they are about to enter into, exacerbated by 
international conflict of laws.
While there is older case law on resolution of custody when the surro-
gacy agreement fails and the surrogate—often also the biological mother in 
those older cases—does not want to give up the child, the courts today have 
been predominantly (although not exclusively) occupied with different issues 
surrounding parentage transfers arising from transnational surrogacy where 
(intended) parentage is not necessarily contested. Where the child’s living 
arrangements have been contested, courts must apply the welfare of the child 
principle, which is paramount in English law. The problem is that the parent-
age rules under the 2008 Act simply do not consider surrogacy, and in UK 
law, the legal mother of the child is always the surrogate as she is the birth 
mother, regardless of genetics or intended parentage. Some recognition of 
alternative surrogacy-created families has been achieved since 2008: Parental 
orders, which transfer legal parenthood to the commissioning or intended 
parents in a surrogacy arrangement, can be issued to same-sex couples as well 
as heterosexual ones, provided there is a genetic tie to one of the intended par-
ents (s.54 HFE 2008). Single people, however, remain excluded by the law. The 
government has announced its intention to reform the law following the 2016 
decision by the High Court in the case of Re Z that the provision is incompat-
ible with the European Convention on Human Rights (House of Commons). 
Discrimination on grounds of identity is to be remedied—here the exclusion 
of singles—and again in this realm of law, we see the emphasis upon formal 
equality. The UK finds itself in a rather curious, and arguably untenable, posi-
tion in which, on the one hand, it prohibits commercial surrogacy yet, on the 
other, it makes some provision for the eventuality—and proven reality—of 
surrogacy occurring. Awards of parental orders have doubled since 2012, and 
there has been considerable judicial criticism of the current legal regime, with 
judges being forced to manipulate orders to give effect to the welfare principle 
and the parentage intentions of those involved.
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The law on parental orders also requires that the surrogate must not have 
been paid, other than reasonable expenses. However, the courts have faced a 
steady stream of cases in which monies that exceed reasonable expenses have 
been paid. Under the welfare of the child principle, the courts have sanc-
tioned such payments so that the parental order can be made. As the judi-
ciary has pointed out, it is practically impossible that parental orders will now 
be withheld (Re L). Despite the ban on commercial surrogacy, arrangements 
are in essence being sanctioned through the back door as they are in effect 
authorized by the courts and the ban is, as Jackson points out, “completely 
ineffective” (892). The limitations of the regulatory regime have been further 
exacerbated by the High Court ruling that the time limit for making appli-
cations for parental orders set down by law as within six months of birth 
cannot prevent the court making an order in late applications (Re X). The 
statutory regime is fundamentally flawed in its assumption that surrogacy can 
be regulated by after-the-fact transfers of parentage, and the law reveals itself 
troublingly unethical, blinkered, and unresponsive to the realities of surro-
gacy, which, in today’s world, mostly involves cross-border arrangements. The 
uncertainty caused by this approach renders children, commissioning parents, 
and surrogates vulnerable, and courts in many countries worldwide, at all 
levels, including the European Court of Human Rights, are increasingly being 
called upon to regulate the results of cross-border surrogacy.
Cross-Border Reproduction and Cross-Border Surrogacy3
Neoliberal globalization situates states within a global market and their citi-
zens as global consumers, for whom the internet provides access to a flour-
ishing global market for clinics, gametes, embryos, and surrogates. The 
globalization and the commercialization of assisted reproduction and sur-
rogacy expedites cross-border reproduction and surrogacy (CBRS)—the 
movement of persons between jurisdictions in the quest for a child—under 
different conditions from those available domestically (Gürtin and Inhorn). 
The trajectories of CBRS are fueled by four main reasons for fertility travel: 
actual (non-chosen) exclusion by regulation in terms of access and treatment 
availability, chosen exclusion, long waiting lists, and economic costs. Differ-
 3. I include cross-border surrogacy in this discussion as it mainly concerns gestational 
surrogacy that requires IVF treatment and is, for this discussion, another way to achieve con-
ception and birth of a child for those unable to conceive or carry a pregnancy. While I am 
not suggesting that all the issues are the same or raise the same level of concern, for ease of 
discussion I am discussing them together under the heading of cross-border reproduction and 
surrogacy (CBRS).
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ent destinations become attractive to different types of fertility traveler, and 
as a consequence, individual state policies and regulation have repercussions 
beyond their domestic jurisdictional borders through juridical globalization. 
The universality of the vulnerability thesis requires that we consider vulner-
abilities created by legislative behaviors that have global impact, in this case 
through CBRS. Our starting point may be to consider the construction of 
CBRS as a positive means of alleviating vulnerability, followed by an explora-
tion of how CBRS may exacerbate vulnerabilities.
CBRS as an Asset
We might think that CBRS could be constructed as an asset supplying resil-
ience in the face of vulnerability attributable to local restrictions on ARTs and 
surrogacy. Importantly, states themselves may purposely construct and rely 
upon CBRS as “a moral safety valve” (Storrow, “Quests” 305). Those who are 
excluded from local treatment by being rendered other (such as by sexuality) 
are able to purchase the means of reproduction on the international market. 
Likewise, those excluded because a treatment type is simply not available, such 
as sex selection or commercial surrogacy, can locate such treatment elsewhere. 
Thus, sidestepping of local regulation is an important function of CBRS and 
may in fact be an ally of reproductive rights. The thriving global market, under 
this analysis, allows access by excluded groups, facilitating alternative fam-
ily forms, and thus offering resilience against vulnerability. The global market 
facilitates access to cheaper treatment abroad—cutting economic costs and 
increasing the availability of reproduction for those who are privileged to have 
some means to purchase treatment. It makes up for shortages in local markets 
and allows for the purchase of autonomy by allowing choice for those who, 
while not actually excluded from treatment, simply disagree with the local 
conditions for treatment.
In its mitigation of adversity for marginalized groups, CBRS might be con-
structed as an important market-based asset promoting reproductive freedom, 
autonomy, and choice. But this market-model is flawed: It reflects a liberal 
construction of the parties as liberal autonomous actors, consumers, and pro-
viders operating in a context of supply and demand, able to freely contract 
without coercion, from a position of equality. It presumes genuine equality 
and opportunity of the parties involved. A vulnerability analysis mandates 
inquiry beyond this construction, this commodity trading, and the explora-
tion of systematic disadvantage in access and equality, “amplified in the con-
text of the globalised neoliberal order” (Grear 54).
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CBRS as Exacerbating Vulnerability
A vulnerability analysis of CBRS must question the law’s role and adequacy. 
First, it must examine how the law functions in acting as a market driver, a 
facilitator of CBRS by exclusory regulation and policy, and consequently as 
the creator of a dual regime in which the rich can contract out of local laws 
and subvert the ethical preferences of the home state, but the poor cannot. 
Secondly, the law’s role in regulating CBRS itself both in terms of its practices 
and standards (such as the number of embryo transfers) and in terms of its 
outcomes (such as legal parentage, legal recognition, and welfare of the child) 
must be questioned.
The way in which CBRS operates gives rise to many potential vulnerabili-
ties. First, the fertility tourist exits the home state in their quest for repro-
duction. This travel is likely to subvert home state regulation and policy and 
is only open to those who can pay. The tourist may find cheaper treatment 
abroad, but that treatment may come with welfare hazards for the traveler her-
self, such as the transfer of multiple embryos. Here we witness the correlation 
between cheaper treatment and value for money; as Connolly et al. note: The 
“level of affordability is an important driver of utilization, treatment choices, 
embryo transfer practices and ultimately multiple birth rates” (603). The risks 
in terms of the lack of safety standards become clear. Multiple pregnancies 
resulting from treatment abroad are both high risk and high cost, which has 
consequences both for pregnant mother and fetuses. Second, the home state 
may be rendered vulnerable in that the costs will be borne by its healthcare 
system as the pregnancy proceeds. University College London Hospital, for 
example, has seen an increase in high-order multiple pregnancies from treat-
ment abroad (Shenfield).
Third, gamete donation may be required to achieve pregnancy. This factor 
in itself may be a motivator for travel when anonymous donation is unlawful 
in home states and in short supply, as is the case in the UK. While UK regula-
tion recognizes the principle of biological truth—that is, for a child to know 
its genetic origins—an exception is made when a citizen chooses to travel 
abroad for treatment. In the absence of any sanctions for using anonymous 
gametes abroad, the law is complicit in the privileging of the rich’s ability to 
circumvent national rules, contributing to the vulnerability of the resulting 
child. Egg donors are vulnerable in terms of the health risks of donation itself 
and potential ovary overstimulation to maximize profit. Nahman discusses 
“reverse traffic repro-migration,” a practice in which clinics retrieve eggs and 
import them to their own country to save women travel, in which she sug-
gests “tissues/embryos/eggs and recipients are prioritized over the well-being 
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of the oocyte seller herself,” perhaps more than in other forms of CBRS (633). 
The market for egg donation can thus be criticized for turning “some women 
into available resources and others into consuming bodies” (Nahman 633), a 
differential exacerbated by inequalities between differently situated women 
in the global market. Whilst some trajectories for CBRS are relatively local-
ized—such as within Europe, where there are established trajectories between 
similarly situated economies (Shenfield)4—there is a constant direction of 
reproductive traffic from poor to rich, from global South to global North. The 
intersection between developed and developing countries in the global mar-
ket, and the potential exploitation of the economically vulnerable and disem-
powered women, raise particular concerns for a vulnerability analysis. Even 
a brief perusal of websites offering egg donation across the world reveals the 
immense price differential—of tens of thousands of dollars—for eggs between 
the global South and global North. The vulnerability analysis must address the 
invisibility of women donors and the commodification of their reproductive 
material both generally and particularly at the juncture of South and North, 
ensuring that these global donors develop visibility. These donors must be 
accounted for by states as part of ethical legislative behavior in their own 
regulation of ART.
Where pregnancy is achieved abroad, and the pregnant mother is the 
intended social mother, the law is relatively unproblematic in regulating the 
issue of birth mother parentage. It is not averse to stepping in, however, in an 
attempt to enforce its national moral perspectives retrospectively in relation to 
surrogacy outcomes.5 For those unable to realize a pregnancy, surrogacy may 
be the only answer, and it is heavily restricted in many developed countries 
either by law or by cost. Generally, where it is permissible, such as in the US, it 
remains an opportunity only for the very rich, with costs estimated to be over 
£100,000 (Horsey). International surrogacy becomes normalized, endorsed, 
and perhaps even glamourized through utilization by celebrities such as Elton 
John, who used a surrogate in California. The attraction of developing coun-
tries such as India or the Ukraine for cheap surrogacy is therefore predictable 
and potentially illustrative of how “the poorest peoples and nations of the 
earth are forced disproportionately to bear the deepening social costs of capi-
talism” (Grear 59). Surrogacy arrangements are often brokered by agencies or 
clinics for high fees (of which the surrogate is likely to receive only a small 
 4. For example, the trajectory is from Italy to Spain for egg donation, and from France to 
Belgium for sperm donation (Shenfield 1366).
 5. For example, in the French cases of Mennesson v. France and Labassee v. France, France 
refused birth certificates to children born in the US. The European Court of Human Rights 
found that France had breached the children’s human rights (Jackson 905; Brooks).
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part) and surrogacy is predominantly gestational. Because the commissioning 
parents are likely to be significantly more financially resilient and advantaged 
than the surrogate, regardless of their respective socioeconomic statuses at 
home, the specter of abuse and inequality of bargaining power is always loom-
ing. Much disquiet has been expressed about the exploitation of women, who 
are structurally and socioeconomically disadvantaged in developing countries 
and who, for example, indicate that hunger motivates their participation in 
egg donation, surrogacy, and similar types of “work” (Pande 161). It is notable 
that as the ethical issues play out in reality, developing country surrogacy 
“hotspots” have begun to wind down or terminate their access to foreigners, 
but this simply shifts trajectories, with the same issues, as new markets open 
their doors (Horsey).
Can free choice ever genuinely be said to operate in such contexts? Some 
facts are inexorable, such as high levels of poverty and that surrogacy and egg 
donation in the host countries are often highly stigmatized. Ironically, part of 
the appeal for clients is exactly that surveillance and loss of autonomy under 
which poor foreign surrogates can be held during pregnancy, as demonstrated 
in the documentary Google Baby (Franz): Indian surrogates are shown living 
communally, lined up close to one another, provoking an image of battery- 
baby-farming, family and existing children left behind. Such surveillance is 
abhorrent to the basic notions of autonomy and dignity enjoyed in the devel-
oped world. Further concerns are raised about illiteracy, lack of bargaining 
power, and lack of (the Westernized concept of) informed consent. In the case 
of AB v. CT, for example, the legal agreement was signed by the surrogate’s 
thumbprint, raising questions about whether the surrogate could ever have 
understood or been made to understand what was a complex contract. While 
on the one hand some authors document illiteracy (Pande), others report 
some surrogates as both literate and questioning (Deomampo); however, even 
literate women have no bargaining power and are fearful of jeopardizing their 
surrogacy contracts by asking questions of doctors and lawyers. Further, while 
the women are paid and this payment may allow them to purchase education 
or commodities otherwise out of reach, such as a home, the surrogacy market 
does not better the conditions of women, their reproductive health, and their 
communities (Mohapatra).
In addition to the vulnerability of the bio-available women, surrogacy cre-
ates issues for the children who become entangled in its web of consequences. 
The situating of Indian surrogates out of sight and away from their families 
during their socially unacceptable and subversive, othered pregnancies means 
that any existing children of the surrogate are likely to be deprived of mother-
ing while their mother mothers for another. The law’s operation can leave the 
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children born through surrogacy vulnerable. The law may render children 
stateless and legally parentless because of conflict of laws, where neither of 
the relevant jurisdictions recognizes the commissioning couple or the sur-
rogate as the legal parents (such as in Re X and Y). In one recent case, twins 
were unable to leave India for over a year (Re Z in 2015) due to immigration 
issues. Some states have refused to recognize surrogate-born children: Ger-
many, in the case of twins born to German parents in Balaz v. Anand 2009 
(Crockin); and the European Court of Human Rights, to protect the Article 
8 rights of surrogate born children refused citizenship by France (see Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights; Brooks). Children may remain uncollected with 
agreements unenforceable at law, as in the case of baby Gammy (mentioned 
at the beginning of this essay), while some children may be taken from their 
parents, who are retrospectively deemed unsuitable by the state (Margaria and 
Sheldon). Legal reforms in India have sought to ban foreign and commercial 
surrogacy, although the exact legal status of such reform attempts is not clear 
(Indian Express, “New Surrogacy Bill”). Such unilateral revocation of surro-
gacy is problematic when arrangements are already in course: For example, 
one British couple was told to leave their surrogate-born baby in an orphan-
age (Patel), and two US couples had to begin legal action to reclaim embryos 
stored in India (Taylor). Such responses of the host state, perhaps somewhat 
ironically, expose the vulnerability of the fertility tourist.
States reveal themselves unresponsive to the vulnerabilities of their own 
citizens and their children born through surrogacy. Western inequality in pro-
vision and the unresponsive, unethical developed nation-state, combined with 
corporeal vulnerability, create and perpetuate various trajectories of exploita-
tion and commodification of all those involved in CBRS in the name of the 
free neoliberal global market, to the detriment of human populations pre-
dominantly in the global South.
Conclusion
The law’s role in ART and surrogacy provision, as a domestic regulator, as a 
driver to transnational markets, and as a fixer of cross-border outcomes, needs 
careful examination. While the UK’s local provision is seemingly progressive 
and inclusive, a focus on vulnerability’s reconstruction of the politico-legal 
subject as vulnerable reveals the UK state is unresponsive and unethical in its 
approach. Genuine equality is mythical and illusory, and privilege and disad-
vantage abound, from which the embodied vulnerability of the global, socio-
economically disadvantaged is readily forseeable.
222 • CHAPTER 11
A more substantive vision of equality, as demanded by Fineman, can only 
be achieved by moving beyond autonomy—and beyond mere formal equal-
ity—to include an examination of the realities and vulnerabilities created by 
ART and surrogacy regulation and policy on a global scale. Vulnerability 
therefore requires us not only to demand the elimination of inequality, privi-
lege, and disadvantage created by our own state’s local provision, but also to 
call upon states to be responsive to globalized structural inequalities and to 
demand accountability for the vulnerabilities created externally by their own 
domestic legislation. Vulnerability facilitates the search for a more just and 
equal global social order, and while vulnerability might not give us ready solu-
tions to the ethics of ARTs, it can be used to argue for fertility justice in the 
forms of global standards, ethics, and regulation in recognition of our univer-
sal embodied vulnerability.
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C H A P T E R  1 2
Dangerous Desires and Abjected Lives
Baby-Hunger, Coerced Surrogacy, and Family-
Making in Michael Robotham’s The Night Ferry
MODHUMITA ROY
IN LATE AUGUST of 2015, the world was yet again shocked by the discovery 
of a truck in Austria with dozens of decomposing bodies in it. With multiple 
continuing wars across the globe—in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Sudan, 
to mention a few—and a deepening global economic crisis, desperate popula-
tions began to make efforts to escape the instabilities and reach safe havens. 
Many became easy targets of ruthless human traffickers, as was clearly the 
case in Austria. The refrigerated truck, with Hungarian number plates, had 
apparently been parked off the highway for a number of days before authori-
ties made the gruesome discovery. The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, 
and her Austrian counterpart at the time, Werner Faymann, who were both 
at a summit in Vienna, expressed their horror. “The refugees who died today 
wanted to save their own lives by fleeing, but instead lost their lives at the 
hands of traffickers,” Faymann was quoted as saying (“Dozens of Refugees”).
This and similar accounts of migrants fleeing war zones and dying in 
their attempt to reach safety rang an eerie bell as I sat down to write this 
essay on coerced surrogacy in Michael Robotham’s 2007 thriller, The Night 
Ferry. Indeed, the novel appears remarkably prescient in its foregrounding of a 
world destabilized by war, where refugee populations are forced to make grim 
choices just to survive. A mass-market, middlebrow read, the novel, though 
positively reviewed in several newspapers, has yet to receive any scholarly 
attention. In many ways, the novel replicates the familiar “death-detective-
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explanation” of detective fiction (Horsley 12). What sets Robotham’s thriller 
apart, as reviews have noted, are the serious ethical questions it raises. The 
novel takes us, says the Sydney Morning Herald quoted on the back cover 
of the paperback edition, “deep into a set of humanitarian concerns.” Unlike 
most garden-variety thrillers that steer clear of politics, The Night Ferry dog-
gedly connects the dots of social, economic, and geopolitical instabilities, and 
shows them to be the grounds upon which criminal activities flourish.
As in detective novels with a political viewpoint, the crime under inves-
tigation in The Night Ferry is revealed to be part of a “network of problem-
atic social and institutional mechanisms of which the crime itself is only one 
manifestation” (Tomc 46). The novel focuses on the never-ending Afghan war 
and the refugee crisis in Europe and links these geopolitical catastrophes to 
the creation of a new, vulnerable class of exploitable people. Many, as the 
novel shows, are forced to fulfill metropolitan demands and desires, espe-
cially for intimate labor—be it caretaking, sex, or reproduction via surrogacy. 
Robotham bravely wades into the troubled waters of reproductive politics, 
connecting coerced reproductive labor to the desperation of some for geneti-
cally related offspring.
The thriller is one of only a handful of novels published in recent years 
that explore the murky underbelly of surrogacy arrangements. For the most 
part, commercial surrogacy, especially in popular cultural representations, 
gets treated rather positively. It would be hard to find a situation comedy, 
serialized drama, or even a reality show in the last decade that did not have at 
least one subplot that favorably examined parenthood via surrogacy.1 As arti-
ficial reproductive technologies (ARTs) have advanced and as vulnerabilities 
of populations, especially in the global South, have increased—not only as a 
result of geopolitical instabilities, as in Robotham’s novel, but also due to dra-
conian Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and neoliberal policies that 
have, among other things, increased labor market volatilities and inequality—
womb renting has become an alternative survival strategy for some women. As 
the wealthy embrace commerce in what Anne Phillips calls “intimate bodily 
services” (Our Bodies 66), stigma attached to renting poor women’s wombs 
seems to have diminished. Instead, such practices have come to be accepted 
as a means of family-making, especially for those experiencing what is often 
referred to as intractable or involuntary infertility. This acceptance coincides 
rather conveniently with increased vulnerabilities of populations.
 1. These include Modern Family, Glee, The Good Wife, Ugly Betty, and Dancing with the 
Stars, among many others.
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The series of intertwined criminalities that the novel presents challenges 
the reader to consider the thriller not simply as a crime-solving exercise, but 
as a political commentary about the ethics of commercial surrogacy, though 
it should be noted that the instances of surrogacy in the novel are criminally 
coerced and not a commercial transaction as such. More broadly, the novel 
can be read as engaging the latent question of what fuels the demand for such 
labor; that is, it focuses on the core issue of baby-hunger or the all-consuming 
desire to have genetically related offspring. The Night Ferry instantiates what 
such desires can let loose in a radically unequal world of “reproscapes” or 
global landscapes and circuits across which technologies, labor, biocapital, and 
ideologies of race and family now travel (Inhorn 90). To be sure, Robotham 
raises the stakes by interjecting into arguments about the morality and ethics 
of commercialized reproduction (whose pros and cons continue to be debated 
in scholarly journals), the extreme—perhaps improbable—circumstance of 
war refugees terrorized into becoming reluctant surrogates. I argue, however, 
that Robotham’s focus forces readers to consider how far the blast radius of 
the globalized war on terror reaches; furthermore, the novel compels us, at the 
very least, to consider where and how and with what consequences abjected 
and precarious lives and dangerous desire for “custom-made, ready-to-order” 
babies intersect (Robotham 57).
In a 2013 essay, Tavia Nyong’o expressed his worry around the “sudden 
acceleration” of the term precarity in academic writing (157). The overuse of 
the term, he rightly warned, “threatens to generalize precarity as ubiquitous 
and therefore an undifferentiated human condition” (157). At first glance, the 
novel too appears to be making such an indiscriminate claim, implying that 
bodies, especially female bodies, are all precarious because they are especially 
susceptible to violence: from murder victim Cate Elliot’s damaged body; to 
her mother’s paralyzed one; to the detective Alisha Barba’s, whose spine is 
held together with steel; not to mention the Afghani refugees in Amsterdam, 
who are forced to become surrogates. On the one hand, such precarity—the 
exposure to assaults that diminish the body’s capacities (for speech or child-
birth or normal movement)—suggests a modicum of equality. On the other 
hand, as the novel illustrates in excruciating detail, only some are much more 
defenseless than others, and this differential in vulnerabilities has everything 
to do with the complex unfolding of geopolitical realities and unevenly dis-
persed economic opportunities and life chances. What the novel demonstrates 
throughout is that while vulnerability may well be a universal human con-
dition, precarity is not; it is—and ought to be—reserved as a description of 
inequitably distributed risk and harm, terror and abjection. The novel’s intri-
cate plot knits together the effects of war, displacement, and economic hope-
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lessness that produce precarious subjects, and the relentless pursuit of profit, 
which exploit their vulnerability and turn them into disposable populations. 
In other words, the novel does appear to remain “scrupulously attentive” to 
“the constitutive and uneven distribution of .  .  . vulnerability,” as Nyong’o 
urges, by taking into account “the full violence of global capitalism” (157).
Mad . . .
The Night Ferry opens with Detective Constable Alisha Barba, of the Lon-
don Metropolitan police, receiving a cryptic note from her estranged friend 
Cate. It reads, “Dear Ali, I’m in trouble. I must see you. Please come to the 
reunion. Love, Cate” (3). Alisha attends the reunion and meets a heavily preg-
nant Cate, who only has time to whisper to Ali that she desperately needs 
help: “They want to take my baby . . . You have to stop them . . .” (15). Before 
Ali can ask any questions, Cate and her husband Felix are struck by a taxi. 
Felix is killed instantly, and though Cate is still alive, her body is so damaged 
it seems unlikely that she will survive. In their attempt to save her life and that 
of the unborn baby, the paramedics tear away her clothes and make a shock-
ing discovery: Cate had been faking her pregnancy. The paramedics find “a 
large piece of upholstery foam, trimmed to fit over her stomach,” and once the 
“prosthetic belly” is pulled away, Cate is “‘pregnant’ no more” (21). Ali sets out 
to piece together the why of Cate’s faked pregnancy and her desperate appeal 
for help. Above all, she wants to find the reason for what Ali suspects to be 
the deliberate and premeditated murder of Cate and her husband. Why had 
Cate faked her pregnancy? If she wasn’t pregnant, how could her baby be in 
danger? Why was she murdered? By whom? To find answers, Ali and her for-
mer boss and mentor, the retired Detective Inspector Vincent Ruiz, travel to 
Amsterdam and to the dark, violent world of human traffickers, baby-sellers, 
refugees, corrupt doctors, and childless couples, desperate to have babies.
Narrated by Ali, the novel shocks us at the outset with Cate’s death and 
the discovery of her secret and takes the reader on a long, murky journey 
of discovery. The plot moves back and forth in time, and we get to know 
Cate and Ali and their intimate friendship in slowly unfolding flashbacks, 
which helps to emphasize their closeness and similarity, as it also reminds us 
of their differences. This oscillation between their similarity, and ultimately 
their difference, becomes the key to understanding the death of one and the 
survival of the other. We learn that though Cate Eliott and Alisha Barba “were 
born at the same hospital and raised in Bethnal Green in London’s East End” 
(10), they belonged to quite different worlds. They first met when they were 
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thirteen years old when Cate transferred to Ali’s school and they “became 
inseparable” (30). Despite their closeness, and despite Ali’s avowal that they 
were “like Siamese twins,” or like “milk and cookies” (30), the girls are sepa-
rated by race and class: Cate is white and middle class; Ali is working class 
and of Indian descent. What also distinguished them from each other are 
their physical appearances. Ali consistently emphasizes Cate’s feminine desir-
ability in contrast to her self-assessed “rather ungirlie” (204) appearance. She 
casts herself as Cate’s physical opposite, a “skinny Indian girl with braces and 
glasses,” with a lean, muscular, athletic body (29); Cate, on the other hand, 
was “the coolest, most desirable girl in the whole school” (25), “born with the 
ability to make men admire her” (14). Though Ali does not have “Cate’s lumi-
nous beauty or infinite sadness,” (60) what she has, and what stands her in 
good stead, perhaps even guarantees her survival, is that she has, as she puts 
it, “wisdom, determination and steel” (60). Of greater moment than appear-
ance, class, or ethnicity is what Ali does not share with Cate: baby-hunger—the 
burning, all-consuming, desperate yearning to have a child, and not just any 
child, but one’s “own genetic offspring” (199).
The novel flirts with the idea of a romantic-sexual attraction between Ali 
and Cate and therefore with the possibility of alternative bonds and kinships. 
Indeed, Ali’s first experience of an erotic kiss is with Cate: “Sitting in the dark-
ness, our shoulders touched, and her fingers found mine. She squeezed my 
hand. I squeezed hers. And that was the start of it” (30). While the “start of 
it” could have blossomed into a romantic relationship between them, which 
might have allowed Cate to reexamine her aspirations for the future, the novel 
turns away from such an option. Instead, Ali states categorically, “I loved her. 
Not in a sexual way” (34). What abruptly ends their friendship is Cate’s dis-
covery of her father’s sexual seduction of Ali; it shatters the placidity of their 
shared childhood and irreparably ruptures their closeness. But neither the 
shocking discovery, nor her parents’ loveless marriage, shakes Cate’s faith in 
and desire for a conventional family; that is, Cate holds on to the fantasy of 
an idyllic, normative life with a husband and especially children who, she 
imagines, would love her unconditionally. Although the novel is disinclined to 
shed its heteronormative ideology, it does, in the end, call into question Cate’s 
idealization of familial life, and replaces the nuclear family with a more capa-
cious version of kinship, about which I will have more to say later in the essay.
Despite their differences, the novel is invested also in setting up Cate and 
Ali as parallels. Since much of the narrative present is interlaced with the past, 
the flashbacks serve as constant reminders to readers of their intimacy and 
their similarities. This mirroring, as Sandra Tomc has maintained, between a 
murder victim and the female detective often has a specific ideological func-
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tion, especially in feminist detective novels (46). It “adjusts our reading of 
the woman detective in a crucial way” (46). Tomc finds the substitutions, or 
what she calls “moments of metaphoric confusion” (46), help to establish the 
text’s political options. Tomc’s exemplary instance is Jane Tennison (played 
memorably by Helen Mirren) in Granada television’s hugely successful crime 
series Prime Suspect (1999–2006). Pointing to the many moments in the series 
where DCI Jane Tension is mistaken for a prostitute or a victim of crime, 
Tomc argues that these moments “insist on a seemingly arbitrary analogy 
between the woman detective and the young women whose murders she is 
investigating. . . . For a split second . . . she and the dead girl are dangerously 
interchangeable” (46). While metaphoric confusion underscores the vulner-
ability of women—the detective could as easily have been the victim—such 
confusions, in fact, draw our attention to what makes the difference. Cate and 
Ali—Siamese twins, telepathic best friends, same age and the same rhythm 
(“we were synchronized” [145])—almost share the same fate.
Even with their potential interchangeability, however, what is of signifi-
cance is that one woman is the victim of a crime that the other will solve. 
This is a carefully deliberate feature of the novel: to explore, as it were, the 
reason why one survives while the other does not. And the death of one, as 
much as the survival of the other, I argue, holds the key to the texts’ horizon 
of understanding of the dangers of certain obsessions—to make genetically 
related children at any cost, for example.
We meet Ali in this novel, a sequel to the earlier Shattered (2008), in which 
she breaks her back; she tells us matter-of-factly, “Somebody dropped me onto 
a wall, crushing my spine” (6). Ali had lain in a hospital bed, recovering from 
life-threatening injuries that had taken six operations and nine months of 
physiotherapy (6) to be able to resume a normal life. Her spine had to be 
reconstructed with steel plates, and as a result (we learn later in the novel), she 
will not be able to have children. Cate’s broken body in the hospital is eerily 
reminiscent of Ali’s: “Cate lies . . . hostage to a tangle of tubing, plasma bags 
and stainless steel. Needles are driven into her veins and her head is swathed 
in bandages. Monitors and machines buzz and blink” (33). Ali is reminded 
of her own ordeal in the hospital, when she, too, had lain helpless, hooked 
to monitors and machines. Reporting on Cate’s condition, Ali tell us, “Now 
they say her pelvis is so badly shattered that even if she survives she’ll never 
be able to carry a baby” (38). This, too, is a moment of deliberate “metaphoric 
confusion”: “Something shudders in me. A déjà vu from another hospital and 
a different time, when my bones were being mended,” says Ali (38).
While Ali’s shattered body has been patched together, Cate’s body “is bro-
ken in too many places to fix” (21) and she dies. Robotham makes their condi-
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tions deliberately and uncannily similar and uses the “metaphoric confusion” 
to stress the differences between the two women to suggest why one dies while 
the other survives. Ali herself signals the limits of the interchangeability of 
identities. Cate, the girl with “a casual, almost unwanted beauty,” had always 
seemed set in her life goal: “I am going to have lots of babies because they 
will love me and never leave me” (31). Even as a teenager, Cate had steadfastly 
expressed this normative vision of her future: “She would map out our paths, 
which included careers, boyfriends, weddings, husbands and children” (34). 
Ali, child of immigrant Sikh parents, though encouraged to be feminine and 
to desire marriage and a family of her own someday, harbored instead fan-
tasies of wining the marathon in the Olympics: “At sixteen I wanted to win 
Olympic gold” (68). We know, of course, that Ali’s Olympic dream proves as 
elusive as Cate’s desire for babies. But after the devastating injury, Ali had 
come to terms with her disappointment and accepted that she would never 
run again at a competitive level. She had slowly and painfully built back her 
stamina and continued to run, not as a compulsion or obsession, but as a heal-
ing and restorative exercise.
Cate, on the other hand, marries Felix and attempts to start a family, as she 
had always declared she would. But she is unable to have children. Cate, we 
are told, became “a walking bloody textbook on infertility,” having tried every-
thing, “IVF, drugs, injections, herbal remedies” (49). But nothing worked. 
Here, again, the novel reminds us of the quite different life goals and tempera-
ments of Cate and Ali. Alisha knows that her “patched pelvis and a reinforced 
spine” cannot “withstand the trials of pregnancy and labor” and acknowl-
edges, “Wanting children is a dangerous ambition for me” (39). It is danger-
ous for Cate, too, of course, but unlike Ali, who accepts the consequences of 
her injury, Cate’s repeated attempts and failure to become pregnant made her 
“obsessed. Desperate” (50). Biology had betrayed Cate, for whom pregnancy 
“was theoretically possible but realistically unlikely” (89). Such a prognosis 
did not deter Cate; she was determined to have a baby, no matter the cost.
After Cate’s death, Ali, with considerable risk to her own safety, pieces 
together Cate’s story of repeated failed attempts at getting pregnant and her 
subsequent mental breakdown. Cate had “spent a fortnight in a psych ward” 
(57), and in her fragile mental state is arrested for stealing baby clothes from 
Mothercare. A compassionate magistrate, taking pity, gave Cate a suspended 
sentence and ordered her to seek counseling. When she finally turned to 
adoption to create a family, the shoplifting conviction disqualified her as a 
fit parent. At her lowest moment of distress and desperation, Cate had “met 
someone who convinced her that for £80,000 another woman would have a 
baby for her. Not just any baby. Her own genetic offspring” (183; my emphasis). 
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And, it was the prospect of genetic offspring that had made Cate set aside all 
qualms and embark on a perilous journey that ended in her murder. Since 
commercial surrogacy is illegal in Britain, Cate had traveled to Amsterdam, 
where gestational surrogacy is permitted, to carry out her plan. With whom 
and under what circumstances had she been able to broker such an arrange-
ment? How would she have brought the babies back into Britain? She had 
almost got away with it—but how?
It turns out, Cate had been encouraged and aided by Julian Shawcroft, the 
head of an evangelical organization, whose own obsession is to save unborn 
babies, for which he doesn’t mind breaking the law, and by her unscrupu-
lous fertility doctor, who also believes that the end justifies the means. Cate 
faked her pregnancy while she put in place a convoluted plan not only to 
circumvent British law, which does not permit paid surrogacy, but also to 
engage in human trafficking: With the help of other criminal elements, Cate 
had planned on smuggling the pregnant surrogate into the UK to give birth 
“in the same country as prospective parents” (266). The home birth, without 
the involvement of hospitals, would go untraced and the newborn could be 
registered later by Cate as hers. If it worked as planned, the nefarious, illegal 
activity would be undetectable, for once the genetic parents take “possession 
of the baby .  .  . [b]lood samples, DNA and paternity test could all confirm 
their ownership” (226; my emphasis). It is in the concoction of this mad and 
criminal plot to realize her lifelong obsession that Cate’s otherwise unremark-
able middle-class life intersected with pronatalist zealots, who claimed to care 
about life, and with criminals, who cared little. All the actors had their own 
reasons for participating and each had rationalized their part in the inhumane 
nexus of coercion, torture, and even death. With the help of Shawcroft, Cate 
found a surrogate willing to carry her last two viable embryos, created with 
her eggs and her husband’s sperm.2
When things went terribly wrong, and she realized that her partners in 
crime might sell the babies to the highest bidder, Cate reached out to Ali. “As 
I tell the story,” Ali confides in the readers, “it strikes me how implausible it all 
sounds. An Englishwoman transports fertilized embryos to Amsterdam inside 
a small cooler box. The eggs are placed in the womb of an unwilling surro-
gate” for Cate to become a mother (184). Yet, in reality, the trade and traffic 
in baby-making, which includes a brisk market in body bits, make Cate’s (and 
the novel’s) scenario almost plausible. Even if Robotham presents an extreme, 
even lurid, case of international human trafficking, blackmail, and murder, the 
 2. Cate was not aware that Samira, the young Afghani refugee, who would serve as a sur-
rogate, was pregnant with twins. Hence, her plea to Ali to save her “baby.”
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legal market in bio-materials and in commercial surrogacy is only marginally 
less sensational. To the vignette with which this anthology begins, of the Lius 
and their gestational carrier, Jessica Allen, can be added such shocking cases 
as Baby Manji in India,3 or Baby Gammy in Thailand,4 and too many instances 
that make headlines on a worryingly regular basis. In addition to disputes 
over payment, unwanted and abandoned babies, and legal challenges about 
embryos are the growing numbers of appalling reports such as the one about 
“nine babies found in mysterious circumstances in a Bangkok apartment,” 
without any documents or identifiable parents.5 Or baby farms discovered in 
various parts of the world: Nigeria, India, Thailand.6
Medical technological innovations have fragmented reproduction—
dividing the necessary raw materials and labor into discrete components: 
genetic, gestational, legal, and social—rendering the labor and meaning of 
gestation culturally and legally ambiguous and locationally separated. The sale 
of reproductive materials (eggs and sperm) and the renting of wombs is a 
booming global trade. It is now possible to buy human eggs in Turkey, buy 
sperm in the US, and hire a woman in India to carry the embryo to term to 
have one’s own child. This dispersed form of reproduction inevitably chal-
lenges, if not reframes, older, more settled, legal definitions of parenthood, 
especially motherhood. Babies can be created now with one person’s egg, with 
a fertilized embryo implanted in another woman’s womb, to fulfill the desire 
of parents unrelated to either. Aided in no small measure by the liberaliza-
tion and deregulation of medical technologies in places like India, ART has 
found a willing partner in neoliberalism, which encourages the commoditiz-
ing of everything. It should not be overlooked, however, that the surrogates 
who carry the fetus to term and for which labor they are given a (paltry) 
sum of money come overwhelmingly from the low-paid, informal, casual-
ized work sectors, where employment is hazardous, when available, and the 
pay is dismal. In the global South, in particular, womb renters sign contracts 
they cannot read or understand and have no say in any medical decisions that 
are made about their bodies and reproductive capacities.7 In the US alone, 
the number of infants born to gestational surrogates is rising. Nonetheless, 
 3. See Roy.
 4. See, for example, https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_95472.
 5. Sunday Morning Herald, August 8, 2014, https://www.smh.com.au/world/thai-
land-launches-human-trafficking-probe-after-nine-surrogacy-babies-found-in-apartment-
20140808-1026b0.html.
 6. See, for example, http://www.vagabomb.com/Baby-Farms-Discovered-in-Gwalior-
Where-Newborns-Can-Be-Bought-for-1-Lakh-Each/ or https://www.theguardian.com/
law/2011/jun/02/nigeria-baby-farm-raided-human-trafficking, among many others.
 7. See, among others, Roy; Rudrappa and Collins; Phillips, Our Bodies.
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as Deborah Spar and Ana Harrington note in their detailed study of assisted 
reproductive markets in the US, ART “remains largely the province of the 
rich, or at least the well-to-do” (50).
It is important also to remind ourselves that the availability of this par-
ticular employment choice is not only driven by biotechnological innovations; 
it is also the result of neoliberal policies that, as many have pointed out, are 
reversing the trajectory of economic development that had once been aimed 
at the greater common good. This reversal, in addition to wars and forced 
dislocations, has created immiseration and desperation on a grand scale. It is 
surely within these contexts that we ought to understand what Melinda Coo-
per calls “the rise of transactional reproductive work,” which, as she argues, 
“demands that we rethink some of the key assumptions of feminist bioethics, 
displacing the salient questions from the realm of care, dignity, respect, and 
the liberal ethical contract (of informed consent) to that of labor relations and 
unequal exchange” (138).
While debates about reproductive justice often focus on economic condi-
tions, and rightly so, much less attention has been paid to the consequences 
of war, civil war, and repression, related though these may be. The appropria-
tion of poor, vulnerable women’s bodies—especially their reproductive capac-
ities—to fulfill the individual, privatized desire to have one’s own children 
(Judith Daar’s phrase for it is “individual procreative aspiration” [105]) is what 
the confluence of war, instability, and neoliberal economic policies produces. 
The unending war in Afghanistan is one instance of the destabilization that 
leads to the horrors this novel catalogues. It is not difficult to see why cheap, 
outsourced ART would become an attractive option for those closed out of 
expensive surrogacy markets, such as in the US, or for those who, for a vari-
ety of reasons, are legally prohibited from going the womb-renting route. But 
Robotham’s novel, as I have been arguing, raises a different, if related, set of 
ethical and legal questions. By presenting an extreme instance—coerced sur-
rogacy—the novel asks us to reconsider the question of choice. Too often what 
is foregrounded is the desperation of the childless, to which the novel adds the 
desperation of abjected populations to ask us to consider whose desperation is 
the greater. The novel poses stark questions: Can one person’s desperation be 
sufficient reason to circumvent the law (as Cate did)? And should such cases of 
baby-making be punished under law? Whom would the law hold accountable?
BAD . . .
In order to track down Cate’s surrogate, Ali travels to Amsterdam, where she 
finds the pregnant Samira, a teenaged Afghan refugee, a devout Muslim, and 
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a virgin. Having lost all her family, except her brother Hasan, in an endless 
cycle of war and occupation, she was desperate to secure their safety, espe-
cially Hasan’s. Trafficked to Amsterdam and owing the traffickers a large sum 
of money, Samira could repay her debt in one of two ways: prostitution or 
surrogacy. Unwilling to violate the religious prohibition against prostitution, 
Samira submitted instead to “medical rape” (260) in the hope that it would 
safeguard her brother’s entry into the UK. Instead, Hasan, along with others, 
had been found dead by suffocation in a freight truck registered to a Dutch 
company, parked in the port of Harwich (134). Ali, in fact, might never have 
been able to unearth Cate’s “implausible” scheme if not for the discovery of 
the truck full of dead bodies, none carrying any identification—except for 
Hasan. The police find, carefully sewn into his shirt, Ali’s name and address. 
Once again, in a moment of metaphoric confusion, Ali, instead of Cate, is sus-
pected of human trafficking. Like Cate, she travels to Amsterdam, to retrace 
her friend’s footsteps and to uncover her crime. Once in Amsterdam, Ali (and 
the reader) begins to understand how volatile the intercalation of individ-
ual procreative aspirations with the desperation of the abjected is. As much 
as those killed by bombs and drones, Samira, her friend Zala, and countless 
other women are equally the War on Terror’s unremarked collateral damage. 
“Orphans. Illegal immigrants. What a perfect combination of the unwanted 
and the desperate,” remarks the inspector in Amsterdam (249). They are what 
Georgio Agamben calls homines sacri: unmourned, disposable populations, 
whose status as refugees—nonpersons—renders them valueless, a burden on 
the state. It is equally their status as nonpersons that creates a different mea-
sure of value for a different constituency. Throughout the novel, we see state-
less people fleeing terror become the reserve army of labor, from whom value 
is ruthlessly extracted by a thriving underworld of criminals.
Samira’s abjection, for example, is a direct result of the superpower rival-
ries in Afghanistan. The successive assaults on the region result in the utter 
decimation of any recognizable civic life. Samira was born during the Soviet 
occupation of the country. Her life and the fate of her family are inextrica-
bly tied to instabilities brought about by geopolitical conflicts and successive 
wars of occupation—the Soviets, the Taliban, the US forces. Each new con-
flict prompted another involuntary dislocation and robbed Afghanis of family 
and future. The upheaval has left Samira no choice but to submit to unspeak-
able exploitation: “People traffickers smuggle them out of Afghanistan as far 
as Amsterdam. They are told they owed a debt for their escape. Either they 
become prostitutes or carried a baby for a childless couple” (260). In a bid 
to survive, if barely, young women—girls—are transformed into baby-mak-
ing machines: “Virgins were implanted with embryos in a ritualized form of 
medical rape. They are the perfect incubators. Factories. Couriers” (260). The 
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choice for Samira, her friend Zala, and countless others is stark: sex slavery 
or medical rape. Other migrants, as the novel recounts in some detail, from 
Surinam and elsewhere, have also faced these alternatives and are all part of 
the real, if overlooked, collateral damage of combined but unevenly dispersed 
geopolitical power and peril.
The twists and turns of the plot eventually lead to some answers: Ali is 
able to pinpoint the principals in “this evil trade” (367)—the choice of words 
connecting this trade to that other, older evil trade, slavery. The contempo-
rary traders are Nigerian, German-Swiss, Moroccan, Irish, English—a global, 
multiracial cast of characters, as befits a globalized, albeit illegal, trade. Ali 
shudders at the horrific possibility that “there could be others. Babies born at 
a price, ushered into the world with threats and blackmail” (184). In fact, Ali 
successfully identifies fourteen infants born through coerced surrogacy, and 
it leads to the disquieting question: “Who owns the babies?” (187; my empha-
sis). Though “appalled by this evil trade” (367), and despite sufficient evidence, 
Adam Greenburg, QC, refuses to prosecute the criminals. “A case such as this,” 
he tells a shocked Ali, “raises moral and ethical issues. Fourteen infants, born 
as a result of illegal surrogacy, have been identified. These children are now 
living with their biological parents in stable loving families” (367). While he 
concedes that prosecution is legally permissible, he is also quick to warn that 
such a move will tear families apart: “Parents will be charged as co-conspira-
tors and their children will be taken into care, perhaps permanently. In pros-
ecuting one individual, we risk destroying the lives of many more” (367). The 
Dutch and German authorities face a similar dilemma, and the implication is 
that they, too, reach a similar conclusion. The overarching, one might say, irre-
sistible ideology of family—nuclear and especially bio-essentialized—trumps 
the prosecution of criminality and lawless profiteering. The children, after all, 
belong now to their families, and breaking up the nuclear family appears to 
authorities as an unthinkable option. The nuclear family, of course, is not a 
biological necessity; it is, Laura Mamo contends, “enforced by regulations and 
reinforced by legal discourse, medical practices, and cultural norms” (5). Yet, 
it is the nuclear family that has come to represent “social order, idealized kin-
ship, and legitimate relations” (5). The novel, despite its unflinching examina-
tion of a grammar of violence—the linked violence of war, human trafficking, 
debt (extracted by traffickers), and the unspeakable suffering of the abjected 
populations—recoils from taking the radical step of declaring the hunger for 
genetically related families also as one kind of founding violence. After all, it 
is worth remembering that it was Cate’s obsessive attempts “to give Felix his 
own child—a perfect genetic match” (186) that had unleashed the series of 
events leading to her murder.
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Even if, within the space of the novel, there can be no solution to the “evil 
trade,” to its credit The Night Ferry does provide an alternative vision of fam-
ily. The ending of the novel presents a capacious network, brought together 
by chance, choice, affection, and even genetics. The creation of this family is 
an act of social renovation that revises, even subverts, the hegemonic nuclear 
family, and this subversion, therefore, explicitly repudiates Cate’s obsession. 
We are left with a multiracial household that includes Ali and her partner, 
“new boy” Dave; her brother and Samira, who are in love; Ali’s mother, who 
can’t stay away from the household; and even Inspector Ruiz, the part-gypsy, 
surrogate father figure and mentor to Ali. At the center of it all are the twins—
who have many mothers: Samira, who is not genetically related to them but 
is their legal mother,8 having given birth to them; Cate, who, had she lived, 
would have been their genetic mother; and Ali, their surrogate mother, who is 
not only appointed their guardian in Cate’s will (“I direct her to love and care 
for them” [357]), but finds herself “besotted. Spellbound by the twins” (406).
Having rejected the obsession for genetically related children—in a final 
ironic twist, we discover that Felix was not the biological father—and posit-
ing a viable alternative for weaving a family together, the novel nonetheless at 
best, is conflicted and ambivalent about motherhood. By making Ali, who had 
steadfastly rejected the yearning to be a mother, confess, “I realize now that I 
wanted one too. I want to be a mother” (239), the novel reinforces the ideology 
of motherhood as something women desire naturally or instinctively. Thus, 
despite its repudiation of Cate’s version of family-making, the novel settles 
for the familiar and comforting arc of redemptive sentimentality, represent-
ing the expectation that family is the shield from worldly harm, the haven in 
a heartless world.
Set aside and sublimated by this sentimental conclusion are Ali’s—and by 
extension our own—shock and horror throughout the harrowing novel. We 
are meant somehow to overlook that Samira’s life, her body, is a living map 
of political and economic vulnerabilities. When Ali finally finds a very preg-
nant Samira hiding in a rundown, seedy apartment in Amsterdam, she asks, 
“I need to know why you are doing this. What did they offer you?” To which 
Samira simply responds, “Freedom.” “From what?” Ali persists. “She looks at 
me as though I’ll never understand. ‘Slavery’” (172). That searing answer must 
now, at the end of the novel, be set aside.
 8. Both in the Netherlands and in the UK, the woman who gives birth is considered the 
legal mother, even if she is genetically unrelated to the baby.
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And Dangerous
For Rayna Rapp, reproductive technologies are a part of the larger picture 
of “the age of highly selective and exquisitely stratified globalization” (695). 
While some yearn for biologically related offspring—however fabricated and 
illusory that relation may be, as we see vividly in the novel—and are willing 
to pursue such a possibility no matter the cost, others, abjected populations 
among them, are “increasingly mobilized as ‘natural resources’ whose own 
future reproduction or health does not enter into sales, surveillance, or any 
vestige of monitoring or access to care” (Rapp 709). The “radical reconcep-
tion of the biology of conception” (Kahn and Chavkin 39) has given rise to 
a globalized marketplace of baby-making that is unevenly regulated, when 
regulated at all. The global trade in commercial surrogacy or womb renting 
has increasingly taken on the features of industrialized production, and yet 
more and more it is presented as a choice that some women are free to make. 
Anne Phillips argues, for example, that the normalization of market logics 
should not be understood as instantiation of the exercise of choice. She argues, 
“Where kidney markets have been normalised, for example, there is evidence 
that debt collectors put pressure on borrowers to sell a kidney in order to 
repay a debt. The opportunity for some to sell then reduces the opportunity 
for others to refuse to do so” (“Inequality” 153). This inability to refuse is often 
obscured in the dominant narratives of bodily sales, including commercial 
surrogacy, which too often casts unequal and unfair market relation as a dou-
ble gain, a win-win, rather than, as is the case in many parts of the world, a 
desperate survival strategy.
One reason why commercial surrogacy is able to recast market relations 
into discourses of altruism and gift is that it comes suffused in the warm glow 
of selflessness, of helping someone achieve a happy ending.9 “I was doing a 
good thing,” says Samira to Ali, ignoring, of course, the horrific circumstances 
under which she had acquiesced and even the violence of the impregnat-
ing process to which she undoubtedly had been subjected; she was, after all, 
“forced to get pregnant” (209) and was only kept physically alive as long as she 
was the incubator. Samira’s sole value to the gang of human traffickers is her 
reproductive body. Indeed, the source of terror for the refugees hiding out in 
Amsterdam is the disposability of their lives. Yet, even Samira recasts her ter-
ror through the discourse of “doing a good thing.”
“Market-driven bodily sales” (Rapp 695) are a global, cutthroat business 
that exploits the language of emotions: hope, longing, desire, fulfillment. Pref-
aced often by such narratives of loss and sorrow of involuntary infertility as 
 9. See Rudrappa and Collins.
MOdHUMITA ROY • 239
Cate’s, this market ultimately relies on what Sara Ahmed calls “the promise 
of happiness.” In the introduction to her 2010 book The Promise of Happiness, 
Ahmed contends that “happiness is consistently described as the object of 
human desires, as being what we aim for, as being what gives purpose, mean-
ing and order to human life” (1). Expressing what she calls a “skeptical dis-
belief in happiness as a technique for living well” (2), Ahmed wants to focus 
instead on “how happiness is associated with some life choices and not oth-
ers, how happiness is imagined as being what follows a certain kind of being” 
(2). It should be noted, of course, that unhappiness, as well as happiness, is 
produced through social scripts that endorse some choices over others, and 
the production entails rituals and performances that are socially recognizable: 
marriage and parenthood chief among them. In fact, happiness and unhap-
piness are both “regulatory effect[s] of a social belief ” (7)—the widely held 
belief, which Cate shared, that childlessness is an unbearable burden, render-
ing life worthless. While childlessness evokes sympathy or pity, in the present 
moment with the availability of medical technologies to assist reproduction, 
not having children can equally be construed as selfishness or worse. Indeed, 
Sheila Jasanoff usefully reminds us, “Not using the available technologies—
by choosing to remain childless, for example—thus becomes the marked, or 
unnatural behavior” (161).
We attach or associate happiness with certain objects that circulate as 
social goods—children, for example. And this desire—for children, which we 
imagine will lead to happiness, and which is legitimated and encouraged by 
society in a variety of different ways—often rationalizes exploitation of oth-
ers. In trying to defend Cate’s actions, Ali had speculated that perhaps “she 
didn’t realize that Samira would be forced to co-operate” (221). In the end, 
however, having uncovered the nefarious plot, Ali concluded that Cate “broke 
the law. She rented a womb” (221) and that she “was an inept thief . . . a foolish 
dreamer. I don’t want to think about her anymore” (396). But Cate’s venture is 
neither unique nor abnormal. Societies are so invested in pronatalism, what 
Lee Edelman in a related if somewhat different context calls “the compulsory 
narrative of reproductive futurism” (12), that human decisions to have chil-
dren are recast as biological reproductive instincts, beyond our control. The 
inability to have children is constructed—and experienced—as a failure that 
gives rise to what Charis Thompson evocatively labels a “monopoly of des-
peration” (207). Robotham’s novel, however, refuses to award such monopoly 
to the childless alone. Instead, it carefully computes different claims to “des-
peration” that intersect—Samira’s for survival, Cate’s for motherhood, Shaw-
croft’s to prevent abortions—and suggests that in effect it is the entanglement 
of different kinds and degrees of desperation that leads to the harrowing trail 
of violence, abjection, and death.
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